<div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;background-color:transparent">On Thu, Aug 20, 2026 at 10:12 AM <<a href="mailto:spike@rainier66.com">spike@rainier66.com</a>> wrote:</span></div></div><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><font face="Calibri, sans-serif"><u><br></u></font><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div class="msg-4987058265071834525"><div lang="EN-US" style="overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div class="m_-4987058265071834525WordSection1"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><font size="4" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b>><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span>…The company’s fortunes cratered as demand for Covid-19 vaccines plummeted. …</b></font></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><font size="4" style="" face="georgia, serif"><i style=""><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">> </span>Wait what? Why did the demand for c-19 vaccines plummet? </i></font></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style=""><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"></font><font size="4" style="" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b style=""><u>ME</u>: <span style="background-color:transparent">From a strictly economic point of view, how would investing in vaccine research by a biotechnology company compare to investing in drug research?</span></b></font></div><div class="gmail_default" style=""><font size="4" style="" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b style=""><span style="background-color:transparent"><br></span></b></font></div><div class="gmail_default" style=""><font size="4" style="" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b style=""><span style="background-color:transparent"><u>GROK</u>: " </span></b></font><strong style="background-color:transparent"><font size="4">From a strictly economic perspective, <u>investing in vaccines is generally less attractive for a biotechnology company than investing in therapeutic drugs</u> (especially chronic or specialty drugs like those in oncology, rare diseases, or other high-value areas), primarily due to lower expected revenues, pricing constraints, <u>limited repeat purchases</u>, and weaker private returns relative to social value—despite often higher clinical success rates and comparable (or sometimes lower) development costs.</font></strong></div>
<h3 dir="auto"><font size="4">Key Economic Differences</font></h3>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><strong><font size="4">1. Revenue potential and market structure</font></strong></p>
<ul dir="auto">
<li><font size="4"><u>Vaccines are typically preventative</u>, durable goods administered once or a few times (or seasonally). This limits lifetime revenue per patient. Drugs, especially for chronic conditions, generate recurring sales over years.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Historical data illustrate the gap: in the early 2000s, global therapeutic drug sales exceeded $300 billion while vaccine sales were ~$5 billion. Vaccines have long represented only a small share (~3%) of the overall medicines market (pre-COVID). Even post-COVID, non-COVID vaccine markets remain concentrated among a few large players with limited blockbuster opportunities compared to oncology or specialty drugs.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Economic models show that for many diseases (especially those with heterogeneous risk, like HIV), a monopolist can extract more surplus from a drug (sold after infection is realized) than from a vaccine (sold before, when private risk information differs). Calibrations suggest drug revenues can be 2–4× higher than vaccine revenues for the same disease. For rare diseases or multi-cohort populations under routine immunization, vaccine revenues from one annual cohort can fall well short of treatment revenues.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">COVID-19 was an exception that produced a temporary revenue windfall (tens of billions), but <u>it was pandemic-driven and not representative of steady-state economics</u>.</font></li>
</ul>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><strong><font size="4">2. Pricing power and buyer dynamics</font></strong></p>
<ul dir="auto">
<li><font size="4">Vaccines face strong downward pressure from governments, public health agencies, UNICEF, and bulk procurement. They are often viewed as public goods, leading to lower prices that do not fully capture externalities (herd immunity, reduced transmission, avoided downstream costs).</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Drugs (especially patented specialty or orphan drugs) command much higher prices, supported by willingness-to-pay from insurers, patients, and value-based pricing in chronic/high-severity indications. Modeled comparisons show economically justifiable vaccine prices can be only a fraction (e.g., ~6%) of equivalent treatment prices in some scenarios.</font></li>
</ul>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><strong><font size="4">3. Development costs, timelines, and success rates</font></strong></p>
<ul dir="auto">
<li><font size="4">Capitalized development costs are broadly comparable: recent estimates put novel vaccine development at roughly $0.9 billion on average (to U.S. market, ~10 years), while new drugs often fall in the $1–3 billion range (risk-adjusted, including failures). Vaccines may require larger trials in healthy populations and stricter safety standards, but overall costs are not dramatically higher.</font></li>
<li><font size="4"><strong>Success rates favor vaccines.</strong> Industry-sponsored vaccine programs have historically shown substantially higher probabilities of approval (e.g., ~33–40% from clinical stages in multi-decade analyses) versus general drugs (~6–10% overall, lower in areas like oncology). This reduces the cost of failures relative to many therapeutic pipelines.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Manufacturing for vaccines (especially biologics) can involve higher fixed costs, specialized facilities, and process controls, which raises the break-even volume.</font></li>
</ul>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><strong><font size="4">4. Profitability, margins, and investment flows</font></strong></p>
<ul dir="auto">
<li><font size="4">Contribution margins can be similar, but absolute profits and ROIC tend to be lower for vaccines due to volume/price constraints and less recurring revenue. Big Pharma and biotech have historically allocated far more R&D and venture capital to therapeutics (e.g., cancer drugs received ~12× the VC of infectious-disease vaccines over a recent decade). Only a minority of top firms maintain significant vaccine programs.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Vaccines generate large positive externalities that private companies cannot fully monetize, creating a classic underinvestment problem relative to social value. Drugs more readily allow private appropriation of value.</font></li>
</ul>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><strong><font size="4">5. Risk and portfolio considerations</font></strong></p>
<ul dir="auto">
<li><font size="4">Vaccines can offer more predictable technical success but higher commercial/policy risk (procurement decisions, pricing negotiations, pandemic vs. endemic demand volatility).</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Therapeutics (especially high-price specialty drugs) offer larger upside in successful cases and better alignment with private investor incentives, even if technical attrition is higher. Portfolio approaches or public-private partnerships are often needed to make vaccine R&D viable at scale.</font></li>
</ul>
<h3 dir="auto"><font size="4">Bottom Line for a Biotech Investor</font></h3>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><font size="4">Purely on expected private economic returns (NPV, IRR, risk-adjusted), <strong><u>drugs—particularly chronic, specialty, oncology, or rare-disease therapeutics—typically dominate vaccines</u></strong>. Vaccines can be viable or even highly profitable in specific cases (high-prevalence diseases with catch-up campaigns, strong government commitments, platform technologies like mRNA that enable follow-on products, or pandemic scenarios), but the baseline incentive structure favors treatments that patients take repeatedly at higher prices. This is why vaccine R&D has historically lagged despite favorable science and success rates, and why policy tools (advance market commitments, higher valuation of externalities, catch-up campaigns, or larger public rewards) are often proposed to close the gap.<span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">"</span></font></p><p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><span class="gmail_default" style=""><font face="tahoma, sans-serif" style="" size="6"><b>******</b></font></span><font size="4"><br></font></p><p style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><font size="4"><span class="gmail_default" style=""><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><u></u></font><b style=""><font face="tahoma, sans-serif"><u>ME</u>: S</font></b></span></font><span style="background-color:transparent"><font size="4" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b>o would it be correct to say that investing in vaccine research might be a "common good" that government could do better at providing<span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"> </span>than the free market?</b></font></span></p><p style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><span style="background-color:transparent"><font size="4" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b><br></b></font></span></p><p style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><span style="background-color:transparent"><font size="4" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b><span class="gmail_default" style=""><u>GROK</u>: " </span></b></font></span><strong style="background-color:transparent"><font size="4"><u>Yes,</u> that is a standard and largely correct economic framing.</font></strong></p>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><font size="4">Vaccines (especially those against infectious diseases with significant transmission externalities) have<u> classic features of a <strong>public good</strong> or a good with large <strong>positive externalities</strong></u>:</font></p>
<ul dir="auto">
<li><font size="4">Private companies capture only a fraction of the total social value. Herd immunity, reduced transmission, avoided hospitalizations, productivity gains, and lower mortality benefit people who never buy or take the vaccine. Private returns therefore systematically understate social returns.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Demand is lumpy and often low in non-crisis periods (routine immunization of healthy people, or preparation for rare/emerging pathogens). This weakens the commercial case relative to chronic or high-price therapeutic drugs that generate recurring revenue from sick patients.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Development involves high fixed costs, long timelines, scientific risk, and (for many vaccines) large trials in healthy populations, while pricing power is constrained by governments and public purchasers.</font></li>
</ul>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><font size="4"><u>As a result, pure free-market incentives tend to produce <strong>underinvestment</strong> relative to the socially optimal level of R&D—exactly the pattern observed historically (far more private capital flowing into oncology, rare diseases, and chronic therapeutics than into preventive vaccines for infectious diseases)</u>. This is why economists and public-health analysts have long argued that government (or government-backed mechanisms) has a comparative advantage in funding, de-risking, or guaranteeing markets for vaccine research that the private sector alone will undersupply.</font></p>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><font size="4">Common policy responses that flow from this analysis include:</font></p>
<ul dir="auto">
<li><font size="4">Direct public funding of basic and translational research (NIH, BARDA, etc.).</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Advance market commitments, prizes, or procurement guarantees that create demand certainty.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Public–private partnerships that share risk and reward.</font></li>
<li><font size="4">Stockpiling or “push” incentives for platform technologies useful against emerging threats.</font></li>
</ul>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><font size="4">None of this implies that private firms should not develop or manufacture vaccines, or that government always executes the role well. Private firms remain essential for later-stage development, manufacturing scale-up, and innovation. Government involvement can also introduce its own inefficiencies, political priorities, or abrupt policy shifts (as seen in the 2025 BARDA mRNA contract terminations). The economic claim is narrower and more robust: because of externalities and the resulting private underinvestment, a pure free-market equilibrium will typically produce too little vaccine research from society’s point of view, so some form of collective (often governmental) investment or market-shaping is justified on efficiency grounds.</font></p>
<div class="msg-4987058265071834525"><div lang="EN-US" style="overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div class="m_-4987058265071834525WordSection1"><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="background-color:transparent"><font size="4">In short, treating substantial parts of vaccine R&D—particularly for infectious-disease prevention and pandemic preparedness—as a common-good activity that government can productively supplement or lead is consistent with mainstream economic analysis of externalities and public goods.<span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">"</span></font></span><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><font size="4"> <span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"></span></font></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><font size="4"><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></span></font></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b style="font-family:tahoma,sans-serif;font-size:xx-large">******</b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b style="font-family:tahoma,sans-serif;font-size:xx-large"><br></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><font size="4" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b><span class="gmail_default" style=""><u>ME</u>: </span><span style="background-color:transparent">Did President Trump recently cancel some research contracts on mRNA vaccines?</span></b></font><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><font size="4"><br></font></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><font size="4" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b><span style="background-color:transparent"><br></span></b></font></p><p class="MsoNormal"><font size="4" face="tahoma, sans-serif"><b><span style="background-color:transparent"><span class="gmail_default" style=""><u>GROK</u>: "</span></span></b></font><font size="4"><strong style="background-color:transparent"><u>Yes</u>.</strong><span style="background-color:transparent"> In August 2025, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), under Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. during <u>the Trump administration, announced a coordinated wind-down of mRNA vaccine development</u> activities funded through the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). This included the cancellation or de-scoping of various contracts and solicitations.</span></font></p>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><font size="4">Key details from the official HHS announcement and contemporaneous reporting:</font></p>
<ul dir="auto">
<li><font size="4"><strong>Scope</strong>: I<u>t affected 22 mRNA vaccine development projects/investments totaling nearly $500 million</u>. This included terminating contracts with entities such as Emory University and Tiba Biotech; de-scoping work in contracts with Luminary Labs, ModeX, and Seqirus; rejecting or canceling multiple pre-award solicitations (including proposals involving Pfizer, Sanofi Pasteur, CSL Seqirus, Gritstone, and others); and restructuring certain Department of Defense collaborations involving nucleic acid-based projects with partners such as Moderna/UTMB, AstraZeneca, and others.</font></li>
<li><font size="4"><strong>Rationale given by HHS/RFK Jr.</strong>: After a review of investments from the COVID-19 era, officials stated that the data showed these vaccines “fail to protect effectively against upper respiratory infections like COVID and flu,” and funding would shift toward what they described as safer, broader platforms (e.g., whole-virus vaccines) that remain effective as viruses mutate. Some final-stage contracts were allowed to continue to preserve prior investments, and no new mRNA-based projects would be started under BARDA. Other non-vaccine uses of mRNA technology within HHS were not affected.</font></li>
<li><font size="4"><strong>Context</strong>: This followed an earlier (May 2025) cancellation of a large (~$590 million) BARDA contract with Moderna for an H5N1 (bird flu) mRNA vaccine candidate. The moves occurred amid broader policy shifts on vaccines under the administration.</font></li>
</ul>
<p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><font size="4">Note that while HHS/BARDA funding for these mRNA vaccine projects was terminated, some related research (e.g., certain Department of Defense efforts) continued in limited form, and the decision drew significant criticism from many infectious-disease experts who view mRNA platforms as important for rapid pandemic response. The official HHS press release remains the primary source for the precise scope of the cancellations.<span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">"</span></font></p><p dir="auto" style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"><b style="font-size:large;background-color:transparent"><font face="tahoma, sans-serif"><span class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"> </span>John K Clark</font></b></p></div></div></div></div></div>