[Paleopsych] CHE: Waking Up From the American Dream
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Waking Up From the American Dream
The Chronicle of Higher Education, 4.7.23
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v50/i46/46b00901.htm
By SASHA ABRAMSKY
Last year I visited London and stumbled upon an essay in a Sunday
paper written by Margaret Drabble, one of Britain's pre-eminent ladies
of letters. "My anti-Americanism has become almost uncontrollable,"
she wrote. "It has possessed me, like a disease. It rises up in my
throat like acid reflux, that fashionable American sickness. I now
loathe the United States and what it has done to Iraq and the rest of
the helpless world."
The essay continued in the same rather bilious vein for about a
thousand words, and as I read it, two things struck me: The first was
how appalled I was by Drabble's crassly oversimplistic analysis of
what America was all about, of who its people were, and of what its
culture valued; the second was a sense somewhat akin to fear as I
thought through the implications of the venom attached to the words of
this gentle scribe of the English bourgeoisie. After all, if someone
whose country and class have so clearly benefited economically from
the protections provided by American military and political ties
reacts so passionately to the omnipresence of the United States, what
must an angry, impoverished young man in a failing third world state
feel?
I grew up in London in the 1970s and 1980s, in a country that was
struggling to craft a postcolonial identity for itself, a country that
was, in many ways, still reeling from the collapse of power it
suffered in the post-World War II years. Not surprisingly, there was a
strong anti-American flavor to much of the politics, the humor, the
cultural chitchat of the period; after all, America had dramatically
usurped Britannia on the world stage, and who among us doesn't harbor
some resentments at being shunted onto the sidelines by a new
superstar?
Today, however, when I talk with friends and relatives in London, when
I visit Europe, the anti-Americanism is more than just sardonic
asides, rueful Monty Python-style jibes, and haughty intimations of
superiority. Today something much more visceral is in the air. I go to
my old home and I get the distinct impression that, as Drabble put it,
people really loathe America somewhere deep, deep in their gut.
A Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project survey recently found
that even in Britain, America's staunchest ally, more than 6 out of 10
people polled believed the United States paid little or no attention
to that country's interests. About 80 percent of French and German
respondents stated that, because of the war in Iraq, they had less
confidence in the trustworthiness of America. In the Muslim countries
surveyed, large majorities believed the war on terror to be about
establishing U.S. world domination.
Indeed, in many countries -- in the Arab world and in regions, such as
Western Europe, closely tied into American economic and military
structures -- popular opinion about both America the country and
Americans as individuals has taken a serious hit. Just weeks ago, 27
of America's top retired diplomats and military commanders warned in a
public statement, "Never in the 21/4 centuries of our history has the
United States been so isolated among the nations, so broadly feared
and distrusted."
If true, that suggests that, while to all appearances America's allies
continue to craft policies in line with the wishes of Washington,
underneath the surface a new dynamic may well be emerging, one not too
dissimilar to the Soviet Union's relations with its reluctant
satellite states in Eastern Europe during the cold war. America's
friends may be quiescent in public, deeply reluctant to toe the line
in private. Drabble mentioned the Iraq war as her primary casus belli
with the United States. The statement from the bipartisan group
calling itself Diplomats and Military Commanders for Change focused on
the Bush administration's recent foreign policy. But to me it seems
that something else is also going on.
In many ways, the Iraq war is merely a pretext for a deeper discontent
with how America has seemed to fashion a new global society, a new
economic, military, and political order in the decade and a half since
the end of the cold war. America may only be riding the crest of a
wave of modernization that, in all likelihood, would have emerged
without its guiding hand. But add to the mix a discontent with the
vast wealth and power that America has amassed in the past century and
a deep sense of unease with the ways in which a secular, market-driven
world divvies up wealth and influence among people and nations, and
you have all the ingredients for a nasty backlash against America.
I'm not talking merely about the anti-globalism of dispossessed Third
World peasants, the fears of the loss of cultural sovereignty
experienced by societies older and more traditional than the United
States, the anger at a perceived American arrogance that we've
recently been reading so much about. I'm talking about something that
is rooted deeper in the psyches of other nations. I guess I mean a
feeling of being marginalized by history; of being peripheral to the
human saga; of being footnotes for tomorrow's historians rather than
main characters. In short, a growing anxiety brought on by having
another country and culture dictating one's place in the society of
nations.
In the years since I stood on my rooftop in Brooklyn watching the
World Trade Center towers burn so apocalyptically, I have spent at
least a part of every day wrestling with a host of existential
questions. I can't help it -- almost obsessively I churn thoughts over
and over in my head, trying to understand the psychological contours
of this cruel new world. The questions largely boil down to the
following: Where has the world's faith in America gone? Where is the
American Dream headed?
What is happening to that intangible force that helped shape our
modern world, that invisible symbiotic relationship between the good
will of foreigners and the successful functioning of the American "way
of life," that willingness by strangers to let us serve as the
repository for their dreams, their hopes, their visions of a better
future? In the same way that the scale of our national debt is made
possible only because other countries are willing to buy treasury
bonds and, in effect, lend us their savings, so it seems to me the
American Dream has been largely facilitated by the willingness of
other peoples to lend us their expectations for the future. Without
that willingness, the Dream is a bubble primed to burst. It hasn't
burst yet -- witness the huge numbers who still migrate to America in
search of the good life -- but I worry that it is leaking seriously.
Few countries and cultures have risen to global prominence as quickly
as America did in the years after the Civil War. Perhaps the last time
there was such an extraordinary accumulation of geopolitical,
military, and economic influence in so few decades was 800 years ago,
with the rise of the Mongol khanates. Fewer still have so definitively
laid claim to an era, while that era was still unfolding, as we did
-- and as the world acknowledged -- during the 20th century, "the
American Century."
While the old powers of Europe tore themselves apart during World War
I, the United States entered the war late and fought the fight on
other people's home terrain. While whole societies were destroyed
during World War II, America's political and economic system
flourished, its cities thrived, and its entertainment industries
soared. In other words, as America rose to global pre-eminence during
the bloody first half of the 20th century, it projected outward an
aura of invulnerability, a vision of "normalcy" redolent with consumer
temptations and glamorous cultural spectacles. In an exhibit at the
museum on Ellis Island a few years back, I remember seeing a copy of a
letter written by a young Polish migrant in New York to his family
back home. Urging them to join him, he wrote that the ordinary person
on the streets of America lived a life far more comfortable than
aristocrats in Poland could possibly dream of.
In a way America, during the American Century, thus served as a safety
valve, allowing the world's poor to dream of a better place somewhere
else; to visualize a place neither bound by the constraints of old nor
held hostage to the messianic visions of revolutionary Marxist or
Fascist movements so powerful in so many other parts of the globe.
Throughout the cold war, even as America spent unprecedented amounts
on military hardware, enough was left over to nurture the
mass-consumption culture, to build up an infrastructure of vast
proportions. And despite the war in Vietnam, despite the dirty wars
that ravaged Latin America in the 1980s, despite America's nefarious
role in promoting coups and dictatorships in a slew of
countries-cum-cold-war-pawns around the globe, somehow much of the
world preserved a rosy-hued vision of America that could have been
culled straight from the marketing rooms of Madison Avenue.
Now something is changing. Having dealt with history largely on its
own terms, largely with the ability to deflect the worst of the chaos
to arenas outside our borders (as imperial Britain did in the century
following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, through to the disastrous
events leading up to World War I in 1914), America has attracted a
concentrated fury and vengeful ire of disastrous proportions. The
willingness to forgive, embodied in so much of the world's embrace of
the American Dream, is being replaced by a rather vicious craving to
see America -- which, under the Bush administration, has increasingly
defined its greatness by way of military triumphs -- humbled.
Moreover, no great power has served as a magnet for such a maelstrom
of hate in an era as saturated with media images, as susceptible to
instantaneous opinion-shaping coverage of events occurring anywhere in
the world.
I guess the question that gnaws at my consciousness could be rephrased
as: How does one give an encore to a bravura performance? It's either
an anticlimax or, worse, a dismal failure -- with the audience heading
out the doors halfway through, talking not of the brilliance of the
earlier music, but of the tawdriness of the last few bars. If the 20th
century was the American Century, its best hopes largely embodied by
something akin to the American Dream, what kind of follow-up can the
21st century bring?
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, an outpouring of genuine,
if temporary, solidarity from countries and peoples across the globe
swathed America in an aura of magnificent victimhood. We, the most
powerful country on earth, had been blindsided by a ruthless,
ingenious, and barbaric enemy, two of our greatest cities violated. We
demanded the world's tears, and, overwhelmingly, we received them.
They were, we felt, no less than our due, no more than our merit. In
the days after the trade center collapsed, even the Parisian daily Le
Monde, not known for its pro-Yankee sentimentality, informed its
readers, in an echo of John F. Kennedy's famous "Ich bin ein Berliner"
speech, that "we are all Americans now."
Perhaps inevitably, however, that sympathy has now largely dissipated.
Powerful countries under attack fight back -- ruthlessly, brutally,
with all the economic, political, diplomatic, and military resources
at their disposal. They always have; like as not, they always will. In
so doing, perhaps they cannot but step on the sensibilities of
smaller, less powerfuldare I say it, less imperialnations and peoples.
And as Britain, the country in which I grew up, discovered so
painfully during the early years of World War II, sometimes the mighty
end up standing largely alone, bulwarks against history's periodic
tidal waves. In that fight, even if they emerge successful, they
ultimately emerge also tarnished and somewhat humbled, their power and
drive and confidence at least partly evaporated on the battlefield.
In the post-September 11 world, even leaving aside Iraq and all the
distortions, half-truths, and lies used to justify the invasion, even
leaving aside the cataclysmic impact of the Abu Ghraib prison
photographs, I believe America would have attracted significant wrath
simply in doing what had to be done in routing out the Taliban in
Afghanistan, in reorienting its foreign policy to try and tackle
international terror networks and breeding grounds. That is why I come
back time and again in my mind to the tactical brilliance of Al
Qaeda's September 11 attacks: If America hadn't responded, a green
light would have been turned on, one that signaled that the country
was too decadent to defend its vital interests. Yet in responding, the
response itself was almost guaranteed to spotlight an empire bullying
allies and enemies alike into cooperation and subordination and, thus,
to focus an inchoate rage against the world's lone standing
superpower. Damned if we did, damned if we didn't.
Which brings me back to the American Dream. In the past even as our
power grew, much of the world saw us, rightly or wrongly, as a moral
beacon, as a country somehow largely outside the bloody, gory,
oft-tyrannical history that carved its swath across so much of the
world during the American Century. Indeed, in many ways, even as
cultural elites in once-glorious Old World nations sneered at upstart,
crass, consumerist America, the masses in those nations idealized
America as some sort of Promised Land, as a place of freedoms and
economic possibilities simply unheard of in many parts of the globe.
In many ways, the American Dream of the last 100-some years has been
more something dreamed by foreigners from afar, especially those who
experienced fascism or Stalinism, than lived as a universal reality on
the ground in the United States.
Things look simpler from a distance than they do on the ground. In the
past foreigners might have idealized America as a place whose streets
were paved if not with gold, at least with alloys seeded with rare and
precious metals, even while those who lived here knew it was a
gigantic, complicated, multifaceted, continental country with a vast
patchwork of cultures and creeds coexisting side by messy side. Today,
I fear, foreigners slumber with dreamy American smiles on their
sleeping faces no more; that intangible faith in the pastel-colored
hue and soft contours of the Dream risks being shattered, replaced
instead by an equally simplistic dislike of all things and peoples
American.
Paradoxically these days it is the political elites -- the leaders and
policy analysts and defense experts -- who try to hold in place
alliances built up in the post-World War II years as the pax Americana
spread its wings, while the populaces shy away from an America
perceived to be dominated by corporations, military musclemen, and
empire-builders-in-the-name-of-democracy; increasingly they sympathize
with the unnuanced critiques of the Margaret Drabbles of the world.
The Pew survey, for example, found that sizable majorities in
countries such as Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Germany, and France
believed the war on terror to be largely about the United States
wanting to control Middle Eastern oil supplies.
In other words, the perception -- never universally held, but held by
enough people to help shape our global image -- is changing. Once our
image abroad was of an exceptional country accruing all the power of
empire without the psychology of empire; now it is being replaced by
something more historically normal -- that of a great power determined
to preserve and expand its might, for its own selfish interests and
not much else. An exhibit in New York's Whitney Museum last year,
titled "The American Effect," presented the works of 50 artists from
around the world who portrayed an America intent on world dominance
through military adventurism and gross consumption habits. In the
run-up to the war in Iraq, Mikhail Gorbachev lambasted an America he
now viewed as operating in a manner "far from real world leadership."
Nelson Mandela talked of the United States as a country that "has
committed unspeakable atrocities in the world."
Maybe the American Dream always was little more than marketing hype
(the author Jeffrey Decker writes in Made in America that the term
itself was conjured up in 1931 by a populist historian named James
Truslow Adams, perhaps as an antidote to the harsh realities of
Depression-era America). But as the savagery of the images coming out
of Iraq demonstrate all too well, we live in a world where image is if
not everything, at least crucial. Perhaps I'm wrong and the American
Dream will continue to sweeten the sleep of those living overseas for
another century. I certainly hope, very much, that I'm wrong -- for a
world denuded of the Dream, however far from complex reality that
Dream might have been, would be impoverished indeed. But I worry that
that encore I mentioned earlier won't be nearly as breathtaking or as
splendid as the original performance that shaped the first American
century.
Sasha Abramsky is a freelance journalist and author of Hard Time
Blues: How Politics Built a Prison Nation (St. Martin's Press, 2002).
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