<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Sep 26, 2026, 12:28 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On 26/09/2026 15:22, Jason Resch wrote:<br>
> On Fri, Sep 25, 2026, 4:38 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <<a href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> Jason Resch wrote:<br>
> > from the level of perspective of a program running on a computer, there is an abstract level below that program to which changes of implementation are invisible. A program may be able to read variables in its scope, but it can't tell how those values are physically implemented, it can't read outside it's address space, it can't tell if it's running on an emulator or not. It is trapped within a particular causal structure beyond which certain information has no way to get to or otherwise influence it. This is an epistemic firewall, and it nearly allows us to define what facts can or can't be relevant to the process at the level of the process.<br>
> ><br>
> > By considering the conscious state as a computational process, we can make a similar determination of what facts are able to enter and influence that conscious state, and this sets a minimum level of detail that a brain scan must capture and that a brain emulation must emulate to preserve the same character of consciousness.<br>
><br>
><br>
> I don't see how the second paragraph follows from the first.<br>
><br>
> You're saying that a process can't access what underlies it, so for example we can't perceive the workings of our neurons, an addition operation has no information about whether it's being performed on an abacus or a computer, etc.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Yes, every process has an underlying interface ( <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interface_(computing)" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interface_(computing)</a> ), so from the point of view of that process, there are only certain things that can make a difference to it.<br>
<br>
<br>
You're talking about /interfaces/ now. That's confusing, I thought you were talking about processes happening on different levels.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I am. Interfaces provide a clear example of boundaries that can separate and isolate levels. Every computable process has such an interface boundary (minimally at the Turing machine that computes it, but often times it exists higher).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
To clarify, take the example of signals travelling through a network of some kind. This might be underlain by a different type of process like transistors switching on and off, or ion channels selectively allowing specific ions through membranes. The network has no 'knowledge' of the transistors/ion channels. In that example, what is the relevant interface?<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You have to identify the process before you can answer that question. There may be several independent processes in your example, depending on which signals can ever reach or interact with others. Interest casualty as paramount in defining process boundaries. There are also different levels in the sense that some processes on your example may depend only on high level logical operations on bits, while at other levels of description there are electromagnetic fields and numbers of electrons.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">When you identify the process you are talking about, then you can begin to define the causal boundaries around it that can alter and affect that process at the level you've defined it, for the possible states relevant and accessible to that process that are capable of altering it's future behavior.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">All this is described in the first few pages of my paper.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
<br>
><br>
><br>
> Then you say that this sets a minimum level of detail that must be captured in a brain scan. How? I don't see how one has any bearing on the other.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Here is an example in computing that I think illustrates it cleanly. Let's say you found a computer that does your taxes. You inspect this computer at various layers from its circuits and transistors to its programming code up to the high level UI it presents on screen.<br>
><br>
> During your investigation you find the tax program is written in Java and runs on a Java virtual machine, which provides a well defined interface. It allows you to run this same program on very different hardware, by replacing the JVM with another suited for that different processor.<br>
><br>
> The program can't tell that the hardware beneath that JVM interface has changed because there's no difference it can access that makes a a difference for it.<br>
><br>
> In the theory of consciousness I defend in the paper, this inability to make a difference or possible distinction at the layer of a conscious mind process is operating at implies there can be no difference in awareness for that process, its internal behaviors at that level will be unchanged and so I argue it's consciousness must be unchanged as well.<br>
><br>
> Now determining where this level is for the brain is not trivial,<br>
<br>
<br>
Well, that's making the assumption that there is only one such level. That is not true. There are many, many levels.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">There are many levels in the brain. I've said that. The question is how do we determine the level that is relevant to maintaining a conscious state.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
But never mind, you just seem to be arguing for substrate indifference for minds. In other words, presenting a defence against 'carbon chauvinism". Is this really necessary?</blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">No, that is an assumption. The paper starts from computational functionalism. But while computational functionalism gives us substrate indifference, it doesn't tell us what the substitution level is. That is one of the main contributions of this paper. Please read at least the abstract to get a picture for what this paper provides beyond standard functionalism.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> You seem to be expending a lot of words and time on something that's pretty obvious to anyone with any common sense.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Have you taken a look at the paper?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
> but I give a procedure in the paper for how it could begin. My hunch is it would be somewhere above where the reliable computational units/components of the brain start to begin.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Knowing that a mind can't directly access the workings of the neurons that give rise to it doesn't give us any information about how exact an emulation of the neurons must be in order to recreate the mind.<br>
><br>
><br>
> But that is part of it. We identify ALL the things a mind is unable to access from its formal description as a process.<br>
<br>
<br>
I doubt that that is possible. We can identify a lot of things, but surely not ALL of them.<br>
<br>
<br>
> All those things sit outside anything that makes a difference to what that process knows, and hence are details that can't affect the mind state. <br>
<br>
<br>
There are things that the mind knows nothing about that DO affect its state (actually most things that change a mind state are going to be things that the mind knows nothing about, I expect). </blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">A substance that changes one's state of awareness in a way noticable to the mind affects what that kind knows (in the sense of that mind knowing a difference in its consciousness). It doesn't mean the mind will know what it is that causes that effect, however, as you rightly indicate.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Think about psychoactive drugs for instance. A mind has no knowledge about the molecular interactions that change when a drug is introduced to the system, but a definite change in state occurs.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You provide an excellent example for why simulating only the spiking neural network may not be enough, as the introduction of simple molecules can perturb the behavior of those neurons. This is a great example and I may include it in an updated version of the paper. Thank you.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
> Then we also will know all the things that can and do make a difference to the high level mind state. That is the level of detail that brain scans must include and that emulations must emulate.<br>
><br>
><br>
> We are just as blind to the structure of neural circuitry as we are to the activation of individual synapses, <br>
><br>
><br>
> These are empirical problems to be solved to be sure. But note we presently also lack a theoretical basis for deciding which details matter for consciousness. Even if we had a complete understanding of neurons and synapses, we still need a theory of consciousness to guide us in determining whether we have to simulate neurons down to the molecular scale or not, or just their coarse spiking behavior, or perhaps we can even take shortcuts and get away with just simulating the high level input and output behavior of cortical columns.<br>
<br>
<br>
If we had a complete understanding of neurons and synapses, I don't see that anything else would be necessary. We'd have a set of information that describes a system in great detail, we'd have (presumably) a way of emulating that system to an arbitrary level of detail, so we just start with a coarse level of detail in the emulation, and keep increasing it until the system behaves as expected (i.e. produces the correct outputs for a set of specified inputs). </blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes but correct behavior is always indexed to some level of fidelity. Where and how do you draw the line at defining the level you are checking again for correctness?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The range of possible behavioral outputs will always be strictly less than the range of internal states the mind can be in. So what you must index on is the fidelity of internal states rather than just the outputs.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Much like was done with the fruit fly connectome recently. If it didn't behave like a fruit fly, we would have known that it didn't work.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">A lot of shortcuts were made with that emulation. I would have a lot of doubts whether its conscious state of this emulation was a good approximation of the original fruit fly's awareness.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I don't know what a 'theory of consciousness' would even look like. It sounds like the sort of thing that leads down a rabbit hole. Surely a theory of how minds are produced would be more relevant. Leave 'consciousness' out of it, I say. Nobody really knows what the word means anyway. I suspect it's something that can't really be defined.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">To me, my having a mind implies being conscious. So when you say make a theory of minds but don't bother with a theory of consciousness, that system doesn't parse meaningfully to me.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">A complete theory of consciousness would tell us which sorts of systems qualify as minds.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
The thing to concentrate on is behaviour, not some elusive (probably forever) theory of consciousness. If we can get a brain emulation to behave the same as the original brain, we've succeeded. It's that simple.<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Internal behavioral fidelity is the anchor I use in the process my paper describes for identifying the level of fidelity required to reproduce a mind. But I think this involves more than just checking motor neuron output. I think it would involve tracking distinctions available to areas in the brain including the visual cortex, language centers, and many typically unconscious processes as well.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Essentially all physical processes consist of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of causal events and information flows through time. Determining the boundaries of differences available to a process involves identifying a subgraph of these events, by tracing causes backwards until a boundary is reached. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
><br>
><br>
> so we still don't know whether it's necessary to emulate each synapse, or just the overall circuitry.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Exactly, and this is why a theory of consciousness that offers these answers will be necessary before we make any promises of ressurecting someone via mind uploading.<br>
><br>
> We might accidentally ressurect someone whose consciousness is not quite the same as it was before.<br>
<br>
<br>
Accidentally?<br>
<br>
Taking 'consciousness' to mean 'mind', I can't see that anyone who'd been uploaded would have, or want to have, exactly the same mind-state as before uploading. Just the knowledge that you've been uploaded would make a big difference, and there wouldn't be much point to uploading someone without their knowledge. I expect they'd soon find out, though, and then they'd be different. Personally, If I woke up one day to find I had been uploaded, it would make a /huge/ difference to me!<br></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Here I'm talking about preserving the same qualities of experience (qualia), to the same level of fidelity and richness they had before, rather than any particular set of memories.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Jason</div></div>