<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Nov 7, 2025, 5:19 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<div>On 07/11/2025 06:17, Jason Resch wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Nov 5, 2025, 9:24 AM
Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Ok,
I've had a look at his paper, and made a few substitutions
to make <br>
it easier to understand. Let me know if you object to any of
these:<br>
<br>
'desire' = intention<br>
'belief' = anticipated result<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I'm fine with these.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
'correctable' = changeable<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Okay. But I'll note this word loses the
connotation of "an improvement."</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Well, the reason for making that substitution is to lose the
implication that the original thing /needs/ to be improved.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Sure. If the action is already morally optimal, then it can't be corrected.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
'real' = preferred<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I can go along with this, but keep in mind they
would be the actual/genuine preferences in light of accurate
information of concern.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
You mean /theoretical/ preferences, in light of accurate information
of concern. I don't see how this can work. It would mean people
often don't actually know what their preferences are.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">They often don't, as the parable of the Chinese farmer highlights:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">"Once upon a time there was a Chinese farmer whose horse ran away. That evening, all of his neighbors came around to commiserate. They said, “We are so sorry to hear your horse has run away. This is most unfortunate.” The farmer said, “Maybe.” The next day the horse came back bringing seven wild horses with it, and in the evening everybody came back and said, “Oh, isn’t that lucky. What a great turn of events. You now have eight horses!” The farmer again said, “Maybe.”</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The following day his son tried to break one of the horses, and while riding it, he was thrown and broke his leg. The neighbors then said, “Oh dear, that’s too bad,” and the farmer responded, “Maybe.” The next day the conscription officers came around to conscript people into the army, and they rejected his son because he had a broken leg. Again all the neighbors came around and said, “Isn’t that great!” Again, he said, “Maybe.”</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The whole process of nature is an integrated process of immense complexity, and it’s really impossible to tell whether anything that happens in it is good or bad — because you never know what will be the consequence of the misfortune; or, you never know what will be the consequences of good fortune."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">— Alan Watts</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This illustrates the dependence on knowledge for distinguishing good from bad. And knowing good from bad is required to what what outcomes we prefer. The farmer acknowledges his imperfect knowledge, which is why he always answers "Maybe."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> So how could
they act on them? (or anticipate an outcome from them?). Using the
word "actual" to mean "theoretical" rather confuses things, don't
you think?<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">As agents operating with constraints in the real world, we have to make our best guess. But we should do so with the understanding that with better knowledge, information, understanding, experience, etc. we can do better.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
'perfect grasp' = foreknowledge<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Just one thing to add: in the paper, a perfect
grasp embodies not only foreknowledge (e.g. perfect knowledge of
future states (think *depth*), but also perfect lateral
knowledge concerning the perspectives and impacts and effects on
other beings (e.g. think breadth).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So the perfect grasp represents a near omniscient
understanding of all the future consequences for all involved
and effected by a particular action, including those who don't
and won't exist.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
So we could use 'omniscience' instead of 'foreknowledge'. Ok.<br>
<br>
Er, consequences for those who don't and won't exist??<br>
<br>
That kind of cancels itself out, doesn't it? There can't, by
definition, be any such consequences.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I've explained multiple times that the paper acknowledges the impossibility of the perfect grasp, and that it explains why that's unimportant to obtain the result the paper presents.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If you still think this is impossible, then consider that Alan Turing defined a mathematical concept of computation using a device which is impossible to build in practice. It's the same kind of thing. This is presenting a definition. That it's physically impossible is irrelevant.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
The relevant passages now read, with my comments in
brackets:<br>
<br>
"Imagine that I have before me on a table a cup containing a
thick, <br>
brown, steaming liquid.<br>
<br>
I want to drink that stuff because I think it is hot
chocolate. But it <br>
is actually hot mud. Well, in that case I don’t really
intend to drink <br>
it. And neither is it in my self-interest to do so.<br>
<br>
This example brings out the way in which intentions depend
on <br>
anticipated results. I only ever intend to do a thing
because of what I <br>
anticipate the result to be."<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Not bad, I can follow along with that
substitution.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
(this is not true. It's not uncommon to have an intention to
do <br>
something in order to /find out/ what the result will be
rather than in <br>
anticipation of an expected result.</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I don't think this escapes the statement.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Your example asks: why would a scientist ever
desire (intend) to test a hypothesis when he doesn't know the
outcome?</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Not quite. I'm saying that, in contrast to Zuboff's statement,
intentions sometimes /don't/ depend on anticipated results, they are
intended to /discover/ the results instead (you don't have to be a
scientist to do this. Non-scientists do it all the time,
particularly young ones).<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I agree one doesn't have to be a scientist.</div><div dir="auto">However, I still disagree that your example provides a counter example.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">My answer to this is that for the scientist, he
believes (anticipates) that the outcome of the experiment will
provide new information for the scientist. Certainly, if the
scientist did not believe (anticipate) any possibility of
learning anything from the experiment, he would not bother
performing it.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
You're making 'the result' include 'finding out the result'.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> So now
we have two results, an actual result, and a meta-result. That could
apply to all intentions. </div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Exactly. I would say all intelligent actions are based on some predicted/anticipated results of the action.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>I expect something to happen when I do x,
and I also expect to find out if it actually happens. So you could
say "I only ever intend to do a thing because I anticipate finding
out if I'm right about what the result will be", and if you don't
have an expectation, it's just 'to find out the result'.<br>
<br>
A problem that this presents to Zuboff's thesis is that this is not
an anticipated result that can be changed. It applies to all
intentions (except the case when someone decides to do something
'just because'. </div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Indeed.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>They aren't thinking about any result, anticipated
or discovered. Or, I suppose, the case where something is purely a
habit).<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
It would be more accurate to say <br>
that intentions CAN be based on anticipated results, and
that you MAY do <br>
a thing because of the anticipated result. In Zuboff's
original <br>
language, you would say 'to have a desire to form a belief
about <br>
something'. The 'desire' precedes the 'belief', rather than
the other <br>
way around, in this case. When A can cause B or B can cause
A, you can't <br>
draw the conclusion that 'A depends on B')<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But to use your language, Zuboff is saying:
intentions depend on anticipated results.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I still think that is true, given my scientist
example.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">And I don't see how it makes sense to say the
reverse, that "anticipated results depend on intentions" --
perhaps only in the wishful thinking way, but not in any
rational way (that I can see), but perhaps you have an example.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Are you kidding? There are thousands of examples.<br>
<br>
I intend to go to my auntie Susan's and anticipate getting a meal of
roast chicken because that's what she usually cooks.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I think you are confusing actions and intentions. Recall that you substituted "desires" (what you want to happen) with "intentions" (what you intellectually intend to happen).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Generally speaking, anticipated results (what one thinks *will* happen) don't depend on what you want or intend to happen, they depend on the actions one takes, the current state of reality, and one's modeling of that reality.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It is wishful thinking that can lead one to believe that what one wants to have happen influences what will happen (absent any intervening actions).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> If I change my
intention and go to a restaurant instead, my anticipation could well
change to getting a steak. My intention could have changed due to
any number of things, even tossing a coin. Maybe I can't decide, and
say "Head's it's Susan's, Tails it's Restaurant". The expectation
changes accordingly, as a result of the changed intention. Random
reasons determine or affect people's intentions all the time, and
their expectations follow.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
"And since anticipated results are changeable, so are
intentions."<br>
<br>
(this implies that intentions are changeable /because/
anticipated <br>
results can change. It's possible to change your mind about
the <br>
anticipated results of an intended action, or to change your
intended <br>
action and anticipate the same result. It would be more
accurate to say <br>
that both anticipations and intentions are changeable, but a
change in <br>
one doesn't necessarily enforce a change in the other)<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">True, not every revelation will justify a change
in action or intention. When playing chess you may find a better
move, and change your action without changing your intention to
win. Or you may learn that if you don't throw the game, the
child will abandon chess altogether, and therefore you may
change your intention to win against the child.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
"From this observation I arrive at a sweeping principle: My
only <br>
preferred intentions are those I would have if I had a
foreknowledge of <br>
everything involved."<br>
<br>
(because of the above, this is a false conclusion)<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I'm, sorry, which are you referring to when you
say "the above"? Could you better break down for me how you see
this argument collapsing?</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
"And since anticipated results are changeable, so are intentions."<br>
<br>
(this implies that intentions are changeable /because/ anticipated <br>
results can change...)<br>
<br>
A false premise, therefore a false conclusion.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I don't see that it's false. Which part is false?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
(quite apart from "if I had a foreknowledge of <br>
everything involved.")<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
"If there is any intention I have only because my
foreknowledge of the <br>
outcome is imperfect, then that cannot be among my preferred
intentions."<br>
<br>
(this would rule out any intention to find something out
(because if you <br>
want to find something out, you necessarily don't already
know the <br>
answer).</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I think I addressed this with my scientist
example.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Yes, by introducing a 'meta-result': that you find out something.
But even this is not guaranteed,</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It doesn't have to be guaranteed. If we needed guarantees to act, we would never act.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> so the foreknowledge is not
perfect.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I agree.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> So the conclusion now becomes that NO intention can be
preferred, regardless of the outcome.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I can't make sense of this sentence.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> I
don't know about anyone else, but a lot of my 'preferred <br>
intentions' have the aim of finding things out that I don't
already <br>
know. If you already knew, there would be no need to have an
intention <br>
to find it out)<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">These represent intentions to learn.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
"And gratifying that intention cannot be in my preferred
self-interest. <br>
The principle going along with this that governs my actions
must tell me <br>
to act, as far as possible, as I would want myself to be
acting with a <br>
foreknowledge of everything involved."<br>
<br>
(it should be obvious now why this is nonsense, but
nevertheless, let's <br>
follow this line of thought through (italics are mine):)<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It's not obvious to me yet, but I will follow
along below.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
"This foreknowledge that defines my preferred intentions and
my best <br>
course of action," /is of course impossible. He goes on to
explain why/. <br>
"It would have to embrace not only the full experience, from
behind the <br>
eyes (or other sensors), of every sentient being but also
every <br>
potential development of experience. It would include within
it, all the <br>
motivations of all of the various systems of intention"
/which would <br>
simply conflict with each other. The overall result would be
chaos and <br>
paralysis (in case this is not obvious, consider combining
the <br>
motivations of a religious fundamentalist with those of a <br>
scientifically-literate materialist. These are conflicting
value <br>
systems. Objective facts can't reconcile them.</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It is knowledge of the subjective feeling of what
it is like to be all those concerned, what Zuboff describes as
"the full experience, from behind the eyes, of every sentient
being" that provides such a resolution.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Such a thing doesn't, and can't, even in principle, exist.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That's well acknowledged by me, the paper, and Zuboff.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Think of it like this: in your own life there is a
version of you that goes to work does, chores, prepares meals,
which doesn't enjoy those tasks. But also in your life there is
a version of you that goes on vacation and enjoys recreation and
leisure, and enjoying the meals your other self prepared.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Why are these different versions? They are both me. There's only one
version of me. That may change in the future, but that's a different
matter.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">All I mean here is that there are different states of you in different points in time.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">You have knowledge of both of those states of
existence, and that puts you in a position to answer whether or
not your life is a life worth living.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Worth living according to who? Me? I should think that I'd think my
life worth living regardless, if that was something I'd be inclined
to ponder.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">According to you.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"> And also it enables you to answer questions about
what changes, and trade offs are worth it. E.g. should the
toiling-self take on extra hours so that the leisure-self can
enjoy a nicer vacation.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
My understanding of my own life, from my own viewpoint enables me
to, etc. Well, I'd hardly call that a revelation. It's true of
everyone, and hardly worth mentioning.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Right, I am using this to establish a point below:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">From the vantage point of the perfect grasp, </div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
This is my main problem with this whole thing. /There is no such
thing as a 'perfect grasp' (omniscience)/. </div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Correct.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>There can't be such a
thing, or everything we know about the world is wrong, and I'm
pretty certain that that's not true. We would soon realise.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">one could make such trade off decisions between
different individuals, because in the same way you understand
what it's like to work and be on vacation, the vantage point of
the perfect grasp understands what it's like to be the
scientific materialist *and* the religious fundamentalist, and
so any actions that would affect their lives, negatively or
positively, this perfect grasp could decide an appropriate trade
offs just as you make such trade off decisions within your own
life.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
One could wave a magic wand and utter "resolvio!" and all problems
would be solved and everybody would be friends and we'd live happily
ever after. Great. If such a thing was possible. It's not. Sometimes
there is no trade-off.<br>
<br>
I really don't get why anyone can take this seriously. "The perfect
grasp understands..." is meaningless, because there is no such thing
as a perfect grasp.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I'll demonstrate the utility of this definition below.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Making such trade off decisions is what is meant
by the reconciliation of all systems of desire. Think of it like
all conscious perspectives are all part of a single life, and
how one super intelligent being would optimize that life (which
embodies and includes all those many perspectives). That
optimization, is what Zuboff contends is the aim of morality.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
No, not 'superintelligent'. That's something we think is possible.
You mean 'Omniscient'. And everyone except religious zealots knows
that there's no such thing. There can't be such a thing. Physics
forbids it. Common sense forbids it. Logic forbids it. </div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">We agree .</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>Zuboffs
theory of morality requires it.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">He doesn't. Zuboff acknowledges the perfect grasp, as defined is logically impossible. From his paper:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">"Such a perfect grasp would thus have to comprehend at once, and perfectly, states of
</div><div dir="auto">consciousness that essentially exclude one another. Perhaps this means that our hypothetical perfect grasp of reality is logically impossible. But, possible or not, omniscience is the inevitable ideal of our knowledge and the perfect grasp of reality is the inevitable</div><div dir="auto">hypothetical basis of an appropriate responsiveness to reality, which is the whole point of action. The perfect grasp need not be logically consistent to have this significance."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So in the same sense that omniscience *as a concept* is significant as "the ideal of knowledge", or that the Turing machine *as a concept* is significant as "the ideal of computation", the reconciliation of all systems of desire *as a concept* is significant as "the ideal of morality."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Or even just consider the concept of infinity, and how useful and important it is in mathematics, despite it never being realizable or attainable by us mere finite beings in a finite observable universe.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Do you not agree that such unattainable/unrealizable ideals have utility as concepts?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> So Zuboffs theory of morality is,
literally, forbidden by reality. </div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">We have access to the theory, it's in his paper.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>He is claiming that something
utterly impossible is the 'aim of morality'.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">He defines an ideal, and aim of morality. And despite that ideal being unrealizable, it stool has utility, just as computer scientists find utility in the definition of Turing machines, or how mathematicians find utility in the definition of infinity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
"Think of it like all conscious perspectives are all part of a
single life" The only 'optimisation' that would be possible for such
a life would be to cut it short as soon as possible. </div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">A rather nihilistic view.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>As I said
before, it would be chaos and paralysis. It would be the ultimate
psychosis. Fortunately, it's not possible.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
'Perfect foreknowledge' <br>
can't do a thing when subjective values are involved. Let's
say that you <br>
have the opportunity to punish/forgive someone who has
stolen something <br>
from you. The values of one person (that you have, according
to this <br>
theory, magical access to) dictate that the thief should be
punished <br>
regardless of the circumstances of the crime, because
'STEALING IS <br>
WRONG'. You also have access to the values that tell you
that stealing <br>
is often wrong, but can be forgiven under certain
circumstances. How can <br>
there be any reconciliation of these two views? What facts
can help?)/.<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I think my explanation above is sufficient but if
not let me know.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
So even if there was any possibility of this, it still
couldn't lead to <br>
any rational definition of morality. The requirement to know
all <br>
possible points of view, and all outcomes of all actions are
impossible <br>
enough, but add on top the requirement to /reconcile/ all
points of <br>
view? And only then can you figure out what's good and
what's bad?<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Moral decisions are hard for exactly this reason.
They involve weighing consequences to subjective states to which
most parties have no access to. I think we should be upfront
with acknowledging that difficulty as it suggests paths for
resolving age old moral questions.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Consider for example whether a law should be
passed to increase the square footage allotted to egg laying
hens. To answer the question requires understanding the stress
and emotional states of the chickens with varying levels of
room, and that has to be balanced again the correspondingly
higher price of eggs, the unaffordability, possible hunger or
nutritional drficicinies or worse health for those who can't
afford eggs at those prices, etc.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">None of these are easy problems to solve, but with
this definition, it makes it clearer how to organize a strategy
to answer the question, and balance the concerns of all involved
(to "reconcile all the systems of desire").</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Really? So how? How do you organise a strategy to answer that
question? How does that work?<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">With a great deal of research in copmparative psychology, comparative biology, and economic impact studies, etc. As I said, these are not easy problems.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
I'd say this is quite easy to solve, with no omniscience required.
Such a law would be immoral because it would tend to compel farmers
to increase the price of eggs, and in practice would make more
farmers criminals because some of them would realise that the legal
penalties would be insignificant to the economic ones, and if they
are going to break the law, they may as well make the maximum profit
from it, so some of them would be even less likely to take good care
of their hens than at present. Realising that, the authorities would
have to put more resources into policing this law, taking them away
from more useful things like solving murders and catching thieves.
Sounds like a lose-lose situation.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">By this logic, no animal welfare/anti cruelty laws are justified.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div> If the basis of your morality is
"The greatest good for the greatest number of people", for example,
this law fails in a big way. I suspect that the only way it could be
regarded as morally good is if your morality gives higher priority
to the welfare of chickens than people. But I have to make a
disclaimer: I know next to nothing about chicken farming, and may
have it all woefully wrong.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Current factory farming conditions are quite abhorrent, which we might expect when the welfare of the animals isn't a factor in the economics of making eggs as cheaply as possible.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But how many of us would choose to keep our pets in the cheapest kennel possible, to send our kids to the cheapest school possible, or to live in the cheapest house possible?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
So who knows? Maybe an omniscient being would see that a healthy
chicken's eggs would make a crucial difference in the brain
development of a person who eventually invents or discovers
something fantastic that benefits all mankind forever after, and
deem this law morally good.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If you think an omniscient mind is better positioned than any lesser mind to make morally correct decisions, then you already tacitly accept the utility of using a "perfect grasp" to define morally optimal actions.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Jason</div></div>