From shovland at mindspring.com Fri Apr 1 01:59:00 2005 From: shovland at mindspring.com (Steve Hovland) Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2005 17:59:00 -0800 Subject: [Paleopsych] Recent safety hazards at aging nuclear plants Message-ID: <01C5361B.51D46CA0.shovland@mindspring.com> In the past three years, old or worn-out equipment has caused dozens of incidents requiring plants to shut down. December 9, 2001 BY CHRIS KNAP The Orange County Register Since January 1999, worn-out equipment at U.S. nuclear power plants has caused more than 50 fires, radiation or steam leaks, or other serious safety hazards requiring shutdown of the nuclear reactor. Here are details of some of the most serious accidents: January 1999: Inadequate maintenance led to a six-hour hydrogen fire on the roof of the control building at J.A. Fitzpatrick in Syracuse, N.Y., forcing a plant shutdown. August 1999: A cooling- water drain line in Callaway, Mo., broke because of severe corrosion, forcing a reactor shutdown. A subsequent inspection revealed at least 10 areas where pipes had decayed and were in danger of breaking. 1999-2000: Millstone in Waterford, Conn., had to repeatedly shut down due to failures of the reactor control-rod drive system, including control rods that came loose and dropped into the reactor. The plant operator blamed failed insulation and damaged electrical leads. February 2000: A steam generator tube ruptured at Indian Point 2 in New York, contaminating 19,000 gallons of cooling water and releasing radioactive steam into the atmosphere. May 2000: A failed electrical conductor at Diablo Canyon 1 in San Luis Obispo County triggered a fire that cut power to the coolant and circulating water pumps that keep the nuclear core from overheating. August 2000: Peach Bottom Unit 3, in Pennsylvania, was forced into emergency shutdown when an instrument valve failed and caused a leak of contaminated reactor cool ant outside of primary containment. A similar valve failure and leak of radiation had occurred May 28, 2000, but the valves were not replaced. October 2000: At V.C. Summer, in South Carolina, a 29- inch diameter coolant pipe, with walls more than 2 inches thick, suffered a crack due to water stress corrosion, creating a leak of radioactive cooling water. Crack indications were later found at four more reactor inlets. November 2000 to April 2001: After receiving a 20-year license extension, operators of Oconee 1, in Seneca, S.C., found 19 cracks in the reactor where control rods pass through to the nuclear core. Radioactive cooling water had been leaking into the containment sump. In February nine leaks were found in Oconee 3, which had been taken down for refueling. Oconee 2 was later found to have four leaking control-rod nozzles. January 2001: Failure of an 18-year-old valve at North Anna, Va., created a leak of radioactive coolant of more than 10 gallons per minute, forcing a shutdown of the reactor. February 2001: A 20-year-old circuit breaker at San Onofre 3, near Camp Pendleton, failed to close, creating a 4000-volt arc and fire that cut power to coolant control systems, drowned emergency switching valves and shut down emergency oil pumps, destroying the Unit 3 generator shaft. Currently, 150 identical breakers remain in service at the plant. February 2001: After Arkansas 1 was re-licensed for 20 years, extensive cracking was found on the control-rod drives and thermocouple nozzles entering the nuclear reactor. August 2001: Failure of a valve at Palo Verde 3, in Arizona, caused a leak of radioactive cooling water from the irradiated fuel-cooling pool into the reactor containment building, forcing a reactor shutdown. Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection reports, incident reports and technical bulletins. From shovland at mindspring.com Fri Apr 1 03:09:42 2005 From: shovland at mindspring.com (Steve Hovland) Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2005 19:09:42 -0800 Subject: [Paleopsych] Anti-Aging: The best things I have found so far Message-ID: <01C53625.32485C20.shovland@mindspring.com> 1. The Anti-Aging Solution by Giampapa(MD), Pero(PhD), and Zimmerman(CN) If you want a fast start on the biochemistry of aging and what we can do about it, get this. The most starting point is their assertion that if we provide the proper inputs, we can repair our DNA and how it is expressed. 2. The Perricone Promise and The Perricone Prescription(CD) by Nicholas Perricone MD. Giampapa etc talk about the inside of the cell. Perricone has a lot to say about the cell membrane and how to repair and maintain it. 3. Fantastic Voyage by Kurzweil and Grossman(MD) Their point is that if we can take care of ourselves for the next 20 years or so then new technologies will be invented that will allow us to live even longer and have it be worth the bother :-) Steve Hovland www.stevehovland.net From HowlBloom at aol.com Fri Apr 1 03:31:11 2005 From: HowlBloom at aol.com (HowlBloom at aol.com) Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2005 22:31:11 EST Subject: [Paleopsych] Re: From Eshel--A Glitch in Genetic-centrism Message-ID: <142.42b2be3d.2f7e1a7f@aol.com> re: (http://www.nytimes.com/adx/bin/adx_click.html?type=goto&page=www.nytimes.com/printer-friendly&pos=Position1&camp=foxsearch-emailtools09-nyt5&ad=pf_million s.gif&goto=http://www.foxsearchlight.com/millions/index_nyt.html%20) A mechanism central to Jeff Hawkins' analysis of the way brains work in his On Intelligence may provide a clue to the manner in which plants with copies of a damaged gene from both their father and their mother manage to "recover" or reconstruct something they never had-- a flawless copy of the gene they've received only in damaged form. Hawkins brings up a neural network trick called auto-associative memory. Here's his description of how it works: "Instead of only passing information forward...auto-associative memories fed the output of each neuron back into the input.... When a pattern of activity was imposed on the artificial neurons, they formed a memory of this pattern. ...To retrieve a pattern stored in such a memory, you must provide the pattern you want to retrieve. ....The most important property is that you don't have to have the entire pattern you want to retrieve in order to retrieve it. You might have only part of the pattern, or you might have a somewhat messed-up pattern. The auto-associative memory can retrieve the correct pattern, as it was originally stored, even though you start with a messy version of it. It would be like going to the grocer with half eaten brown bananas and getting whole green bananas in return. ...Second, unlike mist neural networks, an auto-associative memory can be designed to store sequences of patterns, or temporal patterns. This feature is accomplished by adding time delay to the feedback. ...I might feed in the first few notes of 'Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star' and the memory returns the whole song. When presented with part of the sequence, the memory can recall the rest." (Jeff Hawkins, Sandra Blakeslee. On Intelligence. New York: Times Books, 2004: pp 46-47.) Where would such auto-associative circuits exist in a plant cell? Here are some wild guesses: * In the entire cell, including its membrane, its cytoplasm, its organelles, its metabolic processes, and its genome; * * Or in the entire cell and its context within the plant, including the sort of input and output it gets from the cells around it, the signals that tell it where and want it is supposed to be in the plant's development and ongoing roles. Howard re: ____________________________________ New York Times March 23, 2005 Startling Scientists, Plant Fixes Its Flawed Gene By _NICHOLAS WADE_ (http://query.nytimes.com/search/query?ppds=bylL&v1=NICHOLAS%20WADE&fdq=19960101&td=sysdate&sort=newest&ac=NICHOLAS%20WADE&inline=nyt-pe r) n a startling discovery, geneticists at Purdue University say they have found plants that possess a corrected version of a defective gene inherited from both their parents, as if some handy backup copy with the right version had been made in the grandparents' generation or earlier. The finding implies that some organisms may contain a cryptic backup copy of their genome that bypasses the usual mechanisms of heredity. If confirmed, it would represent an unprecedented exception to the laws of inheritance discovered by Gregor Mendel in the 19th century. Equally surprising, the cryptic genome appears not to be made of DNA, the standard hereditary material. The discovery also raises interesting biological questions - including whether it gets in the way of evolution, which depends on mutations changing an organism rather than being put right by a backup system. "It looks like a marvelous discovery," said Dr. Elliott Meyerowitz, a plant geneticist at the California Institute of Technology. Dr. David Haig, an evolutionary biologist at Harvard, described the finding as "a really strange and unexpected result," which would be important if the observation holds up and applies widely in nature. The result, reported online yesterday in the journal Nature by Dr. Robert E. Pruitt, Dr. Susan J. Lolle and colleagues at Purdue, has been found in a single species, the mustardlike plant called arabidopsis that is the standard laboratory organism of plant geneticists. But there are hints that the same mechanism may occur in people, according to a commentary by Dr. Detlef Weigel of the Max-Planck Institute for Developmental Biology in T?bingen, Germany. Dr. Weigel describes the Purdue work as "a spectacular discovery." The finding grew out of a research project started three years ago in which Dr. Pruitt and Dr. Lolle were trying to understand the genes that control the plant's outer skin, or cuticle. As part of the project, they were studying plants with a mutated gene that made the plant's petals and other floral organs clump together. Because each of the plant's two copies of the gene were in mutated form, they had virtually no chance of having normal offspring. But up to 10 percent of the plants' offspring kept reverting to normal. Various rare events can make this happen, but none involve altering the actual sequence of DNA units in the gene. Yet when the researchers analyzed the mutated gene, known as hothead, they found it had changed, with the mutated DNA units being changed back to normal form. "That was the moment when it was a complete shock," Dr. Pruitt said. A mutated gene can be put right by various mechanisms that are already known, but all require a correct copy of the gene to be available to serve as the template. The Purdue team scanned the DNA of the entire arabidopsis genome for a second, cryptic copy of the hothead gene but could find none. Dr. Pruitt and his colleagues argue that a correct template must exist, but because it is not in the form of DNA, it probably exists as RNA, DNA's close chemical cousin. RNA performs many important roles in the cell, and is the hereditary material of some viruses. But it is less stable than DNA, and so has been regarded as unsuitable for preserving the genetic information of higher organisms. Dr. Pruitt said he favored the idea that there is an RNA backup copy for the entire genome, not just the hothead gene, and that it might be set in motion when the plant was under stress, as is the case with those having mutated hothead genes. He and other experts said it was possible that an entire RNA backup copy of the genome could exist without being detected, especially since there has been no reason until now to look for it. Scientific journals often take months or years to get comfortable with articles presenting novel ideas. But Nature accepted the paper within six weeks of receiving it. Dr. Christopher Surridge, a biology editor at Nature, said the finding had been discussed at scientific conferences for quite a while, with people saying it was impossible and proposing alternative explanations. But the authors had checked all these out and disposed of them, Dr. Surridge said. As for their proposal of a backup RNA genome, "that is very much a hypothesis, and basically the least mad hypothesis for how this might be working," Dr. Surridge said. Dr. Haig, the evolutionary biologist, said that the finding was fascinating but that it was too early to try to interpret it. He noted that if there was a cryptic template, it ought to be more resistant to mutation than the DNA it helps correct. Yet it is hard to make this case for RNA, which accumulates many more errors than DNA when it is copied by the cell. He said that the mechanism, if confirmed, would be an unprecedented exception to Mendel's laws of inheritance, since the DNA sequence itself is changed. Imprinting, an odd feature of inheritance of which Dr. Haig is a leading student, involves inherited changes to the way certain genes are activated, not to the genes themselves. The finding poses a puzzle for evolutionary theory because it corrects mutations, which evolution depends on as generators of novelty. Dr. Meyerowitz said he did not see this posing any problem for evolution because it seems to happen only rarely. "What keeps Darwinian evolution intact is that this only happens when there is something wrong," Dr. Surridge said. The finding could undercut a leading theory of why sex is necessary. Some biologists say sex is needed to discard the mutations, almost all of them bad, that steadily accumulate on the genome. People inherit half of their genes from each parent, which allows the half left on the cutting room floor to carry away many bad mutations. Dr. Pruitt said the backup genome could be particularly useful for self-fertilizing plants, as arabidopsis is, since it could help avoid the adverse effects of inbreeding. It might also operate in the curious organisms known as bdelloid rotifers that are renowned for not having had sex for millions of years, an abstinence that would be expected to seriously threaten their Darwinian fitness. Dr. Pruitt said it was not yet known if other organisms besides arabidopsis could possess the backup system. Colleagues had been quite receptive to the idea because "biologists have gotten used to the unexpected," he said, referring to a spate of novel mechanisms that have recently come to light, several involving RNA. ---------- Howard Bloom Author of The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces of History and Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind From The Big Bang to the 21st Century Visiting Scholar-Graduate Psychology Department, New York University; Core Faculty Member, The Graduate Institute www.howardbloom.net www.bigbangtango.net Founder: International Paleopsychology Project; founding board member: Epic of Evolution Society; founding board member, The Darwin Project; founder: The Big Bang Tango Media Lab; member: New York Academy of Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Psychological Society, Academy of Political Science, Human Behavior and Evolution Society, International Society for Human Ethology; advisory board member: Youthactivism.org; executive editor -- New Paradigm book series. For information on The International Paleopsychology Project, see: www.paleopsych.org for two chapters from The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces of History, see www.howardbloom.net/lucifer For information on Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to the 21st Century, see www.howardbloom.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: image/gif Size: 2614 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: image/gif Size: 1968 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: image/gif Size: 392 bytes Desc: not available URL: From shovland at mindspring.com Fri Apr 1 05:23:28 2005 From: shovland at mindspring.com (Steve Hovland) Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2005 21:23:28 -0800 Subject: [Paleopsych] Re: From Eshel--A Glitch in Genetic-centrism Message-ID: <01C53637.E25C5410.shovland@mindspring.com> At this point in time we think we are doing well if we can sequence genes. What will we find as we begin to analyze the patterns? Will the whole be holographically encoded in the part? Steve Hovland www.stevehovland.net -----Original Message----- From: HowlBloom at aol.com [SMTP:HowlBloom at aol.com] Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2005 7:31 PM To: paleopsych at paleopsych.org; kurakin1970 at yandex.ru; ursus at earthlink.net; paul.werbos at verizon.net Subject: [Paleopsych] Re: From Eshel--A Glitch in Genetic-centrism re: (http://www.nytimes.com/adx/bin/adx_click.html?type=goto&page=www.nytime s.com/printer-friendly&pos=Position1&camp=foxsearch-emailtools09-nyt5&ad =pf_million s.gif&goto=http://www.foxsearchlight.com/millions/index_nyt.html%20) A mechanism central to Jeff Hawkins' analysis of the way brains work in his On Intelligence may provide a clue to the manner in which plants with copies of a damaged gene from both their father and their mother manage to "recover" or reconstruct something they never had-- a flawless copy of the gene they've received only in damaged form. Hawkins brings up a neural network trick called auto-associative memory. Here's his description of how it works: "Instead of only passing information forward...auto-associative memories fed the output of each neuron back into the input.... When a pattern of activity was imposed on the artificial neurons, they formed a memory of this pattern. ...To retrieve a pattern stored in such a memory, you must provide the pattern you want to retrieve. ....The most important property is that you don't have to have the entire pattern you want to retrieve in order to retrieve it. You might have only part of the pattern, or you might have a somewhat messed-up pattern. The auto-associative memory can retrieve the correct pattern, as it was originally stored, even though you start with a messy version of it. It would be like going to the grocer with half eaten brown bananas and getting whole green bananas in return. ...Second, unlike mist neural networks, an auto-associative memory can be designed to store sequences of patterns, or temporal patterns. This feature is accomplished by adding time delay to the feedback. ...I might feed in the first few notes of 'Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star' and the memory returns the whole song. When presented with part of the sequence, the memory can recall the rest." (Jeff Hawkins, Sandra Blakeslee. On Intelligence. New York: Times Books, 2004: pp 46-47.) Where would such auto-associative circuits exist in a plant cell? Here are some wild guesses: * In the entire cell, including its membrane, its cytoplasm, its organelles, its metabolic processes, and its genome; * * Or in the entire cell and its context within the plant, including the sort of input and output it gets from the cells around it, the signals that tell it where and want it is supposed to be in the plant's development and ongoing roles. Howard re: ____________________________________ New York Times March 23, 2005 Startling Scientists, Plant Fixes Its Flawed Gene By _NICHOLAS WADE_ (http://query.nytimes.com/search/query?ppds=bylL&v1=NICHOLAS%20WADE&fdq= 19960101&td=sysdate&sort=newest&ac=NICHOLAS%20WADE&inline=nyt-pe r) n a startling discovery, geneticists at Purdue University say they have found plants that possess a corrected version of a defective gene inherited from both their parents, as if some handy backup copy with the right version had been made in the grandparents' generation or earlier. The finding implies that some organisms may contain a cryptic backup copy of their genome that bypasses the usual mechanisms of heredity. If confirmed, it would represent an unprecedented exception to the laws of inheritance discovered by Gregor Mendel in the 19th century. Equally surprising, the cryptic genome appears not to be made of DNA, the standard hereditary material. The discovery also raises interesting biological questions - including whether it gets in the way of evolution, which depends on mutations changing an organism rather than being put right by a backup system. "It looks like a marvelous discovery," said Dr. Elliott Meyerowitz, a plant geneticist at the California Institute of Technology. Dr. David Haig, an evolutionary biologist at Harvard, described the finding as "a really strange and unexpected result," which would be important if the observation holds up and applies widely in nature. The result, reported online yesterday in the journal Nature by Dr. Robert E. Pruitt, Dr. Susan J. Lolle and colleagues at Purdue, has been found in a single species, the mustardlike plant called arabidopsis that is the standard laboratory organism of plant geneticists. But there are hints that the same mechanism may occur in people, according to a commentary by Dr. Detlef Weigel of the Max-Planck Institute for Developmental Biology in Tubingen, Germany. Dr. Weigel describes the Purdue work as "a spectacular discovery." The finding grew out of a research project started three years ago in which Dr. Pruitt and Dr. Lolle were trying to understand the genes that control the plant's outer skin, or cuticle. As part of the project, they were studying plants with a mutated gene that made the plant's petals and other floral organs clump together. Because each of the plant's two copies of the gene were in mutated form, they had virtually no chance of having normal offspring. But up to 10 percent of the plants' offspring kept reverting to normal. Various rare events can make this happen, but none involve altering the actual sequence of DNA units in the gene. Yet when the researchers analyzed the mutated gene, known as hothead, they found it had changed, with the mutated DNA units being changed back to normal form. "That was the moment when it was a complete shock," Dr. Pruitt said. A mutated gene can be put right by various mechanisms that are already known, but all require a correct copy of the gene to be available to serve as the template. The Purdue team scanned the DNA of the entire arabidopsis genome for a second, cryptic copy of the hothead gene but could find none. Dr. Pruitt and his colleagues argue that a correct template must exist, but because it is not in the form of DNA, it probably exists as RNA, DNA's close chemical cousin. RNA performs many important roles in the cell, and is the hereditary material of some viruses. But it is less stable than DNA, and so has been regarded as unsuitable for preserving the genetic information of higher organisms. Dr. Pruitt said he favored the idea that there is an RNA backup copy for the entire genome, not just the hothead gene, and that it might be set in motion when the plant was under stress, as is the case with those having mutated hothead genes. He and other experts said it was possible that an entire RNA backup copy of the genome could exist without being detected, especially since there has been no reason until now to look for it. Scientific journals often take months or years to get comfortable with articles presenting novel ideas. But Nature accepted the paper within six weeks of receiving it. Dr. Christopher Surridge, a biology editor at Nature, said the finding had been discussed at scientific conferences for quite a while, with people saying it was impossible and proposing alternative explanations. But the authors had checked all these out and disposed of them, Dr. Surridge said. As for their proposal of a backup RNA genome, "that is very much a hypothesis, and basically the least mad hypothesis for how this might be working," Dr. Surridge said. Dr. Haig, the evolutionary biologist, said that the finding was fascinating but that it was too early to try to interpret it. He noted that if there was a cryptic template, it ought to be more resistant to mutation than the DNA it helps correct. Yet it is hard to make this case for RNA, which accumulates many more errors than DNA when it is copied by the cell. He said that the mechanism, if confirmed, would be an unprecedented exception to Mendel's laws of inheritance, since the DNA sequence itself is changed. Imprinting, an odd feature of inheritance of which Dr. Haig is a leading student, involves inherited changes to the way certain genes are activated, not to the genes themselves. The finding poses a puzzle for evolutionary theory because it corrects mutations, which evolution depends on as generators of novelty. Dr. Meyerowitz said he did not see this posing any problem for evolution because it seems to happen only rarely. "What keeps Darwinian evolution intact is that this only happens when there is something wrong," Dr. Surridge said. The finding could undercut a leading theory of why sex is necessary. Some biologists say sex is needed to discard the mutations, almost all of them bad, that steadily accumulate on the genome. People inherit half of their genes from each parent, which allows the half left on the cutting room floor to carry away many bad mutations. Dr. Pruitt said the backup genome could be particularly useful for self-fertilizing plants, as arabidopsis is, since it could help avoid the adverse effects of inbreeding. It might also operate in the curious organisms known as bdelloid rotifers that are renowned for not having had sex for millions of years, an abstinence that would be expected to seriously threaten their Darwinian fitness. Dr. Pruitt said it was not yet known if other organisms besides arabidopsis could possess the backup system. Colleagues had been quite receptive to the idea because "biologists have gotten used to the unexpected," he said, referring to a spate of novel mechanisms that have recently come to light, several involving RNA. ---------- Howard Bloom Author of The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces of History and Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind From The Big Bang to the 21st Century Visiting Scholar-Graduate Psychology Department, New York University; Core Faculty Member, The Graduate Institute www.howardbloom.net www.bigbangtango.net Founder: International Paleopsychology Project; founding board member: Epic of Evolution Society; founding board member, The Darwin Project; founder: The Big Bang Tango Media Lab; member: New York Academy of Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Psychological Society, Academy of Political Science, Human Behavior and Evolution Society, International Society for Human Ethology; advisory board member: Youthactivism.org; executive editor -- New Paradigm book series. For information on The International Paleopsychology Project, see: www.paleopsych.org for two chapters from The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces of History, see www.howardbloom.net/lucifer For information on Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to the 21st Century, see www.howardbloom.net << File: ATT00000.html >> << File: clip_image001.gif >> << File: clip_image002.gif >> << File: clip_image003.gif >> << File: ATT00001.txt >> From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 14:52:55 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 09:52:55 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] WP Editorial: After Terri Schiavo Message-ID: After Terri Schiavo http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17377-2005Mar31 [This just about represents my views, if I were to speak nicely (and not like Mr. Mencken). Perhaps I should.] Friday, April 1, 2005; Page A26 THE DEATH yesterday of Terri Schiavo concludes a legal battle, but its moral quandaries live on. The Schiavo case gripped the nation because of the lines drawn between life and death, and the middle ground of dementia or coma, agonizingly hard areas to delineate. In addition, because of a mute understanding that this subject is too awful to contemplate, a discussion of Schiavo-like choices has not fully penetrated the public square. It will be a healthy thing if this taboo is permanently shattered. We may not want to discuss death, but it will come to all of us. And, because of medical technology, more people will be empowered, or perhaps some would say condemned, to make judgments about when life is worth living, and when not. A century ago, death usually came abruptly; the most frequent causes were pneumonia, tuberculosis, diarrhea and injuries, sudden killers all. Today, the average American spends two years disabled enough to need help with the routine activities of living; and growing numbers survive to be 85 and older, at which point they have a 50 percent chance of suffering dementia before they die. In 2000, there were 4.2 million Americans in the 85-plus cohort, but by 2030 there will be nearly 9 million, according to a paper for the Rand institute by Joanne Lynn and David M. Adamson. We speak of people being "snatched from life." Death, for more and more Americans, however, is the final stumble in a slow decline. We have not adjusted to this transformation, in emotional, moral or economic terms. Death is often portrayed in the movies as gunfights or as heroic battles against diseases. Less discussed are the fading figures in hospices where agonizing questions about the end of life, pain, dementia and, yes, financial costs are confronted. We speak of medicine as "saving lives." But at some point, arguably, medicine isn't so much about saving life as managing the options for parting with it. Many Americans, and not just social conservatives, feel that life is always worth preserving and that wavering from this principle opens the door to selfish relatives who don't want the burden of caring for the vulnerable. It's an honorable outlook -- also a natural one. Many believe on religious grounds that life is sacrosanct. With the survival instinct hard-wired into human nature, others find it difficult to contemplate the extinction of the self. Yet there has to be space in a free society for others to differ: to draw up living wills that specify limits to life-prolonging medical interventions, and perhaps also to opt for assisted suicide. It isn't possible for government to withdraw from this sphere altogether. The Terri Schiavo case featured two claims to speak on her behalf; inevitably Florida's legal system had to adjudicate between them and to decide what standard of evidence was necessary to establish that Mrs. Schiavo herself would have chosen to die. Equally, laws permitting assisted suicide, such as the one in Oregon, require government to create and enforce tight limits on its use. But it's clear that, on a matter as imponderable as this one, the federal role should be minimized. Thanks to Terri Schiavo, a national conversation is, we hope, beginning. From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 14:53:41 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 09:53:41 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Auster: "Theocrats" for Terri Schiavo Message-ID: "Theocrats" for Terri Schiavo http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=17570 "Theocrats" for Terri Schiavo By [1]Lawrence Auster [2]FrontPageMagazine.com | April 1, 2005 How are we to explain liberal's and leftists' support for disconnecting Terri Schiavo from her feeding tube and making her die a slow death, while she is guarded by police officers who prevent anyone from even putting a drop of water to her lips? And how are we to explain the liberals' belief that conservatives, who want to prevent this horror from occurring, are religious dictators intruding into a purely private matter? Most people think that the liberals are driven by their pro-abortion ideology, which takes the form of opposition to the Christian idea that Terri's radically limited life is nevertheless a human life and so worthy of protection. But that can't be the liberals' whole motivation. To demonstrate this, let us suppose that Terri's husband Michael had wanted Terri to go on living on the feeding tube, or, alternatively, that Michael had handed legal guardianship to Terri's parents and they had wanted her to go on living on the feeding tube. In either of those cases, the liberals would have had no problem with Terri's continued existence. The issue of her living or dying wouldn't even have come up. In other words, the very factors in this case upon which the liberals' supposedly principled anti-life position seems to be based are contingent. If Michael had not wanted Terri to die, the liberals wouldn't want her to die either; indeed, they wouldn't be thinking twice about the case, notwithstanding their current expressions of horror at the idea of a person living her whole life on a feeding tube. And since, in this hypothetical scenario, the liberals themselves would be consenting to Terri's living in that condition, they obviously wouldn't be calling conservatives "theocrats" and "religious fanatics" for wanting the same thing that the liberals themselves would be agreeing to. Therefore the liberal position cannot be simply that a person in Terri's situation ought to die. Rather, the liberal position seems to be that personal choiceMichael's personal choiceought to prevail. But this explanation also fails to hold up, as we can see from the following considerations: (1) Terri's parents and siblings love her and want her to live; (2) Terri's parents and siblings are convinced that Terri has consciousness and is not in a vegetative state; (3) Michael has two children by his common law wife of many years, and so logically ought to divorce Terri and let the guardianship revert to Terri's parents. Given these factors, Michael's right to decide on Terri's life and death ceases to seem so sacred. Why, then, would liberals side so absolutely with Michael's (highly doubtful) right to have his wife's existence terminated, while they completely dismiss the Schindlers' (correct and understandable) desire to be made her guardians and to save her life? If individual rights and personal choice are the liberals' bottom line, why must the personal preference of Michael, who has (understandably) moved on with his life, be seen as inviolable, but the personal preference of Terri's parents, who have not moved on with their lives but want to care for their daughter, must be equated with theocratic tyranny and resisted at all costs? Michael's right of guardianship stems from his status as Terri's husband. But he's given up that status in all but name by starting a new family. Since when are liberals so solicitous of traditional marital bonds and the rights of husbands over their wiveslet alone the right of an estranged husband to have his wife killed? Liberal famously regard marriage as an ever-changing institution, to be reshaped to suit changing human needs. Why then do the liberals treat the Shiavo's marriage, and Michael's rights proceeding therefrom, as written in stone, even though it has long since come to an end? Why don't the liberals simply call on Michael to divorce Terri and let the Schindlers take care of her? As all these questions suggest, there remains something mysterious and uncanny at the heart of the liberals' position on this issue. Their passionate conviction that Terri must die cannot be explained in terms of any recognizable liberal perspective, whether a disbelief in the soul, the desire to dispense with a less-than-complete human life that inconveniences others, a devotion to serving the rights and desires of individuals, or an easy-going attitude toward the traditional bonds and duties of marriage. Therefore, I would argue, their position on the Schiavo case can only be explained as stemming from something extrinsic to the case itself, namely their bigoted animus against conservatives: since conservatives support Terri Schiavo's right to live, liberals must oppose it. As a liberal professor recently said to an acquaintance of mine (and these were his exact words), "Anything Tom DeLay and those conservatives are for, I'm against." This reactiveness is a symptom of the extremism that has taken over left-liberals since 9/11. As the conservative writer Jim Kalb points out, prior to 9/11, even when liberal positions were disastrously wrong, they still had a more or less predictable, liberal logic to them that a conservative could understand. But since 9/11, liberals in their hatred of Bush and of conservatives have descended into sheer irrationalism, in the process giving up even those liberal principles that were decent. Thus, prior to 9/11, liberals would no doubt have taken the Schindler's side, as representing the rights of an oppressed and helpless individual. But after 9/11 (with some notable exceptions, such as Jesse Jackson), they do not. What is it about 9/11 that has had this effect on the left? The post-9/11 world has placed liberals and leftists under an unbearable pressure. The Islamist attack on our country propelled us into a conflict, perhaps a decades-long conflict, with a mortal enemy. But liberals can't stand the idea that we have an enemy, let alone a mortal enemy, a "them," whose very existence justifies our use of force. Therefore such an enemy must be seen as a product of "root causes" generated by us. Further, in keeping with the inverted moral order of liberalism, the more threatening such an enemy really is, the more vile must be the root causes within ourselves that are creating that enemy. The more wicked our enemy actually is, the more judgmental, greedy, cynical, dishonest, uncompassionate, racist, and imperialistic we must be for fighting him. If our enemy seeks a theocratic dictatorship over the whole world (which is the case), we must be seen as seeking a theocratic dictatorship over the whole world, even though there has never been anything remotely like a theocratic dictatorship in our entire history. Thus the liberals' helpless rage, both against the war on Islamic theocracy and against the conservatism that has become dominant in American politics as a result of that war, takes the form of a floating indictment of conservatives as the real theocrats. This attitude is then projected onto any issue that may arise between conservatives and liberals, such as the battle over the fate of Terri Schiavo: Terri's right to live is passionately backed by conservatives; conservatives are theocrats; therefore Terri is a symbol of theocracy, and therefore Terri must die. [3]Lawrence Auster is the author of [4]Erasing America: The Politics of the Borderless Nation. He offers a traditionalist conservative perspective at [5]View from the Right. References 1. http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/authors.asp?ID=650 2. http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=17570 3. mailto:Lawrence.auster at att.net 4. http://www.aicfoundation.com/booklets.htm 5. http://www.amnation.com/vfr From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 14:56:53 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 09:56:53 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Chronicle Colloquy: The Crisis in Liberal Education Message-ID: The Crisis in Liberal Education The Chronicle: Colloquy Live Transcript http://chronicle.com/colloquy/2005/03/liberal_ed/ [I had a question answered.] Thursday, March 31, at 1 p.m., U.S. Eastern time The topic Do research universities relegate undergraduate education to the margins? Last year Harvard University made headlines when it announced a plan to change its core curriculum. This year the Association of American Colleges and Universities has begun trying to spark discussion of what a "liberal education" is across different types of institutions. Can such efforts succeed? Are faculty members at research universities ever likely to be superior undergraduate instructors? Given the increasing breadth and complexity of disciplinary knowledge, and the splintering of disciplines into specialties, should undergraduate education emphasize a common knowledge or a way of learning? How can administrators, forced by economic realities to prize efficiency in undergraduate education, deal with such questions? Do changes in the nature of the university preclude substantial change? ? [43]Liberal Education on the Ropes (4/1/2005) The guest Stanley N. Katz, director of Princeton University's Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies and president emeritus of the American Council of Learned Societies, offers his views on this topic in an essay in this week's Chronicle Review. _________________________________________________________________ A transcript of the chat follows. _________________________________________________________________ Malcolm Scully (Moderator): Good Afternoon and welcome to our live discussion about the health--or ill health--of liberal education at major research universities. I'm Malcolm Scully, The Chronicle's editor at large, and I'll be moderating. Our guest is Stanley N. Katz, director of Princeton University's Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies and president emeritus of the American Council of Learned Societies. In an April 1 article in The Chronicle Review, he asked whether liberal education can succeed in the modern research university and suggested that incremental reforms like the ones proposed in recent years do not go far enough to address the changing landscape of higher education. Thank you for joining us, Professor Katz. _________________________________________________________________ Stanley N. Katz: I am looking forward to this Colloquy, but I am a little apprehensive about it, never having done anything of this sort. So please bear with me. Basically, however, I publish in the Chronicle because I get such wonderful response from the paper, and this seems a great enhancement to the feedback I usually get. The initial response to my article on liberal education is that I am too pessimistic. I would be delighted to be convinced that is true. I am aware that people my age can become nostalgic, and as an historian I know the false allure of arguments for golden ages in the past. But I have thought a lot about liberal education, and it has been my primary concern as an educator since I first began teaching as a graduate student in 1957 -- nearly fifty years ago. I mention in the article the fantasy of having a golden wand to change undergraduate education as I would wish, and several people have asked me what I would do. I want to answer that in a way that will frustrate many of you, since my response is that what I would do would probably be different in every research university (my chosen arena). I feel strongly that there are no general institutional solutions to these problems. The problems are general, but the solutions are necessarily local, dependent upon the nature and place of the institution, its history and mission, its particular student body, and so forth. I think the challenge is for those of us who care deeply that something beyond vocational and disciplinary education be part of undergraduate (and especially underclass) experience feel empowered to work within our institutions for workable, pragmatic reforms. I certainly do not believe that there is a specifiable, limited body of knowledge that must form the core of liberal education. But I do think that some body of knowledge about Western culture is essential in this country, that at least one other culture be attended to, and that a small number of intensive explorations into large intellectual problems (defined as problems, not disciplines) need to be part of the process of underclass education. Beyond that, I am very interested in your suggestions. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Carol Geary Schneider, AAC&U: Two questions - In one campus study (at a public university widely praised for its general education program) over 50% of the faculty said that they "frequently" talk to students about liberal education and its importance. But only 12% of the first year students and 13% of the seniors said that they frequently hear from the faculty about liberal education. What advice would you give the faculty of that university? Do you think liberal education can ever be a priority for students if we discuss it mainly or exclusively in terms of general education? Wouldn't it make more sense to tie the aims of liberal education (inquiry and analysis, communication, civic and ethical responsibility, integrative learning) directly to students' majors? Stanley N. Katz: Carol, I have a mini-lecture entitled "the department as the enemy of education." Disciplinary departments can do an excellent job of disciplinary training, but the reason why I am concerned with general education is that if we do not empower students to learn generally, they will never learn liberally. I think there is a tension between general and departmental education. I think we need both. But if the department dominates, as it now does, I do not see how we are going to provide a significantly general education. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Maura, Public Research Intensive University: Is the current fuzziness of the academy's definition of a liberal education in someway linked with the increased emphasis on the "commercialization" and "privitization" of the public university? Stanley N. Katz: Yes, I think so. This is something that both David Kirp and Derek Bok have written about recently, and I am in general agreement that the commercialization of the university has created both values and institutional arrangements that run athwart liberal education. On the other hand, commercialization does not make it impossible for faculty to try to articulate what is going wrong, and to propose solutions to revive or enhance liberal education. Jerry Graff always talks about "teaching the conflicts," and that is not a bad strategy here. If faculty can point out what they think the contradictions and tensions created for liberal education by commercialization are, that may be one of the ways in which we can begin to address the problem meaningfully. I think the burden is on those faculty who care to carry the battle for liberal education forward. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Robert Benedetti: In years past the hallmark of a liberal education was sufficient breath to appreciate a wide range of possible experiences and to treasure learning for its own sake, much as Henry Adams might have done. Is the foundation or justification for a liberal education undergoing a shift away from definitions which value the development of the individual self to definitions which focus on the making of democratic citizens? In other words, is the new standard for a liberal education closer to one that would satisfy Cicero than Henry Adams? Is the liberally educated person today more likely to be engaged in the public square than to be swept up by an aesthetic or spiritual epiphany? Robert Benedetti Executive Director Jacoby Center Universtiy of the Pacific Stanley N. Katz: An interesting question. I don't see the contradiction, though. I think that at least from the beginning of the twentieth century U.S. higher education has been committed to the creation of a democratic citizenry. Certainly the World War I emphasis on general education at Columbia and elsewhere was at least partly inspired by explicit democratic imperatives. And of course Dewey always insisted upon the link between education and democracy (at all levels of education). But the sort of values-oriented version of liberal education (call it Adamsish if you like) should enhance the democratic version. After all, there is no inherent conflict between democracy and meritocratic elitism, and I believe that liberal eduation should form the basis for both. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Dee Abrahamse, California State University, Long Beach: Why does the discussion of liberal education, like so many issues, focus on the dichotomy between major research universities and small liberal arts colleges? The largest number of students will graduate from comprehensive universities, and it is here that the focus of the future of the liberal arts will succeed or fail. Will these universities adopt research models with over-specialized curriculum, or will they become national leaders in championing new models of liberal education for undergraduates? Stanley N. Katz: This is an important question, and a number of respondents have asked related questions. My article focuses on research universities only because I am a fish that swims in that particular pond. But I know that there are other fish and other ponds, and they are equally important. But I know a lot less about them, and do not want to pretend more than I actually know. My strong impression is that liberal education is alive and well in the four year liberal arts colleges, although it is clear that they have a multiplicity of different approaches. I believe that the most selective of the colleges have the easiest time in being self-determining as to their curricula, and therefore as to the extent to which they can explore different strategies for achieving liberal arts education. Wonderful work is being done here. But I think the less selective colleges have a big problem with vocationalism, since job training is what parents (and students) want, and since a diploma from a lesser known college may not be perceived as being as intrinsically valuable as one from the best known and most selective colleges. Ernie Boyer pointed this out some time ago. Ernie was very enthusiastic about the general or comprehensive universities. I have done a little work with a couple of networks of these institutions, and from that experience I know that many of them are seriously committed to liberal education (as well as to vocational and disciplinary approaches). I think in some ways they may be doing better work than the research universities, in part because faculty disciplinary professionalism is a less dominant influence on faculty behavior and administration response. I think we need a lot more empirical information to be sure. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Richard Guarasci,President , Wagner College: Given the impressive list of curricular innovations, such as learning communities experiential and service learning as well as many new pedagogical classroom strategies, are large universities monitoring the newest and successful practices at the smaller liberal arts colleges where curricular effeciency and substantive learning are prized? Are the different sectors talking with and learning from each other? Stanley N. Katz: I do not really know the answer, but I suspect that to ask this question is to suggest that they are not. That would be my guess. I think you point to something important in higher education, and that is what I take to be an increasing fragmentation of the different levels of higher education with a consequent difficulty of communicating across the levels -- much less moving across. It would be worth a serious study, but my hunch is that we as faculty are now even more compartmentalized in particular types of educational structures than we were a generation ago. More important, it is currently so hard to import new curricular strategies into any large institution that even better ideas might not solve the problem. Of course, if there are presidents like you who care, that would make a decisive difference on their campuses! SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Jack Meacham, University at Buffalo, SUNY: Stanley Katz raises the question of whether research universities can purport to offer undergraduates a liberal education. I would rephrase the question to ask whether ANY college or university can purport to offer undergraduates a liberal education. Katz concerns himself primarily with how liberal education has been defined. My concern is primarily with whether we will be able to find any qualified professors to provide the liberal education curriculum, regardless of how defined, to today's students. Our nation's research universities have largely abandoned their commitment to liberal education and now train doctoral students--and the coming generations of assistant professors--only narrowly within sub-disciplines. These newer, younger generations of professors have had no exposure to a liberal education in their own education. They have no conception of what a liberal education might entail, of how to construct and maintain a liberal education curriculum, or of how to engage their students as Thomas Kuhn did so well for Stanley Katz. The transmission of the vision and reality of liberal education from professor to student, who then becomes a professor, has been broken. How can we restart this cycle? If our nation's four-year liberal-arts colleges truly wish to offer their students a liberal education, they must join together and insist to the research universities that they will no longer hire new doctorates who are narrowly trained and poorly educated. We must work together to transform the graduate programs at our nation's research universities so that those who aspire to teach will themselves have been the beneficiaries of a liberal education. My question: Is Princeton University graduating any doctorates who are truly prepared to provide undergraduates with a liberal education? If not, what can Princeton University do to strengthen its doctoral training programs? Stanley N. Katz: A fair question. I said in an earlier response that one of the answers has to be revamped doctoral education, one that both includes a serious commitment to training for teaching and a commitment to taking a generous ("liberal"?) view of graduate disciplinary training. One of our problems has been excessively specialized and narrow training and dissertation topics. But, as you suggest, it is a vicious cycle that we are in. I think that many institutions, especially liberal arts colleges (where many research u. PhD students go)are insisting more on teaching experience, curricular imagination, and breadth of view. We in the research universities need that pressure -- if faculty know they need to train their students differently to get them jobs, I think they will begin to do it. But it is slow. This is another issue, but I think we also need educational leaders to lead on this subject -- and speak out on the sorts of teachers we need to be training in the best universities. Where is Larry Summers when we need him? SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Raymond Rodrigues, Skidmore: Could part of our difficulty in trying to determine how a liberal education would be achieved lie in our perceiving "general education" or "the core" or any other appropriate term as a foundation, a beginning? What if we were to attempt to conceive a liberal education as the result of an undergraduate education rather than the foundation for one? Then we would assess whether students had acquired a liberal education at the end of their four (or six or ten) years. Few faculty own general education, but all are committed to their disciplines. Wouldn't viewing a liberal education as the sum total of one's education do more to involve the disciplines, even granting the focus upon research in one's field? Stanley N. Katz: I understand, and what you are suggesting is enormously important if we are to take outcome assessment for undergraduate education seriously. In some sense, of course, all four years count. Agreed. But I confess that I am focused on the first two years, give or take, because I suspect that from the point of view of cognitive development what we do early on makes a decisive difference to longer term outcomes. But I am sypathetic to efforts to liberalize the last two years, especially with capstone seminars and the like. This needs more attention. _________________________________________________________________ Question from Frank Forman, U.S. Department of Education: I very much appreciate your making the distinction between content and cognitive process. I am very much a process man myself. I have asked countless adults to recall the quadratic formula they supposedly learned in the ninth grade. Almost no one can. The same forgetting is almost as true of other subjects. So why go to school beyond the eighth grade? Process is answer: you learn how to think. Alas, this is almost impossible to measure, so school reform continues to emphasize stuffing more content into kids heads. Let me ask you what a nearly pure process education would be like. I'm thinking of an eight-semester critical thinking curriculum. You can't get a semester's course in medicine, but if you did, students would learn about the *process* of diagnosing failure in a complex system. A semester's course in law would be about the process of making fine distinctions (legal vs. illegal). Economics is about keeping cost and choice uppermost in mind. Engineering is about making do with rules of thumb. Marxism is about group struggle. Add or substitute your own. Archeology uses everything. In fact, life uses everything. How does this sequence sound to you as part of a liberal education? (Disclaimer: I'm not speaking for the U.S. Dept. of Education.) Stanley N. Katz: I am a process guy, and I am in substantial agreement. But I think there is a nexus between process and content. It is not so obvious with the quadratic equation (I think I still remember!), but it is certainly true in much or most of science, social science and humanities. Process is what helps us learn about content, and we do internalize, criticize and reuse content. I think the dialectic between process and content is what forms the core of liberal education. I take it that this is what Lee Shulman and Howard Gardner are talking about when they speak of the importance of content knowledge in cognition. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Naomi F. Collins, Consultant: How can the concept and content of liberal education be expanded to incorporate a global perspective? That is, how might liberal arts fields incorporate a broader vision; and how mightliberal arts methods and approaches be "used" to provide a broader perspective on the impact of globalization (that that provided by business, market, and economic approaches and forces)? Stanley N. Katz: Well, Naomi, I would not privilege "globalization" anymore than I would privilege "diversity," although I would think of diversity as a value and globalization as a social process (that needs to be studied and understood). I cannot imagine that a rich portfolio of general education courses would not contain a great deal of material on globalization, starting with approaches to global history, and coming up to present developments. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Karen Winkler: If simply reforming the undergraduate curriculum will no longer provide quality undergraduate education in the modern research university, where would you start to make changes? Stanley N. Katz: Nasty question, Karen. In my dream world I would of course create "Liberal U.," where everything would work according to my principles and ideas. But that is not going to happen. I am an incrementalist. I think on most campuses it will be the actions of small numbers of faculty who create courses or small curricular structures to embody the ideas of liberal and general education who will make the difference. And I am committed to the notion that we need to reimagine graduate doctoral education significantly in order to recruit and train the sorts of PhDs who will understand and commit to general education in their teaching careers. We have, of course, a chicken and egg problem here, but a prestigious university with a few departments committed to this sort of program could get away with it -- and they could place their students. This is incrementalist, but it would be a good place to start. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Cyrus Veeser, Bentley College: Dr. Katz identifies two developments affecting undergraduate education--structural changes in research universities, and the explosion of knowledge in science, social science, and humanities over the past century. His article is pessimistic about the ability of universities to "recenter" undergrad education given the "breadth and complexity of the intellectual content students now confront." Is that endgame? Or does he have some hope that an "essential core of knowledge" relevant to students in the early 21st century could be devised? Stanley N. Katz: It surely is not the endgame. I am not THAT pessimistic! But I do think we need some new strategies for breaking out of the current dilemma. I think that many of them have already been developed in smaller institutions, especially four year colleges. We need to think which strategies make sense for particular institutions, and how to institutionalize them. We have adopted useful new strategies recently, the freshman seminar's recent popularity being a good example -- but we have not tied the institutional innovation to pedagogical content innovation. I think that is the frontier to which we have to address ourselves now. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Michael Davis, Illinois Institute of Technology: There is justified concern that undergraduate education tends to be too narrow, too dominated by "the major". The way to resolve that problem is simply to limit the number of courses that can be taken in any one department or that a department can require of its majors (or both). Why assume that, in addition, there is a need for a set curriculum for all students? "Liberal education" seems to be a sort of non-major major. What evidence is there that such requirements actually achieve anything, much less that they achieve what they purportedly aim at? Should not the burden of proof lie with those who claim the right to direct the lives of others? Stanley N. Katz: A straightforward answer would be that we have for a century or more experimented with non-structured education. Charles Eliot's elective system paved the way, after all. More recently Brown University and many colleges have versions of low-structure approaches. I would guess (but do not know) that this is effective for some students. But on the whole I think there is a lot to be said for a combination of reasonably deep knowledge (the major)and broad knowledge/process (general education) in preparing a liberally educated young person. That is the balance that American higher education had arrived at by the 1960s, in my judgement, and I think there was a lot to be said for it. But, like everything else, it needs to be reinvented to be suitable to current challenges. The answer cannot simply be to go back. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from W. Jones,Texas A&M: Should diversity education be a part of the new Core curriculm? Stanley N. Katz: At the risk of being thought a curmudgeon, I don't think so. At least not in the sense I suspect you intend. "Diversity" is surely a value in any approach to general education. But diversity as a contemporary social value does not need to be singled out from other values, in my view. Insofar as institutions want structural approaches to promoting diversity (and I favor this), it can and should be done through various kinds of modeling and institutional arrangements. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Malcolm Scully (Moderator): We have about 20 minutes left. Keep your questions coming. Malcolm Scully _________________________________________________________________ Question from Michael G. Hall, U. of Texas at Austin: Could we not raise large issues by insisting on the world history context of the usual history topics? For example, Jamestown could serve as an entryway for discussion of Europe's ongoing encounter with primitive people, the onset and demise of African slavery, comparative New World colonization, the world capitalist system, changes in poliical assumptions from James I to George III, and change from Renaissance to Enlightenment. All these are conexts of Virgina's colonial history. Stanley N. Katz: Hi, Michael. Of course! I think that World History is an excellent example of new/old approaches to the revivification of liberal education. World history uses new techniques and traditional historical techniques, but it reveals things that traditional national/chronological history cannot. There are, I feel sure, comparable opportunities in most fields. My own passion at the moment is for comparison -- an old and difficult technique, but one that helps both teachers and students see old configurations in new ways. I am sure you would agree. Like you, I started out in early American history. I now study transitions to democracy in the contemporary world, but having studied Jamestown has given me an enornmous intellectual leg-up in what I am now trying to do. Best, SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Roger W. Bowen, AAUP: In your CHE article, you suggest that it will be difficult to make "qualitative judgments" about curriculum reform "unless we are safely beyond the conflicts of the culture wars..." and add that this "seems problematic at the current moment in American history." Why do the culture wars continue to plague higher education; and what should educators be doing to put an end to the "wars"? Stanley N. Katz: I wish I knew, Roger. Universities are, as you know, part of society, and we live in a very conflicted society. At the moment I am very concerned with the sort of identity politics that is disrupting so many universities in different ways. Take three examples -- Harvard, Columbia and Colorado. We will work these problems out, but they are deep and difficult. That is one side of the problem. The other is the extent to which so many university faculty distance themselves from anything other than their own disciplinary (or, more likely, subdisciplinary) world. They cannot engage the problems most likely to be urgent for undergraduate students -- and they are not likely to be much interested in addressing larger educational problems. So we are caught between overly-intense involvement, and overly-distanced non-involvement. But in the end the universities are here to train people to maintain the democracy, and we have to keep reminding ourselves of that fact. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from Neal Gill and Russell Brickey, Purdue University: Does the proliferation of cyber-culture, particularly at research institutions, make it even more difficult to pursue liberal arts instruction? In other words, how might we encourage a more deliberative, reflective process in our students while they are being constantly bombarded by the immediate and sensational nature of the online experience? Stanley N. Katz: Well, I would say just the opposite. We need to speak to students in the languages to which they respond. I am experimenting myself with teaching on the web and using technology (though I am a novice), and I think there are many exciting possiblities. The digital humanities offer tremendous opportunities to teachers, and the same is true in other fields. The problem is frequently that institutions do not provide the equipment, technical support or reward for faculty to learn and use such approaches. I think we need to incorporate cyber-learning into the mix of liberal education, and I think we can improve liberal education as we do. _________________________________________________________________ Question from Scott Mattoon, Choate Rosemary Hall: How influential is the current Advanced Placement program in high schools in the shaping (or limiting) of liberal education at the university level? Despite the dependence of high schools on university admissions requirements, do universities feel bound in any way to the kind of curriculum and enterprise espoused by the AP program? Stanley N. Katz: Well, I think one of the places the system of higher education is failing us is in building transitions between high school and college. The College Board was originally built to address that problem in a thoughtful and systematic way, but it is not clear to me that it is capable of doing that anymore. This, I think, is both the fault of the CB itself and of the dramatic changes in student population and institutional proliferation. The AP exam and AP courses were meant to enhance the relationship between school and college, but I worry that they are now simply upping the pressure in school without doing much to enhance student experience in college. To the extent that AP course provide elite challenges in the schools (and provide teachers with breathing room intellectually), they can be a very good thing. But to the extent that they are simply an expensive hurdle, and tie students into very traditional disciplinary approaches, they are not necessarily a good thing for liberal education at the tertiary level. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from robin.v.catmur at dartmouth.edu: In the face of burgeoning research priorities held by "Colleges" (Universities), it is tempting to sacrifice general education to the lure of faculty generated research dollars, scientific PR coups, and reams of peer-reviewed published articles. My first question is institution-specific: if Professor Katz is familiar with Dartmouth College, would he agree or disagree that we manage to walk this tightrope fairly well, compared to others, and to what does he attribute our successes (or, our lack of success, if he disagrees)? Second, what would he propose as the alternative to allowing and even encouraging certain specializations ("majors or concentrations, by any other name) when the undergraduates themselves place a high value on the exposures and opportunities afforded within a liberal arts College "surrounded" by a significant research institution? "The content of knowledge appropriate to our...society", as Professor Katz says, is in fact determined in no small part by what the students want and need, in order to succeed post-graduation in a significantly different world, is it not? Thank you - Robin Catmur Dartmouth College Stanley N. Katz: I am a great admirer of Dartmouth, Robin. In fact the original draft of this article was prepared for a conference on liberal education hosted by Prof. Jonathan Crewe at your humanities center last fall. I think that Dartmouth has an enormous advantage, one that it has seized, in its size. It is simply easier with a moderately sized student body and faculty, to keep things in perspective and under control. It also requires enlightened leadership, which you have had in your presidents for some time. Dartmouth is a great liberal arts college, and has used its resources well. But it is a different question about specialization. Majors serve many students well, but in the ideal I would rather see the option of special created specializations to suit the interests/needs of particular students. A start on that is the current programs focused on problems, not disciplines -- Afro-Am, Women's Studies and the like. But we could also encourage more free-form problem clusters for students interested in poverty, and other discrete issues. This is harder to administer than the current set of majors, and would require new faculty arrangments. But it is not beyond our capacities to be much more flexible in the last two years of college. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Question from ME Madigan, grad student, Univ Neb Lincoln: Is the effort to continue to serve the public good creating a push for all of us to become more vocational? Stanley N. Katz: I don't think it has to. The "public good" is served by the creation of independent, critically thinking and creative people. The historical aim of liberal education is to prepare students for democratic citizenship, and Dewey and others believed that general education was the best way to do that. So do I. This is not to say that someone who majors in a vocational subject cannot be a good citizen, but it is to say that if that person is also liberally educated (no contradiction), she will be an even better citizen. I really believe that. SNK _________________________________________________________________ Malcolm Scully (Moderator): We've come to the end of our allotted time. Many thanks to Professor Katz and to all those who submitted questions. I'm sorry we couldn't get to all of them. Clearly Professor Katz has raised a crucial issue, and we appreciate the thoughtfulness of the questions and the answers. References 43. http://chronicle.com/free/v51/i30/30b00601.htm From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 14:58:29 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 09:58:29 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Rafal Smigrodzki: Neuroscience twist in Schiavo case Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2005 21:47:37 -0800 From: Rafal Smigrodzki To: wta-talk at transhumanism.org Subject: [wta-talk] Neuroscience twist in Schiavo case Quoting "Hughes, James J." : >> A bioethicist friends notes: >> >> According to Judge Greer's order, one of the affidavits in the last >> motion (along the affidavits about Terri Schiavo's alleged vocalization >> of March 18, which, as the Judge points out, was not mentioned in the >> motion of March 23) is from an unnamed "inventor of a technological >> device that detects brainwaves and translates them to words." The >> affidavit, according to the order, "described a device that would >> allegedly permit a person such as Terri Schiavo to communicate "using >> the modulated equivalent of prevocalized thoughts" which would then be >> translated into words using pattern recognition software." Rafal: So far it is impossible to use EEG for vocalization or thought-reading, although a limited form of control through EEG (e.g. moving a cursor) has been achieved in persons with normal EEG. According to the court testimony, Schiavo has a non-reactive, very low-voltage EEG. So we have a double whammy - a guy claiming to achieve from non-existent input an output which so far was impossible to derive even from a high-quality input. Total bunk. Rafal From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 14:59:35 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 09:59:35 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] WP: Turning on DeLay Message-ID: Turning on DeLay http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A9109-2005Mar29 By Howard Kurtz Washington Post Staff Writer Tuesday, March 29, 2005; 8:37 AM In media terms, it's an earthquake almost as loud as Walter Cronkite turning against the Vietnam War. Tom DeLay has got to be thinking: Et tu, Wall Street Journal? Let's be clear: The Journal's editorial page, champion of conservatives and scourge of liberals, has a biblical quality for many on the right. They look to it for guidance, if not divine inspiration. And the page, run by Paul Gigot after the long reign of Robert Bartley, does not come from the we-believe-this-but-the-other-side-has-a-good-point school. In sharp, sometimes caustic language, it almost always backs conservatives and Republicans over liberals and Democrats. The Journal ran so many anti-Clinton editorials on Whitewater that they were turned into several books. Which is why yesterday's editorial slapping the Texas congressman is likely to reverberate for some time to come, and perhaps embolden DeLay's critics. The Republican Party has been solidly behind DeLay (except for the likes of the former House ethics chairman who got bounced by the leadership after the panel admonished the majority leader three times last year). The Washington Post, New York Times and Los Angeles Times have written numerous pieces about ethics allegations involving DeLay, from fundraising questions (three of his associates are under indictment back home) to lobbyist-financed foreign junkets. But it hasn't been much of a television story--too complicated and all that--and conservative commentators haven't really broken ranks, until now. The Journal editorial summarizes what it calls the "rap sheet" against DeLay: The earlier citations, such as offering to endorse then-congressman Nick Smith's son for office if Smith would vote for the Medicare prescription drug bill. The fundraising probe by a Texas prosecutor (a "partisan Democrat"). The junkets, such as one to the Northern Marianas Islands with lobbyist-under-investigation Jack Abramoff, who represented the garment industry there. And guess what? DeLay later led an effort to extend the Islands' exemption from U.S. immigration and labor laws. "By now," says the Journal, "you have surely read about House Majority Leader Tom DeLay's ethics troubles. Probably, too, you aren't entirely clear as to what those troubles are--something to do with questionable junkets, Indian casino money, funny business on the House Ethics Committee, stuff down in Texas. In Beltway-speak, what this means is that Mr. DeLay has an 'odor': nothing too incriminating, nothing actually criminal, just an unsavory whiff that could have GOP loyalists reaching for the political Glade if it gets any worse. "The Beltway wisdom is right. Mr. DeLay does have odor issues. Increasingly, he smells just like the Beltway itself." It gets more pungent as it goes on: "The problem, rather, is that Mr. DeLay, who rode to power in 1994 on a wave of revulsion at the everyday ways of big government, has become the living exemplar of some of its worst habits. Mr. DeLay's ties to Mr. Abramoff might be innocent, in a strictly legal sense, but it strains credulity to believe that Mr. DeLay found nothing strange with being included in Mr. Abramoff's lavish junkets. "Nor does it seem very plausible that Mr. DeLay never considered the possibility that the mega-lucrative careers his former staffers Michael Scanlon and [Ed] Buckham achieved after leaving his office had something to do with their perceived proximity to him. These people became rich as influence-peddlers in a government in which legislators like Mr. DeLay could make or break fortunes by tinkering with obscure rules and dispensing scads of money to this or that constituency. Rather than buck this system as he promised to do while in the minority, Mr. DeLay has become its undisputed and unapologetic master as Majority Leader. "Whether Mr. DeLay violated the small print of House Ethics or campaign-finance rules is thus largely beside the point. His real fault lies in betraying the broader set of principles that brought him into office, and which, if he continues as before, sooner or later will sweep him out." Hmmm. Maybe I mixed things up and this was actually a New York Times editorial. DeLay emerged as a champion of keeping Terri Schiavo alive, in what some critics said was an attempt to deflect attention from his own problems. Here's a [3]NYT report on the latest strange twist in that case: "The parents of Terri Schiavo have authorized a conservative direct-mailing firm to sell a list of their financial supporters, making it likely that thousands of strangers moved by her plight will receive a steady stream of solicitations from anti-abortion and conservative groups. "'These compassionate pro-lifers donated toward Bob Schindler's legal battle to keep Terri's estranged husband from removing the feeding tube from Terri,' says a description of the list on the Web site of the firm, Response Unlimited, which is asking $150 a month for 6,000 names and $500 a month for 4,000 e-mail addresses of people who responded last month to an e-mail plea from Ms. Schiavo's father. 'These individuals are passionate about the way they value human life, adamantly oppose euthanasia and are pro-life in every sense of the word!' "Privacy experts said the sale of the list was legal and even predictable, if ghoulish." Have the Dems been ducking on Schiavo? That's a smart move, says the New Republic's [4]Michelle Cottle: "With public sentiment against religious conservatives and their GOP lapdogs, some prominent liberals--including columnists Maureen Dowd and Richard Cohen--have been grumbling about the Dems' failure to take a tough stand on this issue. Democrats are being urged to bash Republicans for exploiting a private tragedy, for hypocritically abandoning their typical obsession with states' rights, and for, as Dowd sees it, pushing to turn this great republic into an intolerant theocracy. If ever they hope to shed their image as quivering girly men, so the argument goes, the Democratic Party cannot stand around letting Republicans hog the spotlight on an issue where most Americans disagree with them. "Bad advice. Terrible. Political madness. Regardless of what the polls show, Terri Schiavo is a no-win issue for Democrats, and their best course of action is to lie low and wait for the media storm to pass. "For starters, this issue offers none of the emotional oomph for the Democrats' base that it does for Republicans'. As politically self-serving as they may look to you and me, Tom DeLay et al. are storing up major brownie points with social conservatives for this impassioned display of their commitment to the 'culture of life.' Unfortunately, Democrats, by contrast, are unlikely to set many moderate or liberal hearts aflutter by blathering on about spousal rights, the sanctity of the courts, or even privacy rights. Such talk comes across as too wonkish, too legalistic, too much like John Kerry. And while the right to die may be a worthy cause, is it really something to be championed at this particular moment by a party already freaked out about its morally relativistic if not downright godless image? "What's more, while the made-for-TV theatrics of the 'Save Terri' folks have made them an easy object of ridicule for non-conservatives, the reality is that there are enough questions about Michael Schiavo's behavior over the past decade to make you wonder if he's really the sort of hero a political party should hitch its wagon to." In Slate, [5]Michael Crowley says one group of Republicans are no longer superheroes: "To them, pay-as-you-go is a means of restoring sanity to the budget. They are the Senate's plucky band of Republican moderates: Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island, Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe of Maine, and John McCain of Arizona. "In recent years these moderates have become heroes to Democrats -- paragons of conscience and bravery -- and pariahs to conservatives -- heretic "Daschle Republicans." As the GOP has moved to the right, the moderates have struggled valiantly to stand firm in the center, voting repeatedly with Democrats on key issues. I've heard some Democrats fawningly dub them the Fantastic Four, after the team of comic-book superheroes who unwittingly acquired supernatural powers from the cosmic ray of a solar flare. OK, McCain may not be much like the Thing, Chafee isn't as hot as the Human Torch, and neither Collins nor Snowe would want to be dubbed the Invisible Woman (crafty as she was!). But by the standards of hyper-partisan Washington, there has been something almost supernatural about the way these senators defy their party's aggressive right wing on behalf of their principles. In the recent past, the Fantastic Four have been a useful check on congressional GOP excesses. Of late, however, their powers are waning. "Hopes were high for last week's pay-as-you-go vote, because the moderates succeeded in pushing through just such a measure a year ago. Rather than accede then to pay-as-you-go rules, furious GOP leaders opted for the spectacle of passing no budget resolution at all. It was a significant moral and public-relations victory for the mod squad. But this year things were different. When pay-as-you-go came to a Senate vote again last week, it failed to pass despite the intense efforts of the Fantastic Four. That's one of several defeats the moderates have suffered recently. Last week, when the Senate defeated an effort to block oil drilling in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, the moderates voted with the Democrats once again, and once again it didn't matter. Most tellingly, perhaps, it looks increasingly likely that the mods won't be able to stop the most radical move the Senate has seen in years: the Republican push to deploy the 'nuclear option' that would rewrite Senate rules to end filibusters of judicial nominees." Here's what I consider a troubling court ruling, from the [6]Los Angeles Times. I'm the first to say that journalists shouldn't be able to quote Person A libeling Person B without proof, but what if it's said in a public proceeding? "The Supreme Court refused Monday to shield the news media from being sued for accurately reporting a politician's false charges against a rival. Instead, the justices let stand a Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling that a newspaper can be forced to pay damages for having reported that a city councilman called the mayor and the council president 'liars,' 'queers' and 'child molesters.' "The case turned on whether the 1st Amendment's protection for the freedom of the press includes a 'neutral reporting privilege.' Most judges around the nation have said the press does not enjoy this privilege. . . . "The case that reached the high court began 10 years ago when the Daily Local News in West Chester, Pa. printed a story entitled, 'Slurs, Insults drag town into controversy.' It reported that the City Council in nearby Parkesburg had been torn apart by shouting matches and fistfights. The most outspoken councilman was William T. Glenn Sr. In comments during the meeting and in an interview with a news reporter, Glenn referred to Mayor Alan Wolfe and Councilman James Norton as 'liars' and a 'bunch of draft dodgers.'" Glenn "also strongly suggested that they were homosexuals who had put themselves 'in a position that gave them an opportunity to have access to children.' When asked to respond, Norton was quoted as saying: 'If Mr. Glenn has made comments as bizarre as that, then I feel very sad for him, and I hope he can get the help he needs.'" The Supreme Court set no precedent by declining the case. Ah, but which part was during the interview, when the reporter should have exercised some restraint? And what do they put in the water in West Chester, Pa.? John Hinderaker of Powerline has a new piece up, this one in the [7]Weekly Standard, challenging the media reports that Schiavo talking points were distributed to Republican senators. He says I erred in saying that he posted on his blog some comments from an anonymous ABC staffer; Hinderaker says he simply promised not to use the person's name. If you're a tabloid editor, your heart is racing over the latest turn in the Michael Jackson case, as the [8]New York Post reports: "The judge in Michael Jackson's child-molestation trial yesterday dropped a "nuclear bomb" on the star's stunned defense -- allowing evidence that would allegedly link Jacko to sexual acts involving five boys, including actor Macaulay Culkin. "One of the five purported victims -- the son of Jacko's ex-maid -- is set to testify that the Gloved One laid more than a friendly glove on him, twice fondling him outside his clothing and once thrusting his hands down the boy's pants, prosecutors said. "Culkin, however, the former child star of 'Home Alone' fame, has repeatedly denied that he was ever molested by Jackson." Jackson would have been well advised to stay home alone. How much do you want to know about the personal lives of your friendly neighborhood bloggers? The Washington Monthly's [9]Kevin Drum reveals a bit of himself with this post: "I've long felt that occasionally mixing in personal blogging with purely news-driven blogging is useful because it provides my readers with a better perspective of who I am and whether or not they should care what I have to say. It's also fun. This why you get catblogging here, as well as random pet peeve blogging, TV blogging, and linguistic blogging. These posts almost always provoke a few comments from people who want to know why I'm wasting their time with this stuff when GEORGE BUSH IS BUSY TURNING AMERICA INTO A FASCIST STATE! -- but that's the whole point. If this kind of thing makes you think I'm not a serious person, then this probably isn't a blog you should bother reading. "On the other hand, we all draw different limits around our lives -- and that includes limits around the amount of rage and frustration we're willing to expose. Like Prof B, I suffer from chronic depression, though, also like Prof B, it's obviously not debilitating. It just sucks. And while I'm not sure what choices she's made in her non-anonymous life, I chose long ago to mention this very seldom and to very few people. (If you're not sure why, go ahead and let your boss know that you're a chronic depressive and see what happens. For many people, their careers would be over.) I know from experience that my moods change, and while my mood is never what you'd call ebullient, the depressive cycles always eventually give way to something that's at least neutral. While I'm in a down cycle, though, I'm very conscious that I'm in the grip of bad brain chemistry, and my way of coping is to keep myself under very tight control. Don't react. Minimize human contact. Under no circumstances lose control of my temper. "Is this the right choice? I don't know. But it's the one I've made. And it does affect my blogging. For the most part, I keep an even tone because that's just what comes naturally to me, but other times it's a struggle." Speaking of which, I didn't get much sleep last night and am feeling cranky. . . . From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 15:01:47 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 10:01:47 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Replies to Brooks: So Long, Mets? Think '69. '86. Think Again. Message-ID: The New York Times > Opinion > So Long, Mets? Think '69. '86. Think Again. (5 Letters) http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/opinion/l31brooks.html March 31, 2005 To the Editor: Re "Whose Team Am I On?," by David Brooks (column, March 29): Like Mr. Brooks, I immigrated to Washington from New York many years ago, carrying with me a passion for the New York Mets. As a child growing up in the 1970's, I became accustomed to watching the likes of Willie Monta?ez and Steve Henderson bumble their way through season after hapless season. In 1977, I cried when the Mets traded Tom Seaver. Those tears turned to joy nine years later when Mookie Wilson's ground ball saved our season. I was sad to read that Mr. Brooks sees Washington's grass as greener than Shea Stadium's and is ready to abandon the Mets for the promise of the Nationals. Troubled by the Mets' loss of innocence through big-player signings and bad-player signings, he sees a fresh start with the Nats. A fling with the Nats will not ease his pain, because the Mets' problems are emblematic of the problems of all professional sports - prima donna players and greedy and detached owners. So, Mr. Brooks, have your fling. At day's end, though, your cheating heart will return to your first and only true love. James I. Menapace Gaithersburg, Md., March 29, 2005 o To the Editor: To answer David Brooks, there is nothing wrong or unusual about adopting the team of your "new" locale (the Washington Nationals) as your own, even though you fear it is a betrayal of your first baseball love (the New York Mets). You grew up at a magic time, and the 1969 Mets were a magic team. That magic will never leave you. It hasn't left me, and I grew up in San Diego. You will root for the Nationals on some level, even a very loyal and emotional one. But you will not betray the Mets, because you cannot. Your deepest love will always be with those magic Mets, and that girl you proposed to in 1986, on the 40th win. Patrick Gorse Pasadena, Calif., March 30, 2005 o To the Editor: When I was 7, my family moved from Boston to Seattle. My father encouraged me to drop my loyalty to the miserable Red Sox and transfer it to the more miserable Mariners. The Mariners proved as adept as the Red Sox at blowing leads and failing to translate winning seasons into post-season success. They spent the first decade we lived in Seattle at the bottom, cheered on by a few half-hearted fans in the concrete tomb of the Kingdome. We still consider ourselves heroic martyrs for not having dumped them years ago. In this spirit, I say to David Brooks: Devote yourself to the Washington Nationals. No doubt they will stink at first. Lackluster crowds seem assured. You will be one of the few, the proud, who actually root for this ridiculous expansion venture. But when the team finally makes it to the World Series, you and your kids will be able to say, "We were there." Ariela Migdal Kibbutz Maale Gilboa, Israel March 29, 2005 o To the Editor: Abandon the New York Mets? David Brooks, say it isn't so! Do you really think the Washington Nationals will embody anything more than a transplanted team in a transplanted capital, peopled by citizens transplanted from everywhere else? The Nats will never be authentic, in the same way that D.C. bagels and pizza will never be authentic. They'll be soulless and drifting in a city that has never found its soul and drifts only right or left. But ... I, too, am a Mets-loving Washington immigrant from the New York City area. And I, too, am feeling that tug to accept my place in the D.C. community by switching loyalties to the Nationals. How can I even entertain this disloyal notion? I still want my Piazza with my pizza. But I will adapt, buy a hat and cheer for the Nats. After 11 years, the D.C. bagels aren't so bad anymore. Theresa L. Raphael Olney, Md., March 29, 2005 o To the Editor: Such is the relationship that conservatives have with "ideals." First the G.O.P. ended its long embrace of the "ideal" of a balanced budget, then it began to selectively overlook the "ideal" of states' rights - and now this. Go figure. Marshall Gilinsky New York, March 29, 2005 From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 15:13:05 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 10:13:05 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Answering Islam: The Great Scientific Miracles and Discoveries in the Noble Quran and Islam. Message-ID: The Great Scientific Miracles and Discoveries in the Noble Quran and Islam. http://www.answering-islam.com/sci_quran.htm [It is wonderful to know that the Noble Quran confirms that the earth is rotating around its axle. It would be best to click on the URL to get graphics.] Allah Almighty promising to show us His Miracles in the outside Universe and in our Embryology: "We will soon show them Our signs in the Universe and INSIDE THEIR SELVES, until it will become quite clear to them that it is the truth. Is it not sufficient as regards your Lord that He is a witness over all things? (The Noble Quran, 41:53)" Very Important Discovery: A new star forming out of a cloud of gas and dust (nebula), which is one of the remnants of the "smoke" that was the origin of the whole universe. (The Space Atlas, Heather and Henbest, page 50) Allah Almighty said: "Then He turned to the heaven when it was smoke...(The Noble Quran, 41:11)" [3]The Noble Quran on the Origin of the Universe Only Islam claims that the universe was originated from Dust and Hot Gas, or Smoke. Another Very Important Discovery: Allah Almighty Said: "And when the heaven splitteth asunder and becometh ROSY LIKE RED HIDE - (The Noble Quran, 55:37)" What Allah Almighty is Saying here is that when Galaxies explode, they form a red-rose-shaped explosion. He is also telling us that the Universe will all turn into red exploded galaxies looking like red or reddish roses when the Day of Judgement happens. In the Arabic Noble Verse, "wardatan" was translated as "ROSY" above. The root word "WARDA" in Arabic LITERALLY means "ROSE" or "FLOWER". The "tan" at the end of "wardatan" is not part of the word. It is only an Arabic PUNCTUATION that only changes the sound of the word for grammatical rules. It is pronounced as "ten", with the "a" being short. The reason why the above word was not written as "wardaten" is because in many parts of the world, the English word "ten" (number 10) is pronounced as "tin". Only the American-English pronounce the "e" as a short "a". Most of the world uses the British-English system and they pronounce the "e" as "i", and the "o" as it is, such as "stop" pronounced as "stope". The American-English pronounces the "o" as a thick "a". Also, if we were to add two Arabic characters, "alif" and "noon" at the end of "warda", it would change the pronunciation to "taan" (wardataan), and it then becomes two "wardas"; plural. **** Explosion of Galaxies can not be seen with the naked eye. It also can not be seen with regular telescopes. You need the special Government-owned and NASA-owned "Hubble Space" Super Telescope. The point from all of this is that Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him could not have come up with any of this on his own 1500 years ago! [4]The explosion of Stars (FORMING RED ROSES), Galaxies and the Universe in the Noble Quran had been confirmed by NASA. Dr. Zahlool Al-Najjar is a great Muslim Geologist and Scientist who wrote many books, publications ([7]131 publications as shown on his resume in English), and 10s of journals and reports proving many of the Noble Quranic Geological and Scientific Claims to be accurate through Modern Science and Technologies. He is well known in the Scientists community of Geology in both the US and Europe, because much of his work and research, especially during his early days of scientific research, was done in these countries while he resided and studied in them. Science in Islam: The sub sections here are: 1- Life originated from water and dust in the Noble Quran. 2- The Earth's rotation, formation, and Oceanology. 3- The Universe, Astronomy, UFOs and Space Shuttles. 4- Embryology, Human Anatomy, Formation, and Creation from the time of sexual intercourse to the time of birth. 5- The number 19 code in the Noble Quran. 6- Medicine, Insects and Animals. 7- Psychology. 8- Great Web Sites and Online Books. More great resources and web site are available online. 9- Rebuttals. 10- Prophecies. 1- Life originated from water and dust in the Noble Quran: [8]Life originated from water in the Noble Quran. [9]Life and our physical bodies originated from CLAY - The Noble Quran Claimed it and Science confirmed it! 2- The Earth's rotation, formation and Oceanology: [10]The Noble Quran confirms that the earth is rotating around its axle. [11]Allah Almighty said that the earth is "egg-shaped". [12]The Earth is round according to Islam. [13]Did the Noble Quran really say that the sun sets and rises on the earth? [14]The amazing creation of earth and iron in the Noble Quran. Iron came from space, and the Noble Quran mentioned it. [15]The 7 properties of earth in the Noble Quran and Science. Read the first section of the article. [16]Rebuttal to the "Heaven" and "Stars in the lower Heaven" in Noble Verses 37:6 and 65:12. Read the "Rebuttals" section in the article. This was an attempt to refute the fact that Allah Almighty Claimed that He Created 7 Ozone Layers as well as 7 different Heavens. [17]The dead turning into Fossils and Iron. The Noble Quran Claimed it, and Science today Confirmed it! Outside Supporting articles: [18]http://www.universalunity.net/iron.htm This article shows the Mathematical Codes of Iron in the Noble Quran and Science, and shows how Science confirmed Allah Almighty's Divine Claim in Noble Verses 17:49-50 about the dead converting into rocks and iron. In case the web site is down, you can [19]access the article on my site. [20]http://www.universalunity.net/iron2.htm More elaborations on Noble Verses 17:49-51. In case the web site is down, you can [21]access the article on my site. [22]Living Creatures were sent down from space. Science confirms the Noble Quran's Claim. [23]The amazing creation of earth and mountains in the Noble Quran. Science confirms that mountains prevent the earth from shaking while it is revolving around itself. The Noble Quran made a similar claim. [24]Geology in the Noble Quran - See the Scientific confirmation. [25]Oceanology in the Noble Quran - See the Scientific confirmation. The barriers between waters in both science and the Noble Quran. [26]The darkness of oceans and disappearance of light was mentioned in the Noble Quran and confirmed by Science. 3- The Universe, Astronomy, UFOs and Space Shuttles: [27]The amazing creation of earth and iron in the Noble Quran. Iron came from space, and the Noble Quran mentioned it. [28]Living Creatures were sent down from space. Science confirms the Noble Quran's Claim. [29]Allah Almighty talked about lack of Oxygen and painful low pressure in space. Science confirmed the Noble Quran's Divine Claim. [30]The Noble Quran and Astronomers both claim that the Universe is 18 billion years old. [31]The Big Bang Theory and the Cosmic Crunch in the Noble Quran. Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him predicted around the time when the Cosmic Crunch occurs, the Sun would rise from the West. [32]The Noble Quran on the Origin of the Universe. This article has pictures and quotes from Western scientific books that accurately confirm the astronomical claims of the Noble Quran. The Noble Quran was the only book that claimed that the universe originated from Hot Gas or Smoke. Science proved that this claim is true. [33]The explosion of Stars (FORMING RED ROSES), Galaxies and the Universe in the Noble Quran had been confirmed by NASA. [34]Comparison between Allah Almighty's claims about His Creation, and the scientific discoveries that 100% agree with Him. Claims such as: The universe is expanding, the existence of the sun's orbit, the protective atmosphere to the earth, Embryology and many more. [35]Allah Almighty said in the Noble Quran that He is "Expanding" the Universe. Scientists already proved this claim to be true. [36]The "Clot" and the Creation of the Universe in the Noble Quran. [37]Is there mention of U.F.Os or other Human Planets in the Noble Quran? [38]What does the sun orbit? [39]Einstein's time relativity in the Noble Quran. [40]UFOs and Space Shuttles were explicitly mentioned in the Noble Quran! Even the communication with UFOs was prophesied in the Noble Quran. [41]Aliens and UFOs in the Noble Quran. [42]Black Holes and Piercing Stars in the Noble Quran were confirmed by Science. 4- Embryology, Human Anatomy, Formation and Creation from the time of sexual intercourse to the time of birth: [43]The Noble Quran on Human Embryonic Development. [44]Embryology in the Noble Quran. The three stages of the fetus formation in the Noble Quran and Science. [45]Abortion in Islam is a crime! The fetus is a human child in Islam. [46]The Noble Quran on the Cerebrum: Lying is generated from the person's forehead. [47]The region in the brain that controls our movements - In Noble Quran and confirmed by Science. [48]Sex determination and human creation in Islam. Allah Almighty and Prophet Muhammad both claimed that the human gender is determined by the male's ejaculated semen. [49]Were human cloning and gender alteration prophesied in Islam? [50]Why does the Noble Quran, while speaking about determination of the identity of the individual, speak specifically about finger tips? The Noble Quran recognized that finger tips (finger prints) are unique! [51]The blood circulation and the production of milk in the Breast: In the Noble Quran and Science. [52]Breastfeeding for 2 years in the Noble Quran. Science had confirmed Islam's Divine Claims. [53]Thinking with the heart besides the brain in the Noble Quran was proven by Science. 5- The number 19 code in the Noble Quran: [54]The Miracle of the number 19 in the Noble Quran. Yes, the number 19 is miraculous in the Noble Quran and was proven to be essential in many of the Scientific Theories and Discoveries. But it doesn't at all support Rashad Khalifa's removal of two Noble Verses from the Noble Quran, and his claim to be GOD Almighty's Messenger. 6- Medicine, Insects and Animals: [55]Animals' urine and it's relationship to medicine in Islam. [56]Camels could help cure humans. [57]Honey was proven to be healing for humans as was mentioned in the Noble Quran. [58]The fly insect and its cure: Mentioned in Islam and confirmed by Science (Bacteriophages). 7- Psychology: [59]The psychological Wisdom of Prayers in Islam was proven in Science and Psychology. [60]The Wisdom of the age of 40 in the Noble Quran, which had been Scientifically and Psychologically proven to be True. See why Allah Almighty is more forgiving to those who are under the age of 40, and how Science and Psychology proved that people under 40 are less mature and tend to make more irresponsible decisions (i.e., mistakes and sins). 8- Great Web Sites: [61]http://www.it-is-truth.org/ This is an awesome web site that has Western scientific information that accurately confirms the Noble Quran's claims about astronomy, biology, geology and other sciences. [62]http://www.universalunity.net/universe.htm A great site with excellent articles that are backed quotes and proofs about science in the Noble Quran. [63]unify.jpg (61178 bytes) Brother Muhammad Asadi's web site IS RICH with irrefutable scientific facts and details that match many of the Noble Quran's Verses. He has done a wonderful job in explaining things in good details and providing detailed OBJECTIVE analysis that prove the Noble Quran's Scientific Miracles. You can visit his web site at: [64]http://www.rationalreality.com. [65]book-cover-small.jpg (13251 bytes) A great book that contains several articles backed by good Scientific references that prove several of the Noble Quran's Scientific Miracles. [66]http://www.islam-guide.com/. [68]http://www.harunyahya.com/ [69]http://www.harunyahya.com/c_refutation_darwinism.php [70]http://www.harunyahya.com/c_refutation_atheism.php [71]http://www.harunyahya.com/c_design_nature.php [72]Miracles of the Noble Quran. Video files. [73]http://www.harunyahya.com/c_miracles_quran.php [74]http://www.harunyahya.com/c_quran_archaeology.php [75]http://www.harunyahya.com/c_myth_called_matter.php [76]The Bible, the Quran and Science. Written by Dr Maurice Bucaille. In his work, Dr. Baucille proves that the Quran correctly stated scientific facts unknown at the time of the Prophet - showing its divine origin! [77]A web site for the number 19 miracle in the Noble Quran. [78]Evaluating Islam as a Religion based on Divine Revelation. [79]Quran Prior to Science and Civilization, Astro, Islam, Mlivo. [80]Black Holes and Piercing Stars in the Noble Quran were confirmed by Science. 9- Rebuttals: [81]Does the Noble Quran support "The Earth moves around the Sun" theory? Rebuttal to Mr. Avijit Roy's challenge. [82]My rebuttal to Avijit Roy's "Does the Quran support the Earth moves around the Sun theory" response. [83]My rebuttal to Avijit Roy's "Does Quran have any Scientific miracles?" article. [84]Did the Noble Quran really say that the sun sets and rises on the earth? [85]A Muslim response to criticism of Embryology in the Noble Quran. By Nadeem Arif Najmi. [86]Allah Almighty said that the earth is "egg-shaped". Rebuttal to the Christian "Answering Islam" team about "dahaha" in the Noble Quran. 10- Prophecies: Please visit [87]The Noble Quran section, and read the "Prophecies" sub section to see the great Prophecies that were fulfilled only in the Noble Quran. The Noble Quran also made mention and promised the discovery of lost ancient cities and people's bodies, and these promises were all fulfilled today. _________________________________________________________________ Please email me at [88]Osama Abdallah Back to either [89]www.aol40.com or [90]www.answering-christianity.com Both sites are exactly the same [91]Purpose of this site. You are visitor number: [92] [fastcounter?1061971+2123949] since 4/13/1999. [93]Chat with other visitors [94]Download Arabic Songs References 1. http://www.answering-islam.com/quransearch.htm 2. http://www.answering-islam.com/\%22#\" 3. http://www.answering-islam.com/the_universe.htm 4. http://www.answering-islam.com/red_galaxy.htm 5. http://www.elnaggarzr.com/ 6. http://www.elnaggarzr.com/ 7. http://www.elnaggarzr.com/CV-E.htm 8. http://www.answering-islam.com/origin_of_life.htm 9. http://www.answering-islam.com/life_from_clay.htm 10. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth_rotation.htm 11. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth_in_islam.htm 12. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth_round.htm 13. http://www.answering-islam.com/sunrise_sunset.htm 14. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth.htm 15. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth.htm 16. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth.htm 17. http://www.answering-islam.com/from_dead_to_iron.htm 18. http://www.universalunity.net/iron.htm 19. http://www.answering-islam.com/iron1.htm 20. http://www.universalunity.net/iron2.htm 21. http://www.answering-islam.com/iron2.htm 22. http://www.answering-islam.com/life_from_space.htm 23. http://www.answering-islam.com/mountains.htm 24. http://www.answering-islam.com/geology.htm 25. http://www.answering-islam.com/oceanology.htm 26. http://www.answering-islam.com/darkness_of_oceans.htm 27. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth.htm 28. http://www.answering-islam.com/life_from_space.htm 29. http://www.answering-islam.com/space_pressure_in_noble_quran.htm 30. http://www.answering-islam.com/18_billion_years.htm 31. http://www.answering-islam.com/hot_gas.htm 32. http://www.answering-islam.com/the_universe.htm 33. http://www.answering-islam.com/red_galaxy.htm 34. http://www.answering-islam.com/allah_and_science.htm 35. http://www.answering-islam.com/6_days.htm 36. http://www.answering-islam.com/clot_formation.htm 37. http://www.answering-islam.com/ufo.htm 38. http://www.answering-islam.com/sun_orbit.htm 39. http://www.answering-islam.com/time_relativity.htm 40. http://www.answering-islam.com/ufo.htm 41. http://www.answering-islam.com/aliens_in_quran.htm 42. http://www.miraclesofthequran.com/scientific_37.html 43. http://www.answering-islam.com/embryonic_development.htm 44. http://www.answering-islam.com/embryology.htm 45. http://www.answering-islam.com/abortion_is_crime.htm 46. http://www.answering-islam.com/forehead.htm 47. http://www.answering-islam.com/movement_control.htm 48. http://www.answering-islam.com/sex_determination.htm 49. http://www.answering-islam.com/creation_alteration.htm 50. http://www.answering-islam.com/fingertips.htm 51. http://www.answering-islam.com/production_of_milk.htm 52. http://www.answering-islam.com/breast_feeding.htm 53. http://www.answering-islam.com/thinking_with_heart.htm 54. http://www.answering-islam.com/fakir60/fakir60.htm 55. http://www.answering-islam.com/urine.htm 56. http://www.answering-islam.com/camels_cure_humans.htm 57. http://www.answering-islam.com/honey_healing.htm 58. http://www.answering-islam.com/hadiths_of_the_fly.htm 59. http://www.answering-islam.com/psychology_of_prayers.htm 60. http://www.answering-islam.com/mercy_of_allah.htm 61. http://www.it-is-truth.org/ 62. http://www.universalunity.net/universe.htm 63. http://www.rationalreality.com/ 64. http://www.rationalreality.com/ 65. http://www.islam-guide.com/ 66. http://www.islam-guide.com/ 67. http://www.harunyahya.com/ 68. http://www.harunyahya.com/ 69. http://www.harunyahya.com/c_refutation_darwinism.php 70. http://www.harunyahya.com/c_refutation_atheism.php 71. http://www.harunyahya.com/c_design_nature.php 72. http://www.hyahya.org/m_video_miracles_quran.php 73. http://www.harunyahya.com/c_miracles_quran.php 74. http://www.harunyahya.com/c_quran_archaeology.php 75. http://www.harunyahya.com/c_myth_called_matter.php 76. http://home.swipnet.se/islam/quran-bible.htm 77. http://numerical19.tripod.com/ 78. http://www.understanding-islam.com/related/questions.jsp?point=3&id=328 79. http://www.quranm.multicom.ba/science/astronomy.htm 80. http://www.miraclesofthequran.com/scientific_37.html 81. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth_rotation_challenge.htm 82. http://www.answering-islam.com/avijit_roy_response_rebuttal.htm 83. http://www.answering-islam.com/avijit_roy_quran_science_miracles_rebuttal.htm 84. http://www.answering-islam.com/sunrise_sunset.htm 85. http://www.answering-islam.com/nadeem_embryology.htm 86. http://www.answering-islam.com/earth_in_islam.htm 87. http://www.answering-islam.com/quran.htm 88. http://www.answering-islam.com/emailme.htm 89. http://www.aol40.com/ 90. http://www.answering-christianity.com/ 91. http://www.answering-islam.com/purpose.htm 92. http://member.linkexchange.com/cgi-bin/fc/fastcounter-login?1061971 93. http://www.answering-islam.com/chat.htm 94. http://www.answering-islam.com/music.htm From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 15:20:49 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 10:20:49 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Muslim Freethinkers: Why I Am Not a Muslim Message-ID: Why I Am Not a Muslim http://geocities.com/muslimfreethinkers/why_i_am_not_a_muslim.htm [I have started reading the book and spoke of it to the local libertarian atheist, Dean Ahmed, and he denounced the book in no uncertain terms. I brought up the manifest contradictions in the Koran, and he angrily said there are no contradictions in the Koran but that the contradictions were in me. He did not like my attacking his non-existent god! Identity, once again, proves stronger than reason.] A review of the book By Dr. Ali Sina In Why I Am Not A Muslim, Ibn Warraq, exposes the bitter truth about Islam without sugarcoating it. He is learned and his book is well documented. He lashes out at the western intellectuals who instead of condemning the assassination order of a savage man like Khomeini against Salman Rushdi, chose to criticize Rushdi for his book The Satanic Verses because it was not "politically correct". Warraq talks about the brutal treatments of all those who fell under the domination of Islam, from the time of Muhammad to the present days. He talks about the minorities, philosophers, women and slaves in Islam. Jews were massacred and exiled by Muhammad in Medina and Kheibar; their belongings were distributed among the "believers", their women and children taken as slaves. This heinous act of barbarism was repeated time and again throughout history with Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and in recent years with Ahmedies, Baha'is and other minorities in Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, India, Syria and everywhere Islam reined. Warraq talks about the origin of Islam, its pagan background and the influence of Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism on Muhammad. He talks about the origin of Allah in Arab culture, about the early days of Muhammad as a preacher and his rivalry with another storyteller "Al Nadir" and his revenge against him. Warraq traces back the origin of many Islamic rituals to Arab superstitions and Muhammad's strange belief in jinns, demons and other shadowy beings. He also describes how Muhammad rehashed the biblical nonsense about creation, Noah's Ark, birth of Christ etc. while misunderstanding a lot of it, like confusing Mary the mother of Christ with Miriam sister of Aaron, or the Christian belief in Trinity. You will learn about Muhammad's bizarre view of cosmology, science, history, and medicine. (He prescribed drinking the urine of camel as a remedy against stomachache!). Then you will learn about Muhammad's metamorphosis from preacher to despot. How his call for tolerance, when he was still in Mecca and weak changed to the cry of killing and looting when he became powerful in Medina. You will learn how Muhammad encouraged his handful of followers to attack the caravans, kill the men, rape the women and bring the booty (20% for himself) to please Allah, while assuring them that if they are killed their rewards will be "young boys", rivers of wine, and many hurries in the other world. All what Warraq says is backed by Quran and Ahadith. The reader becomes familiar with Muhammad's favorite way of eliminating his opponents, namely assassination. Asma Bint Marwan a poetess who wrote against the prophet was assassinated by his order in the middle of the night while nursing her infant. Her five small children where forced to convert to Islam. Muhammad's hit list also included Ka'b Ibn al-Ashraf and Abu Rafi who spoke against him and had to be taken out traitorously. This policy was adopted by Muslims throughout the history and is being practiced up to this day. What we call terrorism, to a Muslim is Jihad (holly war). The much-publicized fetwa against Rushdi is an example. Among other things we learn about Muhammad's preference for young girls (Ayesha was 9 years old when he consummated his "marriage" with her) rather at an advanced age and how he is unabashed to make Allah reveal Quranic verses to justify his lust for women and his sexual appetite. Warraq makes a thorough study of the totalitarian nature of Islam. He even goes as far as to compare the impact of monotheism on human rights versus polytheism and atheism. For all those who still wonder why Muslims hate so much the west I recommend reading this book. There is a whole chapter dedicated to this subject. Winwoods Reade said; "A sincerely religious man is often an exceedingly bad man" This fact applies to no one more than to Muslims. Here is the proof: "When you meet the unbelievers, strike off their heads; then when you have made wide slaughter among them, carefully tie up the remaining captives." (Quran47.4). "And when the sacred months are passed, kill those who join other gods with God [i.e. moshrekin.] wherever ye shall find them; and seize them, besiege them, and lay wait for them with every kind of ambush: but if they shall convert, and observe prayer, and pay the obligatory alms, then let them go their way, for God is Gracious, Merciful."(Quran 9:5) And as for Christians and Jews who rejected him he has this to say: "Make war upon such of those to whom the Scriptures have been given and believe not in God, or the last day, and who forbid not that which God and His Apostle have forbidden..."( Quran. 9:29) These are the injunctions of Muhammad's Gracious and Merciful God. How can a "good Muslim" disobey these explicit "divine" mandates? And how can one who observes them be a "good person"? This is the question that sincere Muslims must ask themselves. I am not insinuating that there are no good people amongst Muslims. Good and bad people are distributed in equal proportions in all nations. Yet in Islam good people are often forced to do bad things and go against their conscience. They often convince themselves that in this apparent injustice there must be a hidden wisdom that they do not understand and that God knows better. Many good people who claim to be Muslims are often ignorant of true Islam and dismiss the real orthodox Muslims as hard-liners and fundamentalists. But as Ibn Warraq in "Why I am not a Muslim" points out, unlike Christianity, Islam does not leave room for leniency and tolerance. Islam and fundamentalism are synonymous terms. You have to break the laws of Muhammad, just to keep your humanity and be good. No amount of intellectual acrobatics performed by Muslim apologists can justify the intolerant and ruthlessness of Muhammad's religion. "Why I Am Not A Muslim" is worth its weight in gold. Warraq's book by far is the best source I found on Islam. He tells the truth and pays no lip service. The book's only flaw is that it is not translated into the language of people who are victims of Islam. I am sure that will be taken care of too. Islam was established through force and bloodshed. No argument, no reason, no logic was ever given but the blade of the sword. Masses were kept in ignorance. Muslims have no knowledge of Quran and are not aware of its naivete and inhumane character. Should they read Quran in their own language and understand it, they would be disappointed to see the book, far from being a "miracle", is a hoax; poorly written, full of errors and bereft of beauty. Islam has silenced all voices of reason throughout the history. But now is a different time. The Internet, although strictly censored in Islamic countries, is becoming accessible even to Muslims. Freethinkers can write and publish without the fear of persecution. I foresee that ere long, the same devout Muslims will turn their back, against their religion and will endeavor to liberate the rest of humanity from the claws of religion in general and Islam in particular. Warraq talks about "Arab Imperialism and Islamic Colonialism". He explains eloquently how through Islam, many civilized nations lost their identity, their dignity and humanity to bow in front of a savage god of a bunch of uncultured Arabs and follow the wimps of a fanatic and schizophrenic bloodthirsty madman of Arabia. Islam is the enemy of science, of freethinking, of reason and of human rights. It acts as a powerful break on the advancement of civilization. Warraq keenly points out that "Islamic Civilization" is a contradiction in terms. You can either be Islamic or civilized. In another place he argues that also "Islamic Philosophy" is a contradiction in terms, because philosophy was regarded as a "foreign science, which led to heresy, doubt, and total unbelief". Brilliant minds like Zacharia Razi and Avicena never believed in Islam and were attacked by Muslims. More recent intellectuals and freethinkers don't fare better. For example Ali Dashti, the brilliant scholar and the author of "23 years"; a book written about Muhammad and his 23 years of prophetic life, was incarcerated while in his 80s during Khomeni's rule and died in prison. In Warraq's own words: "Thus we had the spectacle of periodic persecution of various group considered either doctrinally suspect or politically subversive; individuals (philosophers, poets, theologians, scientists, rationalists, dualists, freethinkers, and mystics) were imprisoned, tortured, crucified, mutilated, and hanged; their writings burned. Significantly, none of the heretical works of Ibn Rawandi, Ibn Warraq, Ibn al-Muqaffa, and al-Razi has survived. Other individuals are forced to flee from one ruler to another more tolerant ruler (e.g. al-Amidi). Some were exiled or banished (Averroes). Many were forced to disguise their true views and opinions by difficult or ambiguous language. Those who managed to get away with blasphemy were those protected by the powerful and influential." From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 15:35:01 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 10:35:01 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Answering Christianity: GOD Almighty supposedly Changing His Mind (abrogation) in the Bible. Message-ID: GOD Almighty supposedly Changing His Mind (abrogation) in the Bible. http://www.answering-christianity.com/abrogation_in_bible.htm [The Answering Islam site has a sister site, Answering Christianity. The article below is about contradictions in the Bible. I wonder if it's author got his material from a *Christian* freethinker site. Christians and freethinkers have be at one another, with Christians resolving the putative contradictions the freethinkers come up with (and with counterarugments thereto, for well over a century and a half. There's also a Mormon site answering the attacks other Christians level against the Saints.] "and Jehovah repenteth of the evil which He hath spoken of doing to His people." ([4]Exodus 32:14) GOD Almighty supposedly Changing His Mind (abrogation) in the Bible: The sections of this article are: 1- Irrefutable samples where GOD Almighty Changed His Mind in the Bible. 1. What saves the Bible followers? This is the most serious contradiction in the Bible. 2. Is murder of innocent people allowed or not? 3. Can a brother marry his biological sister or not? 4. Can the Bible followers work on Saturday or not? 5. Is bowing down to GOD Almighty allowed or not? 6. Can the strong and rich be punished for adultery or not? 7. Are non-Jews dogs or not? Jesus slipped and said they are, and then instantly changed his mind. Hilarious indeed! 8. Is divorce allowed or not? 2- Christians abrogating the Bible. 1. Is eating swine prohibited or not? 2. Is following the Old Testament's social laws mandatory or not? 3. Is polygamy allowed or not? 3- Conclusion. 1- Irrefutable samples where GOD Almighty Changed His Mind in the Bible: Christians often object to Allah Almighty's Divine Command in the Noble Quran for substituting His previous Divine Revelations with the Noble Quran, and for substituting some of the Divine temporary Commands that He Revealed in the Noble Quran for specific situations with newer ones: "None of Our revelations do We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar: Knowest thou not that God Hath power over all things? (The Noble Quran, 2:106)" "We ordained therein for them: "Life for life, eye for eye, nose or nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal." But if any one remits the retaliation by way of charity, it is an act of atonement for himself. And if any fail to judge by (the light of) what God hath revealed, they are (No better than) wrong-doers. (The Noble Quran, 5:45)" CAPTION: An Example of the Noble Quran Abrogating the Bible: Noble Verse 24:33 "Let those who find not the wherewithal for marriage keep themselves chaste, until God gives them means out of His grace. And if any of your slaves ask for a deed in writing (to enable them to earn their freedom for a certain sum), give them such a deed if ye know any good in them: yea, give them something yourselves out of the means which God has given to you. But force not your maids to prostitution when they desire chastity, in order that ye may make a gain in the goods of this life. But if anyone compels them, yet, after such compulsion, is God, Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful (to them)," ABROGATED: Leviticus 25:44-46 "Your male and female slaves are to come from the nations around you; from them you may buy slaves. You may also buy some of the temporary residents living among you and members of their clans born in your country, and they will become your property. You can will them to your children as inherited property and can make them slaves for life, but you must not rule over your fellow Israelites ruthlessly." Allah Almighty in the Noble Quran Commands the Muslims to free their slaves if the slaves want to be free, and to pay them money too so they can have a good jump start in life. In the Bible on the other hand, we see slaves not being allowed to be freed at all. Not only that, but they and their children must be inherited as slaves forever. Please visit: [5]Human equality and freedom in Islam Vs the Bible. Let us look at some of GOD Almighty's serious and unexplainable abrogations in the Bible: 1- What saves the Bible followers? Perhaps one of the worst and most serious contradictions that exist in the Bible is this one, because it is about Salvation! What saves the Bible followers? Righteousness alone? " "But if you do warn the wicked man and he does not turn from his wickedness or from his evil ways, he will die for his sin; but you will have saved yourself. "Again, when a righteous man turns from his righteousness and does evil, and I put a stumbling block before him, he will die. Since you did not warn him, he will die for his sin. The righteous things he did will not be remembered, and I will hold you accountable for his blood. But if you do warn the righteous man not to sin and he does not sin, HE WILL SURELY LIVE because he took warning, and you will have saved yourself." (From the NIV Bible, Ezekiel 3:19-21)" Jesus? "that everyone who believes in him may have eternal life. "For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world through him. (From the NIV Bible, John 3:15-17)" "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me. (From the NIV Bible, John 14:5-7)" Please visit: [6]Jesus GUARANTEED Paradise to all non-trinitarians. 2- One of the Bible's 10 basic Pillars, the ten commandments, says: "Thou shalt not kill. (Exodus 20:13)." Yet, we see GOD Almighty Commanding His servants to not only kill the enemy's men, but also the innocent children and non-virgin women who have not done anything to anyone: "Now kill all the boys [innocent kids]. And kill every woman who has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who has never slept with a man. (Numbers 31:17-18)" If Exodus 20:13 was supposed to be the basic pillar that prevents the Bible followers from committing murders against innocent people, then how is Numbers 31:17-18 justified then when GOD Almighty Himself nullified His own Commands and decided to kill innocent children and virgin girls perhaps by the thousands? It is most ironic that GOD Almighty prohibited ordinary murders but supposedly allowed massacres to be done by the mass!! Did you Know: Extreme fundamentalists and racists from among the Christians such as Pat Robertson and George W. Bush who could careless about who dies and who doesn't in wars from innocent people are WELL KNOWN FOR THEIR CARELESSNESS about the deaths of innocent civilians? The 100s of thousands of innocent Iraqis that died in the previous Persian Gulf wars [[7]1] [[8]2] [[9]3], and [10]the deformed Iraqi children from the US' Deplete Uranium bombs clearly and irrefutably prove this. Also, we must not forget that the biggest blood sheds and terrorism that took place throughout the world happened by Christians. World Wars I and II prove this. The white Christian race would literally wipe out nations out of the face of the earth if their interests are threatened. We also must not forget about the African slaves who were forcefully brought to the US by the Europeans and were forced to embrace the polytheist trinitarian pagan christianity to at least earn their freedom. Last and most definitely not least, we must not forget about the Native Americans (Red Indians) and how the white Christian man literally killed more than 90% of their population throughout the lands. The white Christian man is the biggest terrorist this world ever known!! 3- GOD prohibiting brothers from marrying their biological sisters after He initially allowed it for Abraham and Sarah: "And yet indeed she is my sister; she is the daughter of my father, but not the daughter of my mother; and she became my wife. (Genesis 20:12)" "Cursed be he that lieth with his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother. And all the people shall say, Amen. (Deuteronomy 27:22)" It is important to know that in the same book of Genesis, GOD Almighty did Speak directly with Abraham. For instance: Genesis 12:1-3 1 The LORD had said to Abram, "Leave your country, your people and your father's household and go to the land I will show you. 2 "I will make you into a great nation and I will bless you; I will make your name great, and you will be a blessing. 3 I will bless those who bless you, and whoever curses you I will curse; and all peoples on earth will be blessed through you." Yet, GOD never prohibited Abraham from marrying his own biological sister, Sarah! So, Deuteronomy 27:22 is indeed an abrogation to the previous Law! Please visit: [11]The Bible claims that Sarah (Isaac's mother) was Abraham's biological sister. 4- Can the Bible followers work on Saturday or not? No: "Ye shall keep the sabbath therefore; for it is holy unto you: every one that defileth it shall surely be put to death: for whosoever doeth any work therein, that soul shall be cut off from among his people. (Exodus 31:14)" "Six days may work be done; but in the seventh is the sabbath of rest, holy to the LORD: whosoever doeth any work in the sabbath day, he shall surely be put to death. (Exodus 31:15)" "Six days shall work be done, but on the seventh day there shall be to you an holy day, a sabbath of rest to the LORD: whosoever doeth work therein shall be put to death. (Exodus 35:2)" Yes: "And it was the sabbath day when Jesus made the clay, and opened his eyes. (John 9:14)" John 7:22-24 22 Moses therefore gave unto you circumcision; (not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers;) and ye on the sabbath day circumcise a man. 23 If a man on the sabbath day receive circumcision, that the law of Moses should not be broken; are ye angry at me, because I have made a man every whit whole on the sabbath day? 24 Judge not according to the appearance, but judge righteous judgment. Mark 6:1-3 1 And he went out from thence, and came into his own country; and his disciples follow him. 2 And when the sabbath day was come, he began to teach in the synagogue: and many hearing him were astonished, saying, From whence hath this man these things? and what wisdom is this which is given unto him, that even such mighty works are wrought by his hands? 3 Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joses, and of Juda, and Simon? and are not his sisters here with us? And they were offended at him. 5- Jesus compromised his own teachings regarding Prayers. He commanded his followers to Pray in a certain way and he then compromised it by bowing down to GOD Almighty. He only prostrated to GOD Almighty once during his most desperate times with his face down to the ground, while we Muslims do it everyday in our 5-daily set of Prayers. He also did the "vain repetitions" ENDLESSLY all night long while he prohibited his followers from doing it. The article is too long to post here. Therefore, please visit: [12]Jesus is a hypocrite for bowing down to GOD only during his desperate times. Islam is the only solution and salvation! It's funny that even the Jesus of the corrupt bible prayed to GOD Almighty as we Muslims do by prostrating his face down to the ground before GOD Almighty. The difference between the Jesus of the bible and the Muslims, however, is that we Muslims Glorify and Honor GOD Almighty through prostrating to Him at least in 5-daily sets of Prayers everyday. The Jesus of the corrupt bible on the other hand was a hypocrite who only bowed down to GOD Almighty once during his most desperate times. Jesus' previous teachings of "prayers" to his followers obviously did not Glorify and Honor GOD Almighty to the fullest, nor did they mean much to Jesus when he desperately needed GOD Almighty. They were the first to be compromised by him. Quite ludicrous indeed! 6- Abrogation in Adultery punishment in the Bible! According to the Mosaic Law, the punishment for adultery and coveting your neighbor's wife is death: "If a man is found sleeping with another man's wife, both the man who slept with her and the woman MUST DIE. (From the NIV Bible, Deuteronomy 22:22)" "If a man commits adultery with another man's wife--with the wife of his neighbor--both the adulterer and the adulteress must be put to death. (From the NIV Bible, Leviticus 20:10)" "You shall not covet your neighbor's house. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, or his manservant or maidservant, his ox or donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbor. (From the NIV Bible, Exodus 20:17)" Let us now look at what David did with his neighbor's wife in the Bible: "One evening David got up from his bed and walked around on the roof of the palace. From the roof he saw a woman bathing. The woman was very beautiful, and David sent someone to find out about her. The man said, 'Isn't this Bathsheba, the daughter of Eliam and the WIFE of Uriah the Hittite?' Then David sent messengers to get her. She came to him, and he slept with her. (She had purified herself from her uncleanness.) Then she went back home. (From the NIV Bible, 2 Samuel 11:2-4)" Here is how David was punished! 2 Samuel 12:7-8 7 Then Nathan said to David, "You are the man! This is what the LORD , the God of Israel, says: 'I anointed you king over Israel, and I delivered you from the hand of Saul. 8 I gave your master's house to you, and your master's wives into your arms. I gave you the house of Israel and Judah. And if all this had been too little, I would have given you even more. ............. 2 Samuel 12:12-14 12 You did it in secret, but I will do this thing in broad daylight before all Israel.' " 13 Then David said to Nathan, "I have sinned against the LORD ." Nathan replied, "The LORD has taken away your sin. You are not going to die. 14 But because by doing this you have made the enemies of the LORD show utter contempt, the son born to you will die." How come David wasn't Commanded to be put to death by GOD Almighty? Instead, the child died instead of David. I wonder how the missionaries would've barked about this story if it were in the Noble Quran instead of their [13]X-Rated Pornographic Bible, the book of women's vaginas and breasts taste like "wine", and brothers can "suck" their sisters' and lovers' privates. The Noble Quran WOULD'VE been "wrong" if Prophet Muhammad INSTEAD was forgiven from such sin! By the way, our beloved and blessed Prophet NEVER EVER committed any such or similar sin! 7- Are non-Jews dogs or not? I'd like to start this section by presenting this Noble Verse from the Noble Quran: "Do they not ponder on the Qur'an? Had it been from other than Allah, they would surely have found therein much discrepancy. (The Noble Quran, 4:82)" Below we will see the overwhelming amount of corruption that exists in the New Testament. Jesus was defeated by the woman's wisdom: "A Canaanite woman from that vicinity came to him, crying out, 'Lord, Son of David, have mercy on me! My daughter is suffering terribly from demon-possession. Jesus did not answer a word. So his disciples came to him and urged him, 'Send her away, for she keeps crying out after us.' He [Jesus] answered, 'I was sent only to the lost sheep of Israel.' The woman came and knelt before him. 'Lord, help me!' she said. He [Jesus] replied 'It is not right to take the children's [Jews] bread [blessings and miracles reserved for them] and toss it to their dogs [the Gentiles].' 'Yes, Lord' she said, 'but even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their masters' table.' Then Jesus answered, 'Woman, you have great faith! Your request is granted.' And her daughter was healed from that very hour. (From the NIV Bible, Matthew 15:22-28)" It's funny how Jesus supposedly in the book of [14]man-made alterations and corruption, the New Testament, instantaneously ABROGATED his views and decision about the non-Jewish woman and people in general being equivalent to dogs when compared to the Jews. It is important to note that the woman, in this corrupted book, from the very start showed that she is a "believer" (what ever that meant back then). So it wasn't a matter of a "disbeliever" or pagan seeking Jesus' help. The woman's wisdom defeated Jesus, the so-called "Creator of the Universe"! Jesus, within a second, changed his racist and trash-mouthed views against her from being a "dog" to a human being who deserves to be helped. "I was sent ONLY to..." clearly and irrefutably means that Jesus initially claimed that he wasn't sent to none other than the Jews! So what if the woman failed with Jesus?? It seems that Jesus in the [15]corrupted book of the new testament changed his racist and filthy views only because the woman begged him. I wonder if the woman never did this and instead answered him inappropriately after he called her and all gentiles as "dogs", would the gentiles today still be considered as the Jews' dogs? Most probably yes. It doesn't take much for a racist to go back to his old habits and generalizing evil beliefs. Again, don't forget that the woman initially showed that she was a believer! Jesus rejected her only because she was a Gentile! The contradiction and man-made corruption in the text are clear! The "Jesus" of the corrupted book of new testament is clearly not the Creator of the Universe as the lie of trinity claims. Allow me to quote Jesus himself, or what's put on his mouth, regarding those so-called masters: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets and stone those sent to you, how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but you were not willing. (From the NIV Bible, Matthew 23:37)" No Prophets killers can ever be better than any human being that GOD Almighty Created! Those so-called masters can not be better than anyone or any race that exists on earth. In fact, the dung that I personally or anyone for this matter flush in the toilet is better than them and those worthless words that were uttered on the tongue of Jesus in the book of racism and lies, the New Testament. Let alone, them being the masters. So much for them being better than me, a non-Jew, and me being their "dog". Because the bible is not Divine and is filled with man's lies, it is easy to find unanswerable contradictions in it. Jesus' views were clearly absurd and allow me to say, stupid. At one point, the Jews were the masters, and because he was satisfied with them, he ignored the fact that they were the Prophets' killers. But after they disappointed him, the balance changed and they became bad, and it was now ok to go and preach to the Gentiles (the non-Jews). So in other words: 1- Have the Jews been ok with Jesus, the Gentiles would not have received any preaching. 2- The face of christianity today would be totally different. "Christianity" today would be limited to "only the lost sheep of Israel," i.e., the Jews. 3- Like I mentioned above, have the woman failed with Jesus, the Gentiles today would still be considered as the "Jews' dogs". Of course me as a Muslim, I don't believe that the foul dirt that was put on Jesus' mouth or anything that exists in the NT is Divine. Again, as Allah Almighty Said: "Do they not ponder on the Qur'an? Had it been from other than Allah, they would surely have found therein much discrepancy. (The Noble Quran, 4:82)" Only the verses in the Bible and Hadiths (collection of Prophet Muhammad's, peace be upon him, words) that directly agree with the Noble Quran [16]are considered close to the Truth, but not quite the Truth. The Jesus of Islam is not the Jesus of the bible. The book of lies, the New Testament, [17]is filled with man's alteration and corruption. I have provided ample quotes from bible theologians and a long list of contradictions that clearly and irrefutably prove this! Also visit: [18]What is the place of Jesus, Jews and Christians in Islam? See the type of Jews and Christians that GOD Almighty is Satisfied with in Islam. So now the question to you is: Do you honestly call this absurdity about Jesus being a trash-mouthed racist and then changing instantaneously in the book of lies as Divine Revelations from GOD Almighty? Where is the Divine Wisdom and Perfection in that? I only see double-standard hypocrisy and CLEAR-CUT stupidity! Let's just briefly compare the above lies with the Divine Justice and Revelations in the Noble Quran: "O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other. Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well-acquainted. (The Noble Quran, 49:13)" For more details, please visit: [19]Human Equality and Liberation of Slaves in Islam VS racism in the bible. 8- Is divorce allowed or not? Matthew 5 31 "You have heard that the law of Moses says, `A man can divorce his wife by merely giving her a letter of divorce.' 32 But I say that a man who divorces his wife, unless she has been unfaithful, causes her to commit adultery. And anyone who marries a divorced woman commits adultery. While GOD Almighty in the Old Testament allowed for divorce if the two spouses could no longer get along with each others, the New Testament claims that Jesus said that divorce is not allowed, unless the wife is unfaithful to him, i.e., she is either a loose woman or an adulterous. 2- Christians abrogating the Bible: 1- Eating swine while it is prohibited in the Bible. "And the pig, though it has a split hoof completely divided, does not chew the cud; it is unclean for you. You must not eat their meat or touch their carcasses; they are unclean for you. (Leviticus 11:7-8)" There goes your Christmas and Easter ham and pork. It amazes me how the polytheist trinitarian pagan christians are the world's biggest consumers of pork meat! Talk about respecting GOD Almighty and obeying His Divine Will! 2- Not following the Social Laws of the Old Testament. If you believe that you don't have to follow the OT's Social Laws, then I must ask you: 1- Can you marry your father's former wife? 2- Can you marry your own sister? 3- If you're a Hindu (male Hindus are allowed to marry their sisters' daughters) and you just recently embraced Christianity, then are you allowed to marry your sister's daughter whom you probably fell in love with before or at least had strong feelings toward, or was probably spoken for, when she was young while you were a Hindu? 4- Can you marry your son's former wife, or daughter's former husband, if you're a dad or mom? 5- CAN YOU MARRY YOUR OWN MOTHER???? The New Testament hardly contains any social law. It certainly doesn't address any of the questions I raised! Only the Old Testament is thorough and contains all of the Social Laws that define the limits of marriage and relationships and other social issues. For points #1&2 above, if the polytheist trinitarian pagans EAT PORK because it is not prohibited in the NT, then SHOULDN'T that also allow for them to start marrying their own siblings (brothers and sisters) or their nieces and nephews, OR EVEN THEIR OWN PARENTS?? I mean, who's really to say no if the NT doesn't prohibit it!! HECK, they're now allowing for men to marry men and women to marry women! What's next? Marry your own dog because the New Testament doesn't say no?! You think some christians wouldn't do it? So if you now agree with me that you must follow the Old Testament's Social Laws, then shouldn't you also follow the following: "And he that curseth his father, or his mother, shall surely be put to death. (Exodus 21:17)" "For every one that curseth his father or his mother shall be surely put to death: he hath cursed his father or his mother; his blood shall be upon him. (Leviticus 20:9)" "And he that blasphemeth the name of the LORD, he shall surely be put to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the stranger, as he that is born in the land, when he blasphemeth the name of the Lord, shall be put to death. (Leviticus 24:16)" Renegades/Apostates: Must they be killed? "If your very own brother, or your son or daughter, or the wife you love, or your closest friend secretly entices you, saying: Let us go and worship other gods (gods that neither you nor your fathers have known, gods of the peoples around you, whether near or far, from one end of the land to the other, or gods of other religions), do not yield to him or listen to him. Show him no pity. Do not spare him or shield him. You must certainly put him to death. Your hand must be the first in putting him to death, and then the hands of all the people. (Deuteronomy 13:6-9)" "And he should go and worship other gods and bow down to them or to the sun or the moon or all the army of the heavens, .....and you must stone such one with stones and such one must die. (Deuteronomy 17:3-5)" Very confusing, isn't it? Please visit: [20]Christians are Commanded to follow the Old Testament. 3- Christians prohibiting polygamy, while Jesus and the Old Testament clearly allowed it! The article is too long to post here. All of Jesus' and the Old Testament's quotes, along with Christian sects and web sites that support polygamy are located at: [21]Polygamy is allowed in the Bible's Old and New Testaments. 3- Conclusion: It is quite clear and beyond question that the Bible contains many abrogations. There Christians' bogus claim about Islam being false because Allah Almighty substituted some of His Holy and Divine Laws in the Noble Quran with Others is soundly debunked in this article! All Praise due to Allah Almighty. Also, it is important to know that the reason why the christian societies today are blasphemous ones (they worship porn, sex and money) is because they live in total darkness and confusion. As we've seen above from the small samples that I provided, it is very easy for a christian to get confused and lost and end up in sin while thinking it is ok. This is what you get out of satan's religions on earth! Islam is the only solution and salvation! Even the Jesus of the bible prayed to GOD Almighty as we Muslims do by prostrating his face down to the ground before GOD Almighty. The difference between the Jesus of the bible and the Muslims, however, is that we Muslims Glorify and Honor GOD Almighty through prostrating to Him at least in 5-daily sets of Prayers everyday. The Jesus of the corrupt bible on the other hand was a hypocrite who only bowed down to GOD Almighty once during his most desperate times. Jesus' previous teachings of "prayers" to his followers obviously did not Glorify and Honor GOD Almighty to the fullest, nor did they mean much to Jesus when he desperately needed GOD Almighty. They were the first to be compromised by him. Quite ludicrous indeed! As I mentioned in section 1 point 7, the Jesus of the corrupt bible is not the Jesus of Islam. Christianity today is the real cause of the corruption and blasphemy that the christian world is living in today. Therefore, embrace Islam, the one and only true Monotheistic Religion today and the only Divine Religion that teaches real discipline in life, and you will be saved. [22]Errors and History of Contradictions and Corruption in the Bible. [23]Christians are Commanded to follow the Old Testament. [24]Allah, Islam, Quran, Muhammad questions and answers. [25]What is the place of Jews, Christians and non-Muslims in Islam? [26]Answering Trinity. [27]"Allah" was GOD Almighty's Original Name in the Bible according to the Hebrew and Aramaic sources. _________________________________________________________________ Please email me at [28]Osama Abdallah Back to either [29]www.aol40.com or [30]www.answering-christianity.com Both sites are exactly the same [31]Purpose of this site. You are visitor number: [32] [fastcounter?1061971+2123949] since 4/13/1999. [33]Chat with other visitors [34]Download Arabic Songs References 1. http://www.answering-christianity.com/quransearch.htm 2. http://www.answering-christianity.com/%22 3. http://www.answering-christianity.com/%22#/" 4. http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus%2032:14;&version=15; 5. http://www.answering-christianity.com/human.htm 6. http://www.answering-christianity.com/jesus_paradise.htm 7. http://www.answering-christianity.com/iraq_lost_many_civilians.htm 8. http://www.answering-christianity.com/iraqs_holocaust.htm 9. http://www.answering-christianity.com/deplete_uranium.htm 10. http://www.answering-christianity.com/iraqi_torture.htm 11. http://www.answering-christianity.com/abraham_sarah.htm 12. http://www.answering-christianity.com/jesus_hypocrite.htm 13. http://www.answering-christianity.com/x_rated.htm 14. http://www.answering-christianity.com/authors_gospels.htm 15. http://www.answering-christianity.com/authors_gospels.htm 16. http://www.answering-christianity.com/warning.htm 17. http://www.answering-christianity.com/authors_gospels.htm 18. http://www.answering-christianity.com/blessed_jesus.htm 19. http://www.answering-christianity.com/human.htm 20. http://www.answering-christianity.com/ot.htm 21. http://www.answering-christianity.com/ntpoly.htm 22. http://www.answering-christianity.com/contra.htm 23. http://www.answering-christianity.com/ot.htm 24. http://www.answering-christianity.com/islam_quran.htm 25. http://www.answering-christianity.com/jesus_in_islam.htm 26. http://www.answering-christianity.com/at.htm 27. http://www.answering-christianity.com/allah.htm 28. http://www.answering-christianity.com/emailme.htm 29. http://www.aol40.com/ 30. http://www.answering-christianity.com/ 31. http://www.answering-christianity.com/purpose.htm 32. http://member.linkexchange.com/cgi-bin/fc/fastcounter-login?1061971 33. http://www.answering-christianity.com/chat.htm 34. http://www.answering-christianity.com/music.htm From ursus at earthlink.net Fri Apr 1 16:54:49 2005 From: ursus at earthlink.net (Greg Bear) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 08:54:49 -0800 Subject: [Paleopsych] RE: From Eshel--A Glitch in Genetic-centrism In-Reply-To: <142.42b2be3d.2f7e1a7f@aol.com> Message-ID: This fabulous bit of science is very evocative. My best guess is that such ?pattern memory??while some of it could be stored in cytosol elements, etc.,--is most likely stored in the vast unexplored territories of ?junk? DNA?perhaps in fragments of genes, pseudogenes, etc., with non-gene RNA elements acting as controls, inhibitors, etc. Could be wrong, but this sort of reconstructive memory does seem essential to life. Best! Greg _____ From: HowlBloom at aol.com [mailto:HowlBloom at aol.com] Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2005 7:31 PM To: paleopsych at paleopsych.org; kurakin1970 at yandex.ru; ursus at earthlink.net; paul.werbos at verizon.net Subject: Re: From Eshel--A Glitch in Genetic-centrism re: The New York Times A mechanism central to Jeff Hawkins' analysis of the way brains work in his On Intelligence may provide a clue to the manner in which plants with copies of a damaged gene from both their father and their mother manage to "recover" or reconstruct something they never had-- a flawless copy of the gene they've received only in damaged form. Hawkins brings up a neural network trick called auto-associative memory. Here's his description of how it works: "Instead of only passing information forward...auto-associative memories fed the output of each neuron back into the input.... When a pattern of activity was imposed on the artificial neurons, they formed a memory of this pattern. ...To retrieve a pattern stored in such a memory, you must provide the pattern you want to retrieve. ....The most important property is that you don't have to have the entire pattern you want to retrieve in order to retrieve it. You might have only part of the pattern, or you might have a somewhat messed-up pattern. The auto-associative memory can retrieve the correct pattern, as it was originally stored, even though you start with a messy version of it. It would be like going to the grocer with half eaten brown bananas and getting whole green bananas in return. ...Second, unlike mist neural networks, an auto-associative memory can be designed to store sequences of patterns, or temporal patterns. This feature is accomplished by adding time delay to the feedback. ...I might feed in the first few notes of 'Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star' and the memory returns the whole song. When presented with part of the sequence, the memory can recall the rest." (Jeff Hawkins, Sandra Blakeslee. On Intelligence. New York: Times Books, 2004: pp 46-47.) Where would such auto-associative circuits exist in a plant cell? Here are some wild guesses: * In the entire cell, including its membrane, its cytoplasm, its organelles, its metabolic processes, and its genome; * * Or in the entire cell and its context within the plant, including the sort of input and output it gets from the cells around it, the signals that tell it where and want it is supposed to be in the plant's development and ongoing roles. Howard re: _____ New York Times March 23, 2005 Startling Scientists, Plant Fixes Its Flawed Gene By NICHOLAS WADE In a startling discovery, geneticists at Purdue University say they have found plants that possess a corrected version of a defective gene inherited from both their parents, as if some handy backup copy with the right version had been made in the grandparents' generation or earlier. The finding implies that some organisms may contain a cryptic backup copy of their genome that bypasses the usual mechanisms of heredity. If confirmed, it would represent an unprecedented exception to the laws of inheritance discovered by Gregor Mendel in the 19th century. Equally surprising, the cryptic genome appears not to be made of DNA, the standard hereditary material. The discovery also raises interesting biological questions - including whether it gets in the way of evolution, which depends on mutations changing an organism rather than being put right by a backup system. "It looks like a marvelous discovery," said Dr. Elliott Meyerowitz, a plant geneticist at the California Institute of Technology. Dr. David Haig, an evolutionary biologist at Harvard, described the finding as "a really strange and unexpected result," which would be important if the observation holds up and applies widely in nature. The result, reported online yesterday in the journal Nature by Dr. Robert E. Pruitt, Dr. Susan J. Lolle and colleagues at Purdue, has been found in a single species, the mustardlike plant called arabidopsis that is the standard laboratory organism of plant geneticists. But there are hints that the same mechanism may occur in people, according to a commentary by Dr. Detlef Weigel of the Max-Planck Institute for Developmental Biology in T?bingen, Germany. Dr. Weigel describes the Purdue work as "a spectacular discovery." The finding grew out of a research project started three years ago in which Dr. Pruitt and Dr. Lolle were trying to understand the genes that control the plant's outer skin, or cuticle. As part of the project, they were studying plants with a mutated gene that made the plant's petals and other floral organs clump together. Because each of the plant's two copies of the gene were in mutated form, they had virtually no chance of having normal offspring. But up to 10 percent of the plants' offspring kept reverting to normal. Various rare events can make this happen, but none involve altering the actual sequence of DNA units in the gene. Yet when the researchers analyzed the mutated gene, known as hothead, they found it had changed, with the mutated DNA units being changed back to normal form. "That was the moment when it was a complete shock," Dr. Pruitt said. A mutated gene can be put right by various mechanisms that are already known, but all require a correct copy of the gene to be available to serve as the template. The Purdue team scanned the DNA of the entire arabidopsis genome for a second, cryptic copy of the hothead gene but could find none. Dr. Pruitt and his colleagues argue that a correct template must exist, but because it is not in the form of DNA, it probably exists as RNA, DNA's close chemical cousin. RNA performs many important roles in the cell, and is the hereditary material of some viruses. But it is less stable than DNA, and so has been regarded as unsuitable for preserving the genetic information of higher organisms. Dr. Pruitt said he favored the idea that there is an RNA backup copy for the entire genome, not just the hothead gene, and that it might be set in motion when the plant was under stress, as is the case with those having mutated hothead genes. He and other experts said it was possible that an entire RNA backup copy of the genome could exist without being detected, especially since there has been no reason until now to look for it. Scientific journals often take months or years to get comfortable with articles presenting novel ideas. But Nature accepted the paper within six weeks of receiving it. Dr. Christopher Surridge, a biology editor at Nature, said the finding had been discussed at scientific conferences for quite a while, with people saying it was impossible and proposing alternative explanations. But the authors had checked all these out and disposed of them, Dr. Surridge said. As for their proposal of a backup RNA genome, "that is very much a hypothesis, and basically the least mad hypothesis for how this might be working," Dr. Surridge said. Dr. Haig, the evolutionary biologist, said that the finding was fascinating but that it was too early to try to interpret it. He noted that if there was a cryptic template, it ought to be more resistant to mutation than the DNA it helps correct. Yet it is hard to make this case for RNA, which accumulates many more errors than DNA when it is copied by the cell. He said that the mechanism, if confirmed, would be an unprecedented exception to Mendel's laws of inheritance, since the DNA sequence itself is changed. Imprinting, an odd feature of inheritance of which Dr. Haig is a leading student, involves inherited changes to the way certain genes are activated, not to the genes themselves. The finding poses a puzzle for evolutionary theory because it corrects mutations, which evolution depends on as generators of novelty. Dr. Meyerowitz said he did not see this posing any problem for evolution because it seems to happen only rarely. "What keeps Darwinian evolution intact is that this only happens when there is something wrong," Dr. Surridge said. The finding could undercut a leading theory of why sex is necessary. Some biologists say sex is needed to discard the mutations, almost all of them bad, that steadily accumulate on the genome. People inherit half of their genes from each parent, which allows the half left on the cutting room floor to carry away many bad mutations. Dr. Pruitt said the backup genome could be particularly useful for self-fertilizing plants, as arabidopsis is, since it could help avoid the adverse effects of inbreeding. It might also operate in the curious organisms known as bdelloid rotifers that are renowned for not having had sex for millions of years, an abstinence that would be expected to seriously threaten their Darwinian fitness. Dr. Pruitt said it was not yet known if other organisms besides arabidopsis could possess the backup system. Colleagues had been quite receptive to the idea because "biologists have gotten used to the unexpected," he said, referring to a spate of novel mechanisms that have recently come to light, several involving RNA. ---------- Howard Bloom Author of The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces of History and Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind From The Big Bang to the 21st Century Visiting Scholar-Graduate Psychology Department, New York University; Core Faculty Member, The Graduate Institute www.howardbloom.net www.bigbangtango.net Founder: International Paleopsychology Project; founding board member: Epic of Evolution Society; founding board member, The Darwin Project; founder: The Big Bang Tango Media Lab; member: New York Academy of Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Psychological Society, Academy of Political Science, Human Behavior and Evolution Society, International Society for Human Ethology; advisory board member: Youthactivism.org; executive editor -- New Paradigm book series. For information on The International Paleopsychology Project, see: www.paleopsych.org for two chapters from The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces of History, see www.howardbloom.net/lucifer For information on Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to the 21st Century, see www.howardbloom.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: image/gif Size: 2614 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: image/gif Size: 1968 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: image/gif Size: 392 bytes Desc: not available URL: From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:26:29 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:26:29 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Foucault: The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine? Message-ID: The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine? Michel Foucault Foucault Studies, No 1, pp. 5-19, December 2004 [This is worth reading in its entirety. It is amazingly prescient and could have been written in 2004, not 1974.] Translated by Edgar C. Knowlton, Jr. (Professor Emeritus, University of Hawai'i), William J. King (University of Hawai'i) and Clare O'Farrell (Queensland University of Technology)1 1 [Ed.] Clare O'Farrell made very extensive changes working from the French version while preserving some of the variations that exist in the Spanish version. Editorial changes were also made by Stuart Elden and Morris Rabinowitz. 2 [Ed.] Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis: the Expropriation of Health, London, Calder and Boyars, 1975. NOTE: This was the first of three lectures given by Michel Foucault on social medicine in October 1974 at the Institute of Social Medicine, Biomedical Center, of the State University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It was originally published in Portuguese translation as "Crisis de un modelo en la medicina?", Revista centroamericana de Ciencas de la Salud, No 3, January-April 1976, pp. 197-209; and in Spanish as "La crisis de la medicina o la crisis de la antimedicina", Educacion Medica y Salud, Vol 10 No 2, 1976, pp. 152-70. The version in Dits et ?crits, (Paris: Gallimard), vol III, pp. 40-58, is a retranslation of the Portuguese back into French. We have translated this article from Spanish and thank PAHO Publications for their permission to publish it. We have also compared it to the French translation by Dominique Reyni?. I would like to open this lecture by drawing attention to a question which is beginning to be widely discussed: should we speak of a crisis of medicine or a crisis of antimedicine? In this context I shall refer to Ivan Illich's book Medical Nemesis: the Expropriation of Health,2 which, given the major impact it has had and will continue to have in the coming months, focuses world public opinion on the problem of the current functioning of the institutions of medical knowledge and power. But to analyze this phenomenon, I shall begin from at an earlier period, the years between 1940 and 1945, or more exactly the year 1942, when the famous Beveridge Plan was elaborated. This plan served as a model for the organization of health after the Second World War in England and in many other countries. The date of this Plan has a symbolic value. In 1942 - at the height of the World War in which 40,000,000 people lost their lives - it was not the right to life that was adopted as a principle, but a different and more substantial and complex right: the right to health. At a time when the War was causing large-scale destruction, society assumed the explicit task of ensuring its members not only life, but also a healthy life. Apart from its symbolic value, this date is very important for several reasons: 1. The Beveridge Plan signals that the State was taking charge of health. It might be argued that this was not new, since from the eighteenth century onwards it has been one of the functions of the State, not a fundamental one but still one of vital importance, to guarantee the physical health of its citizens. Nonetheless, until middle of the twentieth century, for the State guaranteeing health meant essentially the preservation of national physical strength, the work force and its capacity of production, and military force. Until then, the goals of State medicine had been, principally, if not racial, then at least nationalist. With the Beveridge plan, health was transformed into an object of State concern, not for the benefit of the State, but for the benefit of individuals. Man's right to maintain his body in good health became an object of State action. As a consequence, the terms of the problem were reversed: the concept of the healthy individual in the service of the State was replaced by that of the State in the service of the healthy individual. 2. It is not only a question of a reversal of rights, but also of what might be called a morality of the body. In the nineteenth century an abundant literature on health, on the obligation of individuals to secure their health and that of their family, etc. made its appearance in every country in the world. The concept of cleanliness, of hygiene, occupied a central place in all these moral exhortations concerning health. Numerous publications insisted on cleanliness as an indispensable prerequisite for good health. Health would allow people to work so that children could survive and ensure social labour and production in their turn. Cleanliness ensured good health for the individual and those surrounding him. In the second half of the twentieth century another concept arose. It was no longer a question of an obligation to practise cleanliness and hygiene in order to enjoy good health, but of the right to be sick as one wishes and as is necessary. The right to stop work began to take shape and became more important than the former obligation to practise cleanliness that had characterized the moral relation of individuals with their bodies. 3. With the Beveridge Plan health entered the field of macroeconomics. The costs involved in health, from the loss of work days, to the necessity of covering those risks stopped being phenomena that could be resolved through the use of pension funds or with mostly private insurance. From then on, health - or the absence of health - the totality of conditions which allowed the health of individuals to be insured, became an expense, which due to its size became one of the major items of the State budget, regardless of what system of financing was used. Health began to enter the calculations of the macro-economy. Through the avenue of health, illnesses and the need to ensure the necessities of health led to a certain economic redistribution. From the beginning of the present century one of the functions of budgetary policy in the many countries has been ensuring a certain equalization of income, if not of property, through the tax system. This redistribution did not, however, depend on taxes, but on the system of regulation and economic coverage of health and illnesses. In ensuring for all the same opportunities for receiving treatment, there was an attempt to correct inequalities in income. Health, illness, and the body began to have their social locations and, at the same time, were converted into a means of individual socialization. 4. Health became the object of an intense political struggle. At the end of the Second World War and with the triumphant election of the Labour party in England in 1945, there was no political party or political campaign, in any developed country, that did not address the problem of health and the way in which the State would ensure and finance this type of expenditure. The British elections of 1945, as well as those relating to the pension plans in France in 1947, which saw the victory of the representatives of the Conf?d?ration g?n?rale du travail [General Confederation of Workers], mark the importance of the political struggle over health. Taking the Beveridge Plan as a point of symbolic reference, one can observe over the ten years from 1940-1950 the formulation of a new series of rights, a new morality, a new economics, a new politics of the body. Historians have accustomed us to drawing a careful and meticulous relation between what people say and what they think, the historical development of their representations and theories and the history of the human spirit. Nevertheless, it is curious to note that they have always ignored that fundamental chapter that is the history of the human body. In my opinion, the years 1940-1950 should be chosen as dates of reference marking the birth of this new system of rights, this new morality, this new politics and this new economy of the body in the modern Western world. Since then, the body of the individual has become one of the chief objectives of State intervention, one of the major objects of which the State must take charge. In a humorous vein, we might make an historical comparison. When the Roman Empire was crystallized in Constantine's era, the State, for the first time in the history of the Mediterranean world, took on the task of caring for souls. The Christian State not only had to fulfil the traditional functions of the Empire, but also had to allow souls to attain salvation, even if it had to force them to. Thus, the soul became one of the objects of State intervention. All the great theocracies, from Constantine to the mixed theocracies of eighteenth century Europe, were political regimes in which the salvation of the soul was one of the principal objectives. One could say that the present situation has actually been developing since the eighteenth century not a theocracy, but a 'somatocracy'. We live in a regime that sees the care of the body, corporal health, the relation between illness and health, etc. as appropriate areas of State intervention. It is precisely the birth of this somatocracy, in crisis since its origins, that I am proposing to analyze. At the moment medicine assumed its modern functions, by means of a characteristic process of nationalization, medical technology was experiencing one of its rare but extremely significant advances. The discovery of antibiotics and with them the possibility of effectively fighting for the first time against infectious diseases, was in fact contemporary with the birth of the major systems of social security. It was a dazzling technological advance, at the very moment a great political, economic, social, and legal mutation of medicine was taking place. The crisis became apparent from this moment on, with the simultaneous manifestation of two phenomena: on the one hand, technological progress signalling an essential advance in the fight against disease; on the other hand, the new economic and political functioning of medicine. These two phenomena did not lead to the improvement of health that had been hoped for, but rather to a curious stagnation in the benefits that could have arisen from medicine and public health. This is one of the earlier aspects of the crisis I am trying to analyze. I will be referring to some of its effects to show that that the recent development of medicine, including its nationalization and socialization - of which the Beveridge Plan gives a general vision - is of earlier origin. Actually, one must not think that medicine up until now has remained an individual or contractual type of activity that takes place between patient and doctor, and which has only recently taken social tasks on board. On the contrary, I shall try to demonstrate that medicine has been a social activity since the eighteenth century. In a certain sense, 'social medicine' does not exist because all medicine is already social. Medicine has always been a social practice. What does not exist is non-social medicine, clinical individualizing medicine, medicine of the singular relation. All this is a myth that defended and justified a certain form of social practice of medicine: private professional practice. Thus, if in reality medicine is social, at least since its great rise in the eighteenth century, the present crisis is not really new, and its historical roots must be sought in the social practice of medicine. As a consequence, I shall not be posing the problem in the terms used by Illich and his disciples: medicine or antimedicine, should we save medicine or not? The problem is not whether to have individual or social medicine, but whether to question the model of the development of medicine beginning in the eighteenth century, that is, from when what we might describe as the 'take off' of medicine occurred. This 'take off' of health in the developed world was accompanied by a technical and epistemological removal of important obstacles in medicine and in a series of social practices. And it is precisely these specific forms of 'take off' that have produced the current crisis. The problem can be posed in the following terms: (1) what was that model of development? (2) to what extent can it be corrected? (3) to what extent can it be used today in societies or populations that have not experienced the European and American model of economic and political development? To sum up, what is this model of development? Can it be corrected and applied in other places? I would now like to expose some hidden aspects of this current crisis. Scientificity and Efficacy of Medicine In the first place, I would like to refer to the separation or distortion that exists between the scientificity of medicine and the positive nature of its effects, or between the scientificity and the efficacy of medicine. It was not necessary to wait for Illich or the disciples of anti-medicine to know that one of the capabilities of medicine is killing. Medicine kills, it has always killed, and it has always been aware of this. What is important, is that until recent times the negative effects of medicine remained inscribed within the register of medical ignorance. Medicine killed through the doctor's ignorance or because medicine itself was ignorant. It was not a true science, but rather a rhapsody of ill-founded, poorly established and unverified sets of knowledge. The harmfulness of medicine was judged in proportion to its non-scientificity. But what emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, was the fact that medicine could be dangerous, not through its ignorance and falseness, but through its knowledge, precisely because it was a science. Illich and those who are inspired by him uncovered a series of data around this theme, but I am not sure how well elaborated they are. One must set aside different spectacular results designed for the consumption of journalists. I shall not dwell therefore on the considerable decrease in mortality during a doctors strike in Israel; nor shall I mention well-recorded facts whose statistical elaboration does not allow the definition or discovery of what is being dealt with. This is the case in relation to the investigation by the National Institutes of Health (USA) according to which in 1970, 1,500,000 persons were hospitalized due to the consumption of medications. These statistics are upsetting but do not afford convincing proof, as they do not indicate the manner in which these medications were administered, or who consumed them, etc. Neither shall I analyze the famous investigation of Robert Talley, who demonstrated that in 1967, 3,000 North Americans died in hospitals from the side effects of medications. All that taken as a whole does not have great significance nor is it based on a valid analysis.3 There are other factors that need to be known. For example, one needs to know the how these medications were administered, if the problems were a result of an error by the doctor, the hospital staff or the patient himself, etc. Nor shall I dwell on the statistics concerning surgical operations, particularly in relation to certain studies of hysterectomies in California that indicate that out of 5,500 cases, 14% of the operations failed, 25% of the patients died young, and that in only 40% of the cases was the operation necessary. All these facts, made notorious by Illich, relate to the ability or ignorance of the doctors, without casting doubt on medicine itself in its scientificity. On the other hand what appears to me to be much more interesting and which poses the real problem is what one might call positive iatrogenicity, rather than iatrogenicity4: the harmful effects of medication due not to errors of diagnosis or the accidental ingestion of those substances, but to the action of medical practice itself, in so far as it has a rational basis. At present, the instruments that doctors and medicine in general have at their disposal cause certain effects, precisely because of their efficacy. Some of these effects are purely harmful and others are unable to be controlled, which leads the human species into a perilous area of history, into a field of probabilities and risks, the magnitude of which cannot be precisely measured. 3 [Ed.] Letters in relation to this study can be found in Robert B. Talley, Marc F. Laventurier, and C. Joseph Stetler, 'Letters: Drug Induced Illness.' Journal of the American Medical Association 229, no. 8 (1974) pp. 1043-44. It is known, for example, that anti-infectious treatment, the highly successful struggle carried out against infectious agents, led to a general decrease of the threshold of the organism's sensitivity to hostile agents. This means that to the extent that the organism can defend itself better, it protects itself, naturally, but on the other hand, it is more fragile and more exposed if one restricts contact with the stimuli which provoke defences. More generally, one can say that through the very effect of medications - positive and therapeutic effects - there occurs a disturbance, even destruction, of the ecosystem, not only at the individual level, but also at the level of the human species itself. Bacterial and viral protection, which represent both a risk and a protection for the organism, with which it has functioned until then, undergoes a change as a result of the therapeutic intervention, thus becoming exposed to attacks against which the organism had previously been protected. Nobody knows where the genetic manipulation of the genetic potential of living cells in bacteria or in viruses will lead. It has become technically possible to develop agents that attack the human body against which there are no means of defence. One could forge an absolute biological weapon against man and the human species without the means of defence against this absolute weapon being developed at the same time. This has led American laboratories to call for the prohibition of some genetic manipulations that are at present technically possible. We thus enter a new dimension of what we might call medical risk. Medical risk, that is the inextricable link between the positive and negative effects of medicine, is not new: it dates from the moment when the positive effects of medicine were accompanied by various negative and harmful consequences. With regards to this there are numerous examples that signpost the history of modern medicine dating from the eighteenth century. In that century, for the first time, medicine acquired sufficient power to allow certain patients to become healthy enough to leave a hospital. Until the middle of the eighteenth century people generally did not survive a stay in a hospital. People entered this institution to die. The medical technique of the eighteenth century did not allow the hospitalized individual to leave the institution alive. The hospital was a cloister where one went to breathe one's last; it was a true 'mortuary'. 4 [Ed.] Caused by a doctor, from iatros, physician. Another example of a significant medical advance accompanied by a great increase in mortality was the discovery of anaesthetics and the technique of general anaesthesia in the years from 1844 to 1847. As soon as a person could be put to sleep surgical operations could be performed, and the surgeons of the time devoted themselves to this work with great enthusiasm. But at the time they did not have access to sterilized instruments. Sterile surgical technique was not introduced into medical practice until 1870. After the Franco-Prussian war and the relative success of German doctors, it became a current practice in many countries. As soon as individuals could be anaesthetized, the pain barrier - the natural protection of the organism - disappeared and one could proceed with any operation whatsoever. In the absence of sterile surgical technique, there was no doubt that every operation was not only risky, but led to almost certain death. For example, during the war of 1870, a famous French surgeon, Gu?rin, performed amputations on several wounded men, but only succeeded in saving one; the others died. This is a typical example of the way medicine has always functioned, on the basis of its own failures and the risks it has taken. There has been no major medical advance that has not paid the price in various negative consequences. This characteristic phenomenon of the history of modern medicine has acquired a new dimension today in so far as that, until the most recent decades, medical risk concerned only the individual under care. At most, one could adversely affect the individual's direct descendants, that is, the power of a possible negative action limited itself to a family or its descendants. Nowadays, with the techniques at the disposal of medicine, the possibility for modifying the genetic cell structure not only affects the individual or his descendants but the entire human race. Every aspect of life now becomes the subject of medical intervention. We do no know yet whether man is capable of fabricating a living being which will make it possible to modify the entire history of life and the future of life. A new dimension of medical possibilities arises that I shall call bio-history. The doctor and the biologist are no longer working at the level of the individual and his descendants, but are beginning to work at the level of life itself and its fundamental events. This is a very important element in bio-history. It has been known since Darwin that life evolved, that the evolution of living species is determined, to a certain degree, by accidents which might be of a historical nature. Darwin knew, for example, that enclosure in England, a purely economic and legal practice, had modified the English fauna and flora. The general laws of life, therefore, were then linked to that historical occurrence. In our days something new is in the process of being discovered; the history of man and life are profoundly intertwined. The history of man does not simply continue life, nor is simply content to reproduce it, but to a certain extent renews it, and can exercise a certain number of fundamental effects on its processes. This is one of the great risks of contemporary medicine and one of the reasons for the uneasiness communicated from doctors to patients, from technicians to the general population, with regards to the effects of medical action. A series of phenomena, like the radical and bucolic rejection of medicine in favour of a non-technical reconciliation with nature, themes of millenarianism and the fear of an apocalyptic end of the species, represent the vague echo in public awareness of this technical uneasiness that biologists and doctors are beginning to feel with regards to the effects of their own practice and their own knowledge. Not knowing stops being dangerous when the danger feared is knowledge itself. Knowledge is dangerous, not only because of its immediate consequences for individuals or groups of individuals, but also at the level of history itself. This is one of the fundamental characteristics of the present crisis. Undefined Medicalization The second characteristic is what I am going to call the phenomenon of undefined 'medicalization'. It is often argued that in the twentieth century medicine began to function outside its traditional field as defined by the wishes of the patient, his pain, his symptoms, his malaise. This area defined medical treatment and circumscribed its field of activity, which was determined by a domain of objects called illnesses and which gave medical status to the patient's demands. It was thus that the domain specific to medicine was defined. There is no doubt that if this is its specific domain, contemporary medicine has gone considerably beyond it for several reasons. In the first place, medicine responds to another theme which is not defined by the wishes of the patient, wishes which now exist only in limited cases. More frequently, medicine is imposed on the individual, ill or not, as an act of authority. One can cite several examples in this instance. Today, nobody is employed without a report from a doctor who has the authority to examine the individual. There is a systematic and compulsory policy of 'screening', of tracking down disease in the population, a process which does not answer any patient demand. In some countries, a person accused of having committed a crime, that is, an infringement considered as sufficiently serious to be judged by the courts, must submit to compulsory examination by a psychiatric expert. In France, it is compulsory for every individual coming under the purview of the legal system, even if it is a correctional court. These are examples of a type of a familiar medical intervention that does not derive from the patient's wishes. In the second place, the objects that make up the area of medical treatment are not just restricted to diseases. I offer two examples. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, sexuality, sexual behaviour, sexual deviations or anomalies have been linked to medical treatment, without a doctor's saying, unless he is naive, that a sexual anomaly is a disease. The systematic treatment by medical therapists of homosexuals in Eastern European countries is characteristic of the 'medicalization' of something that is not a disease, either from the point of view of the person under treatment or the doctor. More generally, it might be argued that health has been transformed into an object of medical treatment. Everything that ensures the health of the individual; whether it be the purification of water, housing conditions or urban life styles, is today a field for medical intervention that is no longer linked exclusively to diseases. Actually, the authoritarian intervention of medicine in an ever widening field of individual or collective existence is an absolutely characteristic fact. Today medicine is endowed with an authoritarian power with normalizing functions that go beyond the existence of diseases and the wishes of the patient. If the jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are considered to have invented a social system that had to be governed by a system of codified laws, it might be argued that in the twentieth century doctors are in the process of inventing a society, not of law, but of the norm. What governs society are not legal codes but the perpetual distinction between normal and abnormal, a perpetual enterprise of restoring the system of normality. This is one of the characteristics of contemporary medicine, although it may easily be demonstrated that it is a question of an old phenomenon, linked to the medical 'take off'. Since the eighteenth century, medicine has continually involved itself in what is not its business, that is, in matters other than patients and diseases. It was precisely in this manner that epistemological obstacles were able to be removed at the end of the eighteenth century. Until sometime between 1720 to 1750, the activities of doctors focused on the demands of patients and their diseases. Thus has it been since the Middle Ages, with arguably non-existent scientific and therapeutic results. Eighteenth century medicine freed itself from the scientific and therapeutic stagnation in which it had been mired beginning in the medieval period. From this moment on, medicine began to consider fields other than ill people and became interested in aspects other than diseases, changing from being essentially clinical to being social. The four major processes which characterize medicine in the eighteenth century, are as follows: 1. Appearance of a medical authority, which is not restricted to the authority of knowledge, or of the erudite person who knows how to refer to the right authors. Medical authority is a social authority that can make decisions concerning a town, a district, an institution, or a regulation. It is the manifestation of what the Germans called Staatsmedizin, medicine of the State. 2. Appearance of a medical field of intervention distinct from diseases: air, water, construction, terrains, sewerage, etc. In the eighteenth century all this became the object of medicine. 3. Introduction of an site of collective medicalization: namely, the hospital. Before the eighteenth century, the hospital was not an institution of medicalization, but of aid to the poor awaiting death. 4. Introduction of mechanisms of medical administration: recording of data, collection and comparison of statistics, etc. With a base in the hospital and in all these social controls, medicine was able to gain momentum, and clinical medicine acquired totally new dimensions. To the extent that medicine became a social practice instead of an individual one, opportunities were opened up for anatomical pathology, for hospital medicine and the advances symbolized by the names of Bichat, La?nnec, Bayle, et al. As a consequence, medicine dedicated itself to areas other than diseases, areas not governed by the wishes of the sick person. This is an old phenomenon that forms one of the fundamental characteristics of modern medicine. But what more particularly characterizes the present phase in this general tendency is that in recent decades, medicine in acting beyond its traditional boundaries of ill people and diseases is taking over other areas. If in the eighteenth century, medicine had in fact gone beyond its classic limits there were still things that remained outside medicine and did not seem to be 'medicalizable'. There were fields outside medicine and one could conceive of the existence of a bodily practice, a hygiene, a sexual morality etc., that was not controlled or codified by medicine. The French Revolution, for example, conceived of a series of projects concerning a morality of the body, a hygiene of the body, that were not in any way under the control of doctors. A kind of happy political order was imagined, in which the management of the human body, hygiene, diet and the control of sexuality corresponded to a collective and spontaneous consciousness. This ideal of a non-medical regulation of the body and of human conduct can be found throughout the nineteenth century in the work of Raspail for example.5 What is diabolical about the present situation is that whenever we want to refer to a realm outside medicine we find that it has already been medicalized. And when one wishes to object to medicine's deficiencies, its drawbacks and its harmful effects, this is done in the name of a more complete, more refined and widespread medical knowledge. I should like to mention an example in this regard: Illich and his followers point out that therapeutic medicine, which responds to a symptomatology and blocks the apparent symptoms of diseases, is bad medicine. They propose in its stead a demedicalized art of health made up of hygiene, diet, lifestyle, work and housing conditions etc. But what is hygiene at present except a series of rules set in place and codified by biological and medical knowledge, when it is not medical authority itself that has elaborated it? Anti-medicine can only oppose medicine with facts or projects that have been already set up by a certain type of medicine. I am going to cite another example taken from the field of psychiatry. It might be argued that the first form of antipsychiatry was psychoanalysis. At the end of the nineteenth psychoanalysis was aimed at the demedicalization of various phenomena that the major psychiatric symptomatology of that same century had classified as illnesses. This antipsychiatry is a psychoanalysis, not only of hysteria and neurosis, which Freud tried to take away from psychiatrists, but also of the daily conduct which now forms the object of psychoanalytic activity. Even if psychoanalysis is now opposed by antipsychiatry and antipsychoanalysis, it is still a matter of a type of activity and discourse based on a medical perspective and knowledge. One cannot get away from medicalization, and every effort towards this end ends up referring to medical knowledge. 5 [Ed.] Fran?ois Vincent Raspail, Histoire naturelle de la sant? et de la maladie, suivie du formulaire pour une nouvelle m?thode de traitement hygi?nique et curatif, Paris: A. Levavasseur, 2 Volumes, 1843. Finally, I would like to take an example from the field of criminality and criminal psychiatry. The question posed by the penal codes of the nineteenth century consisted in determining whether an individual was mentally ill or delinquent. According to the French Code of 1810, one could not be both delinquent and insane. If you were mad, you were not delinquent, and the act committed was a symptom, not a crime, and as a result you could not be sentenced. Today an individual considered as delinquent has to submit to examination as though he were mad before being sentenced. In a certain way, at the end of the day, he is always condemned as insane. In France at least, a psychiatric expert is not summoned to give an opinion as to whether the individual was responsible for the crime. The examination is limited to finding out whether the individual is dangerous or not. What does this concept of dangerous mean? One of two things: either the psychiatrist responds that the person under treatment is not dangerous, that is, that he is not ill and is not manifesting any pathology, and that since he is not dangerous there is no reason to sentence him. (His non-pathologization allows sentence not to be passed). Or else the doctor says that the subject is dangerous because he had a frustrated childhood, because his superego is weak, because he has no notion of reality, that he has a paranoid constitution, etc. In this case the individual has been 'pathologized' and may be imprisoned, but he will be imprisoned because he has been identified as ill. So then, the old dichotomy in the Civil Code, which defined the subject as being either delinquent or mad, is eliminated. As a result there remain two possibilities, being slightly sick and really delinquent, or being somewhat delinquent but really sick. The delinquent is unable to escape his pathology. Recently in France, an ex-inmate wrote a book to make people understand that he stole not because his mother weaned him too soon or because his superego was weak or that he suffered from paranoia, but because he was born to steal and be a thief.6 Pathology has become a general form of social regulation. There is no longer anything outside medicine. Fichte spoke of the 'closed commercial State' to describe the situation of Prussia in 1810.7 One might argue in relation to modern society that we live in the 'open medical States' in which medicalization is without limits. Certain popular resistances to medicalization are due precisely to this perpetual and constant predomination. 6 [Ed.] Foucault is probably referring to Serge Livrozet, De la prison ? la r?volte. Paris: Mercure de France, 1973. Foucault's preface to this book also appears in Dits et ?crits. Paris: Gallimard, 1994, vol II, pp. 394-416. 7 [Ed.] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Der geschlossne Handelsstaat, T?bingen: Coota, 1800. There is no complete translation into English, but for selections, see Hans Reiss (ed.), The Political Thought of the German Romantics, 1793-1815, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955, pp. 86-102. The Political Economy of Medicine Finally I should like to speak of another characteristic of modern medicine, namely, what might be called the political economy of medicine. Here again, it is not a question of a recent phenomenon, since beginning in the eighteenth century medicine and health have been presented as an economic problem. Medicine developed at the end of the eighteenth century in response to economic conditions. One must not forget that the first major epidemic studied in France in the eighteenth century and which led to a national data gathering was not really an epidemic but an epizootic. It was the catastrophic loss of life of herds of cattle in the south of France that contributed to the origin of the Royal Society of Medicine. The Academy of Medicine in France was born from an epizootic, not from an epidemic, which demonstrates that economic problems were what motivated the beginning of the organization of this medicine. It might also be argued that the great neurology of Duchenne de Boulogne, Charcot, et al., was born in the wake of the railroad accidents and work accidents that occurred around 1860, at the same time that the problems of insurance, work incapacity and the civil responsibility of employers and transporters, etc. were being posed. The economic question is certainly present in the history of medicine. But what turns out to be peculiar to the present situation is that medicine is linked to major economic problems in a different way from the traditional links. Previously, medicine was expected to provide society with strong individuals who were capable of working, of ensuring the constancy, improvement and reproduction of the work force. Medicine was called on as an instrument for the maintenance and reproduction of the work force essential to the functioning of modern society. At present, medicine connects with the economy by another route. Not simply in so far as it is capable of reproducing the work force, but also in that it can directly produce wealth in that health is a need for some and a luxury for others. Health becomes a consumer object, which can be produced by pharmaceutical laboratories, doctors, etc., and consumed by both potential and actual patients. As such, it has acquired economic and market value. Thus the human body has been brought twice over into the market: first by people selling their capacity to work, and second, through the intermediary of health. Consequently, the human body once again enters an economic market as soon as it is susceptible to diseases and health, to well being or to malaise, to joy or to pain, and to the extent that it is the object of sensations, desires, etc. As soon as the human body enters the market, through health consumption, various phenomena appear which lead to dysfunctions in the contemporary system of health and medicine. Contrary to what one might expect, the introduction of the human body and of health into the system of consumption and the market did not correlatively and proportionally raise the standard of health. The introduction of health into an economic system that could be calculated and measured showed that the standard of health did not have the same social effects as the standard of living. The standard of living is defined by the consumer index. If the growth of consumption leads to an increase in the standard of living, in contrast, the growth of medical consumption does not proportionally improve the level of health. Health economists have made various studies demonstrating this. For example, Charles Levinson, in a 1964 study of the production of health, showed that an increase of 1% in the consumption of medical services led to a decrease in the level of mortality by 0.1%. This deviation might be considered as normal but only occurs as a purely fictitious model. When medical consumption is placed in a real setting, it can be observed that environmental variables, in particular food consumption, education and family income, are factors that have more influence than medical consumption on the rate of mortality. Thus, an increased income may exercise a negative effect on mortality that is twice as effective as the consumption of medication. That is, if incomes increase only in the same proportion as the consumption of medical services, the benefits of the increase in medical consumption will be cancelled out by the small increase in income. Likewise, education is two and one-half times more important for the standard of living than medical consumption. It follows that, in order to live longer, a higher level of education is preferable to the consumption of medicine. If medical consumption is placed in the context of other variables that have an effect on the rate of mortality, it will be observed that this factor is the weakest of all. Statistics in 1970 indicate that, despite a constant increase in medical consumption, the rate of mortality, which is one of the most important indicators of health, did not decrease, and remains greater for men than for women. Consequently, the level of medical consumption and the level of health have no direct relation, which reveals the economic paradox of an increase in consumption that is not accompanied by any positive effect on health, morbidity and mortality. Another paradox of the introduction of health into the political economy is that the social changes that were expected to occur via the systems of social security did not occur as expected. In reality, the inequality of consumption of medical services remains just as significant as before. The rich continue to make use of medical services more than the poor. This is the case today in France. The result is that the weakest consumers, who are also the poorest, fund the over consumption of the rich. In addition, scientific research and the great proportion of the most valuable and expensive hospital equipment are financed by social security payments, whereas the private sectors are the most profitable because they use relatively less complicated technical equipment. What in France is called the hospital hotel business, that is, a brief hospitalization for minor procedures, such as a minor operation, is supported in this way by the collective and social financing of diseases. Thus, we can see that the equalization of medical consumption that was expected from social security was watered down in favour of a system that tends more and more to reinforce the major inequalities in relation to illness and death that characterized nineteenth century society. Today, the right to equal health for all is caught in a mechanism which transforms it into an inequality. Doctors are confronted with the following problem: who profits from the social financing of medicine, the profits derived from health? Apparently doctors, but this is not in fact the case. The remuneration that doctors receive, however elevated it might be in certain countries, represents only a minor proportion of the economic benefits derived from illness and health. Those who make the biggest profits from health are the major pharmaceutical companies. In fact, the pharmaceutical industry is supported by the collective financing of health and illness through social security payments from funds paid by people required to insure their health. If health consumers - that is, those who are covered by social security - are not yet fully aware of this situation, doctors are perfectly well aware of it. These professionals are more and more aware that they are being turned into almost mechanized intermediaries between the pharmaceutical industry and client demand, that is, into simple distributors of medicine and medication. We are living a situation in which certain phenomena have led to a crisis. These phenomena have not fundamentally changed since the eighteenth century, a period that marked the appearance of a political economy of health with processes of generalized medicalization and mechanisms of bio-history. The current so-called crisis in medicine is only a series of exacerbated supplementary phenomena that modify some aspects of the tendency, but did not create it. The present situation must not be considered in terms of medicine or antimedicine, or whether or not medicine should be paid for, or whether we should return to a type of natural hygiene or paramedical bucolicism. These alternatives do not make sense. On the other hand what does make sense - and it is in this context that certain historical studies may turn out to be useful - is to try to understand the health and medical 'take off' in Western societies since the eighteenth century. It is important to know which model was used and how it can be changed. Finally, societies that were not exposed to this model of medical development must be examined. These societies, because of their colonial or semi-colonial status, had only a remote or secondary relation to those medical structures and are now asking for medicalization. They have a right to do so because infectious diseases affect millions of people, and it would not be valid to use an argument, in the name of an antimedical bucolicism, that if these countries do not suffer from these infections they will later experience degenerative illnesses as in Europe. It must be determined whether the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European model of medical development should be reproduced as is, or modified and to what extent it can be effectively applied to these societies without the negative consequences we already know. Therefore, I believe that an examination of the history of medicine has a certain utility. It is a matter of acquiring a better knowledge, not so much of the present crisis in medicine, which is a false concept, but of the model for the historical development of medicine since the eighteenth century with a view to seeing how it is possible to change it. This is the same problem that prompted modern economists to engage in the study of the European economic 'take off' in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with a view to seeing how this model of development could be adapted to non-industrialized societies. One needs to adopt the same modesty and pride as the economists in order to argue that medicine should not be rejected or adopted as such; that medicine forms part of an historical system. It is not a pure science, but is part of an economic system and of a system of power. It is necessary to determine what the links are between medicine, economics, power and society in order to see to what extent the model might be rectified or applied. From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:28:39 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:28:39 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] CHE: Foucault Scholars Gain a New Society and Journal Message-ID: Foucault Scholars Gain a New Society and Journal News bulletin from the Chronicle of Higher Education, 5.3.8 http://chronicle.com/daily/2005/03/2005030803n.htm [2]By RICHARD BYRNE Martin Parkins has held a number of jobs, including prominent positions in the corporate side of book publishing and in nongovernmental organizations dedicated to serving refugees, and also as a teacher in New York City public schools. But his latest task is to be the champion of the philosopher Michel Foucault, who died in 1984 at the age of 57. In September 2004, Mr. Parkins was chosen as the first executive director of the new [3]Foucault Society. The society, which unveiled its Web site this month, will promote the French thinker's ideas inside academe and beyond it into the public square. Plans for a resource center and archive in New York City devoted to Foucault's work are also under way. The organization already boasts a who's who of prominent Foucault scholars on its board of advisers, and will convene its first symposium on May 13 (a one-day gathering called "Foucault Now!") at the New School University in New York City. Mr. Parkins cites a "real resurgence in interest in Foucault" -- which also includes a new independent electronic journal devoted to his work -- as a factor in the society's fast start. "That's why we've come so far so quickly," he said in a recent interview. In addition to the Web site and first symposium, a second symposium at the New School -- dealing with Foucault, the body, and gender -- already is planned for October. As much of French philosophy and criticism's high tide of influence in the 1960s and 1970s has receded slowly from American academe in recent decades, Foucault's influence continues to grow. His most prominent works in English translation -- 1965's Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 1973's The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, 1977's Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, and the three volumes of The History of Sexuality (1976 and 1984) -- continue to hold great appeal for philosophers, historians, and literary critics. But his often-provocative ideas about organizational power and resistance to it have percolated into a variety of other disciplines as well, including criminal justice, medicine, and queer studies. "Foucault died 21 years ago, and the 20th century has passed," said Richard Lynch, the coordinator of the [4]Foucault Circle, a small group of American academics devoted to discussing Foucault's ideas. (The circle recently held its fifth annual meeting at Rollins College, in Orlando, Fla.) "Now the question is being asked, Does Foucault belong in the canon? My feeling is that interest in Foucault is not just a flirtation, but the beginning of a recognition of his importance for a number of different disciplines ... and also that his work is of enduring importance." A Place to Publish The new society is only one new player in the Foucault arena. The other addition to the field is a new electronic journal, [5]Foucault Studies, which published its first issue in December 2004. Editorial duties for the journal are split among three editors, who reside on three continents: Stuart R. Elden, a lecturer in geography at the University of Durham, in England; Clare O'Farrell, a lecturer in the school of Cultural and Language Studies in Education at Queensland University of Technology, in Australia; and Alan Rosenberg, a professor of philosophy at Queens College, of the City University of New York. The journal was founded, Mr. Rosenberg said, because "there was a real need for younger scholars working on Foucault to find a place to publish." The lack of such places, he added, is partly because the thinker "crosses so many boundaries." Thus, a journal dedicated solely to Foucault's work was needed. According to Mr. Rosenberg, the editors of Foucault Studies approached a number of academic publishers without success. Then they had the idea to place the journal online. So far, he said, the distances between the editors have created "only one or two problems." "Editing the journal this way would have been impossible without the Internet," he said. The journal's inaugural issue contains a translation of a 1974 lecture given by Foucault ("The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Anti-Medicine?"), as well as a number of articles and reviews. Of particular interest to those interested in the development of the French philosopher's thought is a review essay by Brad Elliott Stone, a professor of philosophy at Loyola Marymount University, on the only two English translations issued thus far of Foucault's lectures at the College of France in the mid-1970s. (To date, six volumes of Foucault's lectures at the college have been published in French.) Mr. Lynch, who contributed two bibliographical works to the first issue of Foucault Studies, says that the lectures are keys to unraveling Foucault's growth as a thinker. While Foucault's books were conceived "as works of art," he observes, the lectures "let you hear him thinking out loud." Beyond the Academy One of the goals of the Foucault Society, Mr. Parkins said, is to push Foucault's ideas into arenas far from academe. Like his colleagues at Foucault Studies, he hopes to attract students and younger scholars to the organization. He would also like to engage artists, activists, and people in other professions in discussions about Foucault. "Our board of advisers is a little too academic right now," he conceded. "We're working on that. ... We need diversity." Mr. Parkins believes that his own varied experiences in and out of academe may help bridge that gap. He has a B.A. in philosophy and an M.A. in religion from Yale University. He also holds an M.B.A. from the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania and an M.S. in education from Hunter College, of the City University of New York. "I have a very diverse background," he says, "but a strong business background, a lot of strategic planning and nonprofit management." Among the society's goals is to secure a home for itself and the resource center that it envisions for Foucault scholars. Yet Mr. Parkins says that the society is seeking an institution that will grant it significant autonomy as well. "A lot of what we're going to do is probably going to be cutting edge, and is probably going to be controversial," he said. "I'm counting on that, actually. Too close an affiliation with any major organization or institutions risks having them dictate the programming, or withdraw support, or any of that game-playing." One of the key ideas in Foucault's thought is that power is too fluid to be possessed, but rather it must be used. Mr. Parkins says that the philosophy behind the society hews closely to that idea. "The point is not to beatify Foucault," he said, "but to use his ideas and methods." References 2. mailto:Richard.Byrne at chronicle.com 3. http://www.foucaultsociety.org/ 4. http://www.siu.edu/~foucault/ 5. http://www.qut.edu.au/edu/cpol/foucst/index1.html From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:30:27 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:30:27 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] American Conservative: Marxism of the Right Message-ID: Marxism of the Right http://www.amconmag.com/2005_03_14/article1.html March 14, 2005 Issue by Robert Locke Free spirits, the ambitious, ex-socialists, drug users, and sexual eccentrics often find an attractive political philosophy in libertarianism, the idea that individual freedom should be the sole rule of ethics and government. Libertarianism offers its believers a clear conscience to do things society presently restrains, like make more money, have more sex, or take more drugs. It promises a consistent formula for ethics, a rigorous framework for policy analysis, a foundation in American history, and the application of capitalist efficiencies to the whole of society. But while it contains substantial grains of truth, as a whole it is a seductive mistake. There are many varieties of libertarianism, from natural-law libertarianism (the least crazy) to anarcho-capitalism (the most), and some varieties avoid some of the criticisms below. But many are still subject to most of them, and some of the more successful varieties--I recently heard a respected pundit insist that classical liberalism is libertarianism--enter a gray area where it is not really clear that they are libertarians at all. But because 95 percent of the libertarianism one encounters at cocktail parties, on editorial pages, and on Capitol Hill is a kind of commonplace "street" libertarianism, I decline to allow libertarians the sophistical trick of using a vulgar libertarianism to agitate for what they want by defending a refined version of their doctrine when challenged philosophically. We've seen Marxists pull that before. This is no surprise, as libertarianism is basically the Marxism of the Right. If Marxism is the delusion that one can run society purely on altruism and collectivism, then libertarianism is the mirror-image delusion that one can run it purely on selfishness and individualism. Society in fact requires both individualism and collectivism, both selfishness and altruism, to function. Like Marxism, libertarianism offers the fraudulent intellectual security of a complete a priori account of the political good without the effort of empirical investigation. Like Marxism, it aspires, overtly or covertly, to reduce social life to economics. And like Marxism, it has its historical myths and a genius for making its followers feel like an elect unbound by the moral rules of their society. The most fundamental problem with libertarianism is very simple: freedom, though a good thing, is simply not the only good thing in life. Simple physical security, which even a prisoner can possess, is not freedom, but one cannot live without it. Prosperity is connected to freedom, in that it makes us free to consume, but it is not the same thing, in that one can be rich but as unfree as a Victorian tycoon's wife. A family is in fact one of the least free things imaginable, as the emotional satisfactions of it derive from relations that we are either born into without choice or, once they are chosen, entail obligations that we cannot walk away from with ease or justice. But security, prosperity, and family are in fact the bulk of happiness for most real people and the principal issues that concern governments. Libertarians try to get around this fact that freedom is not the only good thing by trying to reduce all other goods to it through the concept of choice, claiming that everything that is good is so because we choose to partake of it. Therefore freedom, by giving us choice, supposedly embraces all other goods. But this violates common sense by denying that anything is good by nature, independently of whether we choose it. Nourishing foods are good for us by nature, not because we choose to eat them. Taken to its logical conclusion, the reduction of the good to the freely chosen means there are no inherently good or bad choices at all, but that a man who chose to spend his life playing tiddlywinks has lived as worthy a life as a Washington or a Churchill. Furthermore, the reduction of all goods to individual choices presupposes that all goods are individual. But some, like national security, clean air, or a healthy culture, are inherently collective. It may be possible to privatize some, but only some, and the efforts can be comically inefficient. Do you really want to trace every pollutant in the air back to the factory that emitted it and sue? Libertarians rightly concede that one's freedom must end at the point at which it starts to impinge upon another person's, but they radically underestimate how easily this happens. So even if the libertarian principle of "an it harm none, do as thou wilt," is true, it does not license the behavior libertarians claim. Consider pornography: libertarians say it should be permitted because if someone doesn't like it, he can choose not to view it. But what he can't do is choose not to live in a culture that has been vulgarized by it. Libertarians in real life rarely live up to their own theory but tend to indulge in the pleasant parts while declining to live up to the difficult portions. They flout the drug laws but continue to collect government benefits they consider illegitimate. This is not just an accidental failing of libertarianism's believers but an intrinsic temptation of the doctrine that sets it up to fail whenever tried, just like Marxism. Libertarians need to be asked some hard questions. What if a free society needed to draft its citizens in order to remain free? What if it needed to limit oil imports to protect the economic freedom of its citizens from unfriendly foreigners? What if it needed to force its citizens to become sufficiently educated to sustain a free society? What if it needed to deprive landowners of the freedom to refuse to sell their property as a precondition for giving everyone freedom of movement on highways? What if it needed to deprive citizens of the freedom to import cheap foreign labor in order to keep out poor foreigners who would vote for socialistic wealth redistribution? In each of these cases, less freedom today is the price of more tomorrow. Total freedom today would just be a way of running down accumulated social capital and storing up problems for the future. So even if libertarianism is true in some ultimate sense, this does not prove that the libertarian policy choice is the right one today on any particular question. Furthermore, if limiting freedom today may prolong it tomorrow, then limiting freedom tomorrow may prolong it the day after and so on, so the right amount of freedom may in fact be limited freedom in perpetuity. But if limited freedom is the right choice, then libertarianism, which makes freedom an absolute, is simply wrong. If all we want is limited freedom, then mere liberalism will do, or even better, a Burkean conservatism that reveres traditional liberties. There is no need to embrace outright libertarianism just because we want a healthy portion of freedom, and the alternative to libertarianism is not the USSR, it is America's traditional liberties. Libertarianism's abstract and absolutist view of freedom leads to bizarre conclusions. Like slavery, libertarianism would have to allow one to sell oneself into it. (It has been possible at certain times in history to do just that by assuming debts one could not repay.) And libertarianism degenerates into outright idiocy when confronted with the problem of children, whom it treats like adults, supporting the abolition of compulsory education and all child-specific laws, like those against child labor and child sex. It likewise cannot handle the insane and the senile. Libertarians argue that radical permissiveness, like legalizing drugs, would not shred a libertarian society because drug users who caused trouble would be disciplined by the threat of losing their jobs or homes if current laws that make it difficult to fire or evict people were abolished. They claim a "natural order" of reasonable behavior would emerge. But there is no actual empirical proof that this would happen. Furthermore, this means libertarianism is an all-or-nothing proposition: if society continues to protect people from the consequences of their actions in any way, libertarianism regarding specific freedoms is illegitimate. And since society does so protect people, libertarianism is an illegitimate moral position until the Great Libertarian Revolution has occurred. And is society really wrong to protect people against the negative consequences of some of their free choices? While it is obviously fair to let people enjoy the benefits of their wise choices and suffer the costs of their stupid ones, decent societies set limits on both these outcomes. People are allowed to become millionaires, but they are taxed. They are allowed to go broke, but they are not then forced to starve. They are deprived of the most extreme benefits of freedom in order to spare us the most extreme costs. The libertopian alternative would be perhaps a more glittering society, but also a crueler one. Empirically, most people don't actually want absolute freedom, which is why democracies don't elect libertarian governments. Irony of ironies, people don't choose absolute freedom. But this refutes libertarianism by its own premise, as libertarianism defines the good as the freely chosen, yet people do not choose it. Paradoxically, people exercise their freedom not to be libertarians. The political corollary of this is that since no electorate will support libertarianism, a libertarian government could never be achieved democratically but would have to be imposed by some kind of authoritarian state, which rather puts the lie to libertarians' claim that under any other philosophy, busybodies who claim to know what's best for other people impose their values on the rest of us. Libertarianism itself is based on the conviction that it is the one true political philosophy and all others are false. It entails imposing a certain kind of society, with all its attendant pluses and minuses, which the inhabitants thereof will not be free to opt out of except by leaving. And if libertarians ever do acquire power, we may expect a farrago of bizarre policies. Many support abolition of government-issued money in favor of that minted by private banks. But this has already been tried, in various epochs, and doesn't lead to any wonderful paradise of freedom but only to an explosion of fraud and currency debasement followed by the concentration of financial power in those few banks that survive the inevitable shaking-out. Many other libertarian schemes similarly founder on the empirical record. A major reason for this is that libertarianism has a na?ve view of economics that seems to have stopped paying attention to the actual history of capitalism around 1880. There is not the space here to refute simplistic laissez faire, but note for now that the second-richest nation in the world, Japan, has one of the most regulated economies, while nations in which government has essentially lost control over economic life, like Russia, are hardly economic paradises. Legitimate criticism of over-regulation does not entail going to the opposite extreme. Libertarian na?vet? extends to politics. They often confuse the absence of government impingement upon freedom with freedom as such. But without a sufficiently strong state, individual freedom falls prey to other more powerful individuals. A weak state and a freedom-respecting state are not the same thing, as shown by many a chaotic Third-World tyranny. Libertarians are also na?ve about the range and perversity of human desires they propose to unleash. They can imagine nothing more threatening than a bit of Sunday-afternoon sadomasochism, followed by some recreational drug use and work on Monday. They assume that if people are given freedom, they will gravitate towards essentially bourgeois lives, but this takes for granted things like the deferral of gratification that were pounded into them as children without their being free to refuse. They forget that for much of the population, preaching maximum freedom merely results in drunkenness, drugs, failure to hold a job, and pregnancy out of wedlock. Society is dependent upon inculcated self-restraint if it is not to slide into barbarism, and libertarians attack this self-restraint. Ironically, this often results in internal restraints being replaced by the external restraints of police and prison, resulting in less freedom, not more. This contempt for self-restraint is emblematic of a deeper problem: libertarianism has a lot to say about freedom but little about learning to handle it. Freedom without judgment is dangerous at best, useless at worst. Yet libertarianism is philosophically incapable of evolving a theory of how to use freedom well because of its root dogma that all free choices are equal, which it cannot abandon except at the cost of admitting that there are other goods than freedom. Conservatives should know better. Robert Locke writes from New York City. From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:31:07 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:31:07 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] American Conservative: In Defense of Freedom Message-ID: In Defense of Freedom http://amconmag.com/2005_03_14/article2.html March 14, 2005 Issue by Daniel McCarthy Arthur Schopenhauer once wrote a marvelously cynical manual of eristics called The Art of Always Being Right. The philosopher advised his readers against resort to logic; ad hominem attacks and other plays upon the passions could be much more effective. Put the opponent's argument in some odious category, he urged. Conservatives are long accustomed to residing in such a category: as their enemies would have it, conservatism is the ideology of the rich, the racist, and the illiterate. That this caricature bears no resemblance at all to the philosophy and social thought of Edmund Burke or Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver or Robert Nisbet, is irrelevant. The stereotype endures not because it is true but because it is useful. Sadly, a few conservatives seem to have learned nothing from their experience at the hands of the Left and are no less quick to present an ill-informed and malicious caricature of libertarians than leftists are to give a similarly distorted interpretation of conservatism. Rather than addressing the arguments of libertarians, these polemicists slander their foes as hedonists or Nietzscheans. In fact, there are libertine libertarians, just as there are affluent and bigoted conservatives. But libertinism itself is as distinct from libertarianism as worship of Mammon or hatred of blacks is distinct from conservatism. Libertarianism is a political philosophy, not a complete system of ethics or metaphysics. Political philosophies address specifically the state and, more generally, justice in human society. The distinguishing characteristic of libertarianism is that it applies to the state the same ethical rules that apply to everyone else. Given that murder and theft are wrong--views not unique to libertarianism, of course--the libertarian contends that the state, which is to say those individuals who purport to act in the name of the common good, has no more right to seize the property of others, beat them, conscript them, or otherwise harm them than any other institution or individual has. Beyond this, libertarianism says only that a society without institutionalized violence can indeed exist and even thrive. For some exceptionally Christ-like people no demonstration of feasibility is needed. Doing what is right is enough, regardless of whether it brings wealth or happiness or even daily bread. But most people are not like that; they want security and prosperity--they ask, not unreasonably, not only "is it right?" but "can it work?" Following upon this is a tendency to deny that necessary evils are evils at all. Yes, the state seizes tax money and jails those who do not pay, actions that would be denounced as gangsterism if undertaken by a private organization. But if the only way life can go on is to have the government provide defense and other necessities, such expropriations might have to be called something other than robbery. Moderate libertarians say just that. They propose that the state should do those necessary things that it alone can do--and only those things. Radical libertarians contend there is nothing good that only the state can provide--even its seemingly essential functions are better served by the market and voluntary institutions. The differences between thoroughgoing libertarians and moderates are profound, but the immediate prescriptions of each are similar enough: cut taxes, slash spending, no more foreign adventurism. Discovering just which functions of government are necessary, or showing how life can be led in the absence of institutional coercion altogether, is no easy task. Any power that the state assumes typically comes to be seen in retrospect as absolutely essential. America long got by well without a Federal Reserve or a Food and Drug Administration, yet today it is almost unthinkable that they could be abolished. Coercive and grandiose statist solutions to problems real or imagined have the effect of crowding out voluntary approaches, so that sooner or later the government fix comes to seem the only one. Even the most statist conservative in America today does not call for nationalizing health care. Yet in every country in which a national health service is a fait accompli, conservatives do not dream of abolishing it--certainly Britain's Tories, even under Thatcher, did not. The public in such countries takes socialized medicine for granted; the alternative is practically pre-civilized. Once, conservatives really did intend to repeal the New Deal. Now a Republican president talks about saving Social Security--albeit with a phony "privatization" plan--as if society would collapse in the absence of mandatory savings or government social insurance. Conservatives complain about the media's erstwhile tendency to label Soviet hardliners as Russian "conservatives," but it's hard to escape the conclusion that if Communism were a government program, the Republican Party would be trying to save it, too. Consider the about-face that conservatives in this country have pulled with respect to the Department of Education--one could name other departments as well--which once was targeted for elimination and now is funded more generously than ever. Economics is of some help here, showing both that government is not necessary for prosperity and that in fact state intervention into the free market hurts the very people it's supposed to help. Rent control makes affordable apartments scarce. The minimum wage exacerbates unemployment. And a basic law of economics is that you get more of what you subsidize: doles encourage unemployment. Economics suggests ways in which services now provided poorly and counterproductively by government can be made available without coercion. The limits of this are worth keeping in mind, however, and are kept in mind by libertarians. Economics is not psychology; study of production and exchange does not tell a person what he should buy. Relative valuation of goods--without which there can be no economics, since exchange only takes place when each party values what the other is offering more than what he himself is selling--does not imply a relativistic ethics. The ethical assumption of libertarianism--that it is wrong to murder and steal--is absolute, and other values may be absolute as well. Libertarians are not wholly dependent on economics to show how freedom works, however. From Lord Acton onward, libertarians have taken a keen interest in history, and noncoercive institutions have a long established empirical record. Conservatives should be aware of the evidence. Over the past 200 years the power of the state has grown exponentially: in earlier eras private initiative and civil society provided most of the goods that the state now pretends to supply. Indeed, as libertarian historian-theorists have noted, as state power grows so civil society proportionally diminishes. Before Social Security, families and churches cared for the elderly. Now it is easier for young people to forget their parents and grandparents in old age; let the government take care of them. Social networks decay when they aren't used, and the state crowds out civil society. There is something rather counterintuitive--or just plain nonsensical--to the belief that bureaucrats and politicians care more about the elderly than families and communities do. The same holds true for the notion that the state upholds the interests of children. No, libertarians do not want to see youngsters emancipated from their parents. The family is natural and is not upheld, even allowing for corporal punishment, primarily by force. The power of state over individual and society, on the other hand, is rather different. Government is nobody's parent, and the idea that President Bush would be in any sense the father of citizens who are wiser and more just than he is perversion. When the state treats adults as children, infantilizing its subjects, the more prudent and older becomes subservient to the more reckless and younger, for society antedates the state. Social conservatives have long faced an apparent paradox. No matter how Christian the president and members of his party claim to be, no matter how many "solid" conservatives are elected Congress, the fabric of the social order continues to fray. At some point the question must be asked, is this because there still aren't enough good people in government?--how many would ever be enough? Or is it because the state by nature, far from buttressing the organs of civilization and the way of life dear to conservatives, instead undermines those very things? As Albert Jay Nock once observed, sending in good people to reform the state is like sending in virgins to reform the whorehouse. The free market sometimes involves things that conservatives dislike, such as pornography. What should be considered here, however, is not how the market performs relative to some idealized abstraction of the state run by wise and pure censors, but how a specific market compares to a particular state. If there is a market for pornography there is sure to be a constituency for it, too. Moreover, the state produces far worse depravities of its own: Playboy may be bad, but one is not forced to subsidize it, unlike public-school sex ed, Andres Serrano's "Piss Christ" (funded by the National Endowment for the Arts), and Lynndie England's S&M jamboree with Iraqi prisoners of war. One can avoid pornography on the market, but everyone pays for the depravities of the political class. That is not about to change. The state, since it acts by compulsion, cannot inculcate real virtue in anyone but only a hypocritical and ersatz kind. One can compel action but not belief. No wonder then that as the scope of the state has grown, patriotism has degenerated into warmongering and religion has succumbed to politicization and scandal. The moral muscles atrophy in the absence of personal responsibility. That some self-identified conservatives cannot seem to tell the difference between self-responsibility and compulsion, or between the standards of civil society and those of the state, demonstrates just how thorough the process of crowding out genuine virtue with the coercive counterfeit actually is. Consider the involvement of the state in marriage. Presently the state defines marriage for all, and there is considerable angst among traditionalists that government will redefine the institution to include homosexual unions. This concern is not misplaced: if gay marriage is given state sanction, the force of law will support demands by wedded homosexuals to receive the same privileges from civil society--including churches and religious charities--that married heterosexuals receive. In the absence of state involvement in marriage and in telling businesses and nonprofit organizations whom they can hire, however, individuals, churches, and businesses could make up their own minds as to which marriages they considered legitimate and could act accordingly. This is not a matter of imposing on anyone; libertarianism allows different standards to prevail in different places rather than dragging everyone down to the level of the state. The libertarian rests content to let Utah be Utah and San Francisco be San Francisco--and to let Iraq be Iraq. If the property owners of a neighborhood wanted to establish a certain set of common moral standards, they could do so. Other places could do differently. Libertarianism thus responds to the reality of difference, including profound cultural and religious difference, much better than other political philosophies, which are left trying to smash square pegs into round holes. Libertarian societies in all their variety would not be utopias, of course. Libertarianism does not propose an end to evil or even to coercion, but only the flourishing of civilization in the absence of institutionalized coercion. Crime would not disappear, poor taste would still exist, and even conservative communities would remain beset with imperfection. Removing the privileges of the state would make these evils smaller, less centralized, and more manageable, however. This picture is no abstraction or economic construct; it arises from the practice of actual institutions. The record of civil society and the free market is as old as the human race. The libertarian idea of society would hold true even if a degree of coercion were absolutely necessary and ineradicable: the more authority residing in civil society rather than the state, the better. But there are at least a few prima facie considerations that lend weight to so-called radical libertarianism. The most widely agreed upon of all so-called public goods, national defense, is not what it seems. The mightiest military on earth failed to prevent the atrocity on 9/11. On the contrary, U.S. interference in the Middle East and support for thuggish regimes has endangered Americans. Is a country ripe for invasion without a standing army? The last 200-odd years have shown many instances, including our own Revolutionary War, where guerrilla forces have been more effective than regular armies. Nor is there any need for conscription when people want to defend their homes; conscription is what states need to make people fight for causes in which they don't believe. A libertarian order is not coming any time soon, but it should be plain to anyone who undertakes the investigation that the solution to war, bureaucracy, taxation, personal irresponsibility, and the rot of culture is not more government, it's less. From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:33:19 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:33:19 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] TCS: Marxism of the Right? Message-ID: Marxism of the Right? http://www.techcentralstation.com/031005F.html By Max Borders Published 03/10/2005 Until [18]this article by Robert Locke appeared in The American Conservative, conservatives and libertarians have enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship. After all, there is so much on which they agree. But can it last? Distortions like this one should make us wonder: "Free spirits, the ambitious, ex-socialists, drug users, and sexual eccentrics often find an attractive political philosophy in libertarianism, the idea that individual freedom should be the sole rule of ethics and government." Since Mr. Locke tempers these characterizations of the lib-curious with the word "often," one can no more verify his claim than take issue with it. Still, I should mention that I know a number of libertarians who don't even drink caffeine -- much less smoke crack -- due to their personal and religious choices. As one of my colleagues is fond of saying to those ignorant about our movement: "You're thinking of libertinism." Mr. Locke is, perhaps, guilty of the same error. And that's what makes this article titled "The Marxism of the Right" so fascinating in its contradictions. One can assume that Mr. Locke counts himself among those ready to wield the power of the state in defense of his cloudy notions of "the moral," i.e. to prevent the ambitious from getting too avaricious (one of the seven deadly sins, you know), or to keep sexual eccentrics from using VapoRub in ways unintended by God. If anything is clear in his article, it's that Mr. Locke's only contact with libertarian thought comes from "cocktail parties, on editorial pages, and on Capitol Hill." Consider this definition: "This is no surprise, as libertarianism is basically the Marxism of the Right. If Marxism is the delusion that one can run society purely on altruism and collectivism, then libertarianism is the mirror-image delusion that one can run it purely on selfishness and individualism." The notion that libertarians believe society ought to be run based on "selfishness" indicates that Mr. Locke frequents cocktail parties with [19]Objectivists, not libertarians. First of all, most libertarians don't think society should be "run" at all, rather -- as Hayek taught -- society should essentially [20]run itself. If we have the appropriate rules of non-harm enshrined in proper institutions, society is, while a complex system, a self-regulating one. The very notion that it can be "run" is a form of the fatal conceit, which has evidently entranced Mr. Locke. Social norms like citizenship, community, patriotism and the like can be wonderful (and diverse) epiphenomena of these underlying rules -- but they are meaningless without said rules. And they don't need to be enforced by religious zealots, communitarians, or lesser Pat Buchanans. Mr. Locke goes on to say: "Like Marxism, libertarianism offers the fraudulent intellectual security of a complete a priori account of the political good without the effort of empirical investigation. Like Marxism, it aspires, overtly or covertly, to reduce social life to economics." Notice how Mr. Locke attempts to create a dichotomy through philosophical claptrap. First, he wants to pigeon-hole all libertarians into the simplistic category of a priorism. While some of us are Kantians or (eh hem) Lockeans, such is certainly not universal in our ranks. Indeed there are at least as many types of libertarian as there are prefixes to be fitted with "con." Are such fallacies of generalization typical among paleo-cons? Libertarian thinkers like James Buchanan and Jan Narveson, for example, are contractarians, which means they don't rely on a priori truths for their justification and are -- in many senses -- moral skeptics. If the charge of a priorism was meant to suggest that libertarians simply don't use evidence to support their claims, I would say that is just false -- and wonder about such a curious accusation coming from one who claims that the existence of pornography "vulgarizes" society. (I can't think of anything less empirically verifiable.) The assertion that Marx "reduced social life to economics" is amusing if not misguided. While I realize that Marx's labor theory of value was economics in some vague sense, most contemporary economists are reluctant to give a footnote to Marx in Econ 101 textbooks. Perhaps the better description of Marxist thought is an attempt to "reduce social life to materialism." This more accurate description of Marx has nothing to do with libertarianism, and with that correction, Mr. Locke's cutely constructed "mirror-image" theory collapses. Mr. Locke's biggest mistake comes in the common -- but false -- conflation between individualism and selfishness. All we libertarians are saying is that we are prepared to direct our own "altruistic" and "collectivist" urges in ways that the government simply cannot and, indeed, should not. We are collaborative and cooperative -- and radically so. And, yes, we think that since the market in goods and services is dynamic, the market in making positive changes in peoples lives can be dynamic too. Call it Tocquevillianism on steroids. If Mr. Locke would like to call this a reduction of everything to economics, I suppose we're guilty. In a sense, we do believe that all human values are economic. One makes an economic choice when he gives his money to Bob Jones U or the Nature Conservancy, rather than to Wal-Mart. But if Mr. Locke thinks that doing "moral good" means the government should continue stripping resources away from people and their communities to be managed by the moral elite in Washington, he is more than mistaken -- he is a part of the problem. I will forego any lengthy criticism of Mr. Locke's quasi-philosophical discussion on the nature of "good," which terminates in this sentence: "Taken to its logical conclusion, the reduction of the good to the freely chosen means there are no inherently good or bad choices at all, but that a man who chose to spend his life playing tiddlywinks has lived as worthy a life as a Washington or a Churchill." But I will say that if we were all Churchills, we would have no heroes. For the state to get involved with trying to create Churchills is not only likely to fail, it is likely to infantilize a population. Do we want to "create" people incapable of independent action? If we are to take Mr. Locke's implicit rationale to its logical conclusion, we should expect his manual for "how to make inherently good choices and live a worthy life" in the next edition of The American Conservative. I must admit, Mr. Locke does raise some good questions about the nature of common goods: "But some [goods], like national security, clean air, or a healthy culture, are inherently collective. It may be possible to privatize some, but only some, and the efforts can be comically inefficient. Do you really want to trace every pollutant in the air back to the factory that emitted it and sue?" Libertarians often disagree about the nature of common goods, and a lot of great innovations have come out of these discussions. But these disagreements are no more fatal to our movement than conservatives' internal arguments about whether the Ten Commandments should sit in state courthouses or whether the war in Iraq was justified. Libertarians have been the ones asking whether some private roads might actually be a sound alternative to traffic snarls. (Only now are conservative politicos picking up on innovations like HOT lanes.) Libertarians are the ones asking if private initiatives and market forces will help clean the air and conserve natural lands more effectively (and efficiently). And while no serious libertarian discusses the idea of tracing pollutants back to smoke-stacks, we were the first to propose market alternatives to the environmental regulatory morass that was begun under -- and we proudly lay claim to insightful theories like [21]public choice that show how government can scarcely well provide for the "public good" even if it wanted to. But according to Mr. Locke, libertarians need to consider other "hard questions," like: HQ: "What if it needed to limit oil imports to protect the economic freedom of its citizens from unfriendly foreigners?" A: Why would we want to cripple our economy in pursuit of an autarkic fantasy? (Besides, how can vehicles without oil protect us?) HQ: "What if it needed to force its citizens to become sufficiently educated to sustain a free society?" A: This is like asking whether we need a state religion to preserve religiosity. HQ: "What if it needed to deprive citizens of the freedom to import cheap foreign labor in order to keep out poor foreigners who would vote for socialistic wealth redistribution?" A: Why can't we simply have constitutional checks on redistribution? Granted, some of Mr. Locke's cited "hard questions" are hard, and we've been going over them for a long time. In addition to questions about genuinely public goods, we wonder about whether conscription might be necessary to protect our freedoms in war; or whether open borders without assimilation are dangerous to our institutions. Some libertarians are pragmatic, not just "abstract and absolutist." Most libertarians don't think of children as full agents deserving full freedom despite Mr. Locke's invented claims of libertarian "idiocy." And while there are some [22]extreme libertarians who are against state-sanctioned care for the senile or the insane, few if any libertarians are opposed to volunteer-driven and philanthropically funded care for those who represent a danger to themselves or others -- and this might require oversight of some form to ensure folks aren't harmed. On the question of drug legalization, Mr. Locke would have done well to put his pen down. Even [23]some conservatives are starting to see that the War on Drugs has done little or nothing to clean up inner cities and has created an underclass of prison inmates unnecessarily. The resources the state has wasted in trying to control people's personal lives is appalling, and its failure is evident (yes, there is empirical data for this fact). And "drug users who caused trouble" would be put in prison. Why Mr. Locke assumes otherwise is disturbing, because it appears he really hasn't looked to libertarian resources on this. Putting drug users who cause trouble into prison is a heck of a lot simpler and less costly than imprisoning people simply for possessing or using drugs -- all out of a moral imperative that is not universally shared. The sad part about this article is that Robert Locke sounds like many people. Behind all of his golden mean rhetoric, Locke assumes that an inefficient bureaucracy with a monopoly on power can not only spare us from the "extreme costs" of our free choices, but effectively identify them. Many good thinkers since Frederic Bastiat have spent the last century and a half showing how unintended consequences end up doing us more harm than good. We should wonder how Mr. Locke or anyone else thinks he has finally figured out how to fix complex society. This anointed power-class, while they usually disagree on almost every policy issue, does agree on one thing: that they should be in power. Locke believes he has reached the point of full-tilt profundity when he claims: "Empirically, most people don't actually want absolute freedom, which is why democracies don't elect libertarian governments. Irony of ironies, people don't choose absolute freedom. But this refutes libertarianism by its own premise, as libertarianism defines the good as the freely chosen, yet people do not choose it. Paradoxically, people exercise their freedom not to be libertarians." Mr. Locke should consider something more ironic. In a truly free society, people will be just as able to enter into collective arrangements with people who have also chosen to forego so-called "absolute freedom." Mr. Locke and I can start a Hutterite commune where everybody shares the work and bows hourly to a statue of Edmund Burke as a condition of residing there. I can't imagine why in the world Mr. Locke puts so much faith in democracy while simultaneously implying that inexpensive foreign laborers that might turn 'commie pink' on us should be kept out. Locke's economic assertions in this next passage rival those of Paul Krugman: "There is not the space here to refute simplistic laissez faire, but note for now that the second-richest nation in the world, Japan, has one of the most regulated economies, while nations in which government has essentially lost control over economic life, like Russia, are hardly economic paradises. Legitimate criticism of over-regulation does not entail going to the opposite extreme." There is not the space here to explain the complexities of economics to Mr. Locke, but suffice it to say that Japan has been successful despite stultifying regulation, and those regulations (most notably in banking) are showing signs of making the country's economy [24]sclerotic. Russia, on the other hand, has only been "free" for fifteen years and has lived close to a century without the formal or informal institutions to make a market economy and a free society tick. Nevertheless, it is still growing at close to [25]six percent per year. I will close this article without addressing Mr. Locke's visions of how libertarianism in practice would unleash "sadomasochism" and other caligulan horrors. Suffice it to say that libertarians know that we are able to exercise self-restraint not because the Great Nanny in Washington threatens us with chastening, but because we belong to communities, families, and relationships in which the values of healthy living are naturally grown orders. Max Borders is a libertarian by day, libertine by night in the Washington, DC area. References 18. http://www.amconmag.com/2005_03_14/article1.html 19. http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer 20. http://www.abetterearth.org/article.php/876.html 21. http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/Booklet.pdf 22. http://www.szasz.com/ 23. http://aei.org/publications/bookID.812,filter./book_detail.asp 24. http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/07/bloomberg/sxyen.html 25. http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=47259 From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:33:52 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:33:52 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] James M. Buchanan: Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program Message-ID: Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program* James M. Buchanan Center for Study of Public Choice George Mason University Fairfax, Virginia My subtitle identifies public choice as a research program rather than as a discipline or even a subdiscipline. (The Lakatosian definition seems to fit closely.) A research program incorporates acceptance of a hard core of presuppositions that impose limits on the domain of scientific inquiry while, at the same time, insulating such inquiry from essentially irrelevant criticism. The hard core in public choice can be summarized in three presuppositions: (1) methodological individualism, (2) rational choice, and (3) politics-as-exchange. The first two of these scientific building blocks are those that inform basic economics and will raise few criticisms from economists, although they become central in noneconomists' attacks on the whole enterprise. The third element in the hard core is less familiar, and I shall discuss this feature of public choice more fully later. Temporally, this research program involves a half century during which it originated, developed, and matured. Although there were precursors, some of whom will enter the narrative that follows, we can date the origins of public choice from midcentury. And this fact, in itself, is of considerable interest. Viewed retrospectively, from the vantage point of 2003, the scientific-explanatory "gap" that public choice emerged to fill seems so large that the development of the program seems to have been inevitable. As they emerged from World War II, governments, even in Western democracies, were allocating between one-third and one-half of their total product through collective-political institutions rather than through markets. Economists, however, were devoting their efforts almost exclusively to explanations-understandings of the market sector. No attention was being paid to political-collective decision making. Practitioners in political science were no better. They had developed no explanatory basis, no theory as it were, from which operationally falsifiable hypotheses might be derived. The whole politicized sector of social interaction was, therefore, "crying out" for explanatory models designed to help understand the empirical reality that was observed. My own piddling first entry into the subject matter (Buchanan 1949) was little more than a call for those economists who examined taxes and spending to pay some attention to the models of politics that were assumed to be in existence. And, except for the important, but neglected, paper by Howard Bowen (1943), even those who made the recognized seminal contributions did not seem to appreciate the fact that they were entering uncharted territory. Majority Cycles Almost simultaneously, Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow commenced their work on two quite separate problems, although their results converged with consequences that are by now familiar. Black was concerned with the working of majority-voting rules in small committee settings: How did voting results emerge from separate individual orderings, when collective alternatives (proposals, motions, etc.) were presented in a sequence of pairwise choices? Black found, to his surprise, that only two persons had worked out some of the elementary logic-the French nobleman Condorcet and Charles Dodgson, an Oxford logician more familiarly known under the name of Lewis Carroll. Black (1948, 1958), who was working in Wales, did not attract much early attention, either in his own country or elsewhere. Arrow sought to answer the question: Is it possible to aggregate separate individual orderings over social states so as to generate a "social" ordering that would satisfy reasonable conditions for rationality akin to those that characterized the individual orderings? Arrow commenced from within the tradition of what was then called "theoretical welfare economics." With the demolition of utilitarianism in 1932 at the hands of Lionel Robbins in his The Nature and the Significance of Economic Science, economists rediscovered Pareto, but the Paretian classificatory scheme did not allow for a means of selecting among the many positions that met the criterion for Pareto efficiency or optimality. Using the formal tools of symbolic logic, Arrow reached the seemingly dramatic conclusion that no such social ordering may be derived unless some restrictions are placed on the individual preference orderings. The now-famous impossibility theorem, as published in Arrow's book Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), exerted a major impact on the thinking of economists and political scientists and stimulated an extended discussion. Arrow, and Black less emphatically, was taken to have shown that democracy, interpreted as equivalent to majority voting, could not work. Both of these scientists had discovered, or rediscovered, the phenomenon of majority cycles, and they rigorously demonstrated that, under some sets of preference orderings, majority voting in a sequence of pairwise comparisons would generate continuous cycles, with no equilibrium or stopping point. The central point may be easily illustrated in the three-voter, three-alternative setting, as shown in the figure. Note that each of the three voters, labeled 1, 2, and 3, has a consistent ordering over the three options for choice, A, B, and C. Note also, however, that, when put to a pairwise sequence of majority votes, A will defeat B; B will, in turn, defeat C, but C will defeat A. There is no alternative that will command a majority over all of the other options. Figure 1 2 3 A B C B C A C A B Median Voter Models Black, in particular, wanted to resuscitate the majority-voting rule, as the legitimate means of reaching group decisions. He discovered that if the alternatives for collective choice can be arrayed along a single dimension in such fashion that each voter's preferences exhibit single-peakedness, then the worrisome majority cycles would not occur. Instead, in this setting, the alternatives preferred by the voter whose preferences are median for the group would be majority-preferred to any other alternatives. This result, referred to as the "median voter theorem," was quickly incorporated into both analytical and empirical research. The single-peakedness required remains highly plausible in many settings. Suppose that the choice options, A, B, and C, are alternative levels of spending on a collective outlay, say, on education. It is surely plausible that someone should prefer high spending (A), to medium spending (B), to low spending (C), hence the ordering for the first voter in the figure. It is also plausible that a voter, say 2, might prefer medium spending (B) to low spending (C), and this in turn to high spending (A), the ordering shown for the second voter. But look at the ordering for the third voter in the figure. This voter prefers low spending (C), but his second choice is high spending (A) which he prefers over medium spending (B), which seems a rather bizarre ordering in some settings. Yet it is precisely such anomalies in orderings that are necessary to generate the majority-voting cycles. The median voter theorem seemed initially to be explanatory over wide ranges of collective action. It was evident early on, however, and also had been recognized by Black himself, that once collective choices involve more than a single dimension, majority cycles must occur even if all voters exhibit single-peakedness in preferences over each of the dimensions considered separately. Majority voting seemed to be basically unstable in the sense that it could not produce a unique collective choice; a political equilibrium could not be reached. Is Collective Rationality Desirable? It was at this point that I entered the discussion with a generalized critique of the whole corpus of analysis generated by the Arrow-Black approach (Buchanan 1954a, 1954b). If, indeed, preferences differ over collective alternatives, and if these preferences are such as to generate cycles in voting outcomes, would not this result be precisely that which is best? Any attainment of a unique solution by majority voting would amount to the permanent imposition of the majority's will on the outvoted minority. Would not a guaranteed rotation, as produced through the cycle, be the preferred sequence here? In such a cyclical sequence, the members of the minority in the first round are enabled to come back in subsequent rounds and ascend to majority membership. My concern, then and later, was always with means of preventing discrimination against members of minorities rather than ensuring that, somehow, majority rule produced stable sets of political outcomes. Examined from an economist's perspective, what guarantee could majority rule offer against collective actions that were inefficient in the standard Pareto sense? Clearly, the natural feature of majority voting is the separation of the interests of members of the majority from those of the minority. On any single voting sequence, some persons in the inclusive polity must lose and others must gain. How can collective choice be made more efficient? And more just? Wicksell and the Rule of Unanimity At this point, I introduce the great Swedish economist Knut Wicksell, who is the most important of all precursory figures in public choice, especially for my own work and for what we now call "constitutional economics." In his dissertation published in 1896, Wicksell was concerned about both the injustice and the inefficiency of untrammeled majority rule in parliamentary assemblies. He did not discover the possibility of the majority cycle, but he did recognize that majorities were quite likely to enact legislation aimed at benefiting the constituencies of their own members at the expense of those members left outside of the majority coalitions. Majority rule seemed quite likely to impose net costs or damages on large segments of the taxpayer-beneficiary group. Why should members of such minorities, facing discrimination, lend their support to political structures? Unless all groups can somehow benefit from the ultimate exchange with the government, how can overall stability be maintained? These considerations led Wicksell to question the efficacy of majority rule itself. And to ensure both enhanced efficiency and increased justice in the fundamental dealings of the individual with governmental authority (the state), Wicksell proposed that the voting rule be modified in the direction of unanimity. If the agreement of all persons in the voting group should be required to implement collective action, then this result, in itself, would guarantee that all persons secure net gains and, further, that the projects so approved yield, overall, benefits in excess of costs. Wicksell recognized that, if applied in a literal voting setting, a requirement of unanimity would produce a stalemate, since it allows each and every person to play off against all others in the group. Such a recognition, however, does not change the value of the unanimity rule as a benchmark for comparative evaluation. In suggestions for practical constitutional reforms, Wicksell supported changes in voting rules from simple to qualified majorities, perhaps, for example, the requirement of five-sixths approval for collective proposals. My own serendipitous discovery of Wicksell's neglected work in 1948, followed by my later translation of this work from German, introduced the important contribution to English-language scholars and laid the groundwork for later developments in what we now call "constitutional economics," which I shall discuss more fully below. The Endogeneity of Alternatives In their analyses, Black and Arrow had assumed, more or less implicitly, that the alternatives for collective choice, among which the voting rule generates an outcome, are exogenous to the process itself, that is, that the motions, candidates, or proposals exist prior to the selection process itself. For Wicksell, this exogeneity could not be present, but he did not, himself, recognize the relevance of this difference. Gordon Tullock, with whom I began to work at the University of Virginia in 1958, wrote a seminal paper on majority rule (Tullock 1959) that made the endogeneity of the choice options a central feature, although, even here, he did not recognize the generality of the distinction. Tullock's example was that of farmers-voters, each of whom wants to have his local road repaired with costs borne by the whole community of taxpayers. Majority-voting rules, as these allow for separate coalitions of farmers, generate results that impose costs on all farmers, while producing inefficiently large outlays on all local roads. These results emerge because majority-voting rules, as the institutions for making collective choices, allow any and all potential coalitions to advance taxing-spending proposals endogenously-proposals that would never arise from outside, so to speak. The Calculus of Consent If majority-voting rules operate so as to produce inefficient and unjust outcomes, and if political stability is secured only by discrimination against minorities, how can democracy, as the organizing principle for political structure, possibly claim normative legitimacy? The Wicksellian criterion for achieving justice and efficiency in collective action, namely the shift from majority-voting rules toward unanimity, seems institutionally impractical. But, without some such reform, how could persons, as voters-taxpayers-beneficiaries be assured that the ultimate exchange with the state would yield net benefits? That the whole game of politics be positive sum? At this point, and in implicit response to these questions, Tullock and I commenced to work on what was to become our book The Calculus of Consent, published in 1962. The central contribution of our book was to impose a two-level structure of collective decision making: we distinguished between what may be called "ordinary politics" (indicated by decisions made, often by majority voting, in legislative assemblies) and "constitutional politics" (indicated by decisions made on the set of framework rules within which the operation of ordinary politics is allowed to proceed). We were not, of course, inventing this two-level distinction as descriptive of political reality; both in legal theory and in practice, constitutional law had long been distinguished from statute law. What we did was to bring this quite familiar distinction into the corpus of the theoretical analysis of politics, the research program that was just on the verge of being developed in the 1950s and 1960s. This distinction allowed us to answer the questions posed previously. Less-than-unanimity rules, and even majority rules, may be allowed to operate over the decisions made through ordinary politics provided that there is generalized consensus on the "constitution," on the inclusive set of framework rules that place boundaries on what ordinary politics can and cannot do. In this fashion, the analysis in The Calculus of Consent made it possible to incorporate the Wicksellian reform thrust toward qualified or super majorities into politics at the level of constitutional rules, while allowing for ordinary majority-voting rules within constitutional limits. In a sense, the whole analysis in our book could have been interpreted as a formalization of the structure that James Madison had in mind when he constructed the U.S. Constitution. Or, at the least, the analysis offered a substantive criticism of the then-dominant elevation of majority voting to sacrosanct status in political science. The Public Choice Society and Public Choice Our book was well-received by both economists and political scientists. And, through the decades since its publication, the book has achieved status as a seminal work in the research program. The initial interest in the book, and its arguments, prompted Tullock and me, who were then at the University of Virginia, to initiate and organize a small research conference in Charlottesville in April 1963. We brought together economists, political scientists, sociologists, and scholars from other disciplines, all of whom were engaged in research outside the boundaries of their disciplines. The discussion was sufficiently stimulating to motivate the formation of a continuing organization, which we first called the Committee on Non-Market Decision-Making, and to initiate plans for a journal initially called Papers on Non-Market Decision-Making, which Tullock agreed to edit. We were all unhappy with these awkward labels, but after several annual meetings there emerged the new name "public choice," for both the organization and the journal. In this way the Public Choice Society and the journal Public Choice came into being. Both have proved to be quite successful as institutional embodiments of the research program, and sister organizations and journals have since been set up in Europe and Asia. William Riker, who organized some of the early meetings, exerted a major influence on American political science through the establishment and operation of the graduate research program at the University of Rochester. Second- and even third-generation Riker students occupy major positions throughout the country and carry forward the research thrust in positive political analysis. In the late 1960s, Tullock and I shifted to Virginia Polytechnic and State University, and in Blacksburg we set up the Center for Study of Public Choice, which served as an institutional home, of sorts, for visiting research scholars throughout the world. This center, and its related programs, operated effectively until 1983, when it was shifted to George Mason University, where its operation continues. I shall not discuss in detail the institutional history of the society, the journal, the center, and related organizations. Suffice it to say here that these varying structures reflect the development and maturing of the whole research program. Subprograms and Rent Seeking I shall barely discuss the separate research subprograms that have emerged within public choice as the umbrella subdiscipline. Note may be made only of some, but by no means all, of these subprograms: Riker's early work on coalition formation in legislatures (Riker 1962) was the focus of early attention; the economic analysis of anarchy attracted much effort in the early 1970s (Tullock 1972, 1974a, 1974b; Buchanan 1975); agenda manipulation as a means of controlling political outcomes (Romer and Rosenthal 1978); Mancur Olson's logic of collective action (1965); James Coleman's exchange-based social action (1990); explanations for the growth of government; theories of bureaucracy; structure-induced equilibria in politics; expressive versus interest voting; and the role of ideology. These and other subprograms emerged from within public choice, quite apart from the more familiar subjects upon which analysis was brought to bear, such as unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, legislative committee structures, proportional versus plurality systems, direct democracy, size of legislatures, federalism, and many others.1 One subprogram that emerged from within public choice deserves specific, if necessarily, brief discussion here. I refer to rent seeking, a subprogram initiated in a seminal paper by Tullock in 1967, and christened with this title by Anne Krueger in 1974. At base, the central idea emerges from the natural mind-set of the economist, whose explanation of interaction depends critically on the predictable responses of persons to measurable incentives. If an opportunity that promises to yield value arises, persons will invest time and resources in efforts to capture such value for themselves. The market itself is a profit-and-loss system; resources tend to move to their most highly valued uses because persons can be predicted to respond positively to promised profit opportunities and negatively to threatened losses. The extension of this motivational postulate to the share of value allocated through politics or collective action seems elementary now, but until Tullock explicitly made the connection, no attention had been paid to the profound implications: If there is value to be gained through political action, persons will invest resources in efforts to capture this value. And if this value takes the form of any transfer from one group to others, the investment is wasteful in an aggregate value sense. Tullock's early treatment of rent seeking was concentrated on monopoly, tariffs, and theft, but the list could be almost indefinitely expanded. If the government is empowered to grant monopoly rights or tariff protection to one group, at the expense of the general public or to designated losers, then it follows that potential beneficiaries will compete for the prize, so to speak. And, since by construction, only one group can be rewarded, the 1For a comprehensive treatment that includes discussion of the subprograms in public choice, see Mueller (1989). resources invested by other groups is wasted. These resources could have been used to produce valued goods and services. Once this basic insight is incorporated into the mind-set of the observer, much of modern politics can only be interpreted as rent-seeking activity. The pork-barrel politics of the United States is only the most obvious example. Much of the growth of the transfer sector of government can best be explained by the behavior of political agents who compete in currying constituency support through promises of discriminatory transfers. The rent-seeking subprogram remains active along several dimensions. How much value, in the aggregate, is dissipated through efforts to use political agency for essentially private profit? How can the activity of rent seeking, as aimed to secure discriminatory private gains, be properly distinguished from the activity aimed to further genuinely shared "public" interests? I shall not go into detail here, but it should be clear that rent seeking, as a subprogram in public choice more generally, opens up many avenues for both analytical and empirical inquiry. Constitutional Political Economy I noted earlier that the primary contribution of the book The Calculus of Consent was to impose a two-level framework on analyses of collective action or to distinguish categorically what we may call ordinary, or day-to-day, politics from constitutional politics. Indeed the subtitle of that book was Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. In a sense, this separation marked a major two-part division in the inclusive research program in public choice, that is, between what we might call positive political analysis, or positive public choice, and what we now call "constitutional political economy." Clearly, political-collective action, as resultant from individual choices, takes place at two or more distinct stages or levels. There are, first, the choices made within the existing set of rules, inclusively described as the "constitution." And there are, second, the choices from which these rules themselves emerge. Rules have as their primary function the imposition of limits or constraints on actions that might be taken. And economic theory, traditionally, has analyzed choices made within constraints that are presumed to be exogenously imposed. Why should persons seek to impose limits on their own actions? Only recently have economists broken out of their natural mind-set-that of not allowing for choices of constraints themselves. But recent research has involved the choice of constraints, even on the behavior of persons in noncollective settings. Important contributions have been made in developing the theory of addiction, with drugs, tobacco, diet, and gambling as relevant examples. The issues become categorically different, however, as attention is shifted from the noncollective or individualistic setting to that involving collective rules.2 In this setting, persons desire to impose constraints on the behavior of agents who act on behalf of the political group, not from any fear of irrational behavior on their own part, but, instead, from the fear of the prospect that their own preferences will be overruled, that their own interests will be damaged. Constitutional rules have as their central purpose the imposition of limits on the potential exercise of political authority. 2For general discussion, see Brennan and Buchanan (1985). The "constitutional way of thinking" (Buchanan 2001) shifts attention to the framework rules of political order as the object that commands or secures consensus among members of the body politic. It is at this level that the individual conceptually computes or calculates his own terms of exchange with the state, or with his political authority. Persons may agree that they are made better off by membership in the inclusive structure described by the constitution, while, at the same time, they may assess the impact of particular political actions to be contrary to their own interests. A somewhat loose way of putting this point is to say that in a constitutional democracy, persons owe loyalty to the constitution rather than to the government, as such, no matter how "democratic" such decisions might be. I have long argued that on precisely this dimension American public attitudes are quite different from those in Europe. As research analysis, constitutional political economy involves comparative assessment of alternative sets of constitutional rules, both those in existence and those that might be introduced prospectively. This analysis clearly has close affinity to recent efforts to introduce the study of institutions, generally. There are, of course, both positive and normative elements in this major research program. Differing sets of rules are examined and predictions are advanced concerning their working properties. And from such analysis proposals for reform may be advanced-proposals that take the form of constitutional changes, as opposed to proposals for particularized policy thrusts that might emerge from analysis of ordinary or within-constitutional politics. Is Public Choice Ideologically Biased? To this point, I have outlined the public choice research program as it has developed and as it now exists in its two parts, that of positive political science and constitutional political economy. How does the politics that we observe work, given the existing constitutional structure? And how might this politics be different under differing sets of constitutional constraints? In its approach to answers to each of these questions, public choice theory, as such, remains strictly neutral in the scientific sense. What, then, is the source of the familiar criticism to the effect that public choice, in itself, is ideologically biased? Again, it is necessary to appreciate the prevailing mind-set of social scientists and philosophers at midcentury. The socialist ideology was pervasive, and this ideology was supported by the allegedly neutral research program called-"theoretical welfare economics," which concentrated on the identification of the failures of observed markets to meet idealized standards. In sum, this branch of inquiry offered theories of market failure. But failure by comparison with what? The implicit presumption was always that politicized corrections for market failures would work perfectly. In other words, market failures were set against an idealized politics. Public choice then came along and provided analyses of politics, of the behavior of persons in public choosing roles whether these be voters, politicians, or bureaucrats, that were on all fours with those applied to markets and to the behavior of persons as participants in markets. These analyses necessarily exposed the essentially false comparison that had described so much of both scientific and public attitudes. In a very real sense, public choice became a set of theories of governmental failures, as an offset to the theories of market failures that had previously emerged from theoretical welfare economics. Or, as I put it in the title of a lecture in Vienna in 1978, public choice may be summarized by the three-word description "politics without romance." The research program should have been interpreted as a correction more of the scientific record than as the introduction of some illegitimate anti-governmental ideology. Regardless of any prescientific ideological stance, exposure to public choice analyses necessarily brings a more critical attitude toward politicized nostrums to alleged socioeconomic problems and issues. Public choice almost literally forces the critic to be pragmatic in any comparison of proposed institutional structures. There can be no presumption that politicized corrections for market failures will accomplish the desired objectives. Is Public Choice Immoral? A more provocative criticism of the whole public choice research program centers on the claim that it is immoral, at least in its behavioral impact. The source of this charge lies in the transfer of the two hard-core elements, methodological individualism and rational choice, directly from economic theory to the analysis of politics. At one level of abstraction, these two elements are themselves relatively empty of empirical content. To model the behavior of persons, whether in markets or in politics, as maximizing utilities, and as behaving rationally in so doing, does not require specification of the arguments in utility functions. Economists go further than this initial step, however, when they identify and place arguments into the categories of "goods" and "bads." Persons are then modeled as acting so as to maximize some index of "goods" and to minimize some index of "bads." More specifically, economic models of behavior include net wealth, an externally measurable variable, as an important "good" that persons seek to maximize. The moral condemnation-criticism of public choice is centered on the presumed transference of this element of economic theory over to political analysis. Those who find themselves in roles as public choosers, whether as voters, as legislators, as political agents of any sort, do not, it is suggested, behave in accordance with norms that are appropriate to behavior in markets. Persons are differently motivated when they are choosing "for the public" rather than for themselves in private choice capacities. And it is both descriptively inaccurate and morally questionable to assign self-interest motives to political actors. Or so the criticism runs. At base, this criticism stems from a misunderstanding of what the whole explanatory exercise is all about-a misunderstanding that may have been fostered by the failure of economists to acknowledge the limits of their efforts. The economic model of behavior, even if restricted to market activity, should never be taken to provide the be-all and end-all of scientific explanation. Persons act from many motives, and the economic model concentrates attention only on one of the many possible forces behind actions. To employ the model for prediction does, of course, require the initial presumption that the identified "goods" that are maximized are relatively important in the mix. Hypotheses that imply that promised shifts in net wealth modify behavior in predictable ways have not been readily falsifiable empirically. At issue here is the degree to which net wealth, and promised shifts in net wealth, may be used as explanatory incentives for the behavior of persons in public choice roles. Public choice, as an inclusive research program, incorporates the presumption that persons do not readily become economic eunuchs as they shift from market to political participation. The person who responds predictably to ordinary incentives in the marketplace does not fail to respond at all when his role is shifted to collective choice. The public choice theorist should, of course, acknowledge that the strength, and predictive power, of the strict economic model of behavior is somewhat mitigated as the shift is made from private market to collective choice. Persons in political roles may, indeed, act to a degree in terms of what they consider to be the general interest. Such acknowledgment does not, however, in any way imply that the basic explanatory model loses all of its predictive potential or that ordinary incentives no longer matter. What is left of the charge of immorality, once this much is acknowledged? Critics are somehow left with the claim that persons placed in political or public choice roles will themselves be led to act as the economic model dictates if such models are used in the inclusive explanatory exercise. In this light, it becomes immoral to model political choice behavior as being responsive to ordinary incentives, even if such an exercise is admittedly partially explanatory.3 We should, therefore, proceed with analysis of politics under the illusion that persons do indeed become "saints" as they shift to collective choice roles. The positive value of hypocrisy may be recognized but without elevating hypocrisy to an instrumental status in preserving social stability. Democracy, or self-government generally, is surely strong enough to allow for honesty in analysis of its own workings. Balancing the Accounts As noted, public choice as a research program has developed and matured over the course of a full half century. It is useful to assess the impact and effects of this program, both on thinking in the scientific community and in the formation of public attitudes. By simple comparison with the climate of opinion at half century, both the punditry and the public are much more critical of politics and politicians, much more cynical about the motivations of political action, much less naive in thinking that political nostrums offer easy solutions to social problems. And this shift in attitudes extends well beyond the loss of belief of the efficacy in central planning, in socialism, a loss of belief grounded in both historical regime failures and collapse of intellectually idealized structures. The question to be examined is not whether attitudes toward politics and politicians have shifted, often dramatically, over the half century. The question is, instead, what contribution has the research program of public choice brought to this attitudinal change? As I noted earlier, when we look retrospectively at the scientific and public climates of discussion at midcentury, the failure of social scientists to make efforts to understand and explain decision making in the proportionately large collectivized sector of social interaction seems difficult to comprehend. The gap in scientific effort now seems so obvious that the development of public choice, and related programs, becomes a natural and indeed necessary step in our always incomplete knowledge about the world. Nonetheless, there were two obstacles to be overcome in the intellectual community-obstacles that were, strangely, both opposites and complements. Broadly considered, the prevailing mind-set was socialist in the underlying presupposition that politics offered the solution to social problems. But there was a confusing amalgam of Marxism and ideal political theory involved: Governments, as observed, were modeled by Marxists as furthering class interests, but governments that might be installed after the revolution, so to speak, would become both omniscient and benevolent. In some of their implicit modeling of political behavior aimed at furthering special group or class interests, the Marxists seemed to be closet associates in public choice, even as they rejected methodological individualism. But how was the basic Marxist critique of politics, as observed, to be transformed into the idealized politics of the benevolent and omniscient super state? This question was simply left glaringly unanswered. And the debates of the 1930s were considered by confused economists of the time to have been won by socialists rather than by 3See Kelman (1987) and Brennan and Buchanan (1988). their opponents, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Both sides, to an extent, neglected the relevance of incentives in motivating human action, including action in the politicized sector. The structure of ideas that were adduced in support of the emerging Leviathan welfare state was logically flawed and could have been maintained only through long-continued illusion. But, interestingly, the failure, in whole or in part, of the socialist structure of ideas did not come from within the scientific academy. Mises and Hayek were not successful in their early efforts, and classical liberalism seemed to be at its nadir at midcentury. Failure came, not from a collapse of an intellectually defunct structure of ideas, but from the cumulative record of nonperformance in the implementation of extended collectivist schemes-nonperformance measured against promised claims, something that could be observed directly. In other words, governments everywhere, in both the socialist and the welfare states, overreached themselves, and tried to do more than the institutional framework would support. This record of failure came to be recognized widely, commencing in the 1960s and accelerating in the 1970s. Where was the influence of public choice in this history? Note specifically that I do not claim that public choice, as a coherent set of scientifically based theories of how politics works in practice, dislodged the prevailing socialist mind-set in the academies and that some subsequent recognition of the intellectual vulnerability exerted its feedback on political reality. In common parlance, public choice was not "ahead of the curve" in this respect. What I do claim is that public choice exerted its influence, which was major, in the provision of a coherent understanding and interpretation of that which could be everywhere observed. The public directly observed that collectivistic schemes were failing, that politicization did not offer the promised correctives for any and all social ills, that governmental intrusions often made things worse rather than better. How could these direct observations be fitted into a satisfactory understanding? Why did the nostrums promised fail to deliver? Public choice came along and offered a foundation for such an understanding. Armed with nothing more than the rudimentary insights from public choice, persons could understand why, once established, bureaucracies tend to grow apparently without limit and without connection to initially promised functions. They could understand why pork-barrel politics dominated the attention of legislators; why there seems to be a direct relationship between the overall size of government and the investment in efforts to secure special concessions from government (rent seeking); why the tax system is described by the increasing number of special credits, exemptions, and loopholes; why balanced budgets are so hard to secure; why strategically placed industries secure tariff protection. A version of the old fable about the king's nakedness may be helpful here. Public choice is like the small boy who said that the king really has no clothes. Once he said this, everyone recognized that the king's nakedness had been recognized but that no one had really called attention to this fact. Public choice has helped the public to take off their rose-colored glasses when they observe the behavior of politicians and the working of politics. Let us be careful not to claim too much, however. Public choice did not emerge from some profoundly new insight, some new discovery, some social science miracle. Public choice, in its basic insights into the workings of politics, incorporates a presupposition about human nature that differs little, if at all, from that which informed the thinking of James Madison at the American founding. The essential scientific wisdom of the 18th century, of Adam Smith and classical political economy and of the American Founders, was lost through two centuries of intellectual folly. Public choice does little more than incorporate a rediscovery of this wisdom and its implications into analyses and appraisal of modern politics. References Arrow, Kenneth. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley. Black, Duncan. 1948. On the rationale of group decision making. Journal of Political Economy 56: 23-34. ---. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bowen, Howard. 1943. The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58 (November): 27-49. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---. 1988. Is public choice immoral? The case for the "Nobel" lie. Virginia Law Review 74 (March): 179- 89. Buchanan, James M. 1949. The pure theory of government finance: A suggested approach. Journal of Political Economy 57 (December): 496-505. ---. 1954a. Social choice, democracy, and free markets. Journal of Political Economy 62 (April): 114-23. ---. 1954b. Individual choice in voting and the market. Journal of Political Economy 62 (August): 334-43. ---. 1975. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago. ---. 1979. Politics without romance: A sketch of positive public choice theory and its normative implications. Inaugural lecture, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria. IHS Journal, Zeitschrift des Instituts f?r H?here Studien 3: B1-B11. ---. 2001. The constitutional way of thinking. Working paper. Fairfax, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University. Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Coleman, James. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Krueger, Anne. 1974. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review 64 (June): 291-303. Kelman, Steven. 1987. "Public choice" and public spirit. Public Interest 87: 93-4. Mueller, Dennis. 1989. Public Choice II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Riker, William. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Robbins, Lionel. 1932. The Nature and the Significance of Economic Science. London: Macmillan. Romer and Rosenthal. 1978. Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice 33 (Winter): 27-43. Tullock, Gordon. 1959. Problems of majority voting. Journal of Political Economy 67 (December): 57l-79. ---. 1967. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal 5 (June): 224-32. ---, ed. 1972. Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy. Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice. ---. 1974a. The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice. ---, ed. 1974b. Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy. Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice. Wicksell, Knut. 1896. Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen. Jena: Gustav Fisher; in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance.1958. R.A. Musgrave and A.T. Peacock, eds. New York: St. Martin's Press: 72-118. Center for Study of Public Choice 4400 University Drive, MS 1D3, Fairfax, Virginia 22030 Information: (703) 993-2330 Fax: (703) 993-2323 www.gmu.edu/jbc/ From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:34:59 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:34:59 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] TLS: Unquenchable thirst Message-ID: Unquenchable thirst http://the-tls.co.uk/archive/story.aspx?story_id=2108094&window_type=print Harold Perkin 09 July 2004 BIRTH OF A SALESMAN. The transformation of selling in America. Walter A. Friedman. 334pp. Harvard University Press. $27.95. - 0 674 01298 4. A CENTURY OF AMERICAN ICONS. 100 products and slogans from the twentieth century consumer culture. Mary Cross, editor. 256pp. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. $49.95. - 0 313 31481 0. POP. Truth and power at the Coca-Cola company. Constance Hays. 399pp. Hutchinson. ?18.99. - 0 09 179968 6. David Ricardo believed that production was the engine of the economy and, with J. B. Say, that half the goods in the market bought the other half, so that producers did not have to worry about consumer demand. T. R. Malthus, on the other hand, believed that consumption was the mainspring and that demand, notably that of the idle rich, called forth production. Ever since, most economists have agreed with Ricardo, holding that the supply side would evoke sufficient demand to clear the market. Strangely enough, however, most big businessmen, while kowtowing to Ricardo's free market, have followed Malthus. By and large, they have distrusted the market to buy their goods without massive efforts to stimulate consumer demand. Hence the importance of salesmanship, public relations and advertising. The three books under review preach the significance of consumption in the rise of the American economy and its spread across the globe. In Birth of a Salesman Walter A. Friedman traces the evolution of the modern salesman from the peddlers, hawkers and canvassers of pre-industrial America. They bought their wares - tin utensils, scissors, clocks and watches, lace, sewing materials, even lightning conductors - from workshops and wholesalers at their own risk, unlike the modern commercial traveller, working for a large corporation and controlled by a marketing manager. The first pioneers, some of whom were women, included the sellers of devotional literature, bibles and prayer books. But for the most part, salesmen have been thoroughly masculine, a brotherhood who faced the travails of a peripatetic trade, and the comradeship of the saloon and cheap hotel. The early salesmen had a reputation for conmanship and chicanery. Henry Thoreau in 1854 thought them an unnatural, wasteful force, and Herman Melville, in The Confidence Man (1857), saw them as satanic sellers of false promises, fake medicines, useless stocks and shares, and nonexistent charities. Later in their evolution they were epitomized by Arthur Miller's womanizing, self-pitying, worn-out Willy Loman. Most of the travelling salesmen worked for wholesalers, but soon the modern giant corporations and public-relations firms set up their own marketing departments and turned them into well-respected heralds of free enterprise. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, large corporations with national or even worldwide ambitions, like Singer's sewing machines, Burroughs's typewriters, Candler's Coca-Cola, Heinz's fifty-seven varieties of canned foods, and Patterson's National Cash Register, began to treat marketing as a science, after the pattern of F. W. Taylor's scientific management. They raised the status of their agents, formulated guides to their conduct and approach to the shopkeeper or housewife, and backed them up with large-scale nationwide advertising. Magazines and books sprang up, like Printer's Ink (1888), The Science of Successful Salesmanship (1904) and Scientific Sales Management: A practical application of the principles of scientific sales management to selling (1913). They invented "salesology" with its own magazine in the 1910s and 20s. By 1920 there were 220 sales-management books in the Library of Congress catalogue. The salesmen, backed by mass advertising, helped to create the icons of American consumerism. The contributors to Mary Cross's symposium, A Century of American Icons, have produced 100 micro-histories of the logos, trade marks, slogans and jingles which have become part of the American psyche, many of them reaching out to most of the countries of the world. They include Coca-Cola, Heinz Baked Beans, Campbell's Soup, Kellogg's Cornflakes, Kodak cameras, Marlboro Man with his dangling cigarette, Cadillac luxury cars, Ronald McDonald, Gillette razors, Levi's Jeans, down to Absolut Vodka, Victoria's Secret lingerie, the AppleMac "Big Brother" television ad and the Yahoo internet search engine. They also cover icons that have swamped America but are rarely seen on the other side of the Atlantic: Morton's Salt, Burma-Shave, A&P (the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company), Lydia Pinkham's Vegetable Compound, Uneeda Biscuit and RCA Radio have failed to emigrate. The collection is a potted history of consumerism in the most insatiable consuming nation in the world. It demonstrates not only how the demand for mass-produced goods and services has been stimulated, but also how mass consumption has created the biggest international corporations and largest fortunes for their top executives on the planet. What the book does not show is the way in which the corporations owning the icons have used their muscle to outcompete and marginalize their rivals, by stealthy marketing ploys such as exclusive deals with supermarkets and fast-food outlets, and mergers with or purchases of smaller competitors. This aspect of corporate business is best illustrated by the icon which dominates the cover of the collection, Coca Cola. Constance Hays's story of how Coca-Cola - "a beverage with no nutritional value sold variously as a remedy, a tonic and a refreshment" - reflects the history of American consumer society and the rise of the global economy. It begins with a veteran Civil War ex-cavalryman, John Pemberton, who began to sell home-brewed medicines and mixtures in Atlanta in 1869. He invented a "French Wine Cola" made from a secret syrup containing alcohol, the mildly narcotic coca leaf and cola nut - hence the name - which, when diluted with carbonated water, the locals took to as a refreshment in the yet to be air-conditioned South. Eventually he left out the alcohol and from 1886 developed the first Coca-Cola. He sold it direct to the customers of his growing chain of drugstores and then others from what he called a soda fountain. In 1888, he sold the recipe and rights of manufacture to a brilliant entrepreneur, Asa Candler, whose genius for selling it through soda fountains created a nation of Coca-Cola drinkers and made the logo, sketched in his own cursive handwriting, a household name. By 1899, he was selling over 200,000 gallons of syrup, each gallon making with added soda water nearly 400 Colas, and slaking the thirst of Americans over 80 million times a year. At this point, he had not thought of making the drink available outside his own and other retailers' soda fountains, where it was sold as in ice-cream parlours. No one had thought of bottling it, until a couple of entrepreneurs, Benjamin Thomas and Joseph Whitehead, approached and pestered him to give them a contract. Candler, who thought that bottling would be too expensive but welcomed a further outlet for his syrup, then made the biggest mistake of his career. He signed an unlimited contract to supply Thomas and Whitehead with the syrup at a fixed price, to be raised only with the price of sugar, the main ingredient. Very soon the Coca-Cola bottle, moulded like the hourglass-shaped lady of the period, took off and carried the logo to the ends of the earth. It also gave a name to all carbonated beverages: "Pop", giving the title of Hays's book, came from the characteristic noise when the wired ceramic cap was released. It took the Coca-Cola company many years, and a bit of chicanery by substituting corn syrup or artificial sweeteners (in Diet Coke) for sugar, to get control of the distribution system again. That involved setting up its own bottling subsidiary and buying out as many of the local bottlers as could be persuaded or bullied to sell. This policy exposed what happened when a powerful, by now international corporation, operating in over 200 countries, set out to compete in the free market. Coca-Cola consciously tried to outcompete its rivals, Pepsi Cola, Royal Crown, Dr Pepper, and so on, and to drive them into a shrinking share of the market. The unstated end of competition is monopoly. Coca-Cola used every device it could muster to marginalize its competitors - exclusive deals with supermarkets, fast-food chains, college campuses, hotels and the like - or to persuade stores to give the most prominent shelf space to their products. It was backed by massive advertising in all forms of media, costing millions of dollars, beyond the reach of all but the richest of rivals. The company, it argued, did not sell the actual drink - that was the role of the bottlers, including their own Coca-Cola Enterprises - but only the syrup. That meant it could control the price at both ends, the sum charged to the bottlers and, through the advertised price, to the customer. The price squeeze with its guaranteed profits led not only to conflict and lawsuits with the bottlers but eventually to greater conflict with the government over misleading tax reporting. The issue was the relation between the Coca-Cola company and its dominant bottling subsidiary. The lawsuit argued that the two corporations were interlocked - in 1998 the parent company subsidized the bottlers by $1.2 billion in marketing support and other transfers - and were essentially the same enterprise, thus misleading the shareholders and Federal Treasury. Nonetheless, the fizzy drink and its offshoots, 7-Up, Orangina, Fanta and Dasani (filtered tap water), had built a vast international enterprise which in 1997 employed 29,000 people and was worth billions of dollars, its sales more than the GDP of most countries in the world. It had also made vast fortunes for a series of brilliant executives: Asa Candler, Robert Woodruff, Donald Keough, Roberto Goizueta, Douglas Ivester, Doug Daft and Warren Buffet. Goizueta, the "little Cuban exile" who climbed the heights of corporate wealth and power by his financial genius - though he was also responsible for the fiasco of the unpopular "New Coke" which nearly ruined the brand in 1985 - left over $1 billion when he died in 1997. Since his death, Coca-Cola has suffered a slump in its sales and share price, but it will be a long time dying, if it ever does. His chosen jingle, "I'd like to buy the world a Coke . . .", still rings around the world as the greatest icon of American capitalism. Constance Hays's Pop is a paradigm of the rise and rise of American global dominion. Together, these three books demonstrate how American tastes and culture have come to dominate the world. From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:35:50 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:35:50 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] TLS: (Natalie Wood) Splendour on the screen Message-ID: Splendour on the screen http://the-tls.co.uk/archive/story.aspx?story_id=2108030&window_type=print Philip French 02 July 2004 NATALIE WOOD. 352pp. Faber. ?17.99. By Gavin Lambert. US: New York: Knopf. $25.95. 0 375 41074 0. 0 571 22197 1 Child stardom, adult glamour, a mysterious accident: the troubled life and death of Natalie Wood Natalie Wood's colourful life began and ended in mystery. Her curious death at sea in 1981 brought a telegram of condolence from Queen Elizabeth to Wood's husband, the movie star Robert Wagner, and had the scandal sheets talking of murder and suicide. She was born in San Francisco in 1938, but there are considerable doubts over her paternity. Her story reaches back to the Russian Revolution and the eastward flight of Wood's mother with her family when the news of the Romanovs' demise reached their estate in southern Siberia. This could be the stuff of a Kitty Kelly showbiz biography or a Jerome Robbins roman-a-clef dishing the dirt on Hollywood. But though this book doesn't stint on sordid revelations about daily life in Tinseltown, Wood's life and career are safe in the hands of Gavin Lambert, who has a rare combination of talents. He is an outstanding film critic, a gifted biographer, the author of some of the shrewdest fiction written about Hollywood, and has been closely involved in moviemaking as a screenwriter. Moreover, they have something in common. Both had sex with the charismatic bisexual Nicholas Ray on the day they met him. Lambert's encounter was in London and he followed Ray to Los Angeles as his assistant. Shortly after his arrival he encountered Natalie Wood, who earlier that same year had lost her virginity at the age of sixteen to Ray while he was testing her for Rebel Without a Cause, a film that would change the course of her career. Lambert became one of her many gay friends, and a decade later, in 1965, she appeared in a film version of Lambert's novel Inside Daisy Clover as the eponymous troubled movie star. Wood's mother Maria was a manipulative monster, even worse than the stage mother Rosalind Russell played to Wood's Gypsy Rose Lee in Gypsy. A romantic fantasist obsessed with her lost Russian heritage, she had a brief marriage to an army officer in China (which produced a daughter), before crossing the Pacific to San Francisco. There she contracted a hypergamous relationship with a Russian emigre from a more humble background, a dockworker who also felt cut off from his roots and was violent when drunk. "What did your father die of?" someone was later to ask Natalie. "My mother", she replied. Natalie was born four months after the marriage, and though she was never to know it, her real father was almost certainly a brutish Russian-born captain in the American merchant navy with whom Maria conducted a lifelong affair. The mother was determined to turn one of her three daughters into a star, and in 1943 she ordered the five-year-old Natalie to go and sit on the knee of Irving Pichel, who was directing a movie in Santa Rosa, the little town north of San Francisco where they lived. She and her older sister Olga got walk-on roles in crowd scenes, and immediately Maria shifted the family down to Los Angeles and began grooming Natalie for the screen. After an impressive debut as Orson Welles's ward in the 1945 weepie, Tomorrow Is Forever (Welles recalled "something very sad and lonely about this compelling child"), she became an established child performer and the family's meal ticket. She played orphans, brat sisters, plucky victims of divorce; her characteristic role, Lambert observes, was "an emotionally displaced child whose problems are resolved by understanding adults (thanks, of course, to the understanding filmmakers who contrive a happy ending)". Over the next few years her film mothers were Gene Tierney, Margaret Sullivan, Joan Blondell, Maureen O'Hara and Bette Davis, her screen fathers James Stewart, Bing Crosby, Walter Brennan and Fred McMurray. In the greatest film of her early days she was unhappily cast as John Wayne's niece in John Ford's The Searchers. Maria pushed and pushed, became the keeper of her daughter's fan mail, and, using Natalie as a lever, got her husband a job as a carpenter at 20th-Century Fox. One day he came onto the set of a film she was appearing in, and (in something resembling a scene from a Joan Crawford tearjerker) she called out "Daddy". Everyone was shocked, and Maria told her she must never again acknowledge her father's presence at the studio. Natalie grew up in Hollywood at a time when the big studio system was reluctantly giving way to independent production. She found herself under contract to Warner Brothers, whose penny-pinching production boss, Jack Warner, supervised her career, making ten times her weekly contract payment by hiring her out to other studios. The House Un-American Activities Committee stalked the movie colony and everyone was in thrall to the suffocating conformity of the Eisenhower era. In this enclosed world Natalie had to play the game, kow-towing to the vindictive gossip columnists Loella Parsons and Hedda Hopper. She also had to cope with the near-insanity of Maria, whose account of a Russian Gypsy's curse induced a lifelong terror of "dark waters" in her daughter. Anticipating the horror movies of Wes Craven by some forty years, Maria told Natalie of a figure called "Jack the Jabber" who stabbed errant girls through the backs of cinema seats. She didn't, however, offer information about menstruation, and Natalie never recovered from the shock of her first period. Unlike most child stars, Natalie made the transition to adult performer: she became a piercingly brown-eyed, black-haired beauty and an actor of feeling and subtlety. Rebel without a Cause was the turning point that preceded key roles in Elia Kazan's Splendor in the Grass opposite Warren Beatty and Robert Mulligan's Love with the Proper Stranger opposite Steve McQueen. Playing desperate victims of a repressive culture, she attained Hollywood star status, and was Oscar nominated for all three performances. In between the last two there was West Side Story, which made her bankable. She worked under constant pressure from family, studio and filmmakers, and it would seem that sex became her principal act of rebellion, recreation and self-assertion. Lambert uses that curious old-fashioned term "highly sexed" to describe her, and suggests that her sex drive was part of the Russian heritage she readily embraced. But her conduct didn't differ markedly from that of Sinatra, Beatty, McQueen and other male stars acclaimed for their arrogant concupiscence. They figure among several dozen famous lovers, including our own gently retiring Tom Courtenay, who happened to be in Hollywood making King Rat in 1965. Like Princess Diana, Natalie had an inner circle, which she called her "nucleus" (the equivalent of Diana's "rocks"), a larger group she called her friends, and within it a special section known as "friends you occasionally sleep with". This permissiveness was subject to limits. When her second husband, the British talent agent Richard Gregson, father of the first of her three children, was revealed as having had a fling with her secretary, Natalie called the police, who escorted him off her Beverly Hills mansion with his bags and baggage. She herself expected to be forgiven for her transgressions and flirtations during her first and third marriages to the same man, the charming Robert Wagner, who had broken away from his upper-middle-class background to become a movie actor. It was a turbulent relationship the second time around, their reputations shifting month by month through the successes and failures of their work in television, and not helped by alcohol and Natalie's increasing reliance on prescription drugs to calm her nerves and prepare her for social occasions. Neither had any serious professional training, and their shared insecurity appears to have been played on by the brilliant, demonic Christopher Walken, who starred with Natalie in the misconceived science-fiction melodrama Brainstorm in 1981, and was probably her lover. He seems, quite legitimately from his position as a committed New York stage actor, to have challenged them to address their professional careers with greater seriousness. During a holiday break from shooting, Walken joined the Wagners on their yacht. They cruised to the holiday island of Catalina; immoderate amounts of booze were consumed and dangerous words exchanged. The next day the ship's motorized dinghy was retrieved along the coast and Natalie's body (filled with alcohol and prescription drugs) was fished out of the sea. The coroner recorded a verdict of accidental death: she had slipped on a greasy strip of teak while preventing the banging of the dinghy that was keeping her awake. As far as Tinseltown history is concerned, the jury is still out. The yacht was named Splendor after the movie that was Natalie's greatest triumph, and the dinghy was called Valiant, an ironic reference to the Arthurian comic-strip epic Prince Valiant which made Wagner a star in 1954. The celebrated golden couple were mocked and patronized in much the same way that the Beckhams are today, and glib judgements are unfair in both cases. Lambert rightly claims that Natalie was on the point of regaining control of her own career at the time of her death. She had always wanted to play Blanche Du Bois in A Streetcar Named Desire, and regularly interrogated Lambert about Vivien Leigh, whom he had come to know as a result of writing the screenplay for The Roman Spring of Mrs Stone. Natalie had performed creditably with Robert Wagner in a television version of Tennessee Williams's Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, the weakest element of which was Laurence Olivier's Big Daddy. Natalie had acquired the rights to Nancy Milford's biography of Zelda Fitzgerald, and was preparing to make her stage debut (at the age of forty-three) in Anastasia with Wendy Hiller. This all suggests sanity and ambition. But she seems also to have seen her life as a split screen; towards the end, she took to leaving different messages on her agent's phone as, variously, "Natalie", "Natalie Wood" and "Mrs Wagner". Perhaps this was a joke, for she had become a mistress of irony. Living in Hollywood all her life, Natalie must have become aware that most childhood stars would, sooner or later, sink into painful obscurity. Robert and Natalie entertained to dinner an elderly, drunken Bette Davis. Talking of her performance in The Star, Davis said: "But of course, you're too young to remember it". "Bette," Natalie replied, "I played your daughter in that picture." Davis went on unheeded. The death of Natalie Wood had a predictably sordid aftermath in legal actions, family squabbles and old acquaintances spilling dubious beans to ensure their moment of fame and a few tarnished dollars. This Gavin Lambert scrupulously records. But he also takes away the sour taste in our mouths and the guilty feeling that we may have been engaged in a prurient exercise. His sensitive, sympathetic book ends with a coda that reviews Wood's movies and the development of her career over a period of thirty years. It guarantees her position in movie history. From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:39:07 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:39:07 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Lysander Spooner: No Treason Message-ID: Lysander Spooner: No Treason http://www.chrononhotonthologos.com/lawnotes/notreasn.htm [This is one of the great libertarian classics of all time. Spooner ran a successful pony express. When the government outlawed competition for its own postal system, Spooner became an anarchist. He said he has examined the Constitution and could not find its signature on it. His argument has never been refuted, despite many efforts to ground political obligation on something other than unanimous consent.] Subject: Spooner's _No_Treason_, section 1 Lysander Spooner (1808-1887) was a Massachussetts lawyer noted for his vigorous and brilliant opposition to the encroachment of the State upon the liberty of the individual. His writings on the unconstitutionality of slavery influenced pre-Civil War thought. His challenge to the postal monopoly (he set up a thriving private post) resulted in an Act of Congress sharply reducing postage rates. Unfortunately, he was so successful that Congress finally outlawed his enterprise. The following is Spooner's _No_Treason: The Constitution of No Authority_, which _Playboy_ magazine described as "[possibly] the most subversive document ever penned in this nation." Due to the lack of italic characters in ASCII, italicized words are indicated with uppercase letters. NO TREASON The Constitution of No Authority by Lysander Spooner I. The Constitution has no inherent authority or obligation. It has no authority or obligation at all, unless as a contract between man and man. And it does not so much as even purport to be a contract between persons now existing. It purports, at most, to be only a contract between persons living eighty years ago. [This essay was written in 1869.] And it can be supposed to have been a contract then only between persons who had already come to years of discretion, so as to be competent to make reasonable and obligatory contracts. Furthermore, we know, historically, that only a small portion even of the people then existing were consulted on the subject, or asked, or permitted to express either their consent or dissent in any formal manner. Those persons, if any, who did give their consent formally, are all dead now. Most of them have been dead forty, fifty, sixty, or seventy years. AND THE CONSTITUTION, SO FAR AS IT WAS THEIR CONTRACT, DIED WITH THEM. They had no natural power or right to make it obligatory upon their children. It is not only plainly impossible, in the nature of things, that they COULD bind their posterity, but they did not even attempt to bind them. That is to say, the instrument does not purport to be an agreement between any body but "the people" THEN existing; nor does it, either expressly or impliedly, assert any right, power, or disposition, on their part, to bind anybody but themselves. Let us see. Its language is: We, the people of the United States (that is, the people THEN EXISTING in the United States), in order to form a more perfect union, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves AND OUR POSTERITY, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. It is plain, in the first place, that this language, AS AN AGREEMENT, purports to be only what it at most really was, viz., a contract between the people then existing; and, of necessity, binding, as a contract, only upon those then existing. In the second place, the language neither expresses nor implies that they had any right or power, to bind their "posterity" to live under it. It does not say that their "posterity" will, shall, or must live under it. It only says, in effect, that their hopes and motives in adopting it were that it might prove useful to their posterity, as well as to themselves, by promoting their union, safety, tranquility, liberty, etc. Suppose an agreement were entered into, in this form: We, the people of Boston, agree to maintain a fort on Governor's Island, to protect ourselves and our posterity against invasion. This agreement, as an agreement, would clearly bind nobody but the people then existing. Secondly, it would assert no right, power, or disposition, on their part, to compel their "posterity" to maintain such a fort. It would only indicate that the supposed welfare of their posterity was one of the motives that induced the original parties to enter into the agreement. When a man says he is building a house for himself and his posterity, he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of binding them, nor is it to be inferred that he is so foolish as to imagine that he has any right or power to bind them, to live in it. So far as they are concerned, he only means to be understood as saying that his hopes and motives, in building it, are that they, or at least some of them, may find it for their happiness to live in it. So when a man says he is planting a tree for himself and his posterity, he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of compelling them, nor is it to be inferred that he is such a simpleton as to imagine that he has any right or power to compel them, to eat the fruit. So far as they are concerned, he only means to say that his hopes and motives, in planting the tree, are that its fruit may be agreeable to them. So it was with those who originally adopted the Constitution. Whatever may have been their personal intentions, the legal meaning of their language, so far as their "posterity" was concerned, simply was, that their hopes and motives, in entering into the agreement, were that it might prove useful and acceptable to their posterity; that it might promote their union, safety, tranquility, and welfare; and that it might tend "to secure to them the blessings of liberty." The language does not assert nor at all imply, any right, power, or disposition, on the part of the original parties to the agreement, to compel their "posterity" to live under it. If they had intended to bind their posterity to live under it, they should have said that their objective was, not "to secure to them the blessings of liberty," but to make slaves of them; for if their "posterity" are bound to live under it, they are nothing less than the slaves of their foolish, tyrannical, and dead grandfathers. It cannot be said that the Constitution formed "the people of the United States," for all time, into a corporation. It does not speak of "the people" as a corporation, but as individuals. A corporation does not describe itself as "we," nor as "people," nor as "ourselves." Nor does a corporation, in legal language, have any "posterity." It supposes itself to have, and speaks of itself as having, perpetual existence, as a single individuality. Moreover, no body of men, existing at any one time, have the power to create a perpetual corporation. A corporation can become practically perpetual only by the voluntary accession of new members, as the old ones die off. But for this voluntary accession of new members, the corporation necessarily dies with the death of those who originally composed it. Legally speaking, therefore, there is, in the Constitution, nothing that professes or attempts to bind the "posterity" of those who established it. If, then, those who established the Constitution, had no power to bind, and did not attempt to bind, their posterity, the question arises, whether their posterity have bound themselves. If they have done so, they can have done so in only one or both of these two ways, viz., by voting, and paying taxes. II. Let us consider these two matters, voting and tax paying, separately. And first of voting. All the voting that has ever taken place under the Constitution, has been of such a kind that it not only did not pledge the whole people to support the Constitution, but it did not even pledge any one of them to do so, as the following considerations show. 1. In the very nature of things, the act of voting could bind nobody but the actual voters. But owing to the property qualifications required, it is probable that, during the first twenty or thirty years under the Constitution, not more than one-tenth, fifteenth, or perhaps twentieth of the whole population (black and white, men, women, and minors) were permitted to vote. Consequently, so far as voting was concerned, not more than one-tenth, fifteenth, or twentieth of those then existing, could have incurred any obligation to support the Constitution. At the present time [1869], it is probable that not more than one-sixth of the whole population are permitted to vote. Consequently, so far as voting is concerned, the other five-sixths can have given no pledge that they will support the Constitution. 2. Of the one-sixth that are permitted to vote, probably not more than two-thirds (about one-ninth of the whole population) have usually voted. Many never vote at all. Many vote only once in two, three, five, or ten years, in periods of great excitement. No one, by voting, can be said to pledge himself for any longer period than that for which he votes. If, for example, I vote for an officer who is to hold his office for only a year, I cannot be said to have thereby pledged myself to support the government beyond that term. Therefore, on the ground of actual voting, it probably cannot be said that more than one-ninth or one-eighth, of the whole population are usually under any pledge to support the Constitution. [In recent years, since 1940, the number of voters in elections has usually fluctuated between one-third and two-fifths of the populace.] 3. It cannot be said that, by voting, a man pledges himself to support the Constitution, unless the act of voting be a perfectly voluntary one on his part. Yet the act of voting cannot properly be called a voluntary one on the part of any very large number of those who do vote. It is rather a measure of necessity imposed upon them by others, than one of their own choice. On this point I repeat what was said in a former number, viz.: "In truth, in the case of individuals, their actual voting is not to be taken as proof of consent, EVEN FOR THE TIME BEING. On the contrary, it is to be considered that, without his consent having even been asked a man finds himself environed by a government that he cannot resist; a government that forces him to pay money, render service, and forego the exercise of many of his natural rights, under peril of weighty punishments. He sees, too, that other men practice this tyranny over him by the use of the ballot. He sees further, that, if he will but use the ballot himself, he has some chance of relieving himself from this tyranny of others, by subjecting them to his own. In short, he finds himself, without his consent, so situated that, if he use the ballot, he may become a master; if he does not use it, he must become a slave. And he has no other alternative than these two. In self- defence, he attempts the former. His case is analogous to that of a man who has been forced into battle, where he must either kill others, or be killed himself. Because, to save his own life in battle, a man takes the lives of his opponents, it is not to be inferred that the battle is one of his own choosing. Neither in contests with the ballot -- which is a mere substitute for a bullet -- because, as his only chance of self- preservation, a man uses a ballot, is it to be inferred that the contest is one into which he voluntarily entered; that he voluntarily set up all his own natural rights, as a stake against those of others, to be lost or won by the mere power of numbers. On the contrary, it is to be considered that, in an exigency into which he had been forced by others, and in which no other means of self-defence offered, he, as a matter of necessity, used the only one that was left to him. "Doubtless the most miserable of men, under the most oppressive government in the world, if allowed the ballot, would use it, if they could see any chance of thereby meliorating their condition. But it would not, therefore, be a legitimate inference that the government itself, that crushes them, was one which they had voluntarily set up, or even consented to. "Therefore, a man's voting under the Constitution of the United States, is not to be taken as evidence that he ever freely assented to the Constitution, EVEN FOR THE TIME BEING. Consequently we have no proof that any very large portion, even of the actual voters of the United States, ever really and voluntarily consented to the Constitution, EVEN FOR THE TIME BEING. Nor can we ever have such proof, until every man is left perfectly free to consent, or not, without thereby subjecting himself or his property to be disturbed or injured by others." As we can have no legal knowledge as to who votes from choice, and who from the necessity thus forced upon him, we can have no legal knowledge, as to any particular individual, that he voted from choice; or, consequently, that by voting, he consented, or pledged himself, to support the government. Legally speaking, therefore, the act of voting utterly fails to pledge ANY ONE to support the government. It utterly fails to prove that the government rests upon the voluntary support of anybody. On general principles of law and reason, it cannot be said that the government has any voluntary supporters at all, until it can be distinctly shown who its voluntary supporters are. 4. As taxation is made compulsory on all, whether they vote or not, a large proportion of those who vote, no doubt do so to prevent their own money being used against themselves; when, in fact, they would have gladly abstained from voting, if they could thereby have saved themselves from taxation alone, to say nothing of being saved from all the other usurpations and tyrannies of the government. To take a man's property without his consent, and then to infer his consent because he attempts, by voting, to prevent that property from being used to his injury, is a very insufficient proof of his consent to support the Constitution. It is, in fact, no proof at all. And as we can have no legal knowledge as to who the particular individuals are, if there are any, who are willing to be taxed for the sake of voting, we can have no legal knowledge that any particular individual consents to be taxed for the sake of voting; or, consequently, consents to support the Constitution. 5. At nearly all elections, votes are given for various candidates for the same office. Those who vote for the unsuccessful candidates cannot properly be said to have voted to sustain the Constitution. They may, with more reason, be supposed to have voted, not to support the Constitution, but specially to prevent the tyranny which they anticipate the successful candidate intends to practice upon them under color of the Constitution; and therefore may reasonably be supposed to have voted against the Constitution itself. This supposition is the more reasonable, inasmuch as such voting is the only mode allowed to them of expressing their dissent to the Constitution. 6. Many votes are usually given for candidates who have no prospect of success. Those who give such votes may reasonably be supposed to have voted as they did, with a special intention, not to support, but to obstruct the exection of, the Constitution; and, therefore, against the Constitution itself. 7. As all the different votes are given secretly (by secret ballot), there is no legal means of knowing, from the votes themselves, who votes for, and who votes against, the Constitution. Therefore, voting affords no legal evidence that any particular individual supports the Constitution. And where there can be no legal evidence that any particular individual supports the Constitution, it cannot legally be said that anybody supports it. It is clearly impossible to have any legal proof of the intentions of large numbers of men, where there can be no legal proof of the intentions of any particular one of them. 8. There being no legal proof of any man's intentions, in voting, we can only conjecture them. As a conjecture, it is probable, that a very large proportion of those who vote, do so on this principle, viz., that if, by voting, they could but get the government into their own hands (or that of their friends), and use its powers against their opponents, they would then willingly support the Constitution; but if their opponents are to have the power, and use it against them, then they would NOT willingly support the Constitution. In short, men's voluntary support of the Constitution is doubtless, in most cases, wholly contingent upon the question whether, by means of the Constitution, they can make themselves masters, or are to be made slaves. Such contingent consent as that is, in law and reason, no consent at all. 9. As everybody who supports the Constitution by voting (if there are any such) does so secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to avoid all personal responsibility for the acts of his agents or representatives, it cannot legally or reasonably be said that anybody at all supports the Constitution by voting. No man can reasonably or legally be said to do such a thing as assent to, or support, the Constitution, UNLESS HE DOES IT OPENLY, AND IN A WAY TO MAKE HIMSELF PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTS OF HIS AGENTS, SO LONG AS THEY ACT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE POWER HE DELEGATES TO THEM. 10. As all voting is secret (by secret ballot), and as all secret governments are necessarily only secret bands of robbers, tyrants, and murderers, the general fact that our government is practically carried on by means of such voting, only proves that there is among us a secret band of robbers, tyrants, and murderers, whose purpose is to rob, enslave, and, so far as necessary to accomplish their purposes, murder, the rest of the people. The simple fact of the existence of such a vand does nothing towards proving that "the people of the United States," or any one of them, voluntarily supports the Constitution. For all the reasons that have now been given, voting furnishes no legal evidence as to who the particular individuals are (if there are any), who voluntarily support the Constitution. It therefore furnishes no legal evidence that anybody supports it voluntarily. So far, therefore, as voting is concerned, the Constitution, legally speaking, has no supporters at all. And, as a matter of fact, there is not the slightest probability that the Constitution has a single bona fide supporter in the country. That is to say, there is not the slightest probability that there is a single man in the country, who both understands what the Constitution really is, AND SINCERELY SUPPORTS IT FOR WHAT IT REALLY IS. The ostensible supporters of the Constitution, like the ostensible supporters of most other governments, are made up of three classes, viz.: 1. Knaves, a numerous and active class, who see in the government an instrument which they can use for their own aggrandizement or wealth. 2. Dupes -- a large class, no doubt -- each of whom, because he is allowed one voice out of millions in deciding what he may do with his own person and his own property, and because he is permitted to have the same voice in robbing, enslaving, and murdering others, that others have in robbing, enslaving, and murdering himself, is stupid enough to imagine that he is a "free man," a "sovereign"; that this is "a free government"; "a government of equal rights," "the best government on earth," [1] and such like absurdities. 3. A class who have some appreciation of the evils of government, but either do not see how to get rid of them, or do not choose to so far sacrifice their private interests as to give themselves seriously and earnestly to the work of making a change. ----------- [1] Suppose it be "the best government on earth," does that prove its own goodness, or only the badness of all other governments? ----------- III. The payment of taxes, being compulsory, of course furnishes no evidence that any one voluntarily supports the Constitution. 1. It is true that the THEORY of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that that each man makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties to the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much protection, the same as he does with any other insurance company; and that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to pay tax, as he is to pay a tax, and be protected. But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: "Your money, or your life." And many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat. The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful. The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a "protector," and that he takes men's money against their will, merely to enable him to "protect" those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful "sovereign," on account of the "protection" he affords you. He does not keep "protecting" you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villanies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave. The proceedings of those robbers and murderers, who call themselves "the government," are directly the opposite of these of the single highwayman. In the first place, they do not, like him, make themselves individually known; or, consequently, take upon themselves personally the responsibility of their acts. On the contrary, they secretly (by secret ballot) designate some one of their number to commit the robbery in their behalf, while they keep themselves practically concealed. They say to the person thus designated: Go to A_____ B_____, and say to him that "the government" has need of money to meet the expenses of protecting him and his property. If he presumes to say that he has never contracted with us to protect him, and that he wants none of our protection, say to him that that is our business, and not his; that we CHOOSE to protect him, whether he desires us to do so or not; and that we demand pay, too, for protecting him. If he dares to inquire who the individuals are, who have thus taken upon themselves the title of "the government," and who assume to protect him, and demand payment of him, without his having ever made any contract with them, say to him that that, too, is our business, and not his; that we do not CHOOSE to make ourselves INDIVIDUALLY known to him; that we have secretly (by secret ballot) appointed you our agent to give him notice of our demands, and, if he complies with them, to give him, in our name, a receipt that will protect him against any similar demand for the present year. If he refuses to comply, seize and sell enough of his property to pay not only our demands, but all your own expenses and trouble beside. If he resists the seizure of his property, call upon the bystanders to help you (doubtless some of them will prove to be members of our band.) If, in defending his property, he should kill any of our band who are assisting you, capture him at all hazards; charge him (in one of our courts) with murder; convict him, and hang him. If he should call upon his neighbors, or any others who, like him, may be disposed to resist our demands, and they should come in large numbers to his assistance, cry out that they are all rebels and traitors; that "our country" is in danger; call upon the commander of our hired murderers; tell him to quell the rebellion and "save the country," cost what it may. Tell him to kill all who resist, though they should be hundreds of thousands; and thus strike terror into all others similarly disposed. See that the work of murder is thoroughly done; that we may have no further trouble of this kind hereafter. When these traitors shall have thus been taught our strength and our determination, they will be good loyal citizens for many years, and pay their taxes without a why or a wherefore. It is under such compulsion as this that taxes, so called, are paid. And how much proof the payment of taxes affords, that the people consent to "support the government," it needs no further argument to show. 2. Still another reason why the payment of taxes implies no consent, or pledge, to support the government, is that the taxpayer does not know, and has no means of knowing, who the particular individuals are who compose "the government." To him "the government" is a myth, an abstraction, an incorporeality, with which he can make no contract, and to which he can give no consent, and make no pledge. He knows it only through its pretended agents. "The government" itself he never sees. He knows indeed, by common report, that certain persons, of a certain age, are permitted to vote; and thus to make themselves parts of, or (if they choose) opponents of, the government, for the time being. But who of them do thus vote, and especially how each one votes (whether so as to aid or oppose the government), he does not know; the voting being all done secretly (by secret ballot). Who, therefore, practically compose "the government," for the time being, he has no means of knowing. Of course he can make no contract with them, give them no consent, and make them no pledge. Of necessity, therefore, his paying taxes to them implies, on his part, no contract, consent, or pledge to support them -- that is, to support "the government," or the Constitution. 3. Not knowing who the particular individuals are, who call themselves "the government," the taxpayer does not know whom he pays his taxes to. All he knows is that a man comes to him, representing himself to be the agent of "the government" -- that is, the agent of a secret band of robbers and murderers, who have taken to themselves the title of "the government," and have determined to kill everybody who refuses to give them whatever money they demand. To save his life, he gives up his money to this agent. But as this agent does not make his principals individually known to the taxpayer, the latter, after he has given up his money, knows no more who are "the government" -- that is, who were the robbers -- than he did before. To say, therefore, that by giving up his money to their agent, he entered into a voluntary contract with them, that he pledges himself to obey them, to support them, and to give them whatever money they should demand of him in the future, is simply ridiculous. 4. All political power, so called, rests practically upon this matter of money. Any number of scoundrels, having money enough to start with, can establish themselves as a "government"; because, with money, they can hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort more money; and also compel general obedience to their will. It is with government, as Caesar said it was in war, that money and soldiers mutually supported each other; that with money he could hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort money. So these villains, who call themselves governments, well understand that their power rests primarily upon money. With money they can hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort money. And, when their authority is denied, the first use they always make of money, is to hire soldiers to kill or subdue all who refuse them more money. For this reason, whoever desires liberty, should understand these vital facts, viz.: 1. That every man who puts money into the hands of a "government" (so called), puts into its hands a sword which will be used against him, to extort more money from him, and also to keep him in subjection to its arbitrary will. 2. That those who will take his money, without his consent, in the first place, will use it for his further robbery and enslavement, if he presumes to resist their demands in the future. 3. That it is a perfect absurdity to suppose that any body of men would ever take a man's money without his consent, for any such object as they profess to take it for, viz., that of protecting him; for why should they wish to protect him, if he does not wish them to do so? To suppose that they would do so, is just as absurd as it would be to suppose that they would take his moeny without his consent, for the purpose of buying food or clothing for him, when he did not want it. 4. If a man wants "protection," he is competent to make his own bargains for it; and nobody has any occasion to rob him, in order to "protect" him against his will. 5. That the only security men can have for their political liberty, consists in their keeping their money in their own pockets, until they have assurances, perfectly satisfactory to themselves, that it will be used as they wish it to be used, for their benefit, and not for their injury. 6. That no government, so called, can reasonably be trusted for a moment, or reasonably be supposed to have honest purposes in view, any longer than it depends wholly upon voluntary support. These facts are all so vital and so self-evident, that it cannot reasonably be supposed that any one will voluntarily pay money to a "government," for the purpose of securing its protection, unless he first make an explicit and purely voluntary contract with it for that purpose. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that neither such voting, nor such payment of taxes, as actually takes place, proves anybody's consent, or obligation, to support the Constitution. Consequently we have no evidence at all that the Constitution is binding upon anybody, or that anybody is under any contract or obligation whatever to support it. And nobody is under any obligation to support it. IV. THE CONSTITUTION NOT ONLY BINDS NOBODY NOW, BUT IT NEVER DID BIND ANYBODY. It never bound anybody, because it was never agreed to by anybody in such a manner as to make it, on general principles of law and reason, binding upon him. It is a general principle of law and reason, that a WRITTEN instrument binds no one until he has signed it. This principle is so inflexible a one, that even though a man is unable to write his name, he must still "make his mark," before he is bound by a written contract. This custom was established ages ago, when few men could write their names; when a clerk -- that is, a man who could write -- was so rare and valuable a person, that even if he were guilty of high crimes, he was entitled to pardon, on the ground that the public could not afford to lose his services. Even at that time, a written contract must be signed; and men who could not write, either "made their mark," or signed their contracts by stamping their seals upon wax affixed to the parchment on which their contracts were written. Hence the custom of affixing seals, that has continued to this time. The laws holds, and reason declares, that if a written instrument is not signed, the presumption must be that the party to be bound by it, did not choose to sign it, or to bind himself by it. And law and reason both give him until the last moment, in which to decide whether he will sign it, or not. Neither law nor reason requires or expects a man to agree to an instrument, UNTIL IT IS WRITTEN; for until it is written, he cannot know its precise legal meaning. And when it is written, and he has had the opportunity to satisfy himself of its precise legal meaning, he is then expected to decide, and not before, whether he will agree to it or not. And if he do not THEN sign it, his reason is supposed to be, that he does not choose to enter into such a contract. The fact that the instrument was written for him to sign, or with the hope that he would sign it, goes for nothing. Where would be the end of fraud and litigation, if one party could bring into court a written instrument, without any signature, and claim to have it enforced, upon the ground that it was written for another man to sign? that this other man had promised to sign it? that he ought to have signed it? that he had had the opportunity to sign it, if he would? but that he had refused or neglected to do so? Yet that is the most that could ever be said of the Constitution. [1] The very judges, who profess to derive all their authority from the Constitution -- from an instrument that nobody ever signed -- would spurn any other instrument, not signed, that should be brought before them for adjudication. [1] The very men who drafted it, never signed it in any way to bind themselves by it, AS A CONTRACT. And not one of them probably ever would have signed it in any way to bind himself by it, AS A CONTRACT. Moreover, a written instrument must, in law and reason, not only be signed, but must also be delivered to the party (or to some one for him), in whose favor it is made, before it can bind the party making it. The signing is of no effect, unless the instrument be also delivered. And a party is at perfect liberty to refuse to deliver a written instrument, after he has signed it. The Constitution was not only never signed by anybody, but it was never delivered by anybody, or to anybody's agent or attorney. It can therefore be of no more validity as a contract, then can any other instrument that was never signed or delivered. V. As further evidence of the general sense of mankind, as to the practical necessity there is that all men's IMPORTANT contracts, especially those of a permanent nature, should be both written and signed, the following facts are pertinent. For nearly two hundred years -- that is, since 1677 -- there has been on the statute book of England, and the same, in substance, if not precisely in letter, has been re-enacted, and is now in force, in nearly or quite all the States of this Union, a statute, the general object of which is to declare that no action shall be brought to enforce contracts of the more important class, UNLESS THEY ARE PUT IN WRITING, AND SIGNED BY THE PARTIES TO BE HELD CHARGEABLE UPON THEM. [At this point there is a footnote listing 34 states whose statute books Spooner had examined, all of which had variations of this English statute; the footnote also quotes part of the Massachussetts statute.] The principle of the statute, be it observed, is, not merely that written contracts shall be signed, but also that all contracts, except for those specially exempted -- generally those that are for small amounts, and are to remain in force for but a short time -- SHALL BE BOTH WRITTEN AND SIGNED. The reason of the statute, on this point, is, that it is now so easy a thing for men to put their contracts in writing, and sign them, and their failure to do so opens the door to so much doubt, fraud, and litigation, that men who neglect to have their contracts -- of any considerable importance -- written and signed, ought not to have the benefit of courts of justice to enforce them. And this reason is a wise one; and that experience has confirmed its wisdom and necessity, is demonstrated by the fact that it has been acted upon in England for nearly two hundred years, and has been so nearly universally adopted in this country, and that nobody thinks of repealing it. We all know, too, how careful most men are to have their contracts written and signed, even when this statute does not require it. For example, most men, if they have money due them, of no larger amount than five or ten dollars, are careful to take a note for it. If they buy even a small bill of goods, paying for it at the time of delivery, they take a receipted bill for it. If they pay a small balance of a book account, or any other small debt previously contracted, they take a written receipt for it. Furthermore, the law everywhere (probably) in our country, as well as in England, requires that a large class of contracts, such as wills, deeds, etc., shall not only be written and signed, but also sealed, witnessed, and acknowledged. And in the case of married women conveying their rights in real estate, the law, in many States, requires that the women shall be examined separate and apart from their husbands, and declare that they sign their contracts free of any fear or compulsion of their husbands. Such are some of the precautions which the laws require, and which individuals -- from motives of common prudence, even in cases not required by law -- take, to put their contracts in writing, and have them signed, and, to guard against all uncertainties and controversies in regard to their meaning and validity. And yet we have what purports, or professes, or is claimed, to be a contract -- the Constitution -- made eighty years ago, by men who are now all dead, and who never had any power to bind US, but which (it is claimed) has nevertheless bound three generations of men, consisting of many millions, and which (it is claimed) will be binding upon all the millions that are to come; but which nobody ever signed, sealed, delivered, witnessed, or acknowledged; and which few persons, compared with the whole number that are claimed to be bound by it, have ever read, or even seen, or ever will read, or see. And of those who ever have read it, or ever will read it, scarcely any two, perhaps no two, have ever agreed, or ever will agree, as to what it means. Moreover, this supposed contract, which would not be received in any court of justice sitting under its authority, if offered to prove a debt of five dollars, owing by one man to another, is one by which -- AS IT IS GENERALLY INTERPRETED BY THOSE WHO PRETEND TO ADMINISTER IT -- all men, women and children throughout the country, and through all time, surrender not only all their property, but also their liberties, and even lives, into the hands of men who by this supposed contract, are expressly made wholly irresponsible for their disposal of them. And we are so insane, or so wicked, as to destroy property and lives without limit, in fighting to compel men to fulfill a supposed contract, which, inasmuch as it has never been signed by anybody, is, on general princples of law and reason -- such principles as we are all governed by in regard to other contracts -- the merest waste of paper, binding upon nobody, fit only to be thrown into the fire; or, if preserved, preserved only to serve as a witness and a warning of the folly and wickedness of mankind. VI. It is no exaggeration, but a literal truth, to say that, by the Constitution -- NOT AS I INTERPRET IT, BUT AS IT IS INTERPRETED BY THOSE WHO PRETEND TO ADMINISTER IT -- the properties, liberties, and lives of the entire people of the United States are surrendered unreservedly into the hands of men who, it is provided by the Constitution itself, shall never be "questioned" as to any disposal they make of them. Thus the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 6) provides that, "for any speech or debate (or vote), in either house, they (the senators and representatives) shall not be questioned in any other place." The whole law-making power is given to these senators and representatives (when acting by a two-thirds vote); [1] and this provision protects them from all responsibility for the laws they make. [1] And this two-thirds vote may be but two-thirds of a quorum -- that is two-thirds of a majority -- instead of two-thirds of the whole. The Constitution also enables them to secure the execution of all their laws, by giving them power to withhold the salaries of, and to impeach and remove, all judicial and executive officers, who refuse to execute them. Thus the whole power of the government is in their hands, and they are made utterly irresponsible for the use they make of it. What is this but absolute, irresponsible power? It is no answer to this view of the case to say that these men are under oath to use their power only within certain limits; for what care they, or what should they care, for oaths or limits, when it is expressly provided, by the Constitution itself, that they shall never be "questioned," or held to any resonsibility whatever, for violating their oaths, or transgressing those limits? Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the men holding this absolute, irresponsible power, must be men chosen by the people (or portions of them) to hold it. A man is none the less a slave because he is allowed to choose a new master once in a term of years. Neither are a people any the less slaves because permitted periodically to choose new masters. What makes them slaves is the fact that they now are, and are always hereafter to be, in the hands of men whose power over them is, and always is to be, absolute and irresponsible. [2] [2] Of what appreciable value is it to any man, as an individual, that he is allowed a voice in choosing these public masters? His voice is only one of several millions. The right of absolute and irresponsible dominion is the right of property, and the right of property is the right of absolute, irresponsible dominion. The two are identical; the one necessarily implies the other. Neither can exist without the other. If, therefore, Congress have that absolute and irresponsible law-making power, which the Constitution -- according to their interpretation of it -- gives them, it can only be because they own us as property. If they own us as property, they are our masters, and their will is our law. If they do not own us as property, they are not our masters, and their will, as such, is of no authority over us. But these men who claim and exercise this absolute and irresponsible dominion over us, dare not be consistent, and claim either to be our masters, or to own us as property. They say they are only our servants, agents, attorneys, and representatives. But this declaration involves an absurdity, a contradiction. No man can be my servant, agent, attorney, or representative, and be, at the same time, uncontrollable by me, and irresponsible to me for his acts. It is of no importance that I appointed him, and put all power in his hands. If I made him uncontrollable by me, and irresponsible to me, he is no longer my servant, agent, attorney, or representative. If I gave him absolute, irresponsible power over my property, I gave him the property. If I gave him absolute, irresponsible power over myself, I made him my master, and gave myself to him as a slave. And it is of no importance whether I called him master or servant, agent or owner. The only question is, what power did I put in his hands? Was it an absolute and irresponsible one? or a limited and responsible one? For still another reason they are neither our servants, agents, attorneys, nor representatives. And that reason is, that we do not make ourselves responsible for their acts. If a man is my servant, agent, or attorney, I necessarily make myself responsible for all his acts done within the limits of the power I have intrusted to him. If I have intrusted him, as my agent, with either absolute power, or any power at all, over the persons or properties of other men than myself, I thereby necessarily make myself responsible to those other persons for any injuries he may do them, so long as he acts within the limits of the power I have granted him. But no individual who may be injured in his person or property, by acts of Congress, can come to the individual electors, and hold them responsible for these acts of their so-called agents or representatives. This fact proves that these pretended agents of the people, of everybody, are really the agents of nobody. If, then, nobody is individually responsible for the acts of Congress, the members of Congress are nobody's agents. And if they are nobody's agents, they are themselves individually responsible for their own acts, and for the acts of all whom they employ. And the authority they are exercising is simply their own individual authority; and, by the law of nature -- the highest of all laws -- anybody injured by their acts, anybody who is deprived by them of his property or his liberty, has the same right to hold them individually responsible, that he has to hold any other trespasser individually responsible. He has the same right to resist them, and their agents, that he has to resist any other trespassers. VII. It is plain, then, that on general principles of law and reason -- such principles as we all act upon in courts of justice and in common life -- the Constitution is no contract; that it binds nobody, and never did bind anybody; and that all those who pretend to act by its authority, are really acting without any legitimate authority at all; that, on general principles of law and reason, they are mere usurpers, and that everybody not only has the right, but is morally bound, to treat them as such. If the people of this country wish to maintain such a government as the Constitution describes, there is no reason in the world why they should not sign the instrument itself, and thus make known their wishes in an open, authentic manner; in such manner as the common sense and experience of mankind have shown to be reasonable and necessary in such cases; AND IN SUCH MANNER AS TO MAKE THEMSELVES (AS THEY OUGHT TO DO) INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. But the people have never been asked to sign it. And the only reason why they have never been asked to sign it, has been that it has been known that they never would sign it; that they were neither such fools nor knaves as they must needs have been to be willing to sign it; that (at least as it has been practically interpreted) it is not what any sensible and honest man wants for himself; nor such as he has any right to impose upon others. It is, to all moral intents and purposes, as destitute of obligations as the compacts which robbers and thieves and pirates enter into with each other, but never sign. If any considerable number of the people believe the Constitution to be good, why do they not sign it themselves, and make laws for, and administer them upon, each other; leaving all other persons (who do not interfere with them) in peace? Until they have tried the experiment for themselves, how can they have the face to impose the Constitution upon, or even to recommend it to, others? Plainly the reason for absurd and inconsistent conduct is that they want the Constitution, not solely for any honest or legitimate use it can be of to themselves or others, but for the dishonest and illegitimate power it gives them over the persons and properties of others. But for this latter reason, all their eulogiums on the Constitution, all their exhortations, and all their expenditures of money and blood to sustain it, would be wanting. VIII. The Constitution itself, then, being of no authority, on what authority does our government practically rest? On what ground can those who pretend to administer it, claim the right to seize men's property, to restrain them of their natural liberty of action, industry, and trade, and to kill all who deny their authority to dispose of men's properties, liberties, and lives at their pleasure or discretion? The most they can say, in answer to this question, is, that some half, two-thirds, or three-fourths, of the male adults of the country have a TACIT UNDERSTANDING that they will maintain a government under the Constitution; that they will select, by ballot, the persons to administer it; and that those persons who may receive a majority, or a plurality, of their ballots, shall act as their representatives, and administer the Constitution in their name, and by their authority. But this tacit understanding (admitting it to exist) cannot at all justify the conclusion drawn from it. A tacit understanding between A, B, and C, that they will, by ballot, depute D as their agent, to deprive me of my property, liberty, or life, cannot at all authorize D to do so. He is none the less a robber, tyrant, and murderer, because he claims to act as their agent, than he would be if he avowedly acted on his own responsibility alone. Neither am I bound to recognize him as their agent, nor can he legitimately claim to be their agent, when he brings no WRITTEN authority from them accrediting him as such. I am under no obligation to take his word as to who his principals may be, or whether he has any. Bringing no credentials, I have a right to say he has no such authority even as he claims to have: and that he is therefore intending to rob, enslave, or murder me on his own account. This tacit understanding, therefore, among the voters of the country, amounts to nothing as an authority to their agents. Neither do the ballots by which they select their agents, avail any more than does their tacit understanding; for their ballots are given in secret, and therefore in such a way as to avoid any personal responsibility for the acts of their agents. No body of men can be said to authorize a man to act as their agent, to the injury of a third person, unless they do it in so open and authentic a manner as to make themselves personally responsible for his acts. None of the voters in this country appoint their political agents in any open, authentic manner, or in any manner to make themselves responsible for their acts. Therefore these pretended agents cannot legitimately claim to be really agents. Somebody must be responsible for the acts of these pretended agents; and if they cannot show any open and authentic credentials from their principals, they cannot, in law or reason, be said to have any principals. The maxim applies here, that what does not appear, does not exist. If they can show no principals, they have none. But even these pretended agents do not themselves know who their pretended principals are. These latter act in secret; for acting by secret ballot is acting in secret as much as if they were to meet in secret conclave in the darkness of the night. And they are personally as much unknown to the agents they select, as they are to others. No pretended agent therefore can ever know by whose ballots he is selected, or consequently who his real principles are. Not knowing who his principles are, he has no right to say that he has any. He can, at most, say only that he is the agent of a secret band of robbers and murderers, who are bound by that faith which prevails among confederates in crime, to stand by him, if his acts, done in their name, shall be resisted. Men honestly engaged in attempting to establish justice in the world, have no occasion thus to act in secret; or to appoint agents to do acts for which they (the principals) are not willing to be responsible. The secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is a secret band of robbers and murderers. Open despotism is better than this. The single despot stands out in the face of all men, and says: I am the State: My will is law: I am your master: I take the responsibility of my acts: The only arbiter I acknowledge is the sword: If anyone denies my right, let him try conclusions with me. But a secret government is little less than a government of assassins. Under it, a man knows not who his tyrants are, until they have struck, and perhaps not then. He may GUESS, beforehand, as to some of his immediate neighbors. But he really knows nothing. The man to whom he would most naturally fly for protection, may prove an enemy, when the time of trial comes. This is the kind of government we have; and it is the only one we are likely to have, until men are ready to say: We will consent to no Constitution, except such an one as we are neither ashamed nor afraid to sign; and we will authorize no government to do anything in our name which we are not willing to be personally responsible for. IX. What is the motive to the secret ballot? This, and only this: Like other confederates in crime, those who use it are not friends, but enemies; and they are afraid to be known, and to have their individual doings known, even to each other. They can contrive to bring about a sufficient understanding to enable them to act in concert against other persons; but beyond this they have no confidence, and no friendship, among themselves. In fact, they are engaged quite as much in schemes for plundering each other, as in plundering those who are not of them. And it is perfectly well understood among them that the strongest party among them will, in certain contingencies, murder each other by the hundreds of thousands (as they lately did do) to accomplish their purposes against each other. Hence they dare not be known, and have their individual doings known, even to each other. And this is avowedly the only reason for the ballot: for a secret government; a government by secret bands of robbers and murderers. And we are insane enough to call this liberty! To be a member of this secret band of robbers and murderers is esteemed a privilege and an honor! Without this privilege, a man is considered a slave; but with it a free man! With it he is considered a free man, because he has the same power to secretly (by secret ballot) procure the robbery, enslavement, and murder of another man, and that other man has to procure his robbery, enslavement, and murder. And this they call equal rights! If any number of men, many or few, claim the right to govern the people of this country, let them make and sign an open compact with each other to do so. Let them thus make themselves individually known to those whom they propose to govern. And let them thus openly take the legitimate responsibility of their acts. How many of those who now support the Constitution, will ever do this? How many will ever dare openly proclaim their right to govern? or take the legitimate responsibility of their acts? Not one! X. It is obvious that, on general principles of law and reason, there exists no such thing as a government created by, or resting upon, any consent, compact, or agreement of "the people of the United States" with each other; that the only visible, tangible, responsible government that exists, is that of a few individuals only, who act in concert, and call themselves by the several names of senators, representatives, presidents, judges, marshals, treasurers, collectors, generals, colonels, captains, etc., etc. On general principles of law and reason, it is of no importance whatever that these few individuals profess to be the agents and representatives of "the people of the United States"; since they can show no credentials from the people themselves; they were never appointed as agents or representatives in any open, authentic manner; they do not themselves know, and have no means of knowing, and cannot prove, who their principals (as they call them) are individually; and consequently cannot, in law or reason, be said to have any principals at all. It is obvious, too, that if these alleged principals ever did appoint these pretended agents, or representatives, they appointed them secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to avoid all personal responsibility for their acts; that, at most, these alleged principals put these pretended agents forward for the most criminal purposes, viz.: to plunder the people of their property, and restrain them of their liberty; and that the only authority that these alleged principals have for so doing, is simply a TACIT UNDERSTANDING among themselves that they will imprison, shoot, or hang every man who resists the exactions and restraints which their agents or representatives may impose upon them. Thus it is obvious that the only visible, tangible government we have is made up of these professed agents or representatives of a secret band of robbers and murderers, who, to cover up, or gloss over, their robberies and murders, have taken to themselves the title of "the people of the United States"; and who, on the pretense of being "the people of the United States," assert their right to subject to their dominion, and to control and dispose of at their pleasure, all property and persons found in the United States. no.treason.11 [Note: I have split up some especially long paragraphs in the following section into sequences of shorter paragraphs connected by back-slashes ("\").] XI. On general principles of law and reason, the oaths which these pretended agents of the people take "to support the Constitution," are of no validity or obligation. And why? For this, if for no other reason, viz., THAT THEY ARE GIVEN TO NOBODY. There is no privity (as the lawyers say) -- that is, no mutual recognition, consent, and agreement -- between those who take these oaths, and any other persons. If I go upon Boston Common, and in the presence of a hundred thousand people, men, women and children, with whom I have no contract upon the subject, take an oath that I will enforce upon them the laws of Moses, of Lycurgus, of Solon, of Justinian, or of Alfred, that oath is, on general principles of law and reason, of no obligation. It is of no obligation, not merely because it is intrinsically a criminal one, BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT IS GIVEN TO NOBODY, and consequently pledges my faith to nobody. It is merely given to the winds. It would not alter the case at all to say that, among these hundred thousand persons, in whose presence the oath was taken, there were two, three, or five thousand male adults, who had SECRETLY -- by secret ballot, and in a way to avoid making themselves INDIVIDUALLY known to me, or to the remainder of the hundred thousand -- designated me as their agent to rule, control, plunder, and, if need be, murder, these hundred thousand people. The fact that they had designated me secretly, and in a manner to prevent my knowing them individually, prevents all privity between them and me; and consequently makes it impossible that there can be any contract, or pledge of faith, on my part towards them; for it is impossible that I can pledge my faith, in any legal sense, to a man whom I neither know, nor have any means of knowing, individually. So far as I am concerned, then, these two, three, or five thousand persons are a secret band of robbers and murderers, who have secretly, and in a way to save themselves from all responsibility for my acts, designated me as their agent; and have, through some other agent, or pretended agent, made their wishes known to me. But being, nevertheless, individually unknown to me, and having no open, authentic contract with me, my oath is, on general principles of law and reason, of no validity as a pledge of faith to them. And being no pledge of faith to them, it is no pledge of faith to anybody. It is mere idle wind. At most, it is only a pledge of faith to an unknown band of robbers and murderers, whose instrument for plundering and murdering other people, I thus publicly confess myself to be. And it has no other obligation than a similar oath given to any other unknown body of pirates, robbers, and murderers. For these reasons the oaths taken by members of Congress, "to support the Constitution," are, on general principles of law and reason, of no validity. They are not only criminal in themselves, and therefore void; but they are also void for the further reason THAT THEY ARE GIVEN TO NOBODY. It cannot be said that, in any legitimate or legal sense, they are given to "the people of the United States"; because neither the whole, nor any large proportion of the whole, people of the United States ever, either openly or secretly, appointed or designated these men as their agents to carry the Constitution into effect. The great body of the people -- that is, men, women, and children -- were never asked, or even permitted, to signify, in any FORMAL manner, either openly or secretly, their choice or wish on the subject. The most that these members of Congress can say, in favor of their appointment, is simply this: Each one can say for himself: I have evidence satisfactory to myself, that there exists, scattered throughout the country, a band of men, having a tacit understanding with each other, and calling themselves "the people of the United States," whose general purposes are to control and plunder each other, and all other persons in the country, and, so far as they can, even in neighboring countries; and to kill every man who shall attempt to defend his person and property against their schemes of plunder and dominion. Who these men are, INDIVIDUALLY, I have no certain means of knowing, for they sign no papers, and give no open, authentic evidence of their individual membership. They are not known individually even to each other. They are apparently as much afraid of being individually known to each other, as of being known to other persons. Hence they ordinarily have no mode either of exercising, or of making known, their individual membership, otherwise than by giving their votes secretly for certain agents to do their will. But although these men are individually unknown, both to each other and to other persons, it is generally understood in the country that none but male persons, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, can be members. It is also generally understood that ALL male persons, born in the country, having certain complexions, and (in some localities) certain amounts of property, and (in certain cases) even persons of foreign birth, are PERMITTED to be members. But it appears that usually not more than one half, two-thirds, or in some cases, three-fourths, of all who are thus permitted to become members of the band, ever exercise, or consequently prove, their actual membership, in the only mode in which they ordinarily can exercise or prove it, viz., by giving their votes secretly for the officers or agents of the band. The number of these secret votes, so far as we have any account of them, varies greatly from year to year, thus tending to prove that the band, instead of being a permanent organization, is a merely PRO TEMPORE affair with those who choose to act with it for the time being. \ The gross number of these secret votes, or what purports to be their gross number, in different localities, is occasionally published. Whether these reports are accurate or not, we have no means of knowing. It is generally supposed that great frauds are often committed in depositing them. They are understood to be received and counted by certain men, who are themselves appointed for that purpose by the same secret process by which all other officers and agents of the band are selected. According to the reports of these receivers of votes (for whose accuracy or honesty, however, I cannot vouch), and according to my best knowledge of the whole number of male persons "in my district," who (it is supposed) were permitted to vote, it would appear that one-half, two-thirds or three-fourths actually did vote. Who the men were, individually, who cast these votes, I have no knowledge, for the whole thing was done secretly. But of the secret votes thus given for what they call a "member of Congress," the receivers reported that I had a majority, or at least a larger number than any other one person. And it is only by virtue of such a designation that I am now here to act in concert with other persons similarly selected in other parts of the country. \ It is understood among those who sent me here, that all persons so selected, will, on coming together at the City of Washington, take an oath in each other's presence "to support the Constitution of the United States." By this is meant a certain paper that was drawn up eighty years ago. It was never signed by anybody, and apparently has no obligation, and never had any obligation, as a contract. In fact, few persons ever read it, and doubtless much the largest number of those who voted for me and the others, never even saw it, or now pretend to know what it means. Nevertheless, it is often spoken of in the country as "the Constitution of the United States"; and for some reason or other, the men who sent me here, seem to expect that I, and all with whom I act, will swear to carry this Constitution into effect. I am therefore ready to take this oath, and to co-operate with all others, similarly selected, who are ready to take the same oath. This is the most that any member of Congress can say in proof that he has any constituency; that he represents anybody; that his oath "to support the Constitution," IS GIVEN TO ANYBODY, or pledges his faith to ANYBODY. He has no open, written, or other authentic evidence, such as is required in all other cases, that he was ever appointed the agent or representative of anybody. He has no written power of attorney from any single individual. He has no such legal knowledge as is required in all other cases, by which he can identify a single one of those who pretend to have appointed him to represent them. Of course his oath, professedly given to them, "to support the Constitution," is, on general principles of law and reason, an oath given to nobody. It pledges his faith to nobody. If he fails to fulfil his oath, not a single person can come forward, and say to him, you have betrayed me, or broken faith with me. No one can come forward and say to him: I appointed you my attorney to act for me. I required you to swear that, as my attorney, you would support the Constitution. You promised me that you would do so; and now you have forfeited the oath you gave to me. No single individual can say this. No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, can come forward and say to him: We appointed you our attorney, to act forus. We required you to swear that, as our attorney, you would support the Constitution. You promised us that you would do so; and now you have forfeited the oath you gave to us. No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, can say this to him; because there is no such association or body of men in existence. If any one should assert that there is such an association, let him prove, if he can, who compose it. Let him produce, if he can, any open, written, or other authentic contract, signed or agreed to by these men; forming themselves into an association; making themselves known as such to the world; appointing him as their agent; and making themselves individually, or as an association, responsible for his acts, done by their authority. Until all this can be shown, no one can say that, in any legitimate sense, there is any such association; or that he is their agent; or that he ever gave his oath to them; or ever pledged his faith to them. On general principles of law and reason, it would be a sufficient answer for him to say, to all individuals, and to all pretended associations of individuals, who should accuse him of a breach of faith to them: I never knew you. Where is your evidence that you, either individually or collectively, ever appointed me your attorney? that you ever required me to swear to you, that, as your attorney, I would support the Constitution? or that I have now broken any faith that I ever pledged to you? You may, or you may not, be members of that secret band of robbers and murderers, who act in secret; appoint their agents by a secret ballot; who keep themselves individually unknown even to the agents they thus appoint; and who, therefore, cannot claim that they have any agents; or that any of their pretended agents ever gave his oath, or pledged his faith to them. I repudiate you altogether. My oath was given to others, with whom you have nothing to do; or it was idle wind, given only to the idle winds. Begone! XII. For the same reasons, the oaths of all the other pretended agents of this secret band of robbers and murderers are, on general principles of law and reason, equally destitute of obligation. They are given to nobody; but only to the winds. The oaths of the tax-gatherers and treasurers of the band, are, on general principles of law and reason, of no validity. If any tax gatherer, for example, should put the money he receives into his own pocket, and refuse to part with it, the members of this band could not say to him: You collected that money as our agent, and for our uses; and you swore to pay it over to us, or to those we should appoint to receive it. You have betrayed us, and broken faith with us. It would be a sufficient answer for him to say to them: I never knew you. You never made yourselves individually known to me. I never game by oath to you, as individuals. You may, or you may not, be members of that secret band, who appoint agents to rob and murder other people; but who are cautious not to make themselves individually known, either to such agents, or to those whom their agents are commissioned to rob. If you are members of that band, you have given me no proof that you ever commissioned me to rob others for your benefit. I never knew you, as individuals, and of course never promised you that I would pay over to you the proceeds of my robberies. I committed my robberies on my own account, and for my own profit. If you thought I was fool enough to allow you to keep yourselves concealed, and use me as your tool for robbing other persons; or that I would take all the personal risk of the robberies, and pay over the proceeds to you, you were particularly simple. As I took all the risk of my robberies, I propose to take all the profits. Begone! You are fools, as well as villains. If I gave my oath to anybody, I gave it to other persons than you. But I really gave it to nobody. I only gave it to the winds. It answered my purposes at the time. It enabled me to get the money I was after, and now I propose to keep it. If you expected me to pay it over to you, you relied only upon that honor that is said to prevail among thieves. You now understand that that is a very poor reliance. I trust you may become wise enough to never rely upon it again. If I have any duty in the matter, it is to give back the money to those from whom I took it; not to pay it over to villains such as you. XIII. On general principles of law and reason, the oaths which foreigners take, on coming here, and being "naturalized" (as it is called), are of no validity. They are necessarily given to nobody; because there is no open, authentic association, to which they can join themselves; or to whom, as individuals, they can pledge their faith. No such association, or organization, as "the people of the United States," having ever been formed by any open, written, authentic, or voluntary contract, there is, on general principles of law and reason, no such association, or organization, in existence. And all oaths that purport to be given to such an association are necessarily given only to the winds. They cannot be said to be given to any man, or body of men, as individuals, because no man, or body of men, can come forward WITH ANY PROOF that the oaths were given to them, as individuals, or to any association of which they are members. To say that there is a tacit understanding among a portion of the male adults of the country, that they will call themselves "the people of the United States," and that they will act in concert in subjecting the remainder of the people of the United States to their dominion; but that they will keep themselves personally concealed by doing all their acts secretly, is wholly insufficient, on general principles of law and reason, to prove the existence of any such association, or organization, as "the people of the United States"; or consequently to prove that the oaths of foreigners were given to any such association. XIV. On general principles of law and reason, all the oaths which, since the war, have been given by Southern men, that they will obey the laws of Congress, support the Union, and the like, are of no validity. Such oaths are invalid, not only because they were extorted by military power, and threats of confiscation, and because they are in contravention of men's natural right to do as they please about supporting the government, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY WERE GIVEN TO NOBODY. They were nominally given to "the United States." But being nominally given to "the United States," they were necessarily given to nobody, because, on general principles of law and reason, there were no "United States," to whom the oaths could be given. That is to say, there was no open, authentic, avowed, legitimate association, corporation, or body of men, known as "the United States," or as "the people of the United States," to whom the oaths could have been given. If anybody says there was such a corporation, let him state who were the individuals that composed it, and how and when they became a corporation. Were Mr. A, Mr. B, and Mr. C members of it? If so, where are their signatures? Where the evidence of their membership? Where the record? Where the open, authentic proof? There is none. Therefore, in law and reason, there was no such corporation. On general principles of law and reason, every corporation, association, or organized body of men, having a legitimate corporate existence, and legitimate corporate rights, must consist of certain known individuals, who can prove, by legitimate and reasonable evidence, their membership. But nothing of this kind can be proved in regard to the corporation, or body of men, who call themselves "the United States." Not a man of them, in all the Northern States, can prove by any legitimate evidence, such as is required to prove membership in other legal corporations, that he himself, or any other man whom he can name, is a member of any corporation or association called "the United States," or "the people of the United States," or, consequently, that there is any such corporation. And since no such corporation can be proved to exist, it cannot of course be proved that the oaths of Southern men were given to any such corporation. The most that can be claimed is that the oaths were given to a secret band of robbers and murderers, who called themselves "the United States," and extorted those oaths. But that is certainly not enough to prove that the oaths are of any obligation. XV. On general principles of law and reason, the oaths of soldiers, that they will serve a given number of years, that they will obey the the orders of their superior officers, that they will bear true allegiance to the government, and so forth, are of no obligation. Independently of the criminality of an oath, that, for a given number of years, he will kill all whom he may be commanded to kill, without exercising his own judgment or conscience as to the justice or necessity of such killing, there is this further reason why a soldier's oath is of no obligation, viz., that, like all the other oaths that have now been mentioned, IT IS GIVEN TO NOBODY. There being, in no legitimate sense, any such corporation, or nation, as "the United States," nor, consequently, in any legitimate sense, any such government as "the government of the United States," a soldier's oath given to, or contract made with, such a nation or government, is necessarily an oath given to, or contract made with, nobody. Consequently such an oath or contract can be of no obligation. XVI. On general principles of law and reason, the treaties, so called, which purport to be entered into with other nations, by persons calling themselves ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators of the United States, in the name, and in behalf, of "the people of the United States," are of no validity. These so-called ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators, who claim to be the agents of "the people of the United States" for making these treaties, can show no open, written, or other authentic evidence that either the whole "people of the United States," or any other open, avowed, responsible body of men, calling themselves by that name, ever authorized these pretended ambassadors and others to make treaties in the name of, or binding upon any one of, "the people of the United States," or any other open, avowed, responsible body of men, calling themselves by that name, ever authorized these pretended ambassadors, secretaries, and others, in their name and behalf, to recognize certain other persons, calling themselves emperors, kings, queens, and the like, as the rightful rulers, sovereigns, masters, or representatives of the different peoples whom they assume to govern, to represent, and to bind. The "nations," as they are called, with whom our pretended ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators profess to make treaties, are as much myths as our own. On general principles of law and reason, there are no such "nations." That is to say, neither the whole people of England, for example, nor any open, avowed, responsible body of men, calling themselves by that name, ever, by any open, written, or other authentic contract with each other, formed themselves into any bona fide, legitimate association or organization, or authorized any king, queen, or other representative to make treaties in their name, or to bind them, either individually, or as an association, by such treaties. Our pretended treaties, then, being made with no legitimate or bona fide nations, or representatives of nations, and being made, on our part, by persons who have no legitimate authority to act for us, have instrinsically no more validity than a pretended treaty made by the Man in the Moon with the king of the Pleiades. XVII. On general principles of law and reason, debts contracted in the name of "the United States," or of "the people of the United States," are of no validity. It is utterly absurd to pretend that debts to the amount of twenty-five hundred millions of dollars are binding upon thirty-five or forty millions of people [the approximate national debt and population in 1870], when there is not a particle of legitimate evidence -- such as would be required to prove a private debt -- that can be produced against any one of them, that either he, or his properly authorized attorney, ever contracted to pay one cent. Certainly, neither the whole people of the United States, nor any number of them, ever separately or individually contracted to pay a cent of these debts. Certainly, also, neither the whole people of the United States, nor any number of them, every, by any open, written, or other authentic and voluntary contract, united themselves as a firm, corporation, or association, by the name of "the United States," or "the people of the United States," and authorized their agents to contract debts in their name. Certainly, too, there is in existence no such firm, corporation, or association as "the United States," or "the people of the United States," formed by any open, written, or other authentic and voluntary contract, and having corporate property with which to pay these debts. How, then, is it possible, on any general principle of law or reason, that debts that are binding upon nobody individually, can be binding upon forty millions of people collectively, when, on general and legitimate principles of law and reason, these forty millions of people neither have, nor ever had, any corporate property? never made any corporate or individual contract? and neither have, nor ever had, any corporate existence? Who, then, created these debts, in the name of "the United States"? Why, at most, only a few persons, calling themselves "members of Congress," etc., who pretended to represent "the people of the United States," but who really represented only a secret band of robbers and murderers, who wanted money to carry on the robberies and murders in which they were then engaged; and who intended to extort from the future people of the United States, by robbery and threats of murder (and real murder, if that should prove necessary), the means to pay these debts. This band of robbers and murderers, who were the real principals in contracting these debts, is a secret one, because its members have never entered into any open, written, avowed, or authentic contract, by which they may be individually known to the world, or even to each other. Their real or pretended representatives, who contracted these debts in their name, were selected (if selected at all) for that purpose secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to furnish evidence against none of the principals INDIVIDUALLY; and these principals were really known INDIVIDUALLY neither to their pretended representatives who contracted these debts in their behalf, nor to those who lent the money. The money, therefore, was all borrowed and lent in the dark; that is, by men who did not see each other's faces, or know each other's names; who could not then, and cannot now, identify each other as principals in the transactions; and who consequently can prove no contract with each other. Furthermore, the money was all lent and borrowed for criminal purposes; that is, for purposes of robbery and murder; and for this reason the contracts were all intrinsically void; and would have been so, even though the real parties, borrowers and lenders, had come face to face, and made their contracts openly, in their own proper names. Furthermore, this secret band of robbers and murderers, who were the real borrowers of this money, having no legitimate corporate existence, have no corporate property with which to pay these debts. They do indeed pretend to own large tracts of wild lands, lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and between the Gulf of Mexico and the North Pole. But, on general principles of law and reason, they might as well pretend to own the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans themselves; or the atmosphere and the sunlight; and to hold them, and dispose of them, for the payment of these debts. Having no corporate property with which to pay what purports to be their corporate debts, this secret band of robbers and murderers are really bankrupt. They have nothing to pay with. In fact, they do not propose to pay their debts otherwise than from the proceeds of their future robberies and murders. These are confessedly their sole reliance; and were known to be such by the lenders of the money, at the time the money was lent. And it was, therefore, virtually a part of the contract, that the money should be repaid only from the proceeds of these future robberies and murders. For this reason, if for no other, the contracts were void from the beginning. In fact, these apparently two classes, borrowers and lenders, were really one and the same class. They borrowed and lent money from and to themselves. They themselves were not only part and parcel, but the very life and soul, of this secret band of robbers and murderers, who borrowed and spent the money. Individually they furnished money for a common enterprise; taking, in return, what purported to be corporate promises for individual loans. The only excuse they had for taking these so-called corporate promises of, for individual loans by, the same parties, was that they might have some apparent excuse for the future robberies of the band (that is, to pay the debts of the corporation), and that they might also know what shares they were to be respectively entitled to out of the proceeds of their future robberies. Finally, if these debts had been created for the most innocent and honest purposes, and in the most open and honest manner, by the real parties to the contracts, these parties could thereby have bound nobody but themselves, and no property but their own. They could have bound nobody that should have come after them, and no property subsequently created by, or belonging to, other persons. XVIII. The Constitution having never been signed by anybody; and there being no other open, written, or authentic contract between any parties whatever, by virtue of which the United States government, so called, is maintained; and it being well known that none but male persons, of twenty-one years of age and upwards, are allowed any voice in the government; and it being also well known that a large number of these adult persons seldom or never vote at all; and that all those who do vote, do so secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to prevent their individual votes being known, either to the world, or even to each other; and consequently in a way to make no one openly responsible for the acts of their agents, or representatives, -- all these things being known, the questions arise: WHO compose the real governing power in the country? Who are the men, THE RESPONSIBLE MEN, who rob us of our property? Restrain us of our liberty? Subject us to their arbitrary dominion? And devastate our hooms, and shoot us down by the hundreds of thousands, if we resist? How shall we find these men? How shall we know them from others? How shall we defend ourselves and our property against them? Who, of our neighbors, are members of this secret band of robbers and murderers? How can we know which are THEIR houses, that we may burn or demolish them? Which THEIR property, that we may destroy it? Which their persons, that we may kill them, and rid the world and ourselves of such tyrants and monsters? These are questions that must be answered, before men can be free; before they can protect themselves against this secret band of robbers and murderers, who now plunder, enslave, and destroy them. The answer to these questions is, that only those who have the will and power to shoot down their fellow men, are the real rulers in this, as in all other (so-called) civilized countries; for by no others will civilized men be robbed, or enslaved. Among savages, mere physical strength, on the part of one man, may enable him to rob, enslave, or kill another man. Among barbarians, mere physical strength, on the part of a body of men, disciplined, and acting in concert, though with very little money or other wealth, may, under some circumstances, enable them to rob, enslave, or kill another body of men, as numerous, or perhaps even more numerous, than themselves. And among both savages and barbarians, mere want may sometimes compel one man to sell himself as a slave to another. But with (so-called) civilized peoples, among whom knowledge, wealth, and the means of acting in concert, have becom diffusede; and who have invented such weapons and other means of defense as to render mere physical strength of less importance; and by whom soldiers in any requisite number, and other instrumentalities of war in any requisite amount, can always be had for money, the question of war, and consequently the question of power, is little else than a mere question of money. As a necessary consequence, those who stand ready to furnish this money, are the real rulers. It is so in Europe, and it is so in this country. In Europe, the nominal rulers, the emperors and kings and parliaments, are anything but the real rulers of their respective countries. They are little or nothing else than mere tools, employed by the wealthy to rob, enslave, and (if need be) murder those who have less wealth, or none at all. The Rosthchilds, and that class of money-lenders of whom they are the representatives and agents -- men who never think of lending a shilling to their next-door neighbors, for purposes of honest industry, unless upon the most ample security, and at the highest rate of interest -- stand ready, at all times, to lend money in unlimited amounts to those robbers and murderers, who call themselves governments, to be expended in shooting down those who do not submit quietly to being robbed and enslaved. They lend their money in this manner, knowing that it is to be expended in murdering their fellow men, for simply seeking their liberty and their rights; knowing also that neither the interest nor the principal will ever be paid, except as it will be extorted under terror of the repetition of such murders as those for which the money lent is to be expended. These money-lenders, the Rosthchilds, for example, say to themselves: If we lend a hundred millions sterling to the queen and parliament of England, it will enable them to murder twenty, fifty, or a hundred thousand people in England, Ireland, or India; and the terror inspired by such wholesale slaughter, will enable them to keep the whole people of those countries in subjection for twenty, or perhaps fifty, years to come; to control all their trade and industry; and to extort from them large amounts of money, under the name of taxes; and from the wealth thus extorted from them, they (the queen and parliament) can afford to pay us a higher rate of interest for our money than we can get in any other way. Or, if we lend this sum to the emperor of Austria, it will enable him to murder so many of his people as to strike terror into the rest, and thus enable him to keep them in subjection, and extort money from them, for twenty or fifty years to come. And they say the same in regard to the emperor of Russia, the king of Prussia, the emperor of France, or any other ruler, so called, who, in their judgment, will be able, by murdering a reasonable portion of his people, to keep the rest in subjection, and extort money from them, for a long time to come, to pay the interest and the principal of the money lent him. And why are these men so ready to lend money for murdering their fellow men? Soley for this reason, viz., that such loans are considered better investments than loans for purposes of honest industry. They pay higher rates of interest; and it is less trouble to look after them. This is the whole matter. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | "...no government, so called, can reasonably be | trusted for a moment, ... any longer than it | depends wholly upon voluntary support." | -- Lysander Spooner ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The question of making these loans is, with these lenders, a mere question of pecuniary profit. They lend money to be expended in robbing, enslaving, and murdering their fellow men, solely because, on the whole, such loans pay better than any others. They are no respecters of persons, no superstitious fools, that reverence monarchs. They care no more for a king, or an emperor, than they do for a beggar, except as he is a better customer, and can pay them better interest for their money. If they doubt his ability to make his murders successful for maintaining his power, and thus extorting money from his people in future, they dismiss him unceremoniously as they would dismiss any other hopeless bankrupt, who should want to borrow money to save himself >from open insolvency. When these great lenders of blood-money, like the Rothschilds, have loaned vast sums in this way, for purposes of murder, to an emperor or a king, they sell out the bonds taken by them, in small amounts, to anybody, and everybody, who are disposed to buy them at satisfactory prices, to hold as investments. They (the Rothschilds) thus soon get back their money, with great profits; and are now ready to lend money in the same way again to any other robber and murderer, called an emperor or king, who, they think, is likely to be successful in his robberies and murders, and able to pay a good price for the money necessary to carry them on. This business of lending blood-money is one of the most thoroughly sordid, cold-blooded, and criminal that was ever carried on, to any considerable extent, amongst human beings. It is like lending money to slave traders, or to common robbers and pirates, to be repaid out of their plunder. And the men who loan money to governments, so called, for the purpose of enabling the latter to rob, enslave, and murder their people, are among the greatest villains that the world has ever seen. And they as much deserve to be hunted and killed (if they cannot otherwise be got rid of) as any slave traders, robbers, or pirates that ever lived. When these emperors and kings, so-called, have obtained their loans, they proceed to hire and train immense numbers of professional murderers, called soldiers, and employ them in shooting down all who resist their demands for money. In fact, most of them keep large bodies of these murderers constantly in their service, as their only means of enforcing their extortions. There are now [1870], I think, four or five millions of these professional murderers constantly employed by the so-called sovereigns of Europe. The enslaved people are, of course, forced to support and pay all these murderers, as well as to submit to all the other extortions which these murderers are employed to enforce. It is only in this way that most of the so-called governments of Europe are maintained. These so-called governments are in reality only great bands of robbers and murderers, organized, disciplined, and constantly on the alert. And the so-called sovereigns, in these different governments, are simply the heads, or chiefs, of different bands of robbers and murderers. And these heads or chiefs are dependent upon the lenders of blood-money for the means to carry on their robberies and murders. They could not sustain themselves a moment but for the loans made to them by these blood-money loan-mongers. And their first care is to maintain their credit with them; for they know their end is come, the instant their credit with them fails. Consequently the first proceeds of their extortions are scrupulously applied to the payment of the interest on their loans. In addition to paying the interest on their bonds, they perhaps grant to the holders of them great monopolies in banking, like the Banks of England, of France, and of Vienna; with the agreement that these banks shall furnish money whenever, in sudden emergencies, it may be necessary to shoot down more of their people. Perhaps also, by means of tariffs on competing imports, they give great monopolies to certain branches of industry, in which these lenders of blood-money are engaged. They also, by unequal taxation, exempt wholly or partially the property of these loan-mongers, and throw corresponding burdens upon those who are too poor and weak to resist. Thus it is evident that all these men, who call themselves by the high-sounding names of Emperors, Kings, Sovereigns, Monarchs, Most Christian Majesties, Most Catholic Majesties, High Mightinesses, Most Serene and Potent Princes, and the like, and who claim to rule "by the grace of God," by "Divine Right" -- that is, by special authority from Heaven -- are intrinsically not only the merest miscreants and wretches, engaged solely in plundering, enslaving, and murdering their fellow men, but that they are also the merest hangers on, the servile, obsequious, fawning dependents and tools of these blood-money loan-mongers, on whom they rely for the means to carry on their crimes. These loan-mongers, like the Rothschilds, laugh in their sleeves, and say to themselves: These despicable creatures, who call themselves emperors, and kings, and majesties, and most serene and potent princes; who profess to wear crowns, and sit on thrones; who deck themselves with ribbons, and feathers, and jewels; and surround themselves with hired flatterers and lickspittles; and whom we suffer to strut around, and palm themselves off, upon fools and slaves, as sovereigns and lawgivers specially appointed by Almighty God; and to hold themselves out as the sole fountains of honors, and dignities, and wealth, and power -- all these miscreants and imposters know that we make them, and use them; that in us they live, move, and have their being; that we require them (as the price of their positions) to take upon themselves all the labor, all the danger, and all the odium of all the crimes they commit for our profit; and that we will unmake them, strip them of their gewgaws, and send them out into the world as beggars, or give them over to the vengeance of the people they have enslaved, the moment they refuse to commit any crime we require of them, or to pay over to us such share of the proceeds of their robberies as we see fit to demand. XIX. Now, what is true in Europe, is substantially true in this country. The difference is the immaterial one, that, in this country, there is no visible, permanent head, or chief, of these robbers and murderers who call themselves "the government." That is to say, there is no ONE MAN, who calls himself the state, or even emperor, king, or sovereign; no one who claims that he and his children rule "by the Grace of God," by "Divine Right," or by special appointment from Heaven. There are only certain men, who call themselves presidents, senators, and representatives, and claim to be the authorized agents, FOR THE TIME BEING, OR FOR CERTAIN SHORT PERIODS, OF ALL "the people of the United States"; but who can show no credentials, or powers of attorney, or any other open, authentic evidence that they are so; and who notoriously are not so; but are really only the agents of a secret band of robbers and murderers, whom they themselves do not know, and have no means of knowing, individually; but who, they trust, will openly or secretly, when the crisis comes, sustain them in all their usurpations and crimes. What is important to be noticed is, that these so-called presidents, senators, and representatives, these pretended agents of all "the people of the United States," the moment their exactions meet with any formidable resistance from any portion of "the people" themselves, are obliged, like their co-robbers and murderers in Europe, to fly at once to the lenders of blood money, for the means to sustain their power. And they borrow their money on the same principle, and for the same purpose, viz., to be expended in shooting down all those "people of the United States" -- their own constituents and principals, as they profess to call them -- who resist the robberies and enslavements which these borrowers of the money are practising upon them. And they expect to repay the loans, if at all, only from the proceeds of the future robberies, which they anticipate it will be easy for them and their successors to perpetrate through a long series of years, upon their pretended principals, if they can but shoot down now some hundreds of thousands of them, and thus strike terror into the rest. Perhaps the facts were never made more evident, in any country on the globe, than in our own, that these soulless blood-money loan-mongers are the real rulers; that they rule from the most sordid and mercenary motives; that the ostensible government, the presidents, senators, and representatives, so called, are merely their tools; and that no ideas of, or regard for, justice or liberty had anything to do in inducing them to lend their money for the war [i.e, the Civil War]. In proof of all this, look at the following facts. Nearly a hundred years ago we professed to have got rid of all that religious superstition, inculcated by a servile and corrupt priesthood in Europe, that rulers, so called, derived their authority directly from Heaven; and that it was consequently a religious duty on the part of the people to obey them. We professed long ago to have learned that governments could rightfully exist only by the free will, and on the voluntary support, of those who might choose to sustain them. We all professed to have known long ago, that the only legitimate objects of government were the maintenance of liberty and justice equally for all. All this we had professed for nearly a hundred years. And we professed to look with pity and contempt upon those ignorant, superstitious, and enslaved peoples of Europe, who were so easily kept in subjection by the frauds and force of priests and kings. Notwithstanding all this, that we had learned, and known, and professed, for nearly a century, these lenders of blood money had, for a long series of years previous to the war, been the willing accomplices of the slave-holders in perverting the government from the purposes of liberty and justice, to the greatest of crimes. They had been such accomplices FOR A PURELY PECUNIARY CONSIDERATION, to wit, a control of the markets in the South; in other words, the privilege of holding the slave-holders themselves in industrial and commercial subjection to the manufacturers and merchants of the North (who afterwards furnished the money for the war). And these Northern merchants and manufacturers, these lenders of blood-money, were willing to continue to be the accomplices of the slave-holders in the future, for the same pecuniary considerations. But the slave-holders, either doubting the fidelity of their Northern allies, or feeling themselves strong enough to keep their slaves in subjection without Northern assistance, would no longer pay the price which these Northern men demanded. And it was to enforce this price in the future -- that is, to monopolize the Southern markets, to maintain their industrial and commercial control over the South -- that these Northern manufacturers and merchants lent some of the profits of their former monopolies for the war, in order to secure to themselves the same, or greater, monopolies in the future. These -- and not any love of liberty or justice -- were the motives on which the money for the war was lent by the North. In short, the North said to the slave-holders: If you will not pay us our price (give us control of your markets) for our assistance against your slaves, we will secure the same price (keep control of your markets) by helping your slaves against you, and using them as our tools for maintaining dominion over you; for the control of your markets we will have, whether the tools we use for that purpose be black or white, and be the cost, in blood and money, what it may. On this principle, and from this motive, and not from any love of liberty, or justice, the money was lent in enormous amounts, and at enormous rates of interest. And it was only by means of these loans that the objects of the war were accomplished. And now these lenders of blood-money demand their pay; and the government, so called, becomes their tool, their servile, slavish, villanous tool, to extort it from the labor of the enslaved people both of the North and South. It is to be extorted by every form of direct, and indirect, and unequal taxation. Not only the nominal debt and interest -- enormous as the latter was -- are to be paid in full; but these holders of the debt are to be paid still further -- and perhaps doubly, triply, or quadruply paid -- by such tariffs on imports as will enable our home manufacturers to realize enormous prices for their commodities; also by such monopolies in banking as will enable them to keep control of, and thus enslave and plunder, the industry and trade of the great body of the Northern people themselves. In short, the industrial and commercial slavery of the great body of the people, North and South, black and white, is the price which these lenders of blood money demand, and insist upon, and are determined to secure, in return for the money lent for the war. This programme having been fully arranged and systematized, they put their sword into the hands of the chief murderer of the war, [undoubtedly a reference to General Grant, who had just become president] and charge him to carry their scheme into effect. And now he, speaking as their organ, says, "LET US HAVE PEACE." The meaning of this is: Submit quietly to all the robbery and slavery we have arranged for you, and you can have "peace." But in case you resist, the same lenders of blood-money, who furnished the means to subdue the South, will furnish the means again to subdue you. These are the terms on which alone this government, or, with few exceptions, any other, ever gives "peace" to its people. The whole affair, on the part of those who furnished the money, has been, and now is, a deliberate scheme of robbery and murder; not merely to monopolize the markets of the South, but also to monopolize the currency, and thus control the industry and trade, and thus plunder and enslave the laborers, of both North and South. And Congress and the president are today the merest tools for these purposes. They are obliged to be, for they know that their own power, as rulers, so-called, is at an end, the moment their credit with the blood-money loan-mongers fails. They are like a bankrupt in the hands of an extortioner. They dare not say nay to any demand made upon them. And to hide at once, if possible, both their servility and crimes, they attempt to divert public attention, by crying out that they have "Abolished Slavery!" That they have "Saved the Country!" That they have "Preserved our Glorious Union!" and that, in now paying the "National Debt," as they call it (as if the people themselves, ALL OF THEM WHO ARE TO BE TAXED FOR ITS PAYMENT, had really and voluntarily joined in contracting it), they are simply "Maintaining the National Honor!" By "maintaining the national honor," they mean simply that they themselves, open robbers and murderers, assume to be the nation, and will keep faith with those who lend them the money necessary to enable them to crush the great body of the people under their feet; and will faithfully appropriate, from the proceeds of their future robberies and murders, enough to pay all their loans, principal and interest. The pretense that the "abolition of slavery" was either a motive or justification for the war, is a fraud of the same character with that of "maintaining the national honor." Who, but such usurpers, robbers, and murderers as they, ever established slavery? Or what government, except one resting upon the sword, like the one we now have, was ever capable of maintaining slavery? And why did these men abolish slavery? Not from any love of liberty in general -- not as an act of justice to the black man himself, but only "as a war measure," and because they wanted his assistance, and that of his friends, in carrying on the war they had undertaken for maintaining and intensifying that political, commercial, and industrial slavery, to which they have subjected the great body of the people, both black and white. And yet these imposters now cry out that they have abolished the chattel slavery of the black man -- although that was not the motive of the war -- as if they thought they could thereby conceal, atone for, or justify that other slavery which they were fighting to perpetuate, and to render more rigorous and inexorable than it ever was before. There was no difference of principle -- but only of degree -- between the slavery they boast they have abolished, and the slavery they were fighting to preserve; for all restraints upon men's natural liberty, not necessary for the simple maintenance of justice, are of the nature of slavery, and differ >from each other only in degree. If their object had really been to abolish slavery, or maintain liberty or justice generally, they had only to say: All, whether white or black, who want the protection of this government, shall have it; and all who do not want it, will be left in peace, so long as they leave us in peace. Had they said this, slavery would necessarily have been abolished at once; the war would have been saved; and a thousand times nobler union than we have ever had would have been the result. It would have been a voluntary union of free men; such a union as will one day exist among all men, the world over, if the several nations, so called, shall ever get rid of the usurpers, robbers, and murderers, called governments, that now plunder, enslave, and destroy them. Still another of the frauds of these men is, that they are now establishing, and that the war was designed to establish, "a government of consent." The only idea they have ever manifested as to what is a government of consent, is this -- that it is one to which everybody must consent, or be shot. This idea was the dominant one on which the war was carried on; and it is the dominant one, now that we have got what is called "peace." Their pretenses that they have "Saved the Country," and "Preserved our Glorious Union," are frauds like all the rest of their pretenses. By them they mean simply that they have subjugated, and maintained their power over, an unwilling people. This they call "Saving the Country"; as if an enslaved and subjugated people -- or as if any people kept in subjection by the sword (as it is intended that all of us shall be hereafter) -- could be said to have any country. This, too, they call "Preserving our Glorious Union"; as if there could be said to be any Union, glorious or inglorious, that was not voluntary. Or as if there could be said to be any union between masters and slaves; between those who conquer, and those who are subjugated. All these cries of having "abolished slavery," of having "saved the country," of having "preserved the union," of establishing "a government of consent," and of "maintaining the national honor," are all gross, shameless, transparent cheats -- so transparent that they ought to deceive no one -- when uttered as justifications for the war, or for the government that has suceeded the war, or for now compelling the people to pay the cost of the war, or for compelling anybody to support a government that he does not want. The lesson taught by all these facts is this: As long as mankind continue to pay "national debts," so-called -- that is, so long as they are such dupes and cowards as to pay for being cheated, plundered, enslaved, and murdered -- so long there will be enough to lend the money for those purposes; and with that money a plenty of tools, called soldiers, can be hired to keep them in subjection. But when they refuse any longer to pay for being thus cheated, plundered, enslaved, and murdered, they will cease to have cheats, and usurpers, and robbers, and murderers and blood-money loan-mongers for masters. APPENDIX. Inasmuch as the Constitution was never signed, nor agreed to, by anybody, as a contract, and therefore never bound anybody, and is now binding upon nobody; and is, moreover, such an one as no people can ever hereafter be expected to consent to, except as they may be forced to do so at the point of the bayonet, it is perhaps of no importance what its true legal meaning, as a contract, is. Nevertheless, the writer thinks it proper to say that, in his opinion, the Constitution is no such instrument as it has generally been assumed to be; but that by false interpretations, and naked usurpations, the government has been made in practice a very widely, and almost wholly, different thing from what the Constitution itself purports to authorize. He has heretofore written much, and could write much more, to prove that such is the truth. But whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain -- that it has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist. [The end] From checker at panix.com Fri Apr 1 20:42:22 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 15:42:22 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Kenneth Minogue: Journalism: Power without responsibility Message-ID: Kenneth Minogue: Journalism: Power without responsibility The New Criterion Vol. 23, No. 6, February 2005 http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/23/feb05/journalism.htm [This is worth reading entire. He is one of the few conservatives I find worth reading. The others are Roger Scruton and, if he really is a conservative, John Gray. All three are English!] Stanley Baldwin's bitter jibe that journalists enjoy "the privilege of the harlot down the ages--power without responsibility"--still resonates. One reason is certainly because we recognize that--alas!--we cannot live without journalism. We might sometimes imagine that it is merely the stuff we read in the newspapers every day, but actually journalism is a mode in which we think. It indelibly marks our first response to everything. It dominates television and surrounds us in the vast publishing industry of popularization. The scholar and the professional may escape it as they specialize, but the moment they step outside what they really know about, they enter the flow of popularized understanding like the rest of us. This means that journalism is a problem at two levels. Baldwin's jibe points to the profound idea that there is something essentially pathological about the whole activity that daily satisfies our often pointless curiosity about what is going on in the world. But there is a less extreme position that accords more with common sense: namely, that in our educated and democratic world, a great deal of information is indispensable, and journalism is the only way we can have it. Even here, however, large events such as the Iraq war of 2004 have caused many critics to judge that journalism has lost such integrity as it ever had and is being used to nudge us towards some version of right thinking. Journalism had slid, it has been suggested, into propaganda. We thus have two theses to consider. The first is that journalism in itself is a pathological distortion of our civilization, and the second is that the perfectly respectable and certainly necessary trade of informing us about the world has lost its integrity and become, in some degree, a parody of truth--in a word, pathological. It is not entirely possible to separate these ideas, but let us take each in turn. Journalism responds to the old Roman question: Quid novi?--What's new? The question only makes sense against a background of: What's old? The answer must be composed of things called "events," and, as the etymology of eventus suggests, an event is something understood as the outcome of some earlier situation. Event-making is an art that turns familiar routines and facts into patterns having a certain uniqueness. Some people are better at it than others, but once the art has been learned, most people can do it to some extent. It is all a matter of scale: the Bible tells some stories in a few sentences, while writers of fiction can spin someone's day into a long novel. Responding to stories is one way of conducting life, distinguishable from the times when we are responding to routines, sensations, classifications, or reflections. No life can avoid gossip, ritual, and response to overriding events such as war or famine, but most people, especially if they are illiterate, have hitherto been interested in little beyond what affects them directly. Journalism is the cultivation of concern for things that are for the most part remote from us. The basic contrast is with religion, which is concerned with rituals and sermons revolving around beliefs about our eternal situation. Kierkegaard mistrusted journalism because he thought it would feed our love of the ephemeral, and he was no doubt right about this. Hegel remarked that in his time, newspapers were replacing morning prayer. Perhaps the earliest writer to regard our involvement with daily events as a pathology distracting us from the realities of the human condition was Pascal. As journalism in the contemporary world has extended its range, it has certainly taken in churchly events and concerned itself with the beliefs of different religions, but the very context of such news robs it of the superior status it has for believers, and diminishes religion to the same level as the vast miscellany of other human activities that are also being reported. Religions are composed of archetypes that have a status above the constant flow of ideas and news stories. We respond (or do not respond) to such archetypes in a reflective manner that determines how we view the world, but where journalism dominates our thoughts, reflectiveness is diluted by the passion for novelty. We move from an article on religion to one on fashion, sport, or public affairs. Like democracy, journalism is a manic equalizer. Historically, journalism emerged from the specific interests of princes, merchants, and administrators. A prince needed to know something of foreign powers, and his ambassador sent him back reports, just as a merchant needed to know of profitable opportunities and conditions of trade. A universal institution such as the Papacy needed a constant flow of information. The Greeks, Romans, Chinese, etc. were great annalists, and Herodotus is credited, as the father of History, with creating prose literature out of an assemblage of contingencies, but the drive of most of these writers was precisely to get beyond contingency and find a broader explanatory structure. Printing, of course, transformed everything, leading to the movement of power away from grand patrons towards educated city-dwellers. Large political issues were argued out in books, pamphlets, and broadsheets. The writings of diplomats and merchants were soon being supplemented by correspondents writing for a wider audience. It was the beginning of the end for arcana imperii. By the eighteenth century, the flow of material was so reliable that publishers could be sure of filling an annual, a monthly, and ultimately a weekly or daily issue. This was the first and basic mechanical principle by which we became accustomed to a regular flow of news. Other mechanisms soon emerged to help the editor fill his space--the anniversary, for example, in which nothing related the writer and his subject but an interval of time. Deeper currents were at work. The modern Western world was based upon a close interest in and observation of the things going on around us. The marvels of science in important respects result from a simple propensity to measure things and discover laws relating these measurements. In the early modern period, the value of history, and also of reports of events, consisted in their being able to point a lesson or generate a moral or practical bit of wisdom. The meaning of an event was to be found in its outcome. The Boston Museum of Fine Arts has a painting by Tiepolo, dated 1745-1750, called (in a rather Heideggerian idiom) Time unveiling truth. The allegory is complex and the painting (to my eyes) not without grossness, but the broad idea captures something of how practical men came to understand wisdom. The contrast must be with the religious assumption that the essential truths of life have been revealed, but that the human world is dark and devious, and the connection between events is obscure. Here we have the view that time will tell whether we have been right or wrong to rely on someone. The interest of a contingency is precisely that it cannot be assimilated to a law. To follow the course of events over time is therefore to discover truth. And one possible implication of this view is that to come later is to know more truth. Journalism thus emerges from deep currents in our civilization. It has roots in Greek and Roman experience, and, from the Middle Ages onwards, a passion to follow the actual events of the world seems to have continually grown. Prose literature and the novel were part of that development, and whole new areas of event-making came to be opened up. The narratives relating to kings, aristocrats, and saints were broadened to include a more general concern with individual life. In a religious idiom of life, such diurnal events were mere froth on the surface of the infinite. But as Kierkegaard saw, the ephemeral was coming to dominate our interests. The steady diffusion of a journalistic interest in what is going on affects our consciousness of the world we live in. A nun has a different mind-set from a housewife, a philosopher from a man of affairs, but journalism equips them all with a generalized interest in the world. One dimension of how journalism affects the way we think is our propensity to become bored. Someone who is focussed on the novelty of events as they unfold in the newspapers is to that extent less reflective about the events to which he responds. The details of change crowd out the time and energy that would otherwise go into reflection. Religious people, philosophers, or scientists--people who are genuinely educated, we might say--will think about God, or Nature, or literature, and will find new things in quite exiguous materials, whereas the less educated become increasingly miserable without a continual flow of novelty, and since most of reality is repetition, the novelty is a function of triviality. People become, in a word, shallow. Here then is a new form of consciousness evolving under the spur of improving technology to the point where twenty-four-hour news and comment is available to us. Journalistic consciousness is imperialistic. It invades every sphere of life and takes it over. Consider the world of scholarship, in which men and women dedicate themselves to exploring some area of reality in terms of a particular mode of inquiry--as historians, scientists, or literary scholars, for example. Scholarship is hard, focussed work, continually retracing its steps to check on its validity as scholarly discussion proceeds. It knows nothing of the urgency of the deadline. The scholars who practice this art are often pedantic and stuffy, and certainly impatient with those who think they can master the subject in question without a lengthy apprenticeship. And for centuries scholars used to defend themselves against the contempt of practical men for what is "academic" with an entrenched disdain for journalism and popularization. The Cambridge English don F. R. Leavis detested nothing so passionately as Sunday newspaper reviewing. The Oxford historian A. J. P. Taylor never got the chair to which his abilities entitled him because (so it is plausibly said) he brought scholarship low by writing for newspapers. Might I perhaps focus the point a little more sharply with another British example? Early in 2004, Bernard Levin died. He had been a notable figure of London journalism, both witty and wide-ranging. Many friends remembered his often setting the table on a roar, but few could come up with examples adequate to exhibit his wit. And then Matthew Parris, himself perhaps the pre-eminent columnist of the day, wrote about this. The problem, he suggested, was something deep in the nature of journalism: its absolute dependence on the moment of writing. Good journalism gains some of its impact from responding to the mind of the moment, and that is precisely what cannot fully be captured at a later moment. And indeed, it is hard to read journalism critically without realizing the element of padding that goes into it. The self-protective disdain of the scholar for the popularizer has now gone, or largely gone, and with its disappearance, journalism has been sloshing about in the world of scholarship. Scholars can now become popularizing celebrities without losing face, a further spread of the journalistic imperium. Worse, journalism has begun, by a curious conjunction of cultural tendencies, to invade the world of education. It has long been felt by teachers of subjects in the social sciences that a pupil's reading of the newspaper is an important part of his or her education. And with the decline of discipline in schools, the teacher can no longer command that his charges must learn what he thinks is the next part of their education. He is forced to seduce them, by the guile of a popularizing involvement with their own interests. Journalism's empire thus lies behind the rise of the impulse to make relevance the test of what is worth teaching in schools. A similar development is happening in universities as they expand to take in students with less native wits than before. Instead of the focus on method and discipline basic to education, many university courses have become interdisciplinary, which consists in focusing on some subject of broad popular interest, such as the environment, and investigating its problems in terms of a bit of science, a bit of history, a bit of practical wisdom, etc. Journalistic consciousness, then, has spread into the wide field of the humanities and the social sciences. A journalist is the master of the gist of things, and gist is king of the world. The way it dominates contemporary politics might perhaps help to explain why in our time so much legislation has so frequently to be amended, corrected, and replaced. Journalism may thus be taken as a systematic defiance of the Socratic maxim that wisdom consists in understanding one's own ignorance. We who belong to the world of journalism know a great deal, and are proud of it, and sanctify such knowledgeability in quiz programs and a disdain for those who cannot tell in what century the Civil War happened, or how many states make up the U.S. Stanley Baldwin thought that journalists were prostitutes--but how can knowing a lot be thought to be the satisfaction of a kind of lust? The answer is that journalism satisfies curiosity, a distant relative of the "wonder" thought to be the source of philosophy and science. How then, one must repeat, can curiosity be a vice? The answer is that we are often curious about things that are none of our business. The malicious village gossip is the most curious creature on earth, and finds her successor in the "door-stopping" journalist and the paparazzo infesting the lives of famous people. Further, curiosity is one of those learned human responses that is dependent on what other people are interested in. In a shallow way, we can easily be influenced to take an interest in something merely because others are curious about it. The most evidently vicious kind of curiosity is morbid. Plato recognized this in arguing that the mind was an arena of conflict rather than a Pythagorean harmony. In the Republic, Socrates tells the story of Leontius, son of Aglaion: "On his way up from the Piraeus outside the north wall, he noticed the bodies of some criminals lying on the ground with the executioner standing by them. He wanted to go and look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted and tried to turn away. He struggled for some time and covered his eyes, but at last the desire was too much for him. Opening his eyes wide, he ran up to the bodies and cried, `There you are, curse you; feast yourselves on this lovely sight!'" Some modern press photography is remarkable, almost an art (that of sport for example), but much that we see in tabloid journalism would disgust us had our sensibilities not been corrupted by learning to enjoy the satisfaction of this particular version of lust--the lust to see and know things of no concern to us. As Pascal remarks: "More often than not, curiosity is merely vanity. We only want to know something in order to talk about it." Here then is another arena in which journalism has "colonized" our minds. The very availability of a rather illicit satisfaction has developed in us the very appetite itself. All of this is given some kind of ethical coloring in terms of the public's right to know, and indeed, it would be impossible in the modern world to draw a consistent line between genuinely appropriate objects of our curiosity and the bits of knowledge generously thrown our way. Indiscriminate absorption of information is the way we live. But there is another side to this richness of information available to us about the world we live in. It is that an endless preoccupation with ourselves as subsumed under social categories--as pensioners or teenagers, married or single, heterosexual or homosexual, and so on--dilutes our consciousness, and our identity spills out in all directions. We lose the focus that belongs to real individuality. We meld into others, becoming part of a strange kind of informational collectivity. Until the twentieth century, people did not much consider the category of journalism. Some of what we would now recognize as such was the writing of educated men in books and quarterlies, and some was popular report for the masses. Reporters and newspapermen had relatively little professional standing. One thinks of twentieth-century newspaperman, according to the image in The Front Page and other fictions, as hard-headed drunks working with green eyeshades as they subbed copy in large offices. These were men who thought that journalism reported and therefore reflected the world, and that (as C. P. Scott put it) "facts are sacred and comment is free." They were empiricists who took the description of "reporter" seriously; they purported to "tell it as it was." To use the old logical formulation, "twenty killed in earthquake" was true if, and only if, twenty people had been killed in the earthquake. But at some point in the twentieth century, a familiar type of social evolution occurred. Journalism became a "profession" (rather than just a trade), and succumbed to the culture of universities. The new sophisticated journalist had picked up a little learning and knew that a news story cannot be a mere "reflection" of events, because every event is infinitely complex, susceptible of many descriptions, and therefore that its meaning depends on the prior selection of the reporter. Journalism was something constructed. This view thus reflected the then popular vogue for mechanical images of "construction" and "invention" in the humanities and social sciences. Here was a theory that transformed the life of your humble journalist. He, or she, was no longer a mere agent of transmission, transferring facts to print. The journalist became an actual creator of news. Journalists were not, indeed, quite the same as novelists, but some element of creativity was thought necessary to report even the least significant bit of news. It was in part this cast of mind that led to the explosion of signed reports and photographs of the contributors to newspapers, and of the proliferation of columns. The result was an immense vogue among young people for becoming journalists. It was for the most part clean regular work, allowing plenty of self-expression without accountability, and it required no vast input of learning, or indeed remarkable talent of any kind. Up to a point, both the reflection and the construction views of journalism capture some of its real features. A little light epistemology might have been a pretty harmless addition to journalistic self-understanding had it not soon mutated into a kind of Salvationism. Quite how this mutation occurred is a very large question indeed, but it can best be understood in terms of a similar process happening in most of the professions in the second half of the twentieth century. Teachers came to think that, because they were custodians of the minds of the rising generation, they held the key to social progress. Spreading the right ideas in the classroom would diminish violence and prejudice in the next generation, so molding the attitudes of the young became at least as important as education itself. Similarly, lawyers sought to expand beyond the dry technicalities of the law in order to make society more just, and many a doctor embracing epidemiology was less concerned with curing his patients than with instructing them about a better lifestyle. The idea of social responsibility--that we are all the molders of our society--spread far and wide, even into the temples of profit. We may summarize this by saying that all of these professionals began to acquire the affectations of an elite possessed of saving knowledge. In the case of journalists, this encounter with epistemology turned into a form of political partisanship. The issue was often expounded in terms of the concept of "bias." In the game of bowls, a certain distortion (known as "bias") tests the skill of the player, and metaphorically, the subjective element in the interpretation of an event might be described as "bias." No one doubted that such subjectivity was a distortion, but it was generally held that truth could emerge from discussion and criticism. The new doctrine insisted--at its least sophisticated--that since no judgement was unbiased, any utterance was as good as any other. Any claim to neutrality was treated with particular scorn. Whereas a generation before, facts had been distinguished as the hard stuff of truth by contrast with values, which were merely the porous vehicles of feeling and preference, now facts themselves lost their claim to superiority. Cultural analysts dissolved truth into power, following the lead of Michel Foucault. It is a familiar feature of the history of philosophy that skepticism's partner is dogmatism. The dogmatism emerging from this particular bout of skepticism held that all cultures were equally valid, and that all utterances, as expressing opinion, were equal, at least in this fundamental respect. They could only be discriminated in terms of some sort of notional "correctness." The Salvationism in this doctrine consisted in the belief that in being skeptical of all universal claims, the journalist as critical thinker was revealing a sophistication superior to that of the average voter. The test of such critical sophistication was that the journalist held opinions liberated from the influence of his or her milieu, and the milieu was taken to include not merely class or nation, but European civilization itself. Journalists saw themselves as "free floating intellectuals" in a world of prejudice and superstition. This pleasing self-image was often complemented by the further opinion that the critical thinker had unmasked the hidden partisanship in our common belief that Western civilization was superior to other forms of life. This civilizational self-criticism commonly took a moral form, applying the higher moral abstractions (such as human rights, anti-imperialism, and racial equality) to European societies themselves, and projecting this criterion back down the ages in a massive indictment of our ancestors. Collective guilt was discovered to be the appropriate response to a great deal of Western conduct, ranging from the Crusades to Slavery and Apartheid. Some enthusiasts demanded official apologies, and some politicians (Tony Blair among them) gave them. Skeptical non-judgmentalism had strangely morphed into dogmatic condemnation, generating a strange kind of collective guilt, from which the critic could absolve himself by his very recognition of it. The history of this process, in the universities (especially the universities) and journalism schools of the Western world, is of course immensely complicated, but without referring to it, one cannot begin to understand why our addiction to journalism is virtually inseparable from our dislike of it. The crudest way of formulating our dislike would be to say that the picture of the world presented in newspapers and television programs jars with our political opinions. The discontent is greater among those on "the right" than those on "the left" but both share it. And here the discontent must seem odd, because journalists pride themselves on covering, or trying to cover, all points of view. "Points of view" is, of course, a vulgarizing simplicity that can recognize only those for, and those against, some all-too-familiar opinion. We have all, no doubt, been amused by the absurdities of the television interviewer swinging back and forth between two opposing personages, putting in a mechanically extreme way the opposed opinion (suitably made extreme) to its opponent. No one, I think, seriously believes that the academic sophistication that journalists have acquired helps them give a better account of the world. We are no better informed today than we were when reporters told us how it was. Indeed, all shades of opinion regard "the media" with deep suspicion as giving a biased account of reality. Some bold journalists embrace this universal unpopularity as proof of a perverse kind of integrity, but early in the twenty-first century, it is hard to resist the view that, indispensable as it is in modern democracies, journalism is an increasingly pathological influence on the way we live. For all their affectations of the critical spirit, journalists are putty in the hands of the latest intellectual fashion. What they have to say is dangerously linked to the posture they intend to reveal in saying it. Their basic moral stance must be an unrelenting concern with truth, and it is in this sense that journalism reveals itself as an essentially Western practice. For it has often been observed that ours is a "truth-obsessed" civilization. By "truth" here, we mean something rather beyond mere correspondence with facts; we must incorporate in the word an element, harder to define, of integrity. A really good journalist needs a sturdy ballast of good sense and an almost scholarly revulsion from the quick and the glib in order to transcend the corruptions that have surfaced over the last century. It would no doubt be perilous to think that all Victorian journalists were more serious than our contemporaries, but in writers like Bagehot and Leslie Stephen we have figures who worked on the frontiers of journalism and scholarship without losing their integrity. It may be merely that the temptations of cheap sensationalism were less at that period than they are now, or it may just be that they had more space. It was, however, in the nineteenth century that literary realism took the form in which it became the guiding star of modern journalism. Novelists such as Dickens and Zola were certainly not the first to explore "low life," but they extended the boundaries of social understanding in order to incorporate the experiences of socially insignificant people into the materials of drama, and also to reveal some of the realities--usually poverty, vice, and oppression--"behind" the facades of the time. The crucial ideas of this literary movement were those of journalists themselves--indeed both Dickens and Zola had been journalists in their time. The basic idea of literary realism is that life is a theater put on for show, and that reality is what you find when you go behind the scenes. Reality, in other words, is something concealed by those whose interest lies in concealment. The posture of the journalist is thus that of the investigator debunking institutions by exposing secrets. This general theory clearly domesticates scandal and conspiracy as instruments of revelation. The custodians of ritual and authority are, of course, particularly vulnerable to criticism of this form. Their outward aspect is their essential point, and what lies behind them may well be banal, or worse. We have here a view of reality that cannot distinguish between those things whose inwardness has no bearing on their force, and those things where hypocrisy or dissimulation may be usefully revealed. Journalism begins, then, in genuinely "sensational" events such as wars, earthquakes, and the rise and fall of governments, but it can multiply sensation by getting "behind" the events. Some social personages--royalty, politicians, actors, etc. --are worthy of note in themselves, but even better is to discover how they behave "behind the scenes." Spontaneous irritation is thought to be more revealing than measured dignity, a little light lust than a policy of self-control. Recent philosophy has been strongly influenced by the so-called "philosophers of suspicion"--Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud--but in journalism we find suspicion as the constitutive passion of an entire practice. The rational basis of modern journalism, its claim to our attention as bringing us knowledge of the world, thus turns out to be the practice of revealing what other people want to hide from us. This is, of course, particularly true of what authority wants to hide. The First World War was a watershed in the growth of cynicism about authority. People came to think that the official account of almost anything was generally wrong. Here then we find the beginnings of the journalistic posture of indignation as the reporter demands "full disclosure" of whatever the public might be thought to have a right to know. Such is the rational basis of journalism, but it is important never to ignore the passions it may be supposed to feed? Baldwin, as we have seen, thought it supplied the demand for a kind of lust almost as powerful as the sexual, and perhaps less linked to vigorous youth--the passion for scandal. What journalism most obviously supplies is "sensations" or small shocks of pleasurable surprise because something unexpected has happened, and the journalistic "story" itself may incorporate the contexts within which it was unexpected. But what if the small shock is the discovery of some change in the private life of someone celebrated? Here we would have a case of Pascal's idle and pointless curiosity, the malice of the village gossip in earlier times writ large. Perhaps the best comment on this is Goethe's "No man is a hero to his valet de chambre," to which Hegel added: "not because the hero is not a hero, but because the valet is a valet." It is in expressing this impulse towards psychological valetism, a lowering and demeaning passion, that journalism clearly loses any real contact with its immemorial mission to understand political realities, the mission of the ambassador writing to his prince. As it has evolved, journalism has bent to conform to that universal passion of our civilization: entertainment. So far as most people up until quite recent times were concerned, amusements and entertainments were rare treats. This seriousness of workaday practicality may well have made church services more tolerable, and it certainly conduced to a more reflective cast of mind, for, as Pope remarked, "amusement is the happiness of those that cannot think." In our time, however, radio, television, books, magazines, and a ubiquity of music have had the result that a quiet mind is a rare luxury for many people. Given that most of the information in our ever-expanding journalistic world is of no direct concern to us, it follows that the basic point of most journalism is to entertain. Just as freaks and bearded ladies amazed us in the past, so too do the remarkable private contortions of people we do not know arouse our wonder and astonishment today. This merger between journalism and entertainment is unmistakably evident in the way newspapers treat the news, and at a higher level it is replicated in the corporate expansion by which, for example, the same company may control film, television, and newspapers. And I am not, in saying this, hinting at corporate conspiracy. The corporate connections merely set the seal on a process that had long been bubbling up internally out of the developing dynamics of journalism itself. We are all familiar with many of the corrupting devices of modern journalism--the hopeless addiction to pointless puns in headlines, the treating of politics as if it were a sports contest, the turning of rivalries into "rows" by talking up competition into conflict and hatred. In its pursuit of revelations, journalism has corrupted the servants and employees of famous people and made the vilest of crimes a paying proposition. But evident corruption is the least danger we face from journalism. For how much "truth" can any human activity sustain? I am not here recommending a philosophy of Machiavellian deception, but merely pointing to the familiar fact that to act is to focus one's understanding on the pros and cons of a project, with an inescapable loss of perspective. To act and to philosophize action are two separate and incompatible activities. One cannot do both at once. But the journalist takes up a posture notionally above the battle, and therefore thinks he has little difficulty avoiding the obvious peaks of partisanship with which he is familiar, so long as he can recognize them. Is he then, a kind of philosopher? If he is a passably honest journalist, he will give "left" and "right" more or less equal time, at least so long as he gets the difference right. He understands that there are two sides to a war, and may well parade his neutrality by giving extra mileage to our opponents. Accused of distortion, he takes satisfaction in his own consistency: he is not reporting conflict as a partisan, but as a neutral observer, though he would today be edgy about the term "neutral." Here is indeed a kind of integrity, but it is integrity whose orientation depends on fluid and moving points. But I repeat: how much truth can any human activity sustain? In religious activities, the point is ritual and feeling, not truth, and an insistence upon truth (as empirically understood) is a category error, and often a destructive one. With too much truth, the glory in war gets lost in the details of blood and body bags. Universities depend on finding themselves in a dark and obscure corner of social life largely free from social pressures. Were they to be forced to explain themselves partially or prematurely, they would sound foolish and pretentious, and scholarship would be diverted into righteousness. The ceaseless glare of light from journalism illuminates the dark places in our civilization--and sterilizes many of them. No doubt a significant part of this illumination may prevent evils and expose things that ought to be exposed, but it also takes some immemorial human activities to the brink of extinction. Indeed, journalism exposes things that perhaps ought to be exposed, and prevents evils, but by that very token, it becomes a practical player in the world, and thus finds itself in contradiction with its own posture as a critic above the battles of partisans. In adopting a posture of oppositionality to everything powerful, established, pretentious, and superior, it embraces a kind of universal skepticism, perhaps indeed of nihilism. Some journalists can indeed sustain an opportunistic negativism about everything, but most cannot, and in fact a meta-moralistic addiction to tolerance, secularism, ecumenism, and anti-discrimination becomes evident as what one might initially call "the journalistic ideology." To hold an opinion is to mortgage a certain amount of pleasure and pain to the turn of events. What confirms one's opinion gives pleasure, what seems to refute it, pain. The journalist, living amidst opinions, knows by instinct the pains of being caught out holding a vulnerable opinion. The first move in his professionalization, as it were, must therefore be to evacuate any position that might be explained by others as arising from his own interest: anything having to do with class, nationality, or civilization: all such inherited baggage must be abandoned by the journalist. The problem is that whoever abandons interests--which have about them a certain discussable reality, where compromise is possible--finds that his stock of opinions consists of abstract ideas. These will usually take an ethical form, and that impels them towards righteousness. Any such package of opinions is likely to irritate patriots and partisans of all kinds. The holder of such a position is usually enormously self-satisfied, because, having arrived there by the process of identifying extremes as things to be challenged and questioned, he fancies himself as having all the rationality of an Aristotelian mean. In fact, he has arrived at a form of Whiggery-- "A levelling, rancorous, rational sort of mind That never looked out of the eye of a saint Or out of a drunkard's eye." But as the sage in Yeats's poem adds: "All's Whiggery now." For us, it's all journalism. It seems a vile thing to take so serious a view of the newspapers we read with pleasure every day, and the radio and television that entertain us endlessly, but it is no business of philosophers, any more than of journalists, to reinforce our lazy habits. All civilizations are built upon specific distortions of reality, and ours is particularly concerned with observing, measuring and responding to the discrete objects in terms of which we construe reality. Journalism is a development of this cast of mind, and may be contrasted with other possible worlds, in one version of which we might focus our attention upon what we conceive to be eternal things. Christian writers have been prominent in stigmatizing an interest in ephemera as a dissipation of spiritual energies. The very fact that the journalistic world can focus its attention on nothing for more than a few days at a time, forever seeking a new sensation, makes it clear that this judgment on journalism as one of the pathologies of our civilization should be taken seriously. Change the focus, and we may take journalism as an inescapable development of our Western adventures into literacy and education for all, so that it becomes the mode by which we take our bearings in a rich and exciting world. Journalism now becomes a category of its own, alongside science and history, as something to be valued in its own terms. But what are its own terms? We cannot avoid discovering that these terms constantly change, partly in response to ideas about truth, such as reflection and construction, and partly in response to the demands that the customers of journalism make upon it. We have suggested that the terms of journalism conceal self-contradiction. A pseudo-philosophical commitment to evade partisanship turns at this level into a partisanship of its own. And not the least of the paradoxes we find in examining journalism is that this most Western of all practices should embrace so anti-Western a stance. The logical problem journalists face parallels that of liberals who embrace all lawful forms of freedom, only to be told that this apparent openness is itself a form of concealed partisanship. Liberalism and journalism, we might say, are virtually Siamese twins among the commitments of our civilization, and their fates are bound up together. _________________________________________________________________ Kenneth Minogue's Concept of a University has just been republished by Transaction Publishers with a new introduction. 1. This essay is adapted from a lecture presented at "Power Without Responsibility: Was Kipling Right?," a conference sponsored by the Boston, Oxford, Melbourne Conversazione Society and held at Boston University on October 7-8, 2004. From anonymous_animus at yahoo.com Fri Apr 1 21:30:03 2005 From: anonymous_animus at yahoo.com (Michael Christopher) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 13:30:03 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Paleopsych] violence in quran and bible In-Reply-To: <200504011900.j31J0O223112@tick.javien.com> Message-ID: <20050401213003.50009.qmail@web30803.mail.mud.yahoo.com> >>You will learn how Muhammad encouraged his handful of followers to attack the caravans, kill the men, rape the women and bring the booty (20% for himself) to please Allah<< --I'd like to see more people talk about violence in the Quran AND the Bible. The acts attributed to Mohammad are similar to descriptions in Numbers and Deuteronomy of God-sanctioned violence, slavery and rape. I've met far too many Christians who excused such behavior, saying "God ordered it, therefore it was moral". That Christians in the US have not engaged in organized violence is not reassuring, given death threats against abortion providers and Michael Schiavo and the more prominent judge who sided with him, and the militia movement which went underground after the Oklahoma bombing. If the US falls on hard times economically, I do not fully trust extreme right-wing Christians to stay peaceful. Hate speech is already very common. I'd also avoid attaching all Christians or all Muslims to violence in holy books. It's clear that people CAN behave better than their scriptural "founding fathers", and that moderate believers need all the help they can get promoting a non-literal and merciful version of their faith. If all Christians believed that Moses really did order the murder of infants and kidnapping of virgin girls in war, and that God was responsible for giving Moses the idea, I'd condemn Christianity in no uncertain terms. But I've met many Christians who did not agree with those passages (or who simply didn't know about them) but lived genuinely humble and Christlike lives. I've met as many Muslims, at least online, who were similar. They all claimed to believe in the Bible/Quran, yet they somehow managed to emphasize the nonviolent passages and avoid endorsing the violent ones. Unfortunately, many Christians condemn Islam based on violence in the Quran without acknowledging historical violence by Christians who used the Bible to justify war crimes and slavery. It is not possible to destroy Islam or Christianity, only to make a clear distinction between the behavior of violent and nonviolent believers. That so many people seem to want to destroy one religion or another strikes me as a bad sign. It pushes moderates to either side passively with extremists, or to withdraw from confrontation, which does the small percentage of us who are atheists no good at all. Michael __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Personals - Better first dates. More second dates. http://personals.yahoo.com From shovland at mindspring.com Sat Apr 2 01:31:53 2005 From: shovland at mindspring.com (Steve Hovland) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 17:31:53 -0800 Subject: [Paleopsych] Human rDNA: evolutionary patterns within the genes and tandem arrays derived from multiple chromosomes. Message-ID: <01C536E0.B2C757F0.shovland@mindspring.com> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&lis t_uids=11350117&dopt=Abstract Google search: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=patterns+within+genes Gonzalez IL, Sylvester JE. A. I. DuPont Hospital for Children, Wilmington, Delaware 19899, USA. igonzale at nemours.org Human rDNA forms arrays on five chromosome pairs and is homogenized by concerted evolution through recombination and gene conversion (loci RNR1, RNR2, RNR3, RNR4, RNR5, OMIM: 180450). Homogenization is not perfect, however, so that it becomes possible to study its efficiency within genes, within arrays, and between arrays by measuring and comparing DNA sequence variation. Previous studies with randomly cloned genomic DNA fragments showed that different parts of the gene evolve at different rates but did not allow comparison of rDNA sequences derived from specific chromosomes. We have now cloned and sequenced rDNA fragments from specific acrocentric chromosomes to (1) study homogenization along the rDNA and (2) compare homogenization within chromosomes and between homologous and nonhomologous chromosomes. Our results show high homogeneity among regulatory and coding regions of rDNA on all chromosomes, a surprising homogeneity among adjacent distal non-rDNA sequences, and the existence of one to three very divergent intergenic spacer classes within each array. Copyright 2001 Academic Press. Steve Hovland www.stevehovland.net -----Original Message----- From: Greg Bear [SMTP:ursus at earthlink.net] Sent: Friday, April 01, 2005 8:55 AM To: HowlBloom at aol.com; paleopsych at paleopsych.org; kurakin1970 at yandex.ru; paul.werbos at verizon.net Subject: [Paleopsych] RE: From Eshel--A Glitch in Genetic-centrism This fabulous bit of science is very evocative. My best guess is that such "pattern memory"-while some of it could be stored in cytosol elements, etc.,--is most likely stored in the vast unexplored territories of "junk" DNA-perhaps in fragments of genes, pseudogenes, etc., with non-gene RNA elements acting as controls, inhibitors, etc. Could be wrong, but this sort of reconstructive memory does seem essential to life. Best! Greg _____ From: HowlBloom at aol.com [mailto:HowlBloom at aol.com] Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2005 7:31 PM To: paleopsych at paleopsych.org; kurakin1970 at yandex.ru; ursus at earthlink.net; paul.werbos at verizon.net Subject: Re: From Eshel--A Glitch in Genetic-centrism re: The New York Times A mechanism central to Jeff Hawkins' analysis of the way brains work in his On Intelligence may provide a clue to the manner in which plants with copies of a damaged gene from both their father and their mother manage to "recover" or reconstruct something they never had-- a flawless copy of the gene they've received only in damaged form. Hawkins brings up a neural network trick called auto-associative memory. Here's his description of how it works: "Instead of only passing information forward...auto-associative memories fed the output of each neuron back into the input.... When a pattern of activity was imposed on the artificial neurons, they formed a memory of this pattern. ...To retrieve a pattern stored in such a memory, you must provide the pattern you want to retrieve. ....The most important property is that you don't have to have the entire pattern you want to retrieve in order to retrieve it. You might have only part of the pattern, or you might have a somewhat messed-up pattern. The auto-associative memory can retrieve the correct pattern, as it was originally stored, even though you start with a messy version of it. It would be like going to the grocer with half eaten brown bananas and getting whole green bananas in return. ...Second, unlike mist neural networks, an auto-associative memory can be designed to store sequences of patterns, or temporal patterns. This feature is accomplished by adding time delay to the feedback. ...I might feed in the first few notes of 'Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star' and the memory returns the whole song. When presented with part of the sequence, the memory can recall the rest." (Jeff Hawkins, Sandra Blakeslee. On Intelligence. New York: Times Books, 2004: pp 46-47.) Where would such auto-associative circuits exist in a plant cell? Here are some wild guesses: * In the entire cell, including its membrane, its cytoplasm, its organelles, its metabolic processes, and its genome; * * Or in the entire cell and its context within the plant, including the sort of input and output it gets from the cells around it, the signals that tell it where and want it is supposed to be in the plant's development and ongoing roles. Howard re: _____ New York Times March 23, 2005 Startling Scientists, Plant Fixes Its Flawed Gene By NICHOLAS WADE In a startling discovery, geneticists at Purdue University say they have found plants that possess a corrected version of a defective gene inherited from both their parents, as if some handy backup copy with the right version had been made in the grandparents' generation or earlier. The finding implies that some organisms may contain a cryptic backup copy of their genome that bypasses the usual mechanisms of heredity. If confirmed, it would represent an unprecedented exception to the laws of inheritance discovered by Gregor Mendel in the 19th century. Equally surprising, the cryptic genome appears not to be made of DNA, the standard hereditary material. The discovery also raises interesting biological questions - including whether it gets in the way of evolution, which depends on mutations changing an organism rather than being put right by a backup system. "It looks like a marvelous discovery," said Dr. Elliott Meyerowitz, a plant geneticist at the California Institute of Technology. Dr. David Haig, an evolutionary biologist at Harvard, described the finding as "a really strange and unexpected result," which would be important if the observation holds up and applies widely in nature. The result, reported online yesterday in the journal Nature by Dr. Robert E. Pruitt, Dr. Susan J. Lolle and colleagues at Purdue, has been found in a single species, the mustardlike plant called arabidopsis that is the standard laboratory organism of plant geneticists. But there are hints that the same mechanism may occur in people, according to a commentary by Dr. Detlef Weigel of the Max-Planck Institute for Developmental Biology in Tubingen, Germany. Dr. Weigel describes the Purdue work as "a spectacular discovery." The finding grew out of a research project started three years ago in which Dr. Pruitt and Dr. Lolle were trying to understand the genes that control the plant's outer skin, or cuticle. As part of the project, they were studying plants with a mutated gene that made the plant's petals and other floral organs clump together. Because each of the plant's two copies of the gene were in mutated form, they had virtually no chance of having normal offspring. But up to 10 percent of the plants' offspring kept reverting to normal. Various rare events can make this happen, but none involve altering the actual sequence of DNA units in the gene. Yet when the researchers analyzed the mutated gene, known as hothead, they found it had changed, with the mutated DNA units being changed back to normal form. "That was the moment when it was a complete shock," Dr. Pruitt said. A mutated gene can be put right by various mechanisms that are already known, but all require a correct copy of the gene to be available to serve as the template. The Purdue team scanned the DNA of the entire arabidopsis genome for a second, cryptic copy of the hothead gene but could find none. Dr. Pruitt and his colleagues argue that a correct template must exist, but because it is not in the form of DNA, it probably exists as RNA, DNA's close chemical cousin. RNA performs many important roles in the cell, and is the hereditary material of some viruses. But it is less stable than DNA, and so has been regarded as unsuitable for preserving the genetic information of higher organisms. Dr. Pruitt said he favored the idea that there is an RNA backup copy for the entire genome, not just the hothead gene, and that it might be set in motion when the plant was under stress, as is the case with those having mutated hothead genes. He and other experts said it was possible that an entire RNA backup copy of the genome could exist without being detected, especially since there has been no reason until now to look for it. Scientific journals often take months or years to get comfortable with articles presenting novel ideas. But Nature accepted the paper within six weeks of receiving it. Dr. Christopher Surridge, a biology editor at Nature, said the finding had been discussed at scientific conferences for quite a while, with people saying it was impossible and proposing alternative explanations. But the authors had checked all these out and disposed of them, Dr. Surridge said. As for their proposal of a backup RNA genome, "that is very much a hypothesis, and basically the least mad hypothesis for how this might be working," Dr. Surridge said. Dr. Haig, the evolutionary biologist, said that the finding was fascinating but that it was too early to try to interpret it. He noted that if there was a cryptic template, it ought to be more resistant to mutation than the DNA it helps correct. Yet it is hard to make this case for RNA, which accumulates many more errors than DNA when it is copied by the cell. He said that the mechanism, if confirmed, would be an unprecedented exception to Mendel's laws of inheritance, since the DNA sequence itself is changed. Imprinting, an odd feature of inheritance of which Dr. Haig is a leading student, involves inherited changes to the way certain genes are activated, not to the genes themselves. The finding poses a puzzle for evolutionary theory because it corrects mutations, which evolution depends on as generators of novelty. Dr. Meyerowitz said he did not see this posing any problem for evolution because it seems to happen only rarely. "What keeps Darwinian evolution intact is that this only happens when there is something wrong," Dr. Surridge said. The finding could undercut a leading theory of why sex is necessary. Some biologists say sex is needed to discard the mutations, almost all of them bad, that steadily accumulate on the genome. People inherit half of their genes from each parent, which allows the half left on the cutting room floor to carry away many bad mutations. Dr. Pruitt said the backup genome could be particularly useful for self-fertilizing plants, as arabidopsis is, since it could help avoid the adverse effects of inbreeding. It might also operate in the curious organisms known as bdelloid rotifers that are renowned for not having had sex for millions of years, an abstinence that would be expected to seriously threaten their Darwinian fitness. Dr. Pruitt said it was not yet known if other organisms besides arabidopsis could possess the backup system. Colleagues had been quite receptive to the idea because "biologists have gotten used to the unexpected," he said, referring to a spate of novel mechanisms that have recently come to light, several involving RNA. ---------- Howard Bloom Author of The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces of History and Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind From The Big Bang to the 21st Century Visiting Scholar-Graduate Psychology Department, New York University; Core Faculty Member, The Graduate Institute www.howardbloom.net www.bigbangtango.net Founder: International Paleopsychology Project; founding board member: Epic of Evolution Society; founding board member, The Darwin Project; founder: The Big Bang Tango Media Lab; member: New York Academy of Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Psychological Society, Academy of Political Science, Human Behavior and Evolution Society, International Society for Human Ethology; advisory board member: Youthactivism.org; executive editor -- New Paradigm book series. For information on The International Paleopsychology Project, see: www.paleopsych.org for two chapters from The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition Into the Forces of History, see www.howardbloom.net/lucifer For information on Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to the 21st Century, see www.howardbloom.net << File: ATT00004.html >> << File: image001.gif >> << File: image002.gif >> << File: image003.gif >> << File: ATT00005.txt >> From ljohnson at solution-consulting.com Sat Apr 2 01:44:11 2005 From: ljohnson at solution-consulting.com (Lynn D. Johnson, Ph.D.) Date: Fri, 01 Apr 2005 18:44:11 -0700 Subject: [Paleopsych] violence in quran and bible In-Reply-To: <20050401213003.50009.qmail@web30803.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <20050401213003.50009.qmail@web30803.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <424DF8EB.3070504@solution-consulting.com> Michael, where do you get these quotes? I am not getting emails with them in, then I see a commentary from you. Lynn Michael Christopher wrote: >>>You will learn how Muhammad encouraged his handful >>> >>> >of >followers to attack the caravans, kill the men, rape >the women and bring the booty (20% for himself) to >please Allah<< > >--I'd like to see more people talk about violence in >the Quran AND the Bible. The acts attributed to >Mohammad are similar to descriptions in Numbers and >Deuteronomy of God-sanctioned violence, slavery and >rape. I've met far too many Christians who excused >such behavior, saying "God ordered it, therefore it >was moral". That Christians in the US have not engaged >in organized violence is not reassuring, given death >threats against abortion providers and Michael Schiavo >and the more prominent judge who sided with him, and >the militia movement which went underground after the >Oklahoma bombing. If the US falls on hard times >economically, I do not fully trust extreme right-wing >Christians to stay peaceful. Hate speech is already >very common. > >I'd also avoid attaching all Christians or all Muslims >to violence in holy books. It's clear that people CAN >behave better than their scriptural "founding >fathers", and that moderate believers need all the >help they can get promoting a non-literal and merciful >version of their faith. If all Christians believed >that Moses really did order the murder of infants and >kidnapping of virgin girls in war, and that God was >responsible for giving Moses the idea, I'd condemn >Christianity in no uncertain terms. But I've met many >Christians who did not agree with those passages (or >who simply didn't know about them) but lived genuinely >humble and Christlike lives. I've met as many Muslims, >at least online, who were similar. They all claimed to >believe in the Bible/Quran, yet they somehow managed >to emphasize the nonviolent passages and avoid >endorsing the violent ones. Unfortunately, many >Christians condemn Islam based on violence in the >Quran without acknowledging historical violence by >Christians who used the Bible to justify war crimes >and slavery. It is not possible to destroy Islam or >Christianity, only to make a clear distinction between >the behavior of violent and nonviolent believers. That >so many people seem to want to destroy one religion or >another strikes me as a bad sign. It pushes moderates >to either side passively with extremists, or to >withdraw from confrontation, which does the small >percentage of us who are atheists no good at all. > >Michael > > > > > >__________________________________ >Do you Yahoo!? >Yahoo! Personals - Better first dates. More second dates. >http://personals.yahoo.com > >_______________________________________________ >paleopsych mailing list >paleopsych at paleopsych.org >http://lists.paleopsych.org/mailman/listinfo/paleopsych > > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From waluk at earthlink.net Sat Apr 2 01:49:54 2005 From: waluk at earthlink.net (G. Reinhart-Waller) Date: Fri, 01 Apr 2005 17:49:54 -0800 Subject: [Paleopsych] violence in quran and bible In-Reply-To: <424DF8EB.3070504@solution-consulting.com> References: <20050401213003.50009.qmail@web30803.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <424DF8EB.3070504@solution-consulting.com> Message-ID: <424DFA42.1030507@earthlink.net> My question exactly. I think he gets them from another list or he makes them up. No problem though. Gerry Lynn D. Johnson, Ph.D. wrote: > Michael, where do you get these quotes? I am not getting emails with > them in, then I see a commentary from you. > Lynn > > Michael Christopher wrote: > >>>>You will learn how Muhammad encouraged his handful >>>> >>>> >>of >>followers to attack the caravans, kill the men, rape >>the women and bring the booty (20% for himself) to >>please Allah<< >> >>--I'd like to see more people talk about violence in >>the Quran AND the Bible. The acts attributed to >>Mohammad are similar to descriptions in Numbers and >>Deuteronomy of God-sanctioned violence, slavery and >>rape. I've met far too many Christians who excused >>such behavior, saying "God ordered it, therefore it >>was moral". That Christians in the US have not engaged >>in organized violence is not reassuring, given death >>threats against abortion providers and Michael Schiavo >>and the more prominent judge who sided with him, and >>the militia movement which went underground after the >>Oklahoma bombing. If the US falls on hard times >>economically, I do not fully trust extreme right-wing >>Christians to stay peaceful. Hate speech is already >>very common. >> >>I'd also avoid attaching all Christians or all Muslims >>to violence in holy books. It's clear that people CAN >>behave better than their scriptural "founding >>fathers", and that moderate believers need all the >>help they can get promoting a non-literal and merciful >>version of their faith. If all Christians believed >>that Moses really did order the murder of infants and >>kidnapping of virgin girls in war, and that God was >>responsible for giving Moses the idea, I'd condemn >>Christianity in no uncertain terms. But I've met many >>Christians who did not agree with those passages (or >>who simply didn't know about them) but lived genuinely >>humble and Christlike lives. I've met as many Muslims, >>at least online, who were similar. They all claimed to >>believe in the Bible/Quran, yet they somehow managed >>to emphasize the nonviolent passages and avoid >>endorsing the violent ones. Unfortunately, many >>Christians condemn Islam based on violence in the >>Quran without acknowledging historical violence by >>Christians who used the Bible to justify war crimes >>and slavery. It is not possible to destroy Islam or >>Christianity, only to make a clear distinction between >>the behavior of violent and nonviolent believers. That >>so many people seem to want to destroy one religion or >>another strikes me as a bad sign. It pushes moderates >>to either side passively with extremists, or to >>withdraw from confrontation, which does the small >>percentage of us who are atheists no good at all. >> >>Michael >> >> >> >> >> >>__________________________________ >>Do you Yahoo!? >>Yahoo! Personals - Better first dates. More second dates. >>http://personals.yahoo.com >> >>_______________________________________________ >>paleopsych mailing list >>paleopsych at paleopsych.org >>http://lists.paleopsych.org/mailman/listinfo/paleopsych >> >> >> >> >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >_______________________________________________ >paleopsych mailing list >paleopsych at paleopsych.org >http://lists.paleopsych.org/mailman/listinfo/paleopsych > > From paul.werbos at verizon.net Sat Apr 2 02:14:07 2005 From: paul.werbos at verizon.net (Paul J. Werbos, Dr.) Date: Fri, 01 Apr 2005 21:14:07 -0500 Subject: [Paleopsych] violence in quran and bible In-Reply-To: <20050401213003.50009.qmail@web30803.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <200504011900.j31J0O223112@tick.javien.com> <20050401213003.50009.qmail@web30803.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <6.2.0.14.0.20050401210652.01d6de18@incoming.verizon.net> I do not believe that a true follower either of Jesus or of Mohammed would fall into violence in the way that the fundamentalist fanatics do. Re the Bible -- it is very odd to me how many people call themselves Christians, who work very hard to emulate the Pharisees he opposed. Yes, the Pharisees loved to quote certain parts of the Old Testament, but Jesus made it very clear that he wanted to explain or revise a few things... Mohammed is a bit harder for most of us in the US to track. It was a bit awkward for him, in Medina, trying to follow benevolent principles not so different from what Jesus taught, but threatened very hard by vicious military force from corrupt folks over the hill.... yes, he won some battles, but on the whole he took many affirmative steps to bend things towards the side of peace and trust as much as he could manage. Many of the evils of modern Christianity and Islam are traceable not to Jesus or Mohammed, but to corrupt people who tried to use their names while distorting their messages, so as to enslave people. Constantine and the Abbasid emperors are the most obvious villains. From shovland at mindspring.com Sat Apr 2 03:21:25 2005 From: shovland at mindspring.com (Steve Hovland) Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 19:21:25 -0800 Subject: [Paleopsych] Biolaser Lights Up Stem Cells Message-ID: <01C536EF.FFE4DE40.shovland@mindspring.com> http://wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,67089,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2 Scientists have developed a laser that could illuminate stem cells in greater detail than ever, revealing the important steps they take to become neuron, heart or other types of cells. Stem cells are unformed, and have the ability to become many cells in the human body, which is why scientists believe they could lead to powerful therapies. But the steps stem cells take to establish various identities are poorly understood. Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico say their "biocavity laser " could elucidate those processes. By Kristen Philipkoski | Also by this reporter Page 1 of 1 02:00 PM Mar. 31, 2005 PT From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 15:53:52 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 10:53:52 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Chinese Eugenics Message-ID: Today's theme is Chinese Eugenics. Several articles will follow, some of them alarming, others offensive. But the threat or promise of Chinese eugenics could well be the biggest transhumanist development in the next generation. Questions to ponder? 1. Are the Chinese creating a master race? 2. Will Chinese eugenics trigger off a eugenics arms race? 3. Will these arms races be directed by central governments? 4. Since it will take a generation for eugenics to have an effect, is there any government that can plan ahead that long? Autarchies are prone to being overthrown and politicians in democracies face the electorate several times a generation. Both of these militate against long-range planning. 5. Will autarchies select for conformity toward national objectives or will they realize that what is required for national goals to be achieved is a population that is creative, cantankerous, rebellious, as well as intelligent? These prospective populations put existing governments at a severe risk. 6. Will parents in nations that allow for individual eugenic choice risk having children that will be pointlessly rebellious for the sake of a very few that will be recognized as true pioneers only by posterity? How thick is the line between genius and madness? 7. How will a Chinese-dominated world differ from the world we know? 8. How far will one nation have to get ahead to dominate the world? 9. How can the world be made safe for pluralism? 10. Are these prospects so wicked that a preventive nuclear war be launched against RED China, as some neocons seem to wish? From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 15:54:49 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 10:54:49 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] AmJHumGenet: Xin Mao: Eugenics in China Message-ID: Mao, Eugenics in China http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html Am. J. Hum. Genet., 63:688-695, 1998 0002-9297/98/6303-0006$02.00 Chinese Geneticists' Views of Ethical Issues in Genetic Testing and Screening: Evidence for Eugenics in China Xin Mao Division of Genetics, Department of Psychiatry, West China University of Medical Sciences, Chengdu, China Received March 16, 1998; accepted for publication July 15, 1998; electronically published August 21, 1998. Summary To identify Chinese geneticists' views of ethical issues in genetic testing and screening, a national survey was conducted. Of 402 Chinese geneticists asked to participate, 255 (63%) returned by mail anonymous questionnaires. The majority of respondents thought that genetic testing should be offered in the workplace for a -antitrypsin deficiency (95%) and the predisposition of executives to heart disease, cancer, and diabetes (94%); that genetic testing should be included in preemployment physical examinations (86%); that governments should require premarital carrier tests (86%), newborn screening for sickle cell (77%), and Duchenne muscular dystrophy (71%); and that children should be tested for genes for late-onset disorders such as Huntington disease (85%), susceptibility to cancers (85%), familial hypercholesterolemia (84%), alcoholism (69%), and Alzheimer disease (61%). Most believed that partners should know each other's genetic status before marriage (92%), that carriers of the same defective gene should not mate with each other (91%), and that women should have a prenatal diagnosis if medically indicated (91%). The majority said that in China decisions about family planning were shared by the couple (82%). More than half had views that, in China, there were no laws to prohibit disability discrimination (64%), particularly to protect people with adult polycystic kidney disease (57%), cystic fibrosis (56%), or genetic predisposition to other diseases (50%). To some extent, these results might provide a basis for a discussion of eugenics in China, particularly about China's [1]Maternal and Infant Health Care Law (1994). _________________________________________________________________ Address for correspondence and reprints: Dr. Xin Mao, Section of Molecular Carcinogenesis, Haddow Laboratories, Institute of Cancer Research, 15 Cotswold Road, Sutton, Surrey SM2 5NG, United Kingdom. E-mail: [2]xin at icr.ac.uk _________________________________________________________________ Introduction Genetic testing and screening are hot topics that stimulate widespread discussion and debate, not only among genetics professionals, but among clinicians and scientists generally, and increasingly these topics involve the wider public in developed countries. Views are expressed in the scientific and general press, and through other media, about the likely benefits and dangers that may result from genetic testing and screening ([3]Harper and Clarke 1997). However, there is much less debate about genetic testing and screening in developing countries, where ?1 95% of the world's future children will be born. To some extent, this situation reflects the lack of genetics services in these countries. A majority (3,330) of the estimated 5,000 specialists in medical genetics worldwide work in developed countries, which have an overall geneticist/population ratio of ?1 1:222,000, compared with a ratio of ?1 1:700,000 for eastern European countries and ?1 1:3,700,000 for developing countries ([4]Wertz et al. 1995). Clinicians, scientists, and the public in developing countries are focused on the struggle to improve basic health care. Given the problems of poverty, illiteracy, low contraceptive use, and high infant mortality ([5]Galjaard 1997), they have relatively little interest in the development of genetics research and services. China, however, is an exception, having to some extent made genetics a priority. For example, in the 1960s cytogenetics technology was introduced to China, and in the 1970s chorionic villi sampling was performed in some hospitals ([6]Luo 1988). Since the 1980s, molecular-genetic techniques have been used in genetic research and counseling in several national genetic laboratories ([7]Luo 1988; [8]Fu et al. 1995). In 1988, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, and gamete intrafallopian transfer were available in several teaching hospitals ([9]Zhang et al. 1988). In 1992, the techniques of enrichment of fetal cells from maternal blood, for prenatal diagnosis and sex determination during the first trimester, were introduced to China. In 1994, China launched its Human Genome Project ([10]Li 1994). Gene therapy for patients with hemophilia B has also been used in clinical trials ([11]Fu et al. 1995). On the other hand, according to international standards, genetics services in China are underdeveloped because of a lack of funding and expertise, as well as the large number of people with genetic conditions ([12]Harper and Harris 1986; [13]Luo 1988). Chinese geneticists have expressed their views about ethical, legal,and social issues in genetics research and practice in China. Their concerns are, however, quite different from those of other countries, particularly developed nations (Mao [14]1996, [15]1997; [16]Mao and Wertz 1997). The term "eugenics" has many meanings. Eugenics can be voluntary or coerced, government sponsored or individual, a "science" or a social policy, based on the welfare of individuals oron the welfare of society or a nation ([17]Paul 1992; [18]Garver and Garver 1994; [19]Larson 1995; [20]"Brave New Now" 1997). Most people in developed countries today think of eugenics as a coercive social program enforced by the state for the good of society. Since China announced the [21]Maternal and Infant Health Care Law (1994), it has provoked widespread concern in the international scientific community, because of some of its eugenic content ([22]"China's Misconception of Eugenics" 1994; [23]"Western Eyes on China's Eugenic Law" 1995; [24]O'Brien 1996; [25]"Brave New Now" 1997; [26]Harper and Clarke 1997; [27]Morton 1998). There has, however, been very little international discussion on what eugenics means for Chinese geneticists and why it is alive and well in China. In this article, I will present Chinese geneticists' views of ethical issues in genetic testing and screening and will discuss the likely basis of eugenics in China, particularly China's [28]Maternal and Infant Health Care Law (1994). Subject and Methods An anonymous international questionnaire including 50 questions on ethical issues, which was used in an international study comparing attitudes of geneticists in 37 nations ([29]Wertz and Fletcher 1993), was distributed to 402 geneticists in 30 provinces and autonomous regions in mainland China. These geneticists were registered members of the Chinese Association of Medical Genetics, the Human and Medical Genetics Branch of the Chinese Society of Genetics, or the Chinese Society of Family Planning, all of which are headed by the Chinese Association for Science and Technology butare affiliated with different departments of state (the Ministry of Public Health, the Chinese Academy of Science, and the National Committee of Family Planning, respectively). In all, 255 geneticists (63%) responded. All of the respondents' comments were translated into English. The completed questionnaires were mailed to the Division of Social Science, Ethics and Law, at the Shriver Center for Mental Retardation, in the United States, for statistical analysis. Coded data were entered into the SPSSX program (from Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) on an IBM 3090 computer([30]Mao and Wertz 1997). Results The questionnaire asked whether genetic testing should be offered for job application - related situations; the majority of respondents thought that genetic testing should be offered to workers for a -antitrypsin deficiency in a very dirty workplace (95%) and for executives' predisposition to heart disease, cancer, and diabetes (94%). The questionnaire listed several ethical issues designed to survey respondents' opinions. The majority of respondents agreed that partners should know each other's genetic status before marriage (92%), that carriers of the same defective gene should not mate with each other (91%), that women should have prenatal diagnosis if it is medically indicated (91%), that genetic testing should be included in preemployment physical examinations (86%), and that governments should require premarital carrier tests (86%) and newborn screening for sickle cell anemia (77%) and for Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) (71%) ([31]table 1). Sixty-five percent agreed with the statement that "an important goal of newborn screening is to identify and counsel parental carriers before next pregnancy." [32][tb1.t.gif] Table 1 Views on Various Ethical Issues When Chinese geneticists were asked whether parents should be able to have their children tested for late-onset disorders or predisposition to such diseases, the majority said that, if parents request it, children should be tested for Huntington disease (85%), susceptibility to cancers (85%), familial hypercholesterolemia (FH) (84%), and predisposition to alcoholism (69%) or to Alzheimer disease (AD) (61%) ([33]table 2). [34][tb2.t.gif] Table 2 Views on the Testing of Children for Late-Onset Disorders When asked whether there was a prevailing pattern for decisionsabout family planning, most (82%) said that decisions about family planning were shared by the couple. The minority believed it to be determined by the husband's (10%), doctor's (3%), wife's (2%), husband's parents' (2%), or wife's parents' (1%) views ([35]table 3). [36][tb3.t.gif] Table 3 Views on Family Decision Making When asked whether there were any laws prohibiting disability discrimination, more than half of Chinese respondents said that there were no such laws in China (64%), particularly to protect people with adult polycystic kidney disease (57%), cystic fibrosis carriers (56%), and persons with genetic predisposition to other diseases (50%) ([37]table 4). Ninety-four percent agreed with the statement that "it is not fair for a child to be brought into the world with a serious genetic disorder if the birth could have been prevented;" 79% thought that some disabilities will never be overcome even with maximum social support, and the majority would not support disabled parents' decisions to have disabled children. Ninety percent thought that an ethical code or guidelines for genetics services are needed in China, and 50% said that public education in genetics should be the top priority of the government health budget. [38][tb4.t.gif] Table 4 Views on Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination Discussion Genetic testing, which is offered to individuals and families who are at high risk, is either the analysis of a specific gene -- and/or its product or function -- or other DNA and chromosome analysis, to detect or exclude an alteration likely to be associated with a genetic disorder. Genetic screening is applied to large population groups with unknown excess risk to individuals. Screening is frequently part of government-sponsored public-health programs and may be a preliminary procedure that identifies people at elevated risk of genetic disease, but it does not provide a definitive diagnosis ([39]Wertz et al. 1995; [40]Harper and Clarke 1997). In this survey, questions about newborn genetic screening were asked. This is because newborn screening for phenylketonuria (PKU) and hypothyroidism has saved many thousands of infants worldwide from these two severe disorders and therefore has created a large store of goodwill and ethical credit in favor of genetic screening programs ([41]Harper and Clarke 1997). This survey shows that 77% of Chinese respondents thought that the government should require newborn screening for sickle cell disease ([42]table 1). The figure is higher than those for the United Kingdom (13%) and the United States (11%) ([43]Wertz 1995). One explanation for this difference might be that Chinese geneticists believe that identification of parents and newborns who are heterozygous carriers is important, since sickle cell disease is very common in China. Although newborn screening for DMD fails to meet the established World Health Organization guidelines for the adoption of a screening program ([44]Wilson and Jungner 1968), it might be helpful to avoid diagnostic delays and to permit families to seek genetic counseling before they embark on another pregnancy. The mothers of infants in the United Kingdom appeared to have more enthusiasm for newborn screening for DMD, since 94% of them would accept such screening ([45]Smith et al. 1990). When geneticists around the world were asked whether the government should require newborn screening for DMD, 71% of Chinese respondents, 64% of respondents in the United States, and 49% of respondents in the United Kingdom thought that the governments should do so ([46]table 1) ([47]Wertz 1995). On this issue, the difference between geneticists in China and the United Kingdom may be that Chinese geneticists believe that newborn screening for DMD is a public-health issue, and that, because it is very expensive in China, it must be government sponsored. Geneticists in the United Kingdom are concerned about the state directing genetic decisions, rather than individuals making the choices ([48]Harper and Clarke 1997). In addition, the majority of European, North American, and Chinese geneticists would recommend newborn screening for cystic fibrosis, FH, fragile X, and thalassemia if automated DNA diagnostic techniques were available on newborn blood spots, even though there is no proof that the newborn benefit from such screening ([49]Wertz 1995). It may still be reasonable to offer such screening if the disease has its onset in childhood and if the child's family finds it helpful to have an early diagnosis ([50]Harper and Clarke 1997). The advent of DNA-based testing across a wide and increasing range of late-onset genetic disorders is a challenge to conventionalthinking about medical tests. This is because those individuals receiving an abnormal result are sometimes considered, by themselves and others, to "have the disease," even though they are still presymptomatic. Testing children for late-onset genetic disorders may have serious ethical and social implications. This survey shows that most Chinese geneticists thought that children should be tested for susceptibility to cancers and FH ([51]table 2). Most geneticists in Europe and North America expressed the same view, since they saw early diagnosis and early treatment of these disorders as being a potential benefit to the child ([52]Wertz 1995). However, most of them thought that testing for Huntington disease, alcoholism, and AD provided no medical benefit to the child ([53]Wertz 1995). They opposed the testing of children, on the grounds that testing was an affront to the autonomy of the child, who, on reaching adulthood, should be allowed to make his or her own decisions on whether to be tested. Most Chinese geneticists favored such testing ([54]table 2), on the grounds that parents should be able to decide for their children and should have the power to direct their children's lives. This cultural division reflects the extension of individual autonomy in developed countries, to include preservation of the autonomy of minors. In China, the child is often seen as part of a collectivity (the family), rather than as a potentially autonomous individual. Although, thus far, employers' requests for employment-related genetic testing have been few ([55]Harper and Clarke 1997), questions on whether such testing should be offered were included inthis survey because there is an ethical conflict between the individual's rights and the employer's interest. More and more Western geneticists have expressed their concerns on the likelihood of misuse of such testing, which would cause harm to those employeeswith genetic conditions (i.e., genetic discrimination; [56]Harper and Clarke 1997). This survey shows, however, that most Chinese geneticists agreed that such testing should be offered as a part of a routine physical examination. This result may demonstrate that Chinese geneticists hold strong social views on genetics services ([57]Mao and Wertz 1997). One purpose of genetics services is to provide accurate, full, and unbiased information that individuals and families may use in making decisions. Traditionally, China has been a paternalistic society and parents have had absolute power to make family decisions. To explore the current situation of family planning in China, questions on this issue were asked. This survey shows that, of 255 respondents, 51% were female ([58]Mao and Wertz 1997). Most of them thought that family planning was currently shared by the couple. This figure is quite similar to that in developed countries ([59]Wertz 1995) and, in part, may reflect socioeconomic changes that have occurred in China during the past 4 decades. In 1994, China's population reached 1.2 billion. Now China is pushing on with its goal of ensuring that the country's population is =< 1.3 billion by the end of the century and <1.4 billion by 2010. The basic means of reaching the goal are birth control and the "one couple, one child" policy, which stipulates that each Chinese couple is legally allowed to have only one child ([60]Wu 1994). Ironically, China has paid a huge socioeconomic price for ridiculing the theory and practice of birth control and family planning during the 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, according toa national sampling survey in 1987, there were 51.64 million disabled people (4.9% of the total population) in China. Of these, 54.3% (i.e., 2.66% of the total population) were children. The majority of these disabilities (64.91%) are due to postnatal diseases and injuries, whereas 35.09% are due to birth defects and genetic diseases ([61]Chen and Simeonsson 1993; [62]Ming and Jixiang 1993). One aim of this survey is to investigate geneticists' attitudes toward the social and legal aspects of genetics. It would be necessary to ask whether there are laws or regulations in China that prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities. This survey shows that more than half of Chinese respondents thought that there were no such laws or regulations in China, particularly to protect people with genetic conditions. This may be because, although the rights of people with disabilities have been protected constitutionally in China, there are no Chinese laws specifying whether people with genetic conditions should be protected as disabled people. This survey also suggests that most Chinese still regard disabilities as a severe burden for both family and society. Population and disability issues are universal. As the history of the Western eugenics movement has shown, these issues are to some extent likely to produce a social "medium" or environment for the "birth and growth" of eugenics ([63]Paul 1995). Historically, cost effectiveness appears to be one of the major issues concerning Western eugenicists. A typical example of this wasseen in 1923, when the American Eugenics Society tried to justify the expense of building enough institutions to house and separate all the mentally retarded people by calculating that the $25,000(U.S.) spent on segregating the original mentally retarded persons for life would have saved the state >$2,000,000 in later costs. It also added that sterilizing the original mentally retarded people would have cost <$150 ([64]Larson 1995). Although it is questionable whether economic calculations would really work in genetics, some Western geneticists still regard cost effectiveness as an important factor in genetics services. This is because the clinical genetics services already available have been shown to be highly cost effective, mainly because of the high costs of medical and psychosocial care for the chronically handicapped in Western countries. For example, in the Netherlands seven regional clinical genetics centers involved in pre- and postnatal chromosome analysis, biochemical and DNA diagnosis, and genetic counseling supported by the national health insurers cost ?1 $50 million/year. As a result of their combined activities, the birth of 800 - 1600 severely handicapped children is avoided every year. The costs of their medical and psychosocial care would have been $500 million - $1 billion during an average life span of 10 years ([65]Galjaard 1997).Moreover, it even has been predicted that the most enforced codes of medical practice, particularly in genetics services, may bebased on cost-effectiveness analysis rather than on ethical considerations for the future ([66]Wertz 1997). The concept of cost effectiveness may have different meanings for Chinese geneticists. This is because, unlike Cuba, where a free health care system including genetic testing and screening covers the entire population ([67]Heredero 1992), genetics services in China are not free and are expensive for most Chinese people. For instance, in 1987 the average income of a Chinese worker in a factory or university was ?1 $30/mo, whereas the cost of cytogenetic testing was $6 - $20. On the basis of the population prevalence of chromosomal diseases in Sichuan province (31.5/100,000) ([68]Zhang et al. 1991), it is estimated that there would be 346,500 persons with chromosomal disorders in China at that time (in an overall population 1.1 billion). If all of these cases were diagnosed cytogenetically, it would cost $2,000,000 - $7,000,000, which is equivalent to 69,300 - 231,000 workers' monthly incomes. The costs of genetics services have increased very rapidly in recent years because of inflation and health-care reform, although such services in China are still underdeveloped and fall far short of the needs of people with genetic disorders. The prevalence of PKU in the Chinese population is ?1 6/100,000 people ([69]Liu and Zuo 1986). Thus, there would have been ?1 72,000 people with PKU in 1994, when the population was 1.2 billion. A Chinese study analyzed the cost benefit of newborn screening for PKU and estimated that the 10-year cost of screening, diagnosis, medical care, and dietary therapy for each PKU case identified would be $4,000. If PKU infants were not diagnosed and treated, the estimated cost of living for one untreated, mentally retarded individual with a mean life span of 40 years also would be $4,000. Income loss, special education costs, and inability to contribute tosociety would cause a total loss of >= $20,000. The long-term estimated benefits due to early screening, diagnosis, and treatment, minus the cost of screening and treatment, therefore is ?1 $20,000. Thus, the ratio of benefit:cost ratio would be ?1 5:1 ([70]Zhou 1995). It is a pity, however, that China is still unable to produce a low-phenylalanine diet in quantities large enough to provide adequate therapy for most affected babies ([71]Luo 1988), even though the PKU test is cheap and newborn screening for PKU seems to be cost effective in China. All of these actual situations most likely will lead Chinese thinking to consider the use of other radical means, such as abortion and sterilization, to reduce the incidence of PKU ([72]Mao and Wertz 1997). The word "eugenics," which currently is used more widely in China than in the West, when directly translated into Chinese, is "yousheng" and "youyu," which mean "well bear" and "well rear." The view most widely held by Chinese geneticists is that eugenics implies processes designed to ensure that children who are born are, as far as possible, "normal." How to achieve this, in the context of strict family limitation, has emerged as the most significant difference, in the approach to medical genetics, between China and the West ([73]Harper and Harris 1986). This survey was conducted in 1993, 1 year before China promulgated the [74]Maternal and Infant Health Care Law (1994). In their comments, almost all respondents said that the goal of human genetics was "improvement of the population quality, decrease of the population quantity, and furtherance of eugenic principles" and agreed that "an important goal of genetic counseling is to reduce the number of deleterious genes in the population" ([75]Mao 1997, p. 20). Chinese geneticists also were extremely pessimistic about directive counseling after prenatal diagnosis for almost all genetic disorders ([76]Mao and Wertz 1997). The majority of them would advise voluntary surgical sterilization for a single blind woman on welfare who had a 50% risk of blindness in children (88%), for a woman with fragile X who was living in an institutional setting (73%), and for a cystic fibrosis carrier-carrier couple (52%) ([77]Mao and Wertz 1997). This survey reveals that most Chinese geneticists thought that partners should know their genetic status before marriage, that carriers of the same defective gene should not marry each other, and that women should have prenatal diagnosis if medically indicated. These views were expressed, to some extent, in the Chinese [78]Maternal and Infant Health Care Law (1994). The contentious articles of the law are cited as follows ([79]Maternal and Infant Health Care Law 1994): Article 8. -- The premarital physical checkup shall include the examination of the following diseases: 1. Genetic diseases of a serious nature; 2. Target infectious diseases; 3. Relevant mental disease. Article 10. -- Physicians shall, after performing the premarital physical checkup, explain and give medical advice to both the male and the female who have been diagnosed with a certain genetic disease of a serious nature that is considered to be inappropriate for childbearing from a medical point of view; the two may be married only if both sides agree to take long-term contraceptive measures or to get the ligation operation for sterility. However, a marriage that is forbidden as stipulated by provisions of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China is not included herein. Article 16. -- If a physician detects or suspects that a married couple in their childbearing age suffers from genetic disease of a serious nature, the physician shall give medical advice to the couple, and the couple in their childbearing age shalltake measures in accordance with physician's medical advice. Article 18. -- The physician shall explain to the married couple and give them medical advice about termination of pregnancy if one of the following cases is detected in the prenatal diagnosis: 1. The fetus is suffering from genetic disease of a serious nature; 2. The fetus has a defect of a serious nature; 3. Continued pregnancy may threaten the life and safety of the pregnant woman or seriously impair her health because of the serious disease she suffers from. In these articles, "genetic diseases of a serious nature" refers to diseases that are caused congenitally by genetic factors, that may totally or partially deprive the victim of the ability to live independently, that are highly possible to recur in generations to come, and that are considered medically inappropriate for reproduction; "relevant mental diseases" refers to schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, and other mental diseases of a serious nature. The international opinions on the Chinese law vary. Some Western geneticists have fiercely criticized the law as an "abuse of genetics" and a "violation of human rights" ([80]Morton 1998). Others have said that "in a country where millions of female children vanish, and many children with developmental abnormalities are left to die, the law might represent an improvement" ([81]Beardsley 1997, pp. 33 - 34). Frankly speaking, in China too there is opposition to the law, from some geneticists who did their training in Western countries. For example, they oppose some radical measures such as "sterilization of people with IQ less than 60" and the use of term "eugenics" in the early draft of the law. Interestingly, voices of Chinese geneticists are heard defending the law. Some examples are "China now has a population of 50 million handicapped. Without effective action, China will have an even larger population with serious hereditary diseases and it will naturally impose a grave social problem as regards their livelihood, social and cultural development as a whole and even the quality of the whole population" ([82]"Opportunity for Depth in Chinese Eugenics Debate" 1998, p. 109); "the law was terribly misinterpreted"; "the law was needed to supplement the one-child policy and had no intention of enforcing eugenic aspects" ([83]Takebe 1997, p. 89); "the law only facilitates practices common for decades in Western countries, and there is no similarity between what is practiced in China and Hitler's concept of eugenics" ([84]Maddox and Swinbanks 1995, p. 549). The survey results do, however, suggest that social, economic, and cultural differences most likely will give rise to a disagreement between China and the West, on the issue of eugenics. Public education in genetics is thought to be an effective approach to reduce the incidence of genetic diseases, although it needs a huge and long-term investment from the government ([85]Harper and Clarke 1997). This survey suggests that at least half of Chinese geneticists appear to realize the importance of the issue. On the other hand, genetics education in China has not covered any ethical issues yet ([86]McCaffrey 1989). One ethicist who advised the drafting of the Chinese law admitted that bioethics has just started to be discussed and was not considered seriously when the law was drafted ([87]Takebe 1997). This survey, however, reveals that most Chinese geneticists think that ethical guidelines are necessary for the improvement of genetics services in China. Although the Ministry of Public Health of China published a brief ethical code for medical professionals in 1988 ([88]Qiu 1993), at the moment there are not any ethical guidelines for genetics services in China. A group of experts from both developed and developing countries, including China, sponsored by the World Health Organization, has drafted international guidelines on ethical issues in medical genetics and on the provision of genetics services. The guidelines not only provide ethical principles for genetics services and research but also emphasize respect for cultural, social, and religious diversity ([89]World Health Organization 1998). It therefore is expected that the guidelines will be introduced into China and will serve as a framework for Chinese geneticists in their practice and research. Perhaps in this practical way, such guidelines could bridge the social and cultural gap between Chinese geneticists and their Western counterparts, could help to clarify the nature of eugenics, and could allow a consensus on the ethical, legal, and social issues of genetics in the future. Acknowledgments I am deeply indebted to our Chinese colleagues who participatedin and supported this survey. I wish to thank Profs. Dorothy C. Wertz (Shriver Center for Mental Retardation) and John C. Fletcher (University of Virginia Medical Center), for their excellent organization of the international survey in 37 countries, and to Prof. Renzong Qiu (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), for providing eastern China data. I am grateful to Prof. Peter S. Harper and Dr. Angus J. Clarke (University of Wales College of Medicine, United Kingdom), for their face-to-face discussion of my work with me. I also want to thank Sir Walter Bodmer (Oxford University) and Profs. Martin Bobrow (Cambridge University) and Newton E. Morton (University of Southampton), for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. 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http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=3093157&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 114. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf14 115. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=3367351&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 116. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf15 117. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=8524378&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 118. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf16 119. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=8945458&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 120. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf18 121. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=9288092&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 122. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf19 123. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=9298745&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 124. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf100 125. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf20 126. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=2929603&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 127. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf6 128. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=8175232&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 129. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf21 130. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=9425893&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 131. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf25 132. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=8805683&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 133. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf23 134. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=9515943&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 135. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf27 136. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf28 137. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf29 138. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=2809438&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 139. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf30 140. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=2344537&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 141. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf31 142. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf32 143. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf33 144. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=9212521&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 145. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf34 146. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=8448899&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 147. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf35 148. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf10 149. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=7603222&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 150. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf36 151. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf37 152. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf38 153. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=7892742&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 154. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf39 155. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=3145827&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 156. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf40 157. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=2015698&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r 158. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v63n3/980223/980223.text.html#crf41 159. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/link_Medline?uid=7555244&form=6&db=m&Dopt=r From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 15:56:00 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 10:56:00 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Houston J. Int. Law: Yin and yang: the eugenic policies of the United States and China: is the analysis that black and white? Gail Rodgers Message-ID: Yin and yang: the eugenic policies of the United States and China: is the analysis that black and white? Gail Rodgers Houston Journal of International Law, Fall 1999 v22 i1, p129 If in the First Act you hang a gun upon the wall, by the Third Act you must use it. --Chekhov I. INTRODUCTION As technological and scientific advances proliferate, innumerable questions regarding legal, cultural, ethical, and human rights issues arise begging for answers. In the ever-broadening global climate of economics and human rights, politicians and world leaders are more frequently asking about the impact of these technologies on the policies of countries around the world. More specifically, as genetic and reproductive options are enlarged, their effects elicit questions related to procreative rights, discrimination, and population policy. The purpose of this comment is to analyze the eugenic practices and policies of the United States and China, and comment on their respective human rights implications. This Comment will outline the development of the eugenics movement and how eugenic practices have largely been abandoned in the United States. This will be contrasted with the continuing eugenic sterilization practices in China. This comment will also distinguish the social goals of sterilization policies in both countries. It will recognize as the primary distinction in policy the fundamental choice of whether to subordinate the well being of the individual to the well being of society. In addition, it will discuss the permissive genetic policies in the United States which may implicitly endorse eugenic practices. II. EUGENICS DEFINED For many, the term "eugenics" conjures up some image of a science fiction experiment gone amuck. The film industry has produced enough movies of aliens bred to have certain omnipotent or omniscient capabilities to somewhat justify that notion. However, the term "eugenics " comes by this connotation honestly, as it was first widely discredited in connection with atrocities of Nazi policies in Germany.(1) Surprisingly, the beginning of eugenics comes from a more palatable background. Plato was one of the earliest theorists to advocate the betterment of the human race by choosing the correct mate.(2) The term "eugenics " comes from the Greek word meaning "well born."(3) It was coined by Charles Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, who defined it as "the science of improving stock."(4) Bertrand Russell, a British philosopher, described it as more of a social movement than a science in that it "attempt[s] to improve the biological character of a breed by deliberate methods adopted to that end."(5) There is some controversy over the definition of eugenics and how broadly the term sweeps. Much of the controversy focuses on whether eugenics should be defined in terms of the intent of the policies or their consequences.(6) However, all eugenicists share the common belief that "individual desires should be subordinated to a larger public purpose."(7) The definition of eugenics can be further delineated into "positive" and "negative" eugenics. Positive eugenics is similar to Plato's view which attempts to improve the race through selection and maximization of "socially desirable" genes.(8) In this instance, eugenicists try to manipulate genes or the mating of genes to increase the incidence of "positive" or "desirable traits."(9) This can be contrasted with the more controversial negative eugenics which seeks to eliminate those "bad" or "undesirable" genes or traits from the gene pool.(10) The most infamous example of negative eugenics was Hitler's attempt in the Lebensborn Project to produce "good babies."(11) Accounts vary as to the actual numbers, but historians agree that Hitler had as many as sixty to a hundred thousand "unfit" persons sterilized in an attempt to prohibit reproduction by defectives and eliminate their bad genes from the human race.(12) Eugenicists believed that through the use of both positive and negative eugenics they could eliminate many so-called hereditary defects such as mental retardation, criminality, and mental illness, and thereby eradicate many social problems.(13) Negative eugenics such as sterilization would discourage or prevent the socially undesirable from procreating, while positive eugenics would encourage the reproduction of those with socially and culturally desirable traits.(14) Modern discussions of eugenics include the discipline of genetics, and whether genetics is a new or camouflaged type of eugenics.(15) Scientists acknowledge the horrific past of eugenics, and are cautious to delineate the genetic discipline from that of eugenics.(16) One modern geneticist compared the definition of eugenics to the definition of the term "freedom," in the sense that "it's meaning `is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist.'"(17) A broader definition of eugenics includes almost any type of pre-natal genetic testing because this testing invariably includes the systematic selection of fetuses.(18) However, many geneticists define eugenics on much narrower terms that include a social aim and coercive means.(19) The various definitions used for eugenics depend on the author's political intention and desire to associate or dissociate it from past eugenic practices.(20) Another thorny issue in the definition of eugenics is that the aim of the policy is often considered in deciding whether or not the policy is eugenic.(21) III. HISTORY A. Eugenic Theory The roots of eugenics are planted in the 19th century experiments of Francis Galton's cousin, Charles Darwin.(22) Darwin's work on evolution lent itself to an application to social problems.(23) Social theorists began first in Europe, and then in the United States, to compare the improvement of society to the evolution of the species.(24) Galton elaborated on the social aspects of Darwin's theories, and began studying traits in family trees.(25) Galton concluded that many physical and psychological traits were inherited, and that as a result, manipulative breeding could produce persons with desired traits.(26) Many eugenicists of the time believed that "feeblemindedness" or mental disability was an inherited recessive trait.(27) Consequently, they felt sterilization of the mentally disabled would solve the problem and improve society.(28) Eugenicists further linked intelligence (or lack thereof) with social adequacy and virtue, and predicted the morality of certain people based on their intelligence.(29) It was not difficult for proponents of eugenics to gather support for their theories, as genetic diseases and mental disabilities impacted both the affected person's family and society.(30) The economic realities of caring for the mentally disabled, combined with the misunderstanding of mental illness and fear of the degeneracy of the human race, fueled a drive in the United States for the sterilization of the mentally disabled.(31) B. Historical Eugenics in the United States As eugenicists analyzed American societal problems in the late 1800s, they came to rely on the assumption that nearly all social ill resulted from heredity.(32) In addition, several researchers claimed a dramatic increase, in some reports as much as 200%, in the incidence of feeblemindedness.(33) The initial encroachment of eugenics into the arena of the feebleminded began with an 1890s Connecticut law that prohibited "epileptics, imbeciles, and feebleminded persons from marrying or having extramarital relations before age forty-five."(34) During this time period, although there were no laws expressly authorizing sterilization, human sterilization was practiced in many states on people in penal and mental institutions.(35) After Pennsylvania and Michigan unsuccessfully attempted to pass bills for sterilization of the feebleminded, Indiana became the first state to pass a statute permitting the sterilization of institutionalized criminals, rapists, imbeciles, and idiots.(36) Another of the initial sterilization statutes was legislated in California, partly in response to the influx of "racially inferior" Chinese and Mexicans.(37) In the early twentieth century, the rise of sterilization was very rapid, with twenty-three states having some form of sterilization statute by 1925.(38) Although many of the statutes had little or no legislative history and were passed for a variety of "defectives," virtually all were modeled to some degree after the Indiana statute which provided that if two physicians certified that there was no chance of "improvement" in the person, they could be sterilized without consent.(39) Many of these laws did little to protect individual rights.(40) Accordingly, some were declared unconstitutional on grounds of equal protection, due process, or cruel and unusual punishment.(41) Some courts, however, upheld the statutes on the basis of protecting the race.(42) The breakthrough for the eugenic campaign came in 1927 in the infamous Buck v. Bell case.(43) The Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring that patients in institutions who suffered from "hereditary" forms of mental illness be sterilized as a condition of their release.(44) In one of his most quoted decisions, Justice Holmes rejected the due process claim and the equal protection claim on the basis that sterilization was beneficial to both the patient and society.(45) Carrie Buck was a woman who, along with her mother before her, had been institutionalized for feeble-mindedness.(46) Carrie was an illegitimate child, and had mothered an illegitimate child who was also believed to be feeble-minded.(47) Justice Holmes upheld the statute authorizing sterilization to prevent the parenting of "socially inadequate offspring" on the grounds that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough."(48) Justice Holmes' opinion is most notable for the fact that he accepted and endorsed the eugenic theories without reservation, gave no thought to procreation as a right, and never questioned whether feeblemindedness was actually hereditary.(49) The era following Buck v. Bell consisted of nearly thirty states either enforcing previously unused sterilization statutes, or passing compulsory sterilization statutes to correct what they saw as a serious social problem.(50) Although numerous statutes were passed and sterilization of the feebleminded occurred in most states, the prediction that Buck would dramatically increase the eugenic sterilization practice was largely overestimated.(51) The actual peak in sterilizations occurred about the time that Buck was decided, but the popularity of the eugenic campaign was already losing ground.(52) As advances were made in genetic research and other disciplines such as psychology and sociology became popular, the eugenic movement lost momentum as other explanations became available for mental disability.(53) Another contributor to the decline in popularity of eugenics was the discovery of the Nazi atrocities based on eugenic ideas, and American revulsion at this blatant racism.(54) The turning point in American sterilization law came in 1942 when the Supreme Court decided Skinner v. Oklahoma.(55) In this case, the Court held that procreation is a fundamental right; therefore, any statutes affecting this right to reproduction should be strictly scrutinized by the courts.(56) The court realized that "[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear."(57) In Griswold v. Connecticut,(58) the Supreme Court began expanding the rights to reproductive privacy, based on that fundamental right to procreate.(59) In contravention of the Buck decision which didn't consider procreation as a right, the watershed case of Roe v. Wade(60) held that the right to privacy to procreate included the right to an abortion.(61) As a result of scientific and social developments and the birth of the right to procreate, many states have questioned and repealed their eugenic sterilization statutes.(62) As the pendulum of eugenics and reproductive freedom swings the other way, some cases involve the sterilization of incompetents for non-eugenic, even habilitating reasons.(63) C. Historical Eugenics in China Chinese eugenic policies are unlike the U.S. policies, because they are rooted in a desire for population control.(64) The Chinese began aggressive population policies after the Communist takeover in 1949.(65) In that era, the government implemented very pro-natalist policies to encourage the growth of the population and to improve socioeconomic development.(66) By the mid 1960s, that campaign was largely reversed, as Chinese officials realized the impact of famine and economic hard times on their country.(67) Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping put a screeching halt to the population expansion with his plan of social modernization.(68) The government began urging family planning by limiting couples to two or three children and later promoting the one-child family as the norm.(69) This campaign did slow the population growth. However, Chinese officials continued to worry about the relative scarcity of arable land to support the burgeoning population.(70) "In 1979, the Chinese leadership, faced with demographic data supporting the contention that rapid population growth would slow economic growth, revised their strategy and launched the PRC's One Child Policy."(71) This policy, although not a national law, limited couples to one child per family, and was outlined in numerous Communist Party directives.(72) In 1980, The Marriage Law was enacted and mandated family planning and restricted couples from marrying before proscribed ages.(73) In addition, the 1982 Chinese Constitution mandated that the entire country should practice family planning.(74) Chinese population policy, while arguably innocuous on its face, has elicited international outrage because of the methods used to implement it.(75) Although Chinese officials vigorously deny human rights abuses, numerous reports support the fact that both coercion and force are used to ensure success of the One Child Policy.(76) Although the government has acknowledged that mass sterilization campaigns occur in rural areas, they blame these excesses on local officials.(77) Directives issued in both 1982 and 1991 urged the provinces to maintain strict enforcement of the policy.(78) There are numerous reports of forced abortions and sterilizations, late term aborted babies allowed to die, infanticide, and abandonment of female infants.(79) In addition to force, coercive means such as economic and job sanctions, threats, and community pressure are used on both potential parents.(80) Government officials view these practices as more favorable than allowing uncontrolled population growth which they fear would lead to poverty, high infant mortality rates, and malnutrition.(81) In addition to sterilization for population control, China has also implemented programs to sterilize the mentally retarded for eugenic reasons.(82) Included in the 1986 guidelines for the regulation of childbearing were provisions that prohibit people with histories of mental illness, retardation, or hereditary disease from having children.(83) In 1986, the Ministry of Health also released the Guiding Criteria for Classification of Abnormal Cases which listed four groups of people who are permitted to marry but not allowed to have children.(84) "These include couples in which both spouses are born deaf-mute due to a hereditary disease or disorder, or in which at least one spouse has hereditary schizophrenia, manic depression, or heart disease."(85) The government's apparent purpose in implementing these laws is to reallocate resources to more productive projects than spending the money on disabled individuals.(86) Many provinces passed similar laws in the late 1980s. For example, Shandong Province passed a law in 1989 stating "`[t]hose who have been found to have the possibility to give birth to severely defective babies or babies with severe hereditary diseases ... should be banned from having children; if pregnant, the pregnancy should be terminated.'"(87) Other provinces have similar laws providing that "`[i]f one spouse is insane (chi), an idiot (dai), or a fool (sha), or has any other hereditary disease likely to cause severe defects in descendants, that spouse should be sterilized.'"(88) The Gansu province in China, which has the most comprehensive eugenics measures, defines the term "idiot" as an individual whose IQ is below 49 and who has cognitive and behavioral difficulties.(89) Much of the scientific community has long rejected the assumption that individuals with mental disabilities will automatically reproduce children with the same defects.(90) Another instance of implicit eugenics in China is the widespread practice of prenatal sex selection in favor of male babies.(91) Reports of this discrimination against female babies are best illustrated by a shift in the birth ratio of boys to girls.(92) The state family planning figures from April of 1993 indicate that the ratio was 100 girls for every 111.3 boys born.(93) This figure is drastically different than the worldwide ratio of 100 girls for every 106 boys, which was the ratio in China prior to the One Child Policy.(94) The deputy head of the Family Planning Commission attributed this discrepancy in part to the ancient belief, especially common in rural areas, that only boys can carry on the family line.(95) Although doctors are legally barred from revealing the sex of a fetus, even small rural Chinese towns have ultrasound machines, and reports indicate that healthcare workers will accept bribes to reveal the baby's sex.(96) There are also reports of female babies that are hidden, abandoned, killed, or given away in the hopes that the couple can have a second male baby without the mandated fines and penalties.(97) Although the provinces have laws officially prohibiting violence against baby girls, the regulations prove ineffective because of their lack of specific penalties and enforcement procedures.(98) In addition, Chinese law rarely punishes crimes, unless the victim or the family presses charges which is unrealistic in the case of infanticide.(99) The Chinese government recently adopted the Maternal and Infant Health Care Law, previously known as the Eugenics Law.(100) This law represents an attempt by the Chinese government to not only decrease the quantity of the population, but also to increase the quality.(101) This provision will be discussed at length in section V following. IV. MODERN UNITED STATES EUGENICS POLICY A. Eugenic Theory Although the United States has generally rejected eugenics as a policy for social improvement, there are still some applicable uses for the old statutes permitting sterilization of the mentally disabled.(102) With current political themes of reproductive privacy, and a newfound desire to protect the mentally incapable, some sterilization statutes have been upheld and found beneficial based on a rationale of the disabled person's right to make procreative choices.(103) Three emerging themes are responsible for the transformation of sterilization law: "the discrediting of the eugenic theory, the development of the constitutional doctrine of reproductive privacy, and the changing conception of mental retardation."(104) Current laws reflect a societal distaste for the historical use of eugenics, and a fear of intrusion on individual liberties.(105) The reports of sterilization in Nazi Germany fueled the outcry against eugenic sterilization laws.(106) Subsequently, reproductive rights gained importance with the development of the constitutional doctrine of reproductive privacy.(107) In addition, theories regarding mental retardation have changed drastically from a medical model to a developmental model.(108) Approaches to care of the mentally disabled no longer focus on segregating them, but instead emphasize mainstreaming or integrating them to the extent possible.(109) Currently, mentally disabled people are seen to have the same rights to sexual privacy as other people.(110) The apparent goal of current sterilization law is to prevent erroneous sterilizations, and to protect the right of the mentally disabled individual (or a surrogate acting on her behalf) to make reproductive decisions in her best interests.(111) The argument that frequently supports statutes to sterilize the mentally handicapped is based on the best interests of the patient.(112) There also exists a counter argument to incorporate into the sterilization statutes an element of the best interests of society.(113) The competing values are the importance of reproductive autonomy and a paternalistic protection of the mentally disabled person's right to procreate.(114) One of the difficult issues is defining whether the disabled person's fundamental right to privacy includes both the right to procreate and the right to be sterilized.(115) When dealing with fundamental rights issues, courts have generally taken one of four stances.(116) One view is to ask if the individual's privacy rights would be unfairly restricted if sterilization were denied.(117) Another line of analysis is to only cursorily analyze the fundamental rights to privacy and procreative choice.(118) The third viewpoint is that state interests outweigh fundamental rights and override equal protection and substantive due process challenges.(119) A final view is that there is no state interest strong enough to outweigh the invasion of fundamental rights by involuntary sterilization.(120) This variety of approaches illustrates the controversy over fundamental privacy rights and the disabled individual. B. Statutes Today involuntary sterilization of the mentally disabled is supported by statute in some states, and by case law in others.(121) Presently, ten states have some form of involuntary sterilization statute.(122) The statutes vary widely in application.(123) For example, Idaho's sterilization law applies to persons "past his or her age of puberty,"(124) while Mississippi's law applies to both adults and minors, but only if they are institutionalized.(125) To add to the array of results, statutes use various language and definitions when referring to the mentally disabled.(126) Some states such as North Carolina require only a probability, rather than proof, that the handicapped person may be incapable of caring for their children before they can be ordered sterilized.(127) Other states such as Oregon have more substantive and procedural requirements in place to protect the rights of the mentally handicapped person.(128) The Oregon statute requires the following to establish best interest in the context of sterilization: a) The individual is physically capable of procreating; b) The individual is likely to engage in sexual activity at the present time or in the near future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy; c) All less drastic contraceptive measures, including supervision, education and training, have proved unworkable or inapplicable, or are medically counter-indicated; d) The proposed method of sterilization conforms with standard medical practice, is the least intrusive method available and appropriate, and can be carried out without reasonable risk to the health and life of the individual; and e) The nature and extent of the individual disability, as determined by empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of standardized tests, renders the individual permanently incapable of caring for and raising a child, even with reasonable assistance.(129) The Oregon statute exemplifies the objective "best interest" inquiry,(130) while other statutes use "substituted judgment" in an attempt to determine what the individual would want if he were able to make an informed decision.(131) States place varying levels of importance on factors such as attempts at other forms of contraception and proof of fertility.(132) The Oregon statute can be contrasted with Mississippi law which is essentially the same as the one at issue in the Buck v. Bell case.(133) The Mississippi statute has been criticized by some as having explicit eugenic purposes, and infringing on disabled persons' liberty interests.(134) Depending on the statute, a parent, guardian, physician, spouse or other interested parties may petition for sterilization of the disabled person.(135) C. Case Law Currently most sterilization issues are raised by the parents of a mentally disabled daughter, who wish their child to be sterilized to prevent the psychological, physical and financial toll of pregnancy and parenthood on their child.(136) Judicial opinions tend to show deference to the parents of disabled children who request sterilization.(137) In the absence of statutory authorization, jurisdictions are split as to whether courts may grant petitions for sterilization.(138) Washington and Iowa courts have held that a state constitutional grant of general jurisdiction to the lower courts was adequate to authorize sterilization of mentally disabled persons.(139) Other courts have held that they lacked jurisdiction over sterilization petitions in the absence of specific statutory authorization.(140) However, after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Stump v. Sparkman(141) (holding that sterilizations may be authorized absent express statutory permission) courts have been more likely to grant jurisdiction.(142) Other courts have based their sterilization jurisdiction on the common law parens patriae doctrine which provides that courts have the authority to protect persons who cannot protect themselves due to a legal disability.(143) With or without statutory authorization, the courts rely on several balancing tests developed by sterilization case law.(144) Many courts follow the two-step process developed in In re Hayes(145) to determine the appropriateness of sterilization.(146) First, the court must determine whether the individual is competent to make an informed decision regarding sterilization.(147) If the court finds the individual incompetent, then it applies a best interests analysis to determine if sterilization is appropriate.(148) The Hayes rule is stringent; the court can order sterilization only if specific criteria are met.(149) A more flexible rule is the "discretionary best interest" rule which uses a similar test, but allows a court more discretion in making a decision.(150) Yet other jurisdictions use the "medically essential" standard which authorizes sterilization when it is proven that sterilization is necessary to preserve the life or health of the incompetent.(151) Courts relying on the "substituted judgment" standard "consider the Hayes criteria and any other relevant factors in order to make the decision that the disabled person would make for herself if she were competent."(152) In addition to these tests, some courts inquire further into the individual's preference, disability prognosis, likelihood of sexual activity, and understanding of reproduction.(153) The numerous tests and factors used to consider sterilization petitions create substantial hurdles for petitioners as they tend to create a presumption against sterilization.(154) Although the goal of some of the standards appears to be to protect the individual's right to procreate, others appear to protect the individual from parental or state interference in decision making.(155) Some commentators have criticized the current models as creating adversarial relationships between parent and child and disregarding family interests in the process.(156) Another criticism of sterilization law is that it purports to protect the individual's interest in procreation when it is difficult to determine if that individual even has such an interest.(157) The conflict surrounding sterilization law is best illustrated by the dichotomous view of sterilization itself. "On the one hand, sterilization is authorized as a means of facilitating reproductive choice. On the other hand, sterilization is characterized as a deprivation of a fundamental right."(158) V. MODERN CHINESE EUGENICS POLICY A. The Maternal and Infant Health Care Law China's current eugenic laws stem in part from the controversial Maternal and Infant Health Care Law of 1994 [MIHCL].(159) This law, formerly known as the Eugenics Law, was originally intended to promote the health of women and infants, but contains controversial sterilization provisions.(160) Among other provisions, the law provides that people with certain hereditary disorders must agree to prevent childbirth through sterilization or long term contraception, and those with infectious diseases must delay marriage.(161) In addition, genetic testing is compulsory during pregnancy, and fetuses with serious disorders may be aborted.(162) Although according to the law sterilization or abortion requires the woman's consent,(163) many report that consent is not required in practice.(164) Other concerns regarding the MIHCL are the openly admitted goals of population control and improvement by having fewer and healthier babies.(165) The draft of the law met with so much international criticism that the Chinese government revised some of the language, deleting terms such as "eugenics" and "inferior" births.(166) The law has been denounced by some as proposing Nazi-style eugenics, despite strong denials by Beijing.(167) The scientific community's primary concern with the MIHCL is that it is based on scientifically invalid assumptions.(168) Scientists no longer presume that mentally disabled people will sire children with like defects.(169) Numerous genetic defects arise spontaneously, and there are many birth defects for which there are no known causes or methods of prevention.(170) Genetic testing can predict the likelihood of only certain diseases in a fetus,(171) and the birth of one disabled child does not necessarily indicate the second child will have a disability.(172) Another disturbing premise on which the Eugenics Law is arguably based is that defects or disabilities occur at a greater frequency among minorities and the poor.(173) This belief has concerned human rights activists, who fear that the law will be used to discriminate against these groups.(174) These critics feel that this will lead to an "abuse of private genetic information and a violation of human rights."(175) The MIHCL also fails to specify what type of "serious genetic defect" warrants intervention.(176) The goal of the Eugenic Law is to prevent the perpetuation of diseases that may keep individuals from living and functioning independently.(177) Some officials have interpreted this to include such common defects as harelip and cleft palate.(178) Because the law will be implemented at local levels, the failure to explain what constitutes a "serious genetic condition" will most likely result in wide variations in the interpretation of restrictions.(179) In addition, some of the specified diseases are curable, or have been found to have no effect on pregnancy or the fetus.(180) In 1995, there were an estimated ten million "disabled" people cared for by the Chinese government, many of whom would never have been born had the law been enacted earlier.(181) In contrast to its more controversial provisions, the MIHCL's ban on pre-natal sex determination of fetuses has received widespread approval.(182) The use of technology to identify the gender of a fetus is strictly prohibited unless medically necessary.(183) However, despite its official illegality, the practice of ultrasound sex determination is rampant in areas where the technology is available.(184) Chinese culture traditionally views baby boys as more desirable than baby girls, leading to abortion of female fetuses and girl infanticide.(185) With the strict enforcement of the One Child Policy, many parents desperately wish for that one perfect child to be a son.(186) Numerous reports indicate that in spite of the law, pre-natal sex selection and abortion of female fetuses are common.(187) Despite its good intentions, given the extent of these practices, it is doubtful that the MIHCL will significantly impact pre-natal sex determination.(188) B. Reform of the Maternal and Infant Health Care Law After international criticism of provisions of the MIHCL, Chinese officials announced they were going to clarify the law.(189) This announcement followed the Eighteenth International Congress of Genetics convention in Beijing which included discussions of eugenics and the MIHCL.(190) Scientists at the convention repeatedly criticized the law, and debated whether it openly condoned forced sterilization, or was just vague enough to allow that practice.(191) Many were concerned about the ambiguity surrounding whether the doctor or the couple made the decision regarding sterilization once a defect was detected.(192) Qiu Renzong, a professor of bioethics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and an advisor and critic of the law, stated that this decision was to be made by the couple.(193) He stated that the principle governing sterilization was informed consent (presumably similar to the Western world's idea of consent).(194) Officials claimed they issued an explanation of the law in August of 1998 that clarified the ambiguous provisions.(195) All cities and provinces in China were said to have received a copy of this explanation.(196) The explanation also announced that China was seeking information to determine which diseases were severe enough to qualify for sterilization.(197) In essence, this suspended the provision allowing sterilization, at least until a list of diseases has been compiled.(198) Additionally, the explanation stated that people with HIV (which had not developed into AIDS) did not require permission to marry.(199) According to health officials, it may take several years to formally revise the law, but the explanation issued "had the force of law."(200) C. Related Laws and Policies Despite this clarification of the MIHCL, many specialists feel that forced sterilizations will continue in practice.(201) Provinces and local governments often have regulations that authorize such sterilization.(202) Provinces such as Shandong, Shanxi, Jilin, and Gansu all have some type of regulation preventing people with the potential for producing defective babies from procreating.(203) Reports indicate that the Gansu law for sterilization of "Idiotic, Slow-witted, Stupid, and Deranged People" has resulted in about 5,000 people being sterilized in that region.(204) Other reports indicate that authorities have performed compulsory sterilizations to "improve their genetic pool" and enforce the China One Child policy.(205) One reason for the concern that sterilization will continue in spite of clarification of the law is the effect that Communist Party Directives have over codified law.(206) "In China, Communist Party directives are equivalent or superior to legislation and codified laws."(207) Therefore, party directives such as family planning policy can change or supersede existing law.(208) Another concern voiced by human rights activists is the reported incidence of force or coercion to implement the One Child Policy.(209) Although officials deny sanctioning force to implement sterilizations or abortions, reports indicate that the practice is widespread.(210) Numerous reports tell stories of women taken from their homes in the middle of the night for forced insertion of intrauterine devices or late term abortions.(211) Population officials are held to rigid birth quotas and doctors and nurses may be subject to disciplinary measures for allowing babies from induced abortions to live.(212) Reports indicate that local officials forcefully detain women for these procedures, and punish those who resist by inflicting physical injury, confiscating property, and destroying homes.(213) In addition, coercive measures to enforce population policy are clearly outlined in provincial family planning regulations.(214) Widespread penalties for violations of population policy include severe economic sanctions; disqualification for health care, housing, and child-care benefits; loss of employment; and public posting and monitoring of menstrual periods.(215) As a result of these policies, there is intense pressure by fellow villagers and officials who are charged with maintaining their quota of births.(216) Some commentators feel that with this troubled history of enforcement of the population policy, there is little doubt that similar practices will continue to be used to enforce the sterilization provisions of the MIHCL.(217) Another concern regarding China's eugenic practices was raised after "[a] survey of 255 geneticists throughout China showed that they overwhelmingly supported the use of eugenics to improve public heath."(218) Xin Mao of West China University of Medical Sciences in Chengdu conducted the survey which indicated that there exists widespread support of genetic testing for reasons unacceptable to much of the Western world.(219) Approximately eighty-six percent of those surveyed felt that the government should mandate premarital testing to identify hereditary disease,(220) and ninety-one percent thought that couples who were both carriers of a particular genetic disorder should be prohibited from having children.(221) In addition, nearly seventy percent of the scientists favored genetic testing for susceptibility to diseases such as alcoholism.(222) Although these beliefs may seem abhorrent in the Western world, they represent "cultural common sense" in China.(223) Chinese culture appears to support the idea of promotion of the common good, rather than individual good, even if it means endorsing eugenic practices.(224) Mao states that "[t]he core issue is to clean up the gene pool [and to] reduce the number of deleterious genes."(225) He admits that these policies promote discrimination among the disabled Chinese.(226) VI. UNITED STATES GENETIC POLICIES Genetic research is advancing rapidly in the United States, especially with the advent of the Human Genome Project.(227) A primary goal of genetic research and testing is to detect diseases and develop methods for prevention and treatment.(228) "The potential of genetic technology to alleviate the physical, emotional, and financial pain of disease makes this technology extremely attractive."(229) However, the wide use of genetic testing and gene therapy has been seen by some to be heading down a dangerous path to social control.(230) Commentators warn against the evils of widespread genetic testing which may lead to discrimination and eugenic practices.(231) Critics fear that genetic testing may be used to deny insurance, to enable employers to accept or reject certain workers based on their fitness, or to influence educational decisions.(232) Widespread testing and discrimination could even lead to the development of a "`genetic underclass' that society marginalizes based on factors beyond its control."(233) Other developing genetic technologies with human rights implications include germ line manipulation.(234) This technology entails inserting genes into an undeveloped embryo that is fertilized in vitro in an effort to cure genetic diseases.(235) Analysts fear that this technology may create a demand for manipulation of other characteristics such as hair color, intelligence, stature, sexual orientation, and personality.(236) This type of manipulation could result in "racial" discrimination by deselecting for certain cosmetic traits such as skin and eye color and bone structure which are identifiable with a certain race.(237) Currently, reports indicate that sex selection technology is available in the United States.(238) The advent of such technologies has prompted discussions of ethics, morality, and political responsibility.(239) Some scientists express concern about the eugenic possibilities of selecting children with cosmetic or performance traits, or lack of defective traits.(240) Others fear that techniques such as sex selection will lead to skewing of the sex ratio, and contribute to discrimination against women and girls.(241) In support of these fears are isolated reports of aborted fetuses of the "wrong" sex.(242) While efforts to detect and treat genetic diseases receive critical acclaim, other aspects of genetic testing and manipulation have more dubious rewards.(243) As one critic states, "being short, being of average intelligence, or being homosexual - is [not] a disease," and therefore needs no prevention.(244) Although none of these practices are widespread today, commentators stress the possibility that the newfound knowledge may be used to reintroduce eugenic policies rather than to benefit individuals.(245) VII. YIN AND YANG: UNITED STATES V. CHINA East and West, black and white, yin and yang.... do any of these analogies accurately describe the eugenic practices of China versus those of the United States? On their face, the policies and goals seem vastly different, but upon closer inspection, some startling similarities appear. Current U.S. policy regarding eugenic sterilization seems geared to protect the procreative rights of disabled individuals against outside interference.(246) There are numerous procedural and substantive protections to prevent unwarranted sterilizations.(247) In addition, sterilization law seems to be aimed at protecting the mentally disabled person's interests, instead of the interests of society.(248) In the United States when mentally handicapped persons are sterilized, it is usually at the request of their parents in an effort to protect them from the travail of procreation.(249) The statutes and case law primarily apply to incompetent persons, rather than to competent persons with genetic defects.(250) Although some courts consider whether the person's offspring will inherit a disability, this has not been a deciding factor in most cases.(251) Several courts have explicitly rejected any eugenic rationale for sterilization of the mentally disabled.(252) This approach can be contrasted with Chinese policy on sterilization which seems rooted in the true eugenic goal of eliminating defective genes from the population.(253) Unlike the United States policy, the Chinese policy contains no checks and balances to protect the rights of the disabled.(254) Although the government denies it, reports indicate that practices exist that force sterilization against the will of the subject.(255) The MIHCL purports to allow couples to make the decision about their sterilization and contraception, but most commentators believe couples have no choice.(256) Chinese policy is also more inclusive, because it targets individuals for sterilization who may be mentally competent but carry genetic disorders or infectious diseases.(257) In China, sterilization is generally requested by the physician or by government officials rather than by the potential parents.(258) The primary distinguishing feature between Chinese and American eugenic policy appears to be that China focuses on the interests of the whole population, while the United States emphasizes the interests of the individual.(259) While Chinese policy purports to protect the society from the ill of supporting the disabled individual,(260) American policy attempts to protect the individual from the ill of society violating their rights.(261) The United States prides itself in securing rights for its citizens, and some of these fundamental rights include the right to privacy and bodily integrity, including decisions relating to abortion, contraception and sterilization.(262) As this Comment demonstrates, these rights are neither accorded the same status nor guarded as vigorously in China as in the United States. These fundamental rights in the United States result in potential parents having the freedom to make numerous reproductive decisions. Additionally, the importance we attach to these freedoms creates a climate where potential parents may incorporate genetic technology into their reproductive decision making and family planning. Is there anything between Yin and Yang? From an initial analysis, it appears that Chinese eugenic policy is a much greater threat to human rights than the American policy. However, upon examining American genetic policy, one may draw the conclusion that America implicitly endorses eugenics. This conclusion may be drawn depending on how broadly eugenics is defined. Geneticists, in an attempt to disassociate their science from odious practices, may define eugenics as having "a social aim and often coercive means."(263) If this definition is used, many eugenicists who endorse voluntary or positive eugenics would be excluded from the definition.(264) Modern commentators believe that a resurgence of eugenics is occurring without the element of coercion, but rather as a result of voluntary choices.(265) Parents who select for certain cosmetic or performance traits in their children are practicing positive eugenics, whether knowingly or unknowingly. Similarly, those who elect not to have children with certain disabilities may be implementing a form of negative eugenics. Although genetic testing and reproductive decisions in the United States are voluntary, the current permissive attitudes toward the use of genetics in reproductive decisions may lead toward the use of genetics for eugenic practices. Testing which discovers genetic defects and leads to negative eugenic decisions may be seen as discriminatory toward people with such defects. Similarly, the use of genetic testing to select for cosmetic traits may result in discrimination against certain races or ethnic groups. Although not intended to have a eugenic purpose, these types of voluntary decisions pose threats to the human rights that Americans value dearly. As Americans become more comfortable with the idea of determining characteristics such as sex, the implicit eugenic policy becomes more dangerous. While American policies seem safe because of their voluntary nature, they may actually pose an equal risk to human rights as genetic discrimination becomes socially acceptable. VIII. CONCLUSION The twentieth century has witnessed the rise and fall of the eugenic movement in both the East and the West. Currently eugenic policy is in disfavor in many countries, though still strong in China. The United States has numerous safeguards to protect the disabled from eugenic elimination. However, the United States also has policies that permit eugenic decisions on a voluntary basis. With genetic and reproductive technology rapidly outpacing ethical and legal developments, our society may be facing the rise of social eugenic policies once again. In order to combat this occurrence, it is vital for scientists, human rights activists, and scholars to engage in open dialogue about eugenic policies. Now is the time to address genetic and eugenic issues and formulate policies and laws to protect society. "If in the First Act you hang a gun upon the wall, by the Third Act you must use it." The gun is on the wall. Now is the time to determine when, how and against whom it will be used. (1.) See Diane B. Paul, Is Human Genetics Disguised Eugenics?, in GENES AND HUMAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE 67, 72 (Robert F. Weir et al. eds., 1994). (2.) See Richard A. Estacio, Comment, Sterilization of the Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: Three Generations Without Legislative Guidance Are Enough, 92 DICK. L. REV. 409, 411 (1988); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, 149-53 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1985). (3.) See Estacio, supra note 2, at 411. (4.) FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 17 n.1 (AMS Press 1973) (1907). (5.) Paul, supra note 1, at 68 (quoting Bertrand Russell). (6.) See id. (discussing the implications of using intent or effects to define eugenics). (7.) Id. at 69. (8.) See Estacio, supra note 2, at 411. (9.) See Paul, supra note 1, at 70. (10.) See Estacio, supra note 2, at 411. (11.) See TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 112 (1990). (12.) See Philip R. Reilly, Eugenic Sterilization in the United States, in GENETICS AND THE LAW III 227, 236 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1985). (13.) See Eric M. Jaegers, Note, Modern Judicial Treatment of Procreative Rights of Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal Rights to Procreation and Sterilization, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 947, 950 (1993) (tracing the development of sterilization laws). (14.) See id. (15.) See Paul, supra note 1, at 67. "Fear of a Eugenics Revival appears to be a principle anxiety aroused by the Human Genome Project." Id. (16.) See id. at 69-70 (citing the element of coercion as a major distinguishing factor between genetics and eugenics). (17.) ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958), reprinted in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121 (1969); see also Paul, supra note 1, at 70 (quoting Berlin). (18.) See Paul, supra note 1, at 68. "Prenatal diagnosis presupposes that certain fetal conditions are extrinsically not bearable." Id. (19.) See id. (20.) See id. (21.) See id. at 69 (contemplating whether it is possible to know the motives behind any policy). (22.) See Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1420 (1981). (23.) See id. (24.) See id. at 1420 n.4 (citing several prominent social theorists of the time). (25.) See id. at 1420. Galton also performed statisitical analysis on eighty sets of twins. See id. (26.) See id. (explaining Galton's belief that society "could use his principles to produce `men of ability' through planned breeding"). (27.) See id. at 1422. (28.) See Estacio, supra note 2, at 412. (29.) See Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1422. One researcher of the time came to the following conclusion: [W]ithin one racial group, the correlations between the divergences of an individual from the average in different desirable traits are positive, that the man who is above the average of his race in intelligence is above rather than below it in decency, sanity, even in bodily health.... The child of good reasoning powers has better, not worse, memory than the average; the child superior in observation is superior in inference; scholarship is prophetic of success out of school; a good mind means a better than average character. Id. (30.) See Jaegers, supra note 13, at 951 (describing lobbying efforts of eugenicists). (31.) See Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1423-25 (describing how the economic conditions in the United States in the late 19th century and the misunderstanding of mental illness during that time period combined to strengthen the eugenics movement in the United States). For an example of the prevailing climate, see the comments made by Dr. Walter E. Fernald before the Massachusetts Medical Society in 1912: The past few years have witnessed a striking awakening of professional and popular consciousness of the widespread prevalence of feeblemindedness.... and as a causative factor in the production of crime, prostitution, pauperism, illegitimacy, intemperance and other complex social diseases.... The feebleminded are a parasitic, predatory class, never capable of self-support or of managing their own affairs.... Feebleminded women are almost invariably immoral and if at large usually become carriers of venereal disease or give birth to children who are as defective as themselves.... Every feebleminded person, especially the high-grade imbecile, is a potential criminal.... STANLEY POWELL DAVIES, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT 92 (Gerald N. Grob et al. eds., 1976). (32.) See Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1423 (describing the view that an "individual's social adequacy is soley a function of his mental endowment"). (33.) See id. at 1423-24; see also Reilly, supra note 12, at 228 (discussing "the Jukes"). The report on the Jukes was written by a prison inspector who described the traits of 709 descendents of a particular Dutch settler, many of whom were prisoners, and all of whom supposedly had a penchant for taverns, brothels, and other social ills. The story of the Jukes was widely accepted by the general public, and furthered the interest in calculating the cost of these defectives to society. Another "experiment" involved a Revolutionary War soldier who impregnated a girl who was thought to be low class. He later married a "respectable" Quaker woman and bred a line of eminent citizens, while the illegitimate side of the family were feebleminded paupers. See id. at 229. (34.) Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1432 (citing Act of July 4, 1895, 1895 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 325). (35.) See id. at 1432-33 (discussing a systematic program of sterilization implemented at the Kansas State Home for the Feebleminded). (36.) See id. at 1433 (citing Act of March 9, 1907, 1907 Ind. Acts ch. 215) (noting that the campaign for sterilization of the feebleminded in Indiana was led by a physician who was experimenting with the newly developed vasectomy, and that prior to passage of the law, he had sterilized 176 inmates in a reformatory); see also Jaegers, supra note 13, at 950-51 (discussing the use of vasectomy, castration, and salpingectomy for eugenic purposes). Vasectomy is partial or complete removal of the vas deferens; castration is the removal of the ovaries or testicles; and a salpingectomy is the removal of the fallopian tube. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 299, 1593, 1977 (3d ed. 1992). (37.) See Reilly, supra note 12, at 231. A similar situation to that of Indiana existed in California in 1909. A physician and lobbyist named F.W. Hatch helped to draft a sterilization law, helped to convince the legislature to adopt it, and after the law was enacted, was appointed General Superintendent of State Hospitals and was thus authorized to implement the new law. The California law focused on the insane and provided for consent by the insane person's family; however, as sterilization was a prerequisite for release from the institutions, few withheld consent. See id. at 231-32. (38.) See Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1433. (39.) See Reilly, supra note 12, at 231. (40.) See Jaegers, supra note 13, at 952. (41.) See Haynes v. Lapeer, 166 N.W. 938 (Mich. 1918) (holding a Michigan law providing for sterilization of institutionalized `mentally defective' persons unconstitutional and void as class legislation). The court reasoned that the enactment selected out of a "natural class of defective and incompetent persons only those already under public restraint, leaving immune from its operation all others of like kind to whom the reason for the legislative remedy is normally and equally, at least, applicable, extending immunities and privileges to the latter which are denied to the former." Id. at 940. See also Smith v. Board of Examiners, 88 A. 963 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1913) (holding a New Jersey law providing for sterilization of epileptics in public institutions unconstitutional because the statutory remedy denied institutionalized epileptics equal protection); Jaegers, supra note 13, at 952. (42.) See State ex Rel. v. Schaffer, 270 P. 604, 605 (Kan. 1928) (upholding a statute authorizing the sterilization of hospital inmates): "Procreation of defective and feeble-minded children with criminal tendencies does not advantage, but patently disadvantages, the race. The race may insure its own perpetuation and such progeny may be prevented in the interest of the higher general welfare." Id. (43.) 274 U.S. 200 (1927). (44.) See id. at 200; see also Jaegers, supra note 13, at 947. The Act declared: [T]he Commonwealth ... is supporting ... many defective persons who if now discharged or paroled would likely become by the propagation of their kind a menace to society but who if incapable of procreating might properly and safely be discharged or paroled and become self-supporting.... [H]uman experience has demonstrated that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy and crime.... Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1436. The Virginia law contained much of the same language as the laws Hitler used to sterilize the defective in Germany, as both were based on the Model Eugenical Sterilization Law proposed by an American eugenicist. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 30, 31 & n.6 (1985) (citing A. CHASE, THE LEGACY OF MALTHUS: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE NEW SCIENTIFIC RACISM 135, 351 n.15 (1977)). (45.) See Buck, 274 U.S. at 206; see also Jaegers, supra note 13, at 953. (46.) See Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. (47.) See id.; Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1437. (48.) Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. (49.) See Jaegers, supra note 13, at 953; see also Estacio, supra note 2, at 415-16 (commenting on how Justice Holmes quickly and erroneously assumed that heredity is the primary cause of mental retardation); ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 365-67 (2d ed. 1949) (discussing the post-Buck research and developments, and indicating that many of the so-called hereditary mental defects provided for in the sterilization statutes were in fact not inherited). It is interesting to note that several historians and commentators offer proof that Buck was a test case specifically designed to bolster the sterilization campaign. See Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1437; see also Lombardo, supra note 44, at 51-54 (offering evidence that none of the three Buck generations were actually "imbeciles," but rather were considered social defectives because they mothered illegitimate children and that Carrie became a mother as a result of rape). (50.) See Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1454; Jaegers, supra note 13, at 953-54. The initial sterilization statutes were aimed at institutionalized persons, and prior to 1930, roughly half of those sterilized were men. In 1930, the number of women sterilized began to rise dramatically. See Reilly, supra note 12, at 235-36. (51.) See Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1454 (noticing that despite the Buck decision, and the increased number of sterilizations in Virginia, the nationwide use of sterilization was declining). (52.) See id. (commenting that by the time of the Buck decision, eugenic scientists had become increasingly aware of the simplistic nature of their assumptions, and had begun to withdraw their support from the eugenics movement). (53.) See id. at 1456. Despite strong, support for eugenic sterilization in the medical community, only eighteen state medical associations officially supported the eugenic position. See Reilly, supra note 12, at 235. In 1937, the American Medical Association stated, "Present knowledge regarding human heredity is so limited that there appears to be very little scientific basis to justify limitation of conception for eugenic reasons.... There is conflicting evidence regarding the transmissibility of epilepsy and mental disorders." Charles P. Kindregan, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three Generations of Imbeciles" and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CHI. KENT L. REV. 123, 136-37 (1966) (internal quotations omitted). (54.) See Cynkar, supra note 22, at 1456. Although word of the German campaign horrified many Americans, nearly haft of the involuntary sterilizations in the United States occurred after Hitler's campaign was in full swing. See Reilly, supra note 12, at 935. (55.) 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see Jaegers, supra note 13, at 958 (arguing that Skinner established procreation as a fundamental right, and sparked a debate regarding sterilization of mentally disabled persons). (56.) See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536-39 (invalidating an Oklahoma statute that provided for involuntary sterilization of individuals convicted of more than two felonies). The Supreme Court invalidated the statute in part on equal protection grounds. They reasoned that the crimes Skinner committed, stealing chickens and armed robbery, were essentially the same as embezzlement which was excluded from the statute. See id.; see also Jaegers, supra note 13, at 957-58 (commenting that states seeking to enforce compulsory sterilization statutes must show a compelling state interest and the unavailability of less intrusive means of accomplishing the same goal). (57.) Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. (58.) 318 U.S. 479 (1965). (59.) See id. at 485-86 (holding that married couples had a right to privacy that included non-interference with contraception); see also Jaegers, supra note 13, at 958 (commenting that the Supreme Court began formulating the modern doctrine of reproductive privacy in Griswold). This right was later expanded to include unmarried couples. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (holding that prohibiting only unmarried persons access to contraceptives violated Equal Protection). (60.) 410 U.S. 113 (1973). (61.) See id. at 154. (62.) See Jaegers, supra note 13, at 959. (63.) See In re Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985). In this case, the California Supreme Court held that it was unable to permit the sterilization of a severely retarded woman, even at the request of her parents, because the statute didn't allow sterilization of non-consenting persons. See id. at 761-62. (64.) See Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China's Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 148-55 (outlining China's population policy and its ramifications). (65.) See Reed Boland, The Environment, Population, and Women's Human Rights, 27 ENVTL. L. 1137, 1143 (1997) [hereinafter Women's Rights] (commenting that after 1949, the new Communist regime aggressively pursued a policy of encouraging births). (66.) See id. (explaining that the Communist government implemented the policy to strengthen the country through increased socioeconomic development). The Communist Party Chairman, Mao Zedong, instituted a policy with the slogan "the more babies, the more glorious are their mothers." Li, supra note 64, at 148. (67.) See Li, supra note 64, at 148. The new slogan in the 1970s was "Later, farther apart, and fewer." Id. (68.) See id. His plan emphasized economic efficiency and the importance of halting the population explosion. See id. (69.) See id. (70.) See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1143. China has approximately a fifth of the world's people but less than a tenth of the world's farmable land. See Graciela Gomez, China's Eugenics Law as Grounds for Granting Asylum, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 563, 565 (1996). (71.) Gomez, supra note 70, at 565. (72.) See id. (noting that the Chinese Constitution gives the individual states power to carry out family planning in order to achieve the goal of population control). "The Central Party Committee and the State Council announced that `controlling population growth is an important strategic issue facing our country's modern socialist construction.'" Li, supra note 64, at 149. (73.) See Li, supra note 65, at 149. (74.) See Gomez, supra note 70, at 566. (75.) See Li, supra note 65, at 152-155 (discussing in detail the `one-birth' policy that generally requires couples to obtain birth permits prior to conception, punishes couples who have more than one child by forcing the woman to terminate the pregnancy, and forces couples to use contraceptives if they already have one child). (76.) See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1144. (77.) See id. (78.) See Li, supra note 654, at 149-50. (79.) See Gomez, supra note 70, at 568-69; Reed Boland, Cairo Conference and Programme of Action: An Innovative Approach to Population Policy or Old Wine in a New Bottle?, 1995 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 23, 31 (1995); Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1144 (discussing reports of mass sterilization campaigns in the provinces). (80.) See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1145-46. At times the whole community is involved in pressuring women into sterilization, abortion, or insertion of an IUD. In some areas officials actually monitor the women's use of contraceptives and whether they become pregnant. See id. at 1146. The government may also withhold medical, educational or housing benefits, or impose stiff fines for non-compliance. See Reed Boland, Civil & Political Rights and the Right to Nondiscrimination Population Policies, Human Rights, and Legal Change, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1261 (1995). In contrast, those couples who comply with the one child policy may be rewarded with better benefits. See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1145. (81.) See Timothy John Fitzgibbon, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Are Children Really Protected? A Case Study of China's Implementation, 20 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 325, 344 (1998). (82.) See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1151 (noting that provinces have enacted laws requiring sterilization of individuals with hereditary diseases or mental or physical disabilities). (83.) See Li, supra note 64, at 160. (84.) See id. at 161. (85.) Id. (internal quotations omitted). (86.) See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1151. (87.) Li, supra note 64, at 161 (citing Shadong Family Planning Regulations art. 17 (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh Shandong People's Congress, July 20, 1988)). (88.) Id. at 161 (citing Shanxi Family Planning Regulations art. 13 (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh Shanxi People's Congress, Sept. 22, 1989)). (89.) See id. at 161 n.87. (90.) See id. at 162. (91.) See id. at 169 (discussing the common practice of aborting female fetuses). (92.) See id. at 166 & n.114 (citing Li Yongping, Infant Sex Ratio and Its Relationship With Socio-economic Variables: Results of Population Census and The Reflected Realities, 4 POPULATION & ECON. 3 1993); Mu Guangzong, A Theoretical Explanation of Recent Rise in Sex Ration at Birth in China, 1 POPULATION & ECON. 50 (1995) (describing China's sex ratio). (93.) See Uli Schmetzer, In Controlling China's Population, Girls `Disappear,' CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1993, [sections] 1, at 1. [hereinafter Girls Disappear. Some sources claim the ratio is even more skewed, and that as many as 750,000 females born in China each year are missing. See id. Calculations from as far back as 1986 indicate over half a million female births unaccounted for each year. See Terence H. Hull, Recent Trends in Sex Ratios of Birth in China, 16 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 63, 67 (1990). (94.) See Girls Disappear, supra note 93 (comparing worldwide sex ratios to China's pre-One Child Policy sex ratio). (95.) See id. (discussing China's preference for male offspring); see also Nicholas D. Kristof, China's Crackdown on Births: A Stunning and Harsh Success, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at A1 (describing the emphasis Chinese peasants place on bearing male offspring). (96.) See Li, supra note 64, at 169 (describing largely ineffective provincial regulations and legislation prohibiting sex identification); see also Kristof, supra note 95 (discussing the growing use of ultrasound technology for sex identification). Although the Chinese government denies fetal preference, in the 1980s, they created exceptions to the One Child Policy by allowing rural couples whose only child was female to have a second male child. See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1150. (97.) See Li, supra note 65, at 166-67 & n.117 (explaining various techniques for concealing the birth of female babies). (98.) See id. at 167 (discussing ineffectiveness of laws aimed at protecting female infants). (99.) See id. at 167 & n.121. (100.) See id. at 162 (citing Ruth Youngblood, China Law Defers Disabled Marriages, UPI, Oct. 27, 1994). (101.) See Gomez, supra note 70, at 569. (102.) See James C. Dugan, The Conflict Between "Disabling" and "Enabling" Paradigms in Law: Sterilization, the Developmentally Disabled, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 507, 517-20 (discussing the shift from a predominantly disabling paradigm, permitting involuntary sterilization, to the current, less severe, enabling paradigm). (103.) See id. at 520-21 (comparing enabling sterilization statutes which maximize the disabled person's ability to choose, with disabling sterilization statutes which minimize the disabled person's ability to choose). (104.) Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 809 (1986). (105.) See id. at 811-12 (describing reform law rejecting eugenics to protect individual liberties). (106.) See id. at 811. (107.) See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down as unconstitutional a law prohibiting married couples access to birth control on the grounds that it interfered with marital privacy). Several related decisions further broadened women's rights to contraception, abortion, and fertility. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (holding that women have a constitutionally protected right to an abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (holding a law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors restricts their reproductive privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that women have a privacy right to abortion during the first trimester); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that prohibiting single persons from using contraceptives violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Robert Randal Adler, Note, Estate of C. W.: A Pragmatic Approach to the Involuntary Sterilization of the Mentally Disabled, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1323, 1347-48 (discussing the development of the fundamental right to sexuality and privacy). (108.) See Scott, supra note 104, at 814 (elaborating on the changing conception of mental retardation). (109.) See id. at 815 (discussing current trend to integrate mentally retarded persons). (110.) See id. at 813. (111.) See id. at 807. (112.) See Estacio, supra note 2, at 420. (113.) See id. This concern for the best interests of society is based on the presumption that some, if not all, mentally handicapped persons are unable to become fit parents. See id. at 421. Further arguments are put forward regarding the costs to society of supporting and raising the children, and any risks to the children from being in the custody of an incapable parent. See id. (114.) See Scott, supra note 104, at 807 (contrasting a purported emphasis on reproductive autonomy with a more apparent interest in paternalism with regard to the reproductive choices of the mentally disabled). (115.) See Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 122, 131-33 (1993). See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 at 474 (1981). "The right to be sterilized comes within the privacy rights protected from undue governmental interference." Id. (116.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 130-31. (117.) See id. See, e.g., In re Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985); In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Mass. 1982). (118.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 130-31. See, e.g., In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 639 (Wash. 1980); C.D.M. v. State, 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981). (119.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 130-31. See, e.g., In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 308-09 (N.C. 1976). (120.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 130-31. See, e.g., In re Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881 (Wis. 1981). (121.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 146-58 (analyzing statutory and common law policies). (122.) See ARK. CODE ANN. [subsections] 20-49-205 to -304 (Michie 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, [subsections] 5701-16 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. [subsections] 31-20-2 to -3 (1996); IDAHO CODE [subsections] 39-3901 to -3909 (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. [subsections] 41-45-1 to -19 (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. [subsections] 35-39 to -43 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. [subsections] 436.225 to .295 (1998); UTAH CODE ANN. [subsections] 62A-6-101 to -116 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, [subsections] 8705-12 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. [subsections] 54.1-2975 to -2977 (Michie 1998). (123.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 146 (stating the various state approaches to statute applicability). (124.) IDAHO CODE [sections] 39-3901(a) (1999). (125.) See MISS. CODE ANN. [sections] 41-45-5 (1998). (126.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 146 (examining the various ways statutes define mental disability). In addition, some statutes require certain safeguards when an individual is incapable of giving informed consent. See OR. REV. STAT. [sections] 436.215 (1998). (127.) See Estacio, supra note 2, at 421. The North Carolina statute leaves the determination whether the handicapped person would be able to care for children solely to the petitioner, and has no guidelines regarding the handicapped person's best interests. See N.C. GEN. STAT. [sections] 35-39(3) (1997). It should be noted that North Carolina was one of the last and most vigorous enforcers of the previous compulsory eugenic sterilization laws, and performed these well into the 1960s after most of these laws had fallen into disfavor with the general American public. See Reilly, supra note 12, at 237. (128.) See OR. REV. STAT. [sections] 436.215 (1998); See also Estacio, supra note 2, at 422. (129.) OR. REV. STAT. [sections] 436.205(1) (1998). (130.) See OR. REV. STAT. [sections] 436.295 (1998). (131.) See UTAH CODE ANN. [sections] 62A-6-108(4) (1997) (setting forth the substituted judgment scheme); Cepko, supra note 115, at 154. (132.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 153. See also, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. [sections] 62A-6-108(1)(c) (1997) (providing for a rebuttable presumption of fertility in physically normal individuals); VA. CODE ANN. [sections] 54.1-2977.2 (Michie 1998) (requiring proof that there is no reasonable alternative method of contraception). (133.) 274 U.S. 200 (1927); See Dugan, supra note 102, at 527 (discussing the language and the controlling interests in the Mississippi statute). The Mississippi statute allows involuntary sterilization of persons "afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, or feeblemindedness." MISS. CODE ANN. [sections] 41-45-1 (1998). (134.) See Dugan, supra note 102, at 527. (135.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 149; GA. CODE ANN. [sections] 31-20-3(c)(1) (Supp. I 1998) (1996) (guardian or next of kin); ARK. CODE ANN. [sections] 20-49-202(a) (Michie 1997) (parent or guardian); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. [sections] 5123.86(c) (Anderson 1998) (natural or court appointed guardian or two doctors if neither is available); Va. CODE ANN. [sections] 54.1-2975 (Michie 1998) (spouses); CONN. GEN. STAT. [sections] 45a-692 (West 1993) (interested parties). (136.) See e.g., In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 145 (Del. Ch. 1977) (denying parents' petition to sterilize severely mentally retarded girl who required nearly total physical care); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 430-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (granting guardian's petition to sterilize moderately severely mentally retarded daughter who had multiple medical problems, and was overly affectionate); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 470 (N.J. 1981) (denying parents' petition to sterilize daughter with Down's Syndrome because they failed to meet a clear and convincing standard of proof); In re Valerie N., 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389-90 (Cal. 1985) (denying conservator's application to sterilize mentally retarded daughter who exhibited inappropriate sexual behavior towards men that was not corrected with behavior modification). (137.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 149. See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467. "Parents decided not to place her in an institution but to care for her at home. Since that time they have provided her with love and emotional support, as well as the physical necessities of life." Id. at 469-70. See also In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635. "Edith's parents are sensitive to her special needs and concerned about her physical and emotional health. During the year or so that Edith has been capable of becoming pregnant, [her parents] have become frustrated, depressed and emotionally drained by the stress of seeking an effective and safe method of contraception." Id. at 637. Although deferential to parents, courts have not entirely disregarded the interests of disabled children. "A court must take particular care to protect the rights of the mentally impaired when considering the prospect of sterilization." In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 472. See also In re Hayes, 608 P.2d at 640 (commenting on the "detrimental emotional effects" that mentally disabled persons may suffer as a result of sterilization, and recognizing that the interests of the retarded person are not always coterminous with the interests of the parent). (138.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 156. (139.) See In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 638 (Wash. 1980); In re Matejski, 419 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Iowa 1988). (140.) See, e.g., Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1969); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470-71 (Mo. 1974); In re D.D., 408 N.Y.S.2d 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 145-46 (Del. Ch. 1977); Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. 1979). (141.) 435 U.S. 349 (1978). (142.) See Susan Stefan, Whose Egg Is It Anyway? Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized and Incompetent Women, 13 NOVA L. REV. 405, 418-19 (1989) (comparing the treatment of sterilization petitions before and after the Stump decision). The specific issue in Stump was whether a judge had judicial immunity from granting sterilization absent the statutory authorization. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 358. Although the Court focused on the judicial immunity issue rather than the validity of court ordered sterilizations, this decision has been cited repeatedly as support for sterilization decisions. See Cepko, supra note 115, at 157-58. (143.) See, e.g., In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1381-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); see also Estacio, supra note 2, at 425. (144.) See Jaegers, supra note 13, at 961-63 (discussing the procedural requirements imposed by various jurisdictions). (145.) 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980). (146.) See id. at 961. (147.) See In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (Wash. 1980). "[T]he judge must first find by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the individual is (1) incapable of making his or her own decision about sterilization, and (2) unlikely to develop sufficiently to make an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable future." Id. (148.) See Scott, supra note 104, at 818. (149.) See Hayes, 608 P.2d at 641: The judge must find that the individual is (1) physically capable of procreation, and (2) likely to engage in sexual activity at the present or in the near future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy, and must find in addition that (3) the nature and extent of the individual's disability, as determined by empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of standardized tests, renders him or her permanently incapable of caring for a child, even with reasonable assistance. Id. at 641 (emphasis added). (150.) See Scott, supra note 104, at 822. See, e.g,. In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 543 (N.H. 1980); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct.1982). (151.) See In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375-76 (Colo. 1981) (holding that expert testimony must be used to prove medical necessity, and that the court must make this finding by using the clear and convincing evidentiary standard). (152.) Scott, supra note 104, at 823. (153.) See id. at 820-21. (154.) See Jaegers, supra note 13, at 965; Scott, supra note 104, at 824. (155.) See Scott, supra note 104, at 823-24. (156.) See id. at 825 (acknowledging the burden a severely disabled individual can put on their family and addressing the latter's interest in sterilization). (157.) See id. (158.) Id. at 824 n.58. (159.) Law on Maternal, Infant Health Care (Oct. 27, 1994), Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service, available in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Daily Report-China-94-211, Nov. 1, 1994, at 29 [hereinafter MIHCL] (on file with the Houston Journal of International Law). See Li, supra note 64, at 160-61. (160.) See MIHCL, supra note 159. (161.) See MIHCL supra note 159, ch. II, arts. 9 & 10; Li supra note 64, at 161-62; Gomez, supra note 70, at 571. (162.) See MIHCL, supra note 159, ch. III; Gomez, supra note 70, at 571. (163.) See MIHCL, supra note 159, ch. III, art. 19. (164.) See Li, supra note 64, at 162. One interpretation says women will be `advised' to terminate pregnancies. China's Repellent Eugenics Policy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 1995, at 12. Doctors have the power to virtually veto the birth of a child based on genetics, and though parents may appeal, courts rarely overturn the doctor's decision. Uli Schmetzer, China Lays Down the Law Over Who Gives Birth, Who Doesn't, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1995, at 10. (165.) See MIHCL, supra note 159, ch. I; Gomez, supra note 70, at 569. The law seeks to improve the quality of the newborn population, and prevent any relaxation of the One Child Policy. See id. (166.) See Chinese Minister Defends New Eugenics Law, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, June 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7810735. (167.) See Retired Doctor Lands in Jail for Identifying Sex of Fetuses, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 19, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7858358; David Wallen, UK Scientists See Defects in Genetics Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 6, 1995, at 8, available in 1995 WL 7528908 (discussing British geneticist's claim that the law is an "undisguised embodiment of eugenic principles, the implementation of which has had such a disastrous history in the West"). Further support for claims that the law is eugenic may be found in the comments of Health Minister Chen Minzhang, who proposed the initial draft of the law as the "National Eugenics Programme" to combat the problem of "births of inferior quality." Anthony O'Brien, Editorial, China's Genetics Law, TIMES (London), June 13, 1995, at 17. Chen Minzhang also stated that this problem happened more frequently among "ethnic minorities, frontier peoples and economically poor areas." Id. (168.) See Li, supra note 64, at 162. (169.) See id. "This eugenics policy is not based on agreed scientific information about the transmission of parents' conditions to their offspring...." Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human Rights of Chinese Women, 17 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 285, 298 (1996) [hereinafter Tradition & State]. (170.) See Gomez, supra note 70, at 572. (171.) See Li, supra note 64, at 162. (172.) See Gomez, supra note 70, at 572. (173.) See id. (174.) See id. Chinese minority groups have been described by officials as "low in population quality," which includes characteristics such as mental retardation and short stature in addition to hereditary defects. O'Brien, supra note 167, at 17. O'Brien suggests that minorities such as Tibetans under Chinese control may fear this law as part of the "final solution." Id. (175.) Gomez, supra note 70, at 572. Alastair Kent of Britain's Genetic Interest Group stated, "The problem is that the state defines who may have children. In China, `serious genetic disability' could mean just being Tibetan." Birth Rights, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 9, 1995, at 13. (176.) See Gomez, supra note 70, at 571. (177.) See Nigel Hawkes, Scientists Attack China Over Selective Breeding, TIMES (London), June 5, 1995, at 19. (178.) See id. (179.) See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1152. (180.) See Gomez , supra note 70, at 572; Chan Wai-Fong, Law Bans Pregnancy by "Unfit" Mothers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 8, 1994, at 7, available in 1994 WL 8786467. (181.) See Schmetzer, supra note 165. (182.) See Clarification of Maternal, Infant Health-Care Law Planned, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRES, Aug. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12177752. (183.) See MIHCL, supra note 159, art. 32. (184.) See Li, supra note 64, at 169. (185.) See Girls Disappear, supra note 93, at 14. Part of this belief lies in the tradition that only males are able to carry on the family lineage. See id. Additionally, girls are viewed as providing lower productivity to the family unit, because they leave the family when they marry, and require a sizable dowry for marriage. See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1149. (186.) See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1149-50. (187.) See Li, supra note 64, at 169. Sex-screening is so important to prospective parents that it has become a highly profitable business, and virtually anyone who can pay for the services can obtain them. See id. at 170. Furthermore, reports estimate that 97.5% of all fetuses aborted in China are female. See Tradition & State, supra note 169, at 298. (188.) See Li, supra note 64, at 170. In one of the first known cases of punishment for identifying the sex of fetuses, a physician was sentenced to four years in prison after eight women who used his services aborted female fetuses. See Retired Doctor Lands in Jail for Identifying Sex of Fetuses, supra note 167. (189.) See Government to Clarify "Ambiguity" on Rules Against Pregnancy, XINHUA NEWS AGENGY, Aug. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, TBBCSW File. (190.) See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Chinese Law Sparks Scientific Debate Over Genetics, Sterilization, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 16, 1998, at A28. Geneticists from several countries boycotted the prestigious meeting because they took offense to the Eugenics Law. See id; Carolyn Abraham, Don't Shun Conference in China: Canadians Scientists Divided over Genetics Meeting, GLOBE & MAIL, July 31, 1998, at A3. (191.) See Rosenthal, supra note 190. (192.) See id. (193.) See Elisabeth Tacey, Roots of a Controversy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22025369. (194.) See id. However, a prominent Chinese geneticist explained to the press that that China has never practiced any type of informed consent. See id. (195.) See John Pomfret, China Clarifies Its Law on Sterilization, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1998, at 210 [hereinafter China Clarifies]. (196.) See id. (197.) See China Clarifies, supra note 195. (198.) See id. (199.) See id. (200.) Id. (201.) See John Pomfret, China Suspends Sterilization of People with Genetic Ills, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 18, 1998, at 5. (202.) See China Clarifies, supra note 195. (203.) See Li, supra note 64, at 184. (204.) China Clarifies, supra note 195. (205.) Id. (206.) See Li, supra note 64, at 150-51. (207.) Id. at 150. (208.) See id. at 151. (209.) See Tradition & State, supra note 169, at 295. (210.) See id.; Gomez, supra note 70, at 568; U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995 [sections] 1f (Comm. Print 1996) (discussing the prevalence of the use of force, and how punishment rarely exceeds minimal disciplining and retraining). (211.) See Gomez, supra note 70, at 568-69. Tradition & State, supra note 169, at 295 (discussing incidents of women who are seven, eight, and nine months pregnant being forced to submit to abortions by local population control officials). (212.) See Tradition & State, supra note 169, at 295. (213.) See id. (214.) See id. Central authorities deny responsibility for these measures, but this claim lacks credibility. See id. (215.) See Li, supra note 64, at 154. (216.) See id. at 154-55. Officials are judged on the achievement of their birth quotas, and failure to meet them may result in fines, penalties, anddemotions. See id. at 155. (217.) See China Clarifies, supra note 195. (218.) Andy Coghlan, Perfect People's Republic, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 24, 1998, at 18. (219.) See id. (220.) See id. (221.) See id. (222.) See id. (223.) Id. (expressing Xin Mao's view on why the Chinese accept eugenic practices). (224.) See id.; Dinah Ashman, Editorial, The Chinese Way, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 14, 1998, at 58. (225.) Coghlan, supra note 218. (226.) See id. (227.) See Maha Munayyer, Comment, Genetic Testing and Germ-Line Manipulation: Constructing a New Language for International Human Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L, L. & POL'Y 687, 688 (1997). (228.) See id. (229.) Id. at 688-89. (230.) See id. at 689. (231.) See id. (232.) See id. at 695-96. (233.) Id. at 696 (quoting Robert N. Proctor, Genomics and Eugenics : How Fair is the Comparison?, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 60 (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, eds., 1992)). See Vicki Norton, Comment, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation Genetic Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV., 1581, 1587 (1994) (discussing how African Americans who were carriers for sickle cell anemia were discriminated against in job opportunities, insurance costs, and admission to the Air Force Academy). (234.) See Munayyer, supra note 227, at 692-93 (discussing potential applications of germ line manipulation). (235.) See id. at 692-93. (236.) See id. at 693-95. (237.) See generally Norton, supra note 233. (238.) See Gina Kolata, Researchers Report Success in Method to Pick Baby's Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at A1. (239.) See Richard Nygaard, Genetics and the Law: The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Genetic Technology and Biomedical Ethics (Jan. 19, 1996), in 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1996 at 417, 418. See also Jodi Danis, Sexism and "The Superfluous Female": Arguments for Regulating Pre-Implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 220 (1995). (240.) See Norton, supra note 233, at 1583. (241.) See Danis, supra note 239, at 220. (242.) See Kimberly Mills, Editorial, Scientific Progress Again Outpaces Ethics, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 13, 1998, at E2. See also Norton, supra note 233, at 1601 (citing Geoffrey Cowley et al., Made to Order Babies, NEWSWEEK, Winter/Spring 1990 (Special Issue) at 94) (discussing requests for prenatal gender diagnosis which led to sex-selective abortions and noting that the highest rate of sex-selective abortion occurred among doctors' families). (243.) See Norton, supra note 233, at 1601-02 (explaining how genetic testing is used for more controversial goals such as sex-selective abortions). (244.) Mills, supra note 242. (245.) See WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 794 (5th ed. 1998). (246.) see supra Part IV.A and accompanying notes 99-117, for a discussion of the goals of current sterilization law in the United States. (247.) See Jaegers, supra note 13, at 962--65. (248.) See Scott, supra, note 104, at 812. (249.) See supra note 136 (discussing petitions for sterilization by parents of the mentally handicapped). (250.) See generally Jaegers, supra note 13 (explaining that many laws require incompetence to be established before nonconsensual sterilization is considered). Most jurisdictions require a preliminary finding under Hayes that the person is incompetent before proceeding with the sterilization petition. See id. at 962 n.86, Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc. 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (Md. 1982); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612-13 (Alaska 1981); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (N.J. 1981). (251.) See Cepko, supra note 115, at 127. Some courts emphasize that the likelihood of hereditary disability has no impact on the sterilization decision. See id. (252.) See, e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1981); In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 473 n.3. (253.) See China Clarifies, supra note 195; Li, supra note 64, at 151. (254.) See Li, supra note 64, at 151. Communist Party Directives supersede existing law and there are no limits on the Party's powers. See id. Furthermore, there are few opportunities to challenge these policies. See id. (255.) See Gomez, supra note 70, at 568-69. Reports describe sterilization by force and coercion, and at times without the woman's knowledge. See id. at 569. (256.) See supra Part V.A and accompanying notes for a discussion of the involuntary nature of sterilization and abortion practices based on controversial provisions of the MIHCL. While this law stipulates that ligation or the termination of a pregnancy has to be consented to by the pregnant woman (or, if she is legally incompetent, by her guardian), serious doubt remains that this gives the woman much protection in practice. See Li, supra note 64, at 161-62. (257.) See Li, supra note 64, at 161-62. In the "explanation" issued by the Chinese government, officials stated they would seek definition of which hereditary conditions are serious enough to warrant sterilization. See China Clarifies, supra note 195. (258.) See generally Gomez, supra note 70, at 571-72. (259.) Compare Li, supra note 64, at 148-55 (outlining the population policy and its results) with Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (describing the individual's "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" as central to the right of privacy) and Scott, supra note 104, at 833-40 (noting that personal autonomy and the fundamental right to individual reproductive choices are recognized in the United States). (260.) See Women's Rights, supra note 65, at 1151. (261.) See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (1981) (holding that under some circumstances, an individual's personal right to control her own body and life overrides the state's general interest in preserving life); Scott, supra note 104, at 823-24. (262.) See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (holding that individuals have a right to privacy that includes a qualified right to an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that married couples have a right to privacy that includes non-interference in contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (extending the right to the use of contraception to unmarried persons); In re Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 777 (Cal. 1985) (holding that individuals have a fundamental right to procreation that includes a right to consent to sterilization). (263.) Paul, supra note 1, at 68 (emphasis in original). (264.) See id. at 70. (265.) See id. Gail Rodgers, This Comment received the Gus A. Schill, Jr. Writing Award and was named the Best Candidate Paper of 1998-99 by the Houston Journal of International Law. From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 15:56:45 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 10:56:45 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Eubios J. Asian & Intl. Bioethics: A call for a new definition of eugenics Message-ID: A call for a new definition of eugenics http://www.biol.tsukuba.ac.jp/~macer/EJ93/ej93e.html EJAIB 9(3) May 1999 - Yanguang Wang, Ph.D. The Center for Applied Ethics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Email: Ameliaw at ihw.com.cn Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 9 (1999), 73-74. _________________________________________________________________ As we will see, eugenics has always been a protean concept. Almost from the start of debate, eugenics has meant different things to different people. Eugenics comes from the Greek word eugenes meaning "good in birth". In 1883 Francis Galton started using the word" eugenics" defining it as the "science of improving stock-not only by judicious mating, but whatever tends to give the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had." Galton later experimented with a variety of different formulations such as "the study of agencies under social control which may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations", and "the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race: also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage" In all of these definitions, eugenics sounds rather innocuous. Most medical genetics would fall within its domain (1). Nearly five decades ago, both the United States and Germany, a number of leading figures moved the right direction of the first eugenics definition. They combined eugenic interests with a focus on the "unfit". In the heyday of eugenics, sterilization, infanticide, murder, euthanasia, or a variety of "final solutions" were tools for the prevention or elimination of the "unfit". The eugenics is same as Nazism and a major weapon for discrimination against minorities. From those eugenic programs, eugenics is generally regarded as a pseudoscience in modern world. Also most contemporary definition of eugenics is labeled a country's policies that are coercive. The contemporary geneticists warned the above eugenics movement's amount to cautions over the Nazism and racism, the untenable claims in behavioral genetics, in particular the heritability of personality traits, and both genetic essentialism and determinism. Some has warned of eugenics as the unintended result of individual choices (2). However the social policy intervention, along with genetics measures exists in many countries. These policies do not aim to coerce or mandatory who will be conceived and born, they emphasise the elimination of hereditary disease and handicaps through the prevention of marriages or conception between persons likely to transmit to their progeny such diseases and handicaps. This eugenics thinking can be justified if it is not a science based on Nazism, racism, discrimination to minorities and genetic determinism, it is a science which inherent in the core eugenic doctrine of improving the stock of humankind by application of the science of human heredity. Such aa social policy intervention is based on the individual' informed consent. This science can be called "negative eugenics." There are some eugenics practices that can be justified in the modern world. The Chinese Encyclopedia of Medicine defines eugenics as: "a science for the improvement of human heredity, prevention of birth defects and raising the quality of the population by research and applying genetics theories and approaches." In fact, most of such eugenic practices pay attention to the prevention the defect of the births (3). The intention of the Chinese government in the "law of the people's Republic of China on maternal and infant health care" is merely that people in China should be warned of the risks of inheriting heritable genetic diseases, and helped to avoid them among their children. The Minister of Public Health, Chen Minzhang has said: "the cost of looking after those with hereditary handicaps was enormous, imposing a heavy burden both on the state and on millions of families. There was therefore wide popular support for the rapid enactment of a eugenics law containing effective measures to reduce inferior-quality births." The Chinese government is concerned with the avoidance of avoidable genetic handicap among future generations. They have no discrimination on the present handicap population (4). The law is not be very different in its effect from the services provided elsewhere, where public health services offer genetic counseling, on occasion, abortion if there is proof that the outcome of a pregnancy will be a seriously handicapped child. The chief beneficiaries of the law, which is of necessity voluntary, are parents and their children. To the extent that seriously handicapped children may be an expense on public finances, there may also be some benefit to nation. The eugenics thinking in the law belongs to negative eugenics and may be justified ethically (5). In this sense, the Chinese word "Yousheng" is same as the Greek word eugenics meaning "good in birth", also it is belong to the Galton's eugenics' core doctrine of improving the stock of humankind by application of the science of human heredity. In this sense, the Chinese word "Yousheng" can be translated as eugenic. But it is different from the US and the German "eugenics" in history. Some (e.g. Bajema, 1976) have said a new eugenics consists of genetic counseling, the examination before the birth and the selective abortion (6). There are the laws that prohibit the marriage between close relatives in many countries. This can also be called eugenics. Even though involuntary is included in such eugenics, almost no person objects to it, for the birth quality is quite low. There are so many definitions of eugenics and relative practices. We can also find differences in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics. In the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, someone defined eugenics as a major scientific and pseudoscientific weapon for discrimination against minorities, a political, economic, and social policy that espouses the reproduction of the "fit" over the "unfit" and discourages the birth of the "unfit". But others defined eugenics differently following the history developing steps in the same important book (7). All definitions show a close relationship between eugenics and medical genetics. Following the development of genetics and the growing amount of genetics technology applied in the genetics practice, we must justify how to use them, and what are the ethical reasons to use them. It is important to have a contemporary definition of eugenics for the genetics in debate. We need only one definition or a new one of it. It can make the concept of thinking clear and justify the practice involved in contemporary genetic medicine. What is right depends not just on the facts but on what is meant by eugenics. In my opinion, we should recover the core doctrine of eugenics - good in birth and prevention the defect of the birth voluntarily. We can focus our attention on negative eugenics. Genetic medicine which has found some defective genes or some certain proof of what causes inherited diseases can make it possible. We can do something for positive eugenics, but the eugenics programs could limit its focus to those human characters on whose desirability there is universal or widespread agreement (8). Anyway, few of us are entirely free of the eugenic thinking" good in birth" in some aspect of our daily lives. A parent's decision to delay having a child until he or she was financially and emotionally ready to be a good provider and parent. Most modern governments hope that their people will be energetic, ingenious and enterprising. But the eugenic thinking and practice should balance the interest of all sides. How to define eugenics remains to be seen. But it is true that the eugenics cannot and should not be understood without an analysis of the moral, political, and social implications of advances in science and technology at particular times and in particular places and for particular individuals or groups of individuals within a society. References 1. Diane B. Paul, Controlling Human Heredity-1865 to Present, Humanities Press, 1995, pp.3-9. 2. Martin S. Pernick, The Black Stork: Eugenics and the Death of "Defective" Babies in American Medicine and Motion Pictures Since 1915, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.25-29. 3. Encyclopedia of Chinese, v. Medicine, Press of Chinese Encyclopedia, 1994, pp.1727-1730. 4. Tim Beardsley, Scientific American: Analysis: China Syndrom: 03/97,p.3. 5. Opinion, China' misconception of eugenics, Nature, 367, 6 January 1994, p.1-3. 6. Renying Yen, Applied Eugenics, Ren Min Medicine Press, 1986, p.4. 7. Simon & Schuster Macmillan, Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Revised Edition, Volume 2, Macmillan Library Reference Press, 1995 p.978. Pp. 955-959. Pp.970-972. 8. Daniel Wikler, Eugenic Values, December 1997. The Eubios Ethics Institute is on the world wide web of Internet: http://www.biol.tsukuba.ac.jp/~macer/index.html From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 15:58:05 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 10:58:05 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] A review of the book "Eugenics: A Reassessment by Richard Lynn, released 2002. Message-ID: A review of the book "Eugenics: A Reassessment by Richard Lynn, released 2002. http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/lynn.htm Eugenics: A Reassessment by Richard Lynn, 2001. Published by Praeger Press as part of the "Human Evolution, Behavior, and Intelligence" series edited by Seymour W. Itzkoff. This book is a remarkable achievement because it brings back eugenics at a time when it has already arrived; but no one is admitting to its triumphant return. Richard Lynn has finally announced its arrival and has produced a remarkable work that is complete, a pleasure to read, and leaves no doubt that we are entering a new era: humans are about to go through the most rapid genetic transformation imaginable, and the outcome of this apocalypse cannot even be imagined. Is this just hype like the Y2K scare? Hardly: it is real and it is here to stay and Lynn's book shows just how profound it will be. New human species will be born, and a racial/species war will precede the ultimate victory for those who have the ego-strength to see what is coming. The Left, led by Marxists like Montagu, Boaz, Gould, Lewontin, Rose, Kamin et al., captured the reins of ideological propaganda and convinced the West that "race" did not exist and that eugenics was pseudoscience. They managed to do this through sheer force of character and the willing passiveness of the public to believe what they were told. Repetition and deception along with moral duplicity allowed these intellectual terrorists to neuter Western society into believing in an egalitarian and false human nature. We are just now freeing ourselves from those shackles that were placed upon us to keep us from challenging the very concept of racial differences and group evolutionary strategies. The book covers eugenics from top to bottom so I will discuss just some of the most interesting or informative aspects of the book. First, Lynn finally puts to rest the notion that equates Nazism with eugenics and eugenics with the Holocaust. Many scholars have corrected this misinformation, and Lynn summarizes it elegantly. In short, Nazi Germany did not have a sterilization program for the mentally retarded or insane that was any broader in scope than other countries at the time. Per capita, Sweden had sterilized far more people, as did many other Western countries. When it came to euthanasia, there was basically one purpose when beginning in 1939 they needed to free up resources and make room in the hospitals for the war effort. Euthanasia had nothing to do with eugenics. And with regards to the Holocaust, the Jews were killed because they were seen to be behind the spreading of communism and they were viewed as a highly intelligent and capable race of people who would compete with Germany's goal of world domination. So as it turns out, Germany's eugenics' program was never very developed or aggressive: they had war on their minds. Other countries were much more assertive as eugenics was supported by socialists as well as the general public. But to make a case for Marxism in the last few decades, it was very beneficial to link the defeated and hated Nazis with eugenics and racism. When this stuck in the public's mind, radical environmentalism was on its way to being largely unchallenged. Today, this mindset is still in place. In numerous articles and surveys, different racial groups are compared and typically the status of Blacks is compared to that of Whites, and the disparity is blamed always on racism or the government's failure to act strongly enough to make everyone equal. Never is the point made that different racial groups have incomes equivalent to their average IQs, with Blacks on the bottom and Jews and East Asians at the top. It is always taken for granted that different racial groups are on average equally intelligent, and yet only sociologists and cultural anthropologists still embrace this myth and perpetuate it through the media by routinely issuing new studies and surveys that ignore genetic differences. Lynn shatters the racial equality myth summarizing succinctly what is known today. He even includes a formula for estimating the expected intelligence of your children based on the parents IQ and the average IQ of the general population that the parents belong to. He also tackles the "if everyone is intelligent, who will mow my lawn?" argument. With numerous examples, explanations, and hypotheses about a future world of geniuses, he puts this conundrum to rest. In short, even geniuses are capable of doing the dishes and mowing the lawn. If highly intelligent Jews can share the manual workload on an Israeli Kibbutzim, then a eugenic state of geniuses can also. I would also venture a guess from the evidence that the only intelligent people who would resist doing their share of the more tedious tasks would be those with the behavioral trait of low conscientiousness. And as I will discuss later, this is the only behavioral trait that probably has no benefit to society and should be bred out of the general population anyway. Which brings us to psychopathy, conscientiousness and agreeableness. Once we all agree that a eugenics' program should reduce genetic disease and raise general intelligence, the only question left is should we tamper with human behavioral traits? Psychometricians, astonishingly, have settled on the use of the Big Five behavioral factors: conscientiousness, agreeableness, introversion-extroversion, open-mindedness, and neuroticism. Lynn puts to rest, as do many other psychometricians, any notion that the last three have any consequences in the workplace in general. That is, many different combinations of these three factors can be of benefit or a hindrance depending on the task. So Lynn concentrates on the first two that in combination results in a psychopathic personality. He demonstrates convincingly that from all the available research, psychopaths along with low intelligence are responsible for society's problems with crime, drug addiction, unwed mothers, drug abuse, rape, child abuse, unemployment, etc. These people are the underclass. And they result from the combination of two behavioral traits. They almost universally have low conscientiousness and agreeableness or altruism. (Lynn explains that altruism would be a better term than agreeableness but that term has now "stuck" as the common descriptor for this behavioral trait). That is, people who are both highly unconscientious and disagreeable are pathological, and both of these traits are highly heritable. From this observation, Lynn softly recommends that a eugenics' program should include a reduction of both unconscientiousness and disagreeableness. But I have to take issue with this recommendation. My interpretation is that only unconscientiousness has no value in modern society, and that its elimination will eliminate the psychopaths, especially in a nation state with an extremely high average intelligence. Such a society should be able to deal with the occasionally exceptionally disagreeable person. There is no need to get rid of disagreeableness because a highly altruistic state may be extremely vulnerable to indoctrination and subjugation. This seems to be why the West is now in a dysgenic spiral downward, the more Scandinavian races have a maladaptive level of altruism that allows others to become parasitical towards them. This is a dangerous combination and though the society may benefit internally from altruism it can also be overtaken by other racial groups who are far less altruistic and benevolent. Lynn then deals with the mechanisms for reducing genetic disease and increasing intelligence. First, he points out that detractors of eugenics are correct in their pessimism of completely eliminating recessive genetic diseases because as they are reduced they become ever more difficult to select against. But he notes that in ten generations, half of all recessive genetic disease alleles could be eliminated. This in combination with genetic testing of the fetus could make the complete elimination of the alleles unnecessary. The genetic disease itself would seldom be expressed in a child. With regards to increasing intelligence, he makes a good case for how relatively easy it is. Since the heritability of intelligence is so high at around 80% compared to say behavioral factors around 50% or a little less, intelligence is a no-brainer for eugenics. And with new technologies, remarkable jumps can be made in just one generation. He shows how if a normal couple would just genetically select the potentially most intelligent embryos for implantation, the intelligence of the children selected would increase by 15 IQ points. Yes, 15 IQ points in every generation up to the theoretical maximum of about 200 without any new mutations. All we need to do is identify the intelligence genes, and this should be possible in just a few shorts years (Plomin's prediction -- not Lynn's). Eugenic selection for intelligence via genetic testing of embryos followed by IVF is just a few years away. And even if it would cost a couple say $100,000 per child, it would be a bargain in terms of savings in education and increased earnings potential. And the advantages would be passed on to every generation that follows! Now that is one hell of a rate of return on your money. Spend it up front before the child is even born, and the returns are forever. Up until the last two chapters of the book, Lynn just provides us with what eugenics can do, the mechanics, and ethical foundations for its use. In these final chapters however he states what I also think is the obvious but he is much more sanguine about the outcome. Let me try to summarize his perspective and then I will embellish it. Basically the West is too weak morally (I can't think of any better term) to institute an effective eugenics' program. But the East is capable of making these tough-minded decisions, and especially China. They have already fully embraced a eugenics' policy and as the ruling totalitarian oligarchs shift from communism to nationalism, this lone nation with over a billion people will arise as the world power. They will use a combination of eugenics with a population that is already second to none in intelligence (aside from the Jews) and along with their size will grow in power and technology. But here is where Lynn and I differ. He thinks that once China has dominated the world, we will enter a period of peace even if it is without democracy. I see a different outcome, based on human nature. There is no point having power unless one can use it to dominate others. As the Chinese eugenic nation state expands, they will not make peace with other races but they will instead subjugate others for financial gain. In addition, they will use the females of other subjugated races to raise their children. That is, human slaves will be used as surrogate mothers. This new elite race of East Asians will not tolerate their own women having to suffer the pains of bearing children when there is a plentiful supply of breeders available. These slave breeders will be kept in perfectly controlled environments for this breeding purpose, to assure that the elite women do not have to suffer any inconveniences. And after birth, East Asian professional caretakers will raise the children so that again, the elite will not have to be bothered by the inconvenience of annoying children. Sound impossible? Read Lynn's book and see which scenario seems more plausible. But of course, the above plausibility is not really even relevant. What is important is that once eugenics becomes commonplace, and it is recognized that the most intelligent races will dominate the world, then the arms race in eugenics will commence. It may happen within one nation state, it may happen by way of secret cults, it may happen by the wealthiest only using the technology. But it will happen and it will not happen equally to all races or peoples. And this is what an evolutionary arms race is all about. The next 100 years will see a new human species arise --- or the destruction of all humans. But one thing is sure; it will not be peaceably negotiated away. Eugenics is happening now! And it will be accelerating at an exponential rate over the next few decades. Matt Nuenke, July 2001 -------------- "Important note: You can get 20% off Eugenics: A Reassessment (and all other books published by Praeger) by telling the operator the 'source code,' which is F238. You can order by phone by calling 800-225-5800." ------------------------------------------------- Richard Lynn along with Tatu Vanhanen have a new book coming out in 2002 entitled IQ and the wealth of Nations. In the Summer 2001 issue of Mankind Quarterly they have published some of the findings that will be presented in that book. Following I have provided the 81 nations where he has looked at the average IQ and the Gross Domestic Product, and it is clear that just like an individual's intelligence has an impact on how successful a person will become, nations also die or succeed depending on their average intelligence. But first a few notes of interest on the numbers. The "fitted GDP" is a perfect correlation with the average IQ. That is, compare the "fitted GDP" to the actual "GDP" and there will be some anomalies. For example, Qatar has a low average IQ but a high GDP---they are a small oil rich nation with foreigners extracting and exporting the oil for them. Another of course is the once Communist and still Communist countries. They were destroyed economically by an environmental determinist ideology. And it shows in the numbers. Then there is the low intelligence of Ireland and Israel that seems like a mistake. In the case of Ireland, selective migration has caused the more intelligent Irish to emigrate, leaving the poor and less intelligent farmers behind. In the case of Israel, the authors explain, that Jews from many areas are of low intelligence along with Palestinians. However, the Ashkenazi Jews of Eastern Europe who dominate the politics of Israel and are the dominant Jews in the United States have an average IQ of about 115. And one other observation with regards to the average intelligence of a nation and its GDP should be considered. Is it a homogeneous nation or is there a ruling elite? If there is a separate small racial group of highly intelligent people who can direct the nation, the GDP may be higher than one would expect. Anyway, we will need to wait for the book length analysis to get more information on this fascinating study. But it is just one more way that we can use to show that intelligence is important, and that some countries are just too backward to expect them to join in a common bond with the rest of humanity. The following table lists the country, then the average IQ, then the gross domestic product (GDP), and then the fitted GDP. The fitted GDP is just the theoretical straight line correlation between IQ and GDP. For example, China should have a GDP of 16,183 based on the average intelligence of the population, but because of Communism, they only have a GDP of 3,105. Country average IQ GDP fitted GDP Hong Kong 107 20,763 19,817 Korea, South 106 13,478 19,298 Japan 105 23,257 18,779 Taiwan 104 13,000 18,260 Singapore 103 24,210 17,740 Austria 102 23,166 17,221 Germany 102 22,169 17,221 Italy 102 20,585 17,221 Netherlands 102 22,176 17,221 Sweden 101 20,659 16,702 Switzerland 101 25,512 16,702 Belgium 100 23,223 16,183 China 100 3,105 16,183 NewZealand 100 17,288 16,183 U. Kingdom 100 20,336 16,183 Hungary 99 10,232 15,664 Poland 99 7,619 15,664 Australia 98 22,452 15,145 Denmark 98 24,218 15,145 France 98 21,175 15,145 Norway 98 26,342 15,145 United States 98 29,605 15,145 Canada 97 23,582 14,626 Czech Republic 97 12,362 14,626 Finland 97 20,847 14,626 Spain 97 16,212 14,626 Argentina 96 12,013 14,107 Russia 96 6,460 14,107 Slovakia 96 9,699 14,107 Uruguay 96 8,623 14,107 Portugal 95 14,701 13,589 Slovenia 95 14,293 13,588 Israel 94 17,301 13,069 Romania 94 5,648 13,069 Bulgaria 93 4,809 12,550 Ireland 93 21,482 12,550 Greece 92 13,943 12,031 Malaysia 92 8,137 12,031 Thailand 91 5,456 11,512 Croatia 90 6,749 10,993 Peru 90 4,282 10,993 Turkey 90 6,422 10,993 Colombia 89 6,006 10,474 Indonesia 89 2,651 10,474 Suriname 89 5,161 10,474 Brazil 87 6,625 9,436 Iraq 87 3,197 9,436 Mexico 87 7,704 9,436 Samoa (Western) 87 3,832 9,436 Tonga 87 3,000 9,436 Lebanon 86 4,326 8,917 Philippines 86 3,555 8,917 Cuba 85 3,967 8,398 Morocco 85 3,305 8,398 Fiji 84 4,231 7,879 Iran 84 5,121 7,879 Marshall Islands 84 3,000 7,879 Puerto Rico 84 8,000 7,879 Egypt 83 3,041 7,360 India 81 2,077 6,322 Ecuador 80 3,003 5,803 Guatemala 79 3,505 5,284 Barbados 78 12,001 4,765 Nepal 78 1,157 4,765 Qatar 78 20,987 4,765 Zambia 77 719 4,246 Congo (Brazz) 73 995 2,170 Uganda 73 1,074 2,170 Jamaica 72 3,389 1,651 Kenya 72 980 1,651 South Africa 72 8,488 1,651 Sudan 72 1,394 1,651 Tanzania 72 480 1,651 Ghana 71 1,735 1,132 Nigeria 67 795 -944 Guinea 66 1,782 -1,463 Zimbabwe 66 2,669 -1,463 Congo (Zaire) 65 822 -1,982 Sierra Leone 64 458 -2,501 Ethiopia 63 574 -3,020 Equatorial Guinea 59 1,817 -5,096 From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 15:59:02 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 10:59:02 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Magic City Morning Star: New Maine House Bill Would Protect Fetuses Carrying the 'Gay Gene' Message-ID: New Maine House Bill Would Protect Fetuses Carrying the 'Gay Gene' http://magic-city-news.com/article_3173.shtml By IPR Feb 22, 2005, 19:02 AUGUSTA -- Rep. Brian Duprey (R-Hampden) has submitted a bill to the State Legislature to shield potentially homosexual fetuses from discrimination. LD 908, "An Act to Protect Homosexuals from Discrimination," attempts to protect homosexuals from death because they might carry the gene that could lead to homosexuality. This bill as drafted would make it a crime to abort an unborn child if that child is determined to be carrying the "homosexual gene." Duprey said that no such genetic marker has yet been discovered. But considering rapid advancements in genetic mapping research, he wants legislation in place should such a breakthrough occur. "If the homosexual gene is ever determined to exist," he said, "I want to ensure that a woman could not abort an unborn child simply because that child is determined to be carrying this gene." Duprey received the idea for this bill when listening to the Rush Limbaugh radio show. "I heard Rush saying that the day the 'gay gene' is determined to be real, that overnight gays would become pro-life," Duprey said. "Most people would agree that to kill someone just because that person might be gay would constitute a hate crime," said Duprey. "I have heard from women who told me that if they found out that they were carrying a child with the gay gene, then they would abort. I think this is wrong. Those unborn children should be protected." Rep. Duprey is serving in his third term representing the towns of Hampden, Newburgh and Dixmont. He is the lead Republican on the Labor Committee. From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 15:59:43 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 10:59:43 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Jonah Goldberg: Technology Changes Things: Chesterton and Terri Schiavo. Message-ID: Jonah Goldberg: Technology Changes Things: Chesterton and Terri Schiavo. http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.asp?ref=/goldberg/goldberg200503251202.asp [This mentions the Maine politician who tried to pass a law limiting parental eugenic choice. I have not heard any further developments since James Hughes alerted us to it on February 24.] March 25, 2005, 12:02 p.m. "Progress," G.K. Chesterton proclaimed, "is the mother of problems." Whatever side you come down on regarding the tragic case of Terri Schiavo, this is an important observation to keep in mind. Not too long ago I wrote a column about how technology changes the ideological landscape. To illustrate the point, I mentioned the attempt by a Maine politician to pass a law that would bar aborting fetuses that tested positive for the "gay gene." The effort was a lark, of course. But I thought taking it seriously, in a hypothetical way, would illuminate some of the ways in which technology can transform our ideological categories. Many, many readers from across the country disagreed. "I don't know about you, Mr. Goldberg, but I try to be consistent in my principles, no matter how the circumstances change," was the general response from most of the dissenters. This kind of objection is well intended but fundamentally flawed, as the Schiavo case makes clear. It is now likely that Ms. Schiavo will starve to death. While I think there are major problems with Congress's intrusion into this case, I also think her death is certainly tragic, and the Florida courts probably got this one wrong. But we would not be having this debate if medical science had not advanced beyond where it was, say, 100 years ago. Ms. Schiavo would have died before the argument was born. Those who advocate keeping Schiavo alive like to draw an analogy between the feeding tube that sustains her and normal food. The analogy obviously has a lot of power. But analogies always leave out important differences. If Schiavo could eat normal food in a normal fashion, this debate wouldn't exist. The courts cannot deny a person the right to eat food or drink water on their own. And, of course, if Schiavo could do these things, it would be powerful evidence that her brain damage is not as extensive as some claim. In other words, it is only thanks -- for want of a better word -- to the very wonderful advances in medical technology that we are having this argument at all. Progress and its consequences also has some bearing on the great debate Americans were conducting before the Schiavo story crowded out all else: Social Security reform. Whatever you think about the merits of this proposal or that, few would disagree that Social Security faces funding problems essentially because society has changed. Few Americans lived to 65, let alone much past it, when the New Dealers created their Ponzi, er, pension scheme. Today the ratio of workers to oldsters is dropping like a stone because technology allows us to live so much longer. The most obvious credit goes to medical progress. But technology has also made jobs less life-threatening and food safer and more bountiful. Technology has also helped transform children from economic necessities to glorious luxuries. In agricultural societies, kids are the best source of cheap labor. Indeed, not long ago, having a lot of children was your smartest retirement plan. Today, by contrast, in advanced, industrialized societies kids are people you invest in with little anticipated material return. All of these developments bring new problems to the surface, most of them unanticipated. Even many of the pro-life protesters on the courthouse steps hold up signs saying, in effect, that if Terri Schiavo had a living will, they'd have nothing to protest. Well, the whole idea of a living will would have seemed batty before we came up with the technologies that can keep hearts beating long after it's certain that their brains work at all. None of this is to say that principled people change their principles when the wind changes. Rather, new events make us rethink how our principles should be applied. Everyone is for free speech and everyone is, eventually, pro-life. But new circumstances test where we will draw the lines for this or that principle. This is how ideological coalitions arise and, often, disappear. Whittaker Chambers, that great hero of modern conservatism, actually refused to call himself a "conservative" for largely these reasons (he preferred to call himself a "man of the right"). A former Communist (like so many of modern conservatism's founding fathers), he couldn't abandon a certain attachment to Marxist dialectical materialism. Without rummaging through the dustbin of history to explain what that means, suffice it to say that Chambers believed that the tides of change -- technological, economic, political -- were too powerful for mere individuals to stop. Rather, the best that self-described conservatives could do was work within those currents for the best possible outcome. He called his stance the Beaconsfield position, after the British prime minister credited with reconciling conservatism to modern realities. I don't agree entirely with Chambers, but he and Chesterton were obviously correct on the basic insight that modernity often crashes down on us faster than we can adapt. New events create new stresses on ideological pillars once considered adamantine while they render old conflicts irrelevant. The Schiavo case split many people along principled lines. Is it so unimaginable that tomorrow they may be reunited by some new and unforeseen crisis that progress brings? -- (c) 2005 Tribune Media Services [spacer.gif] [spacer.gif] [spacer.gif] [spacer.gif] ______________________________________________________________________ [spacer.gif] [spacer.gif] http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg200503251202.asp References 1. mailto:jonahnro at aol.com 2. http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg-archive.asp 3. http://www.nationalreview.com/email_friend/email-friend.asp 4. http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.asp?ref=<%=printurl%> From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:00:40 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:00:40 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Plausible Futures: God, Religion and Tribal Conflict Message-ID: http://plausible.custompublish.com/index.php?id=195061&cat=6698&printable=1 4.12.11 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY PROMETHEUS BOUND There is now enough evidence that modern human society should be based on an understanding that as long as we are a tribalistic species, there will be more peace, more prosperity, and more happiness when nation-states can be formed by similar people. That is, the homogenous state is far more prone to be beneficial to human happiness than the discords found in multicultural and diverse states. This means a rejection of any political universals enforced by a world body except maybe the notion that to stop conflict, it is best to just separate the belligerents physically as much as possible. That is, promote non-aggressive, non-jingoistic nationalismwhere countries compete in the marketplace of commerce and ideas. Lately I have read several books on why humans have religion, why humans are basically irrational, why humans can't differentiate between what is instrumentally beneficial and what is emotionally destructive, etc. One thing that does jump out at me when I read these works dealing with our evolutionary past, is that books can vary in extremes from just-so stories to well documented hypotheses testing. Two recent books occupy these extremes: The God Gene: How Faith Is Hardwired into Our Genes by Dean Hamer (2004), and Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, Edited by Peter Hammerstein (2003). The God Gene is the just-so story, it has a lot of good information; however it jumps to some rather silly conclusions from the skimpy data. Hamer makes the case that religion is different from what he calls self-transcendence: religion is what is culturally transmitted, and one's leaning towards self-transcendence is primarily geneticno god or religion required; so even the title of the book is misleading. He does do a good job of showing that self-transcendence may be yet another behavioral trait that is independent of others that have been studied, but he does not show that it is independent of cooperation and/or ethnocentrism. More on this later. Hamer states that, "Self-transcendence provides a numerical measure of people's capacity to reach out beyond themselvesto see everything in the world as part of one great totality. If I were to describe it in a single word, it might be 'at-one-ness.'" That is, it includes losing oneself in a common good, feeling like part of something special, mysticism, etc. The problem with Hamer's perspective however is that he sees this as a universal goodpeople who are spiritual are somehow better than people that are more rational. In fact, this book could be, morally speaking, the flip side of Stanovich's The Robot's Rebellion, where he calls on people to be more rational and less mystical. He reiterates, "Self-transcendence is a term used to describe spiritual feelings that are independent of traditional religiousness. It is not based on belief in any particular God, frequency of prayer, or other orthodox religious doctrines or practices. Instead, it gets to the heart of spiritual belief: the nature of the universe and our place in it. Self-transcendent individuals tend to see everything, including themselves, as part of one great totality. They have a strong sense of 'at-one-ness'of the connections between people, places, and things. Non-self-transcendent people, on the other hand, tend to have a more self-centered viewpoint. They focus on differences and discrepancies between people, places, and things, rather than similarities and interrelationships." Hamer seems to be advocating, though I am not sure he is aware of it, for what I would merely call tribalism, ethnocentrism, cooperative human behavior, etc. versus the more independent behavioral types who are less tribal, more creative, more questioning, and perhaps more scientific and rational. There seems to be, in some way, a thread of connectedness between groupishness and independence, and it could be as easily argued that it is our human groupishness that gets us into trouble, not our more rational/scientific independence. I don't claim that there is a clear dichotomy between these two extremes, but research into altruism, mysticism, ethnocentrism, cooperation, etc.must be anchored in evolutionary adaptation (unless they are merely artifacts). In either case, they carry no intrinsic moral value either way. For example, Hamer states that: "These are some of the questions used to assess the second sub-scale of self-transcendence, known as transpersonal identification. The hallmark of this trait is a feeling of connectedness to the universe and everything in itanimate and inanimate, human and nonhuman, anything and everything that can be seen, heard, smelled, or otherwise sensed. People who score high for transpersonal identification can become deeply, emotionally attached to other people, animals, trees, flowers, streams, or mountains. Sometimes they feel that everything is part of one living organism. "Transpersonal identification can lead people to make personal sacrifices to help othersfor example, by fighting against war, poverty, or racism. It may inspire people to become environmentalists. Although there are no formal survey data, it is likely that members of the Sierra Club and Greenpeace score above average on this facet of self-transcendence. A drawback of transpersonal identification is that it can lead to fuzzy-headed idealism that actually hinders rather than helps the cause. "Individuals who score low on transpersonal identification feel less connected to the universe and therefore feel less responsible for what happens to the world and its inhabitants. They are more concerned about themselves than about others, more inclined to use nature than to appreciate it." Imbedded in the above remarks is an extreme bias for "fuzzy-headed" idealism as being more beneficial than rational discourse and action. He makes a wild leap that if a person does not feel connected to the universe, they are somehow not going to make rational choice decisions about what is good for themselves and other humans. Now if Hamer could link free-riders or psychopathic personalities with people who are low on self-transcendence, then he might have a case that one group may be more concerned about other people, but he does not do this. Islamic terrorists probably tend to be mystical rather than merely religious due to cultureit takes a whole lot of "connectedness" to blow oneself up over injustices perceived. And most progress when it comes to science, including all of the health improvements made possible by it, comes from the minds of the dedicated scientists, not the spiritual recluse chanting a prayer to reach nirvana. The Western mind, the mind that is responsible for most of what is science, is practical and less mystical, and it has reduced a great deal of suffering because of our scientific progress. I think Stanovich's prognosis of what ails humanity is far more grounded in facts than Hamer's moralizing. As Hamer states, people who score low on mysticism are, "more materialistic and objective. They see an unusual loaf of bread or an unexpected parking opportunity as nothing more than coincidence. They don't believe in things that can't be explained scientifically." That suites me just fine. The more rational humans can becomeeither through education, genetics, or boththe better we will be able to settle conflicts. Mysticism is a dead end to answering complex problems. Part of Hamer's interest in writing this book is to publicize his work in finding the so-called God-Gene, or VMAT2. This one gene has a significant impact on the degree of self-transcendence, but other genes are yet to be found. What interests me as a eugenicist is that we can now screen for this gene and eliminate it, whereas Hamer would most likely try to breed for it. In fact, he does go into a great deal of discussion with regards to assortative mating. Pointing out that while one's religion is cultural and self-transcendence is primarily genetic, he notes (as have many others) that people marry their own kind when it comes to personality types and chosen religion. In the past, humans typically married others with the same religion because humans up until recently have been very parochial. Now however, we are far more mobile and cosmopolitan, and it seems that rather than the human genome becoming a melting pot, we will increasingly be more selective in marrying those who are more like us in terms of intelligence and behavior. Increasingly, materialists will marry materialists, and spiritualists will marry spiritualists. Personally, that is one area where I would not suffer a mate who believed in magic, god, Gaia, or any other significant level of self-transcendenceit would just be too alien to me. Hamer also devotes a chapter to Jewish "cultural practices as genetic selective forces." I could not quite get a handle on where he was going with these examples of culturally defined breeding practices, but it does follow or parallels MacDonald's work on Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. This surprised me because he makes no reference to MacDonald, as if he is unaware of his work. (MacDonald 1994, 1998a, 1998b.) He also devotes a great deal of time to healing, health, religion and spiritualism. Nevertheless, ultimately, the only message seems to be that almost any correlation can be found between how people are treated and how well they do in terms of health. These stories are as numerous as they are meaningless in the totality of things. Yes, make people feel better, more optimistic, less afraid, and they will probably have a better outcome when it comes to health and happiness. Alternatively, just get a pet dog or shoot your oppressive boss and get away with it. Almost anything has an impact on our inner state of beingunfortunately, most of us can do little to create a personally blissful life for ourselves without knocking heads with others trying to do the same. Embracing new age mysticism is not the answer to real problems that require empirical approaches. Prayer vigils to my knowledge have never stopped an execution by the state, nor prevented war. Hamer then discusses temporal lobe epilepsy, and shows that this particular form of epilepsy can lead to profound religious experiences in afflicted people. From this, he and others have extrapolated that the temporal lobe must be the seat of all mystical experience (hallucinations) and that even normal people sometimes have temporal lobe misfirings that cause them to experience miraculous events. This is an extreme stretch of logic that needs far more research to connect self-transcendence with a singular area of the brain. (For an excellent book on Islam and its founder, and the connection with epilepsy and self-transcendence that leads to terrorism, read The Sword of the Prophet: IslamHistory, Theology, Impact on the World by Serge Trifkovic, 2002.) Hamer tries to support this brain malfunction for spirituality theory: "Based on this experiment and other lines of evidence, Persinger believes that the biological basis of all spiritual and mystical experiences is due to spontaneous firing of the temporoparietal regionhighly focal microseizures without any obvious motor effects. He calls such episodes transients and theorizes that they occur in everybody to some extent. Exactly how often and how strongly is determined by a mix of genes, environment, and experience. The main effect of such transients is to increase communication between the right and left temporoparietal areas, leading to a brief confusion between the sense of self and the sense of others. The outcome, he says, is a 'sense of a presence' that people interpret as a God, spirit, or other mystical being." He does tell us that 60,000 years ago, there is evidence that Neanderthal man had religion. He then states, "I believe our genetic predisposition for faith is no accident. It provides us with a sense of purpose beyond ourselves and keeps us from being incapacitated by our dread of mortality. Our faith gives us the optimism to press on regardless of the hardships we face." This seems to be the sum total of his explanation for human irrationality and embracing of false beliefs. He goes on to mention what decades of research by evolutionary psychologists now accept: that altruism, human cooperation, acceptance of group norms (like religion), disgust towards outsiders, blood lust, patriotism, ethnocentrism, and a host of other human tendencies are due to group evolutionary strategies. If the tribe were not united into a tight and cohesive unit, they would be killed or displaced by other tribes who were more aggressive and united, including a willingness to die for the group in intertribal warfare. Then he dismisses this research as impossible: "One popular concept is that religion helps societies organize and successfully compete against others. But if such group-level selection were the only selective force, God genes would probably die out or be limited to only certain parts of the world, since the necessary conditionshigh degree of kinship within the group and high degree of competition with outside groupsare limited to particular geographical areas and certain historical times. To be a universal facet of our evolution, there must be additional reasons to account for the persistence of God genes." The problem with this simplistic explanation is that there is massive amounts of data that group selection did take place over millions of years, and even if there were short periods where tribal conflict and/or tribal cooperation was absent or minimal, such periods were short in duration and were the exception. Evolution is slow, and such short respites from conflict and/or cooperation would not have altered human behavior (below I will discuss new research about tribal conflict leading to cooperative behaviors). Hamer finishes the book with a chapter on Jewish cultural practices, explains that Jews have maintained their racial separation, and today they continue to be closer genetically to Arabs. He claims that the racial separation between Jews and those they lived among was due to Jewish religious culture, which is what has been put forth by Kevin MacDonald and includes an analysis of Jewish genetic frequencies for xenophobia, high intelligence, as well as other behavioral traits (again gene-culture coevolution). However, he then claims that Jews were allowed to assimilate into the surrounding gentile cultures, but gentiles were not allowed into the Jewish faith, and this was due to Jews being discriminated against! Now that is a strange twist of logic, and a bit simplistic to say the least. Conflicts between Jews and gentiles have been a 3,000 year ordeal, it is complex, and it is ever changing. To dismiss assimilation because "people don't like us" seems rather sophomoric. Gene-Culture Coevolution In contrast to Hamer's book, Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation came out of the 90th Dahlem Workshop held in Berlin, Germany in 2002. I only stumbled upon two paragraphs that deviated from scientific objectivity. With contributions by numerous researchers in evolutionary psychology, had it been read by Hamer, his book would have been far more empirical with less utopian dreaming. For decades, group selection has been downplayed, primarily because humans were lumped in with other organisms, and the model just did not work out. Simply stated, after further review, since humans have an evolved language, we have also evolved oddities like altruism and or cooperation, as well as religion and irrationality. With language came a host of evolutionary artifacts that other organisms do not have to deal with. In fact, the only explanation for such extreme forms of human behavior such as universal altruism, feeling one-with-the-earth, suicide bombers, and serial killers is to look at how language and culture coevolved to insert a great deal of human emotion into what makes us do what we do, even to our own detriment. One of the fundamental principles of evolutionary psychology (EP) is the assumption that during the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA), humans everywhere faced similar ecologies and therefore we all evolved in roughly the same way. On the other hand, behavior or quantitative genetics looks at the differences between people and between races, with the understanding that humans in different parts of the world and under varying degrees of ecological change and cultural differences, adapted in differing ways. This book seems to be just barely breaking through the simplistic EP assumption of a single universal human mind, though the evidence for diversity in behavior has been evident to even pre-scientific man. Now for the problem: people often act in a way that is harmful to them in order to fulfill some inner need or emotion. We have evolved to do the irrational. The list here is endless but includes giving spare change to beggars and blowing oneself up for a nation or religion. Humans can span the extremes from indifference to extreme outrage at transgressors of norms and/or values adopted by the group. Likewise, the group is very malleable and changingthough this was not the case 10,000 years ago. The challenge is to try to fit together our irrational moral outrages of today with evolved human emotions from our commonand often racially uniquepasts. Daniel M.T. Fessler and Kevin J. Haley state that "We have suggested that guilt and righteousness facilitate the formation and preservation of cooperative relationships. However, not all cooperative relationships are worthwhile. In some cases, the benefits of defection exceed the benefits of cooperation. In a world without emotions that function to preserve cooperative relationships, steep time discounting alone would lead to high rates of defection. However, the existence of relationship-preserving emotions creates a situation in which it may be advantageous to mark explicitly individuals who have little of value to offer the actor. We suggest that contempt is the emotion accompanying exactly such an evaluation. By highlighting the low value of the other individual, contempt predisposes the actor to either (a) avoid establishing a relationship, (b) establish a relationship on highly unequal (i.e., exploitative) grounds, or (c) defect on an existing relationship. Consistent with the low valuation of the other, contempt seems to preclude the experience of prosocial emotions in the event that the actor is able to exploit the partner, apparently by framing the harm as merited." This is an interesting insight, and yet I doubt if the authors understand its universal implications. Just as individuals within groups may find others contemptible, it is even more prevalent in group conflicts. In diverse societies where different ethnic groups mingle, contempt for the other is rampant, even though most states take extraordinary measures reduce tensions. When groups react like individuals howeverinstituting avoidance, exploitation, or defectionit is seen as somehow immoral. In reality however, these are just emotions that any one individual can have from one extreme to the other. One person becomes an anti-racist (universal moralist) and attacks their own race in favor of another, while the race realist faces the certainty that benevolence towards others may not be reciprocated in kind. But I digress, as the point of this book is to explain the process of punishment coupled with cooperation. Ernst Fehr and Joseph Henrich state that, "Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. This chapter provides ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling, and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem with these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior, whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity." Strong reciprocators are the "do-gooders" or the "berserkers" both. That is whether I am a suicide bomber in Iraq, or a missionary healing the sick in Somalia, it is the same behavior that has to be explained. Why would anyone give up so much for so little in return, in terms of evolutionary fitness? That is, humans do very peculiar things when it comes to altruism, cooperation, taking revenge, etc. To really understand how this takes place and what it means, I think one has to play games with themselves on a rational level. I started slowly doing that years ago when I first came upon questions of rationality and behavior. It goes something like this: next time you eat at a diner where you will probably never return, how much of a tip will you leave? What organizations will you give to, any that you are really againstlike the United Way but the corporation pressures you to "participate?" If someone needs help, how do you react? I have found that by being rational I can modify some of my behavior but in other areas I prefer the feeling of "doing the right thing" or feeling "self righteous." I will over-tip the cabby; I will give large tips to movers who deliver my new stove; I will buy a ticket at an event from some pest at work just to keep the peace and my image in tact. At the same time, when asked by a Costco clerk if I would like to donate a dollar to a children's hospital I said no! He said "it was only a dollar and for a good cause," as I rebutted, "I do not like to be hustled by corporations trying to make themselves look good." To get inside of the extremes from self-serving behavior (bordering on psychopathy) to extreme kinship resource acquisition (families fighting over an uncle's inheritance), to universal moralism (missionaries and suicide bombers), to the passive individual that merely follows the rules but doesn't really take much notice of anything (I'd rather be fishing), we have to understand the complex emotions that evolved to drive us into behavioral niches. Virtually all humans are coalition builders, at least passively by getting along by going along with some groups while being antagonistic against others. But there are behavioral differences in the way that individuals react to group members. Some people are moral enforcers, and will take action to punish non-cooperators even at their own expense. Others will punish non-cooperators only when they need to, while yet others will shirk their duty to "act morally" within the group. As Ernst Fehr and Joseph Henrich put it, "Hence, within-group selection creates evolutionary pressures against strong reciprocity [moral enforcers] because strong reciprocators engage in individually costly behaviors that benefit the whole group. In contrast, between-group selection favors strong reciprocity because groups with disproportionately many strong reciprocators are better able to survive. The consequence of these two evolutionary forces is that in equilibrium, strong reciprocators and purely selfish humans coexist. This logic applies to genes, cultural traits, or both in an interactive process. Thus, this approach provides a logically rigorous argument as to why we observe heterogeneous responses in laboratory experiments." What is showing up over and over again in the behavioral sciences is the recognition that unlike most organisms, humans with their language ability can enforce group conforming behavior that sets up our in-group/out-group nature. We compete with each other within the group, but we also have a fiercely embraced sense of belonging to a group for protection from other groups as well as advancement for our group against other groups. Originally, this was only the tribal group, but humans have such a strong attachment to tribalistic affiliations that it can now be artificially created through indoctrination on almost any level, from patriotism to religious adherence, to terrorist cells. This may not seem like such an important observation, but only a few years ago group-level evolutionary selection was dismissed as impossible. As such, we could not come to grips with human behavior that was irrational in terms of selection pressures on only individuals and their genes. This meant that universals like racism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and social dominance were dismissed as social constructs that could just be adjudicated away by our wise leaders. (Our leaders still use the old paradigms that are rapidly being replaced in the behavioral sciences.) Peter J. Richerson, Robert T. Boyd, and Joseph Henrich state that "These successive rounds of coevolutionary change continued until eventually people were equipped with capacities for cooperation with distantly related people, emotional attachments to symbolically marked groups, and a willingness to punish others for transgression of group rules. Mechanisms by which cultural institutions might exert forces tugging in this direction are not far to seek. People are likely to discriminate against genotypes that are incapable of conforming to cultural norms. People who cannot control their self-serving aggression ended up exiled or executed in small-scale societies and imprisoned in contemporary ones. People whose social skills embarrass their families will have a hard time attracting mates. Of course, selfish and nepotistic impulses were never entirely suppressed; our genetically transmitted evolved psychology shapes human cultures, and as a result cultural adaptations often still serve the ancient imperatives of inclusive genetic fitness. However, cultural evolution also creates new selective environments that build cultural imperatives into our genes." It is also now observed that our new advanced technological culture will push genetic changes in our behavioral and cognitive repertoires. 50,000 years ago, humans lived in small tribes, only occasionally went to war with their neighbors, sometimes committing genocide while taking the women for mating. This fusion and fissuring of genotypes was slow compared to the options we have today for rapid changes in our genes. From preimplantation diagnostics to select against genetic disease, to mass extinction of whole nations from either conventional or nuclear weapons is now possible. From the turmoil of rapid social change will come rapid genetic change: "Contemporary human societies differ drastically from the societies in which our social instincts evolved. Pleistocene hunter-gatherer societies were comparatively small, egalitarian, and lacking in powerful institutionalized leadership. By contrast, modern societies are large, inegalitarian, and have coercive leadership institutions. If the social instincts hypothesis is correct, our innate social psychology furnishes the building blocks for the evolution of complex social systems, while simultaneously constraining the shape of these systems. To evolve large-scale, complex social systems, cultural evolutionary processes, driven by cultural group selection, take advantage of whatever support these instincts offer. For example, families willingly take on the essential roles of biological reproduction and primary socialization, reflecting the ancient and still powerful effects of selection at the individual and kin level. At the same time, cultural evolution must cope with a psychology evolved for life in quite different sorts of societies. Appropriate larger-scale institutions must regulate the constant pressure from smaller groups (coalitions, cabals, cliques) to subvert rules favoring large groups. To do this cultural evolution often makes use of 'work-arounds.' It mobilizes the tribal instincts for new purposes. For example, large national and international (e.g., great religions) institutions develop ideologies of symbolically marked inclusion that often fairly successfully engage the tribal instincts on a much larger scale." (Peter J. Richerson, Robert T. Boyd, and Joseph Henrich) There is now enough evidence that modern human society should be based on an understanding that as long as we are a tribalistic species, there will be more peace, more prosperity, and more happiness when nation-states can be formed by similar people. That is, the homogenous state is far more prone to be beneficial to human happiness than the discords found in multicultural and diverse states. This means a rejection of any political universals enforced by a world body except maybe the notion that to stop conflict, it is best to just separate the belligerents physically as much as possible. That is, promote non-aggressive, non-jingoistic nationalismwhere countries compete in the marketplace of commerce and ideas. --- Matt Nuenke, December 2004. From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:01:39 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:01:39 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Gold Sea: Asian Faces Under the American Beauty Standard Message-ID: Asian Faces Under the American Beauty Standard http://goldsea.com/Features/Beauty/beauty.html [And here's the emergence of what, for want of a better term, Yellow Supremacy. A reply follows from another list follows.] Asian female faces rate high under universal beauty standards and are moving up under an increasingly Asianizing American beauty standard. by Dean Ching Beauty matters. Ask any Asian American who has spent hours in front of a mirror tormenting herself with the question ?Am I beautiful?? Beauty is one of those things that's easy to spot but hard to define. That's why lazy thinkers of the past have gotten themselves off the hook with the breezy "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder." Copout. That old saw begs the question, why does Ms Beholder think I'm a total hottie and my pal has a great personality. The whys and wherefores of beauty aren't any more difficult to understand than, say, organic chem or quantum mechanics. It's a matter of applying the same analytical tools with the same rigor. What's really going on when we perceive someone to be hot? How does Asian beauty rate against white beauty in American minds? Are our faces beautiful or merely exotic. These are the questions on our minds. All meaningful discussions begin with fundamentals. Let's not confuse personal attraction with a society's beauty standard. As an example, most guys at the office may fantasize about that certain marketing assistant but you may avoid her because she reminds you of a teacher who traumatized you in the third grade. That brings up a key concept: that beauty comprises both a physical base and a social overlay. For any given individual the social overlay plays a much bigger role than it does for society as a whole. In other words, even though a society's beauty standards do incorporate a large social component, it tends to average out endlessly variable individual biases into a collective social overlay. So how do Asian beauties like Vivian Lai, Song Hye-kyo or Sonohara Yukino compare on the beauty scale against the likes of Kate Hudson, Gwyneth Paltrow and Reese Witherspoon? (We're saving Asian male beauty for a later article.) A Universal Beauty Standard Evolutionary psychologists have concluded that humans have an innate attraction to beautiful people. Various studies have produced some obvious conclusions: that lateral symmetry and a healthy appearance rate high on universal concepts of beauty. Another universal seems to be the waist-to-hip ratio in women which converges around .7 (e.g. 36-25-36). One of the most important, however, is a study conducted by Judith Langlois of the University of Texas. It suggests that even 3- to 6-month old babies who haven't been media-conditioned show a distinct preference for faces that conform to a narrow range of facial proportions. Interestingly, these proportions vary little across racial lines. They are uniform enough to have allowed a company called MBA to derive blueprints showing the proportions and angles that make up ideal beauty. [Caption for picture: MBA has distilled blueprints for faces of ideal beauty in both straight and smiling configurations. The blueprints are good fits when superimposed over beautiful faces of every race.] To help ensure that our species survives and continues up the evolutionary ladder, we are genetically coded to be drawn to people who possess traits suggesting health and strong survival and reproductive abilities. These include wideset eyes, high cheekbones, large eyes, full lips, clear light skin, a short nose and a relatively small lower face. The majority happen to be traits that Asian women are more likely to possess than women of other races. Below is a chart showing each feature as embodied in an attractive Asian and caucasian face and a score reflecting how the typical features of that race would rate. Asian women can rest assured that their faces aren't at a disadvantage when judged against deeply held notions of feminine beauty. American Social Overlay Where Asian beauty encounters resistance is more often on the level of the associations that its features evoke in American minds. This social overlay comprises economic, cultural and political associations as viewed through the prism of individual biases. For example, a deeply tanned Asian woman might remind many older Americans of impoverished and wartorn Asian nations, causing them to assign a lower value to her brand of beauty. Another example is a young American male who may associate an Asian woman with media images, prompting him to impute more sexuality to Asian features. The chart below shows the most common biases that produce the American social overlay on Asian beauty. Asianization of American Beauty [Caption: The appeal of Asian female beauty is shown by the increasingly frequent selection of Asians as newscasters and beauty queens. Among them are 1997 Miss USA/Universe Brooke Lee (upper left), 2001 Miss America Angela Perez Baraquio (upper right) and ABC news anchor Liz Cho.] All three components of the social overlay are shifting in favor of Asian beauty. The prosperity and modernity of East Asia and the fast emergence of China from impoverished third-world status to having the world's fastest growing middle class have raised the value of Asians in American eyes. The vibrant hi-tech cultures of Japan, Corea, Taiwan, Singapore and major Chinese cities like Hong Kong, Shanghai and Guangzhou are associating Asians with the glamour of the future rather than the dubious romance of the past. At the same time, the remarkable success of Asians in the United States and Canada have shown that Asians can compete well even as a minority on American turf. In the sphere of geopolitics, unlike previous generations in which Asians were seen as military threats, today's focus on fighting Muslim terrorism has transformed Asian nations into friends and allies. Even on the economic front, U.S. industries have either conceded the segments in which Asian companies pose the most intense competition or made alliances and other accommodations. The combined effect has been to raise Asians closer to the status of friendly, upscale faces in global society. Consequently, America's beauty standard has shifted to embrace this side of the globe. [Caption: Recent years has seen a marked increase in the numbers of Non-Asian beauties bearing Asian facial features. They include Ren?e Zellweger (facial proportions, eyes, cheeks), Mandy Moore (eyes, nose, lips) Shalom Harlow (cheekbones, jawline).] The rise of Asians on the global socio-economic charts have had a visible impact in American popular media. Recent years have seen a dramatic increase not only in the number of popular actors of Asian or part-Asian ancestry, but a dramatic shift toward more Asian-looking facial types even among non-Asian celebrities. The biggest source of Asian-looking features in otherwise non-Asian Americans is the Native American contribution to the American gene pool. Upwards of an eighth of the American population claim at least fractional Native American ancestry. Genetically native Americans are indistinguishable from people from northeast Asia, and their genes tend to be dominant, giving a large number of Americans a uniquely Asian look not found, for example, in most people in European nations. Popular non-Asians beauties like Mandy Moore, Kate Hudson, Ren?e Zellweger, Shalom Harlow and Reese Witherspoon share facial features more commonly found in Asian women than in the average caucasian women. Most have relatively small eyes, short noses, full lips, pronounced cheekbones and broad jawlines. As for the eyes and the jawlines, popular American tastes seem to defy the supposedly universal beauty ideals isolated by researchers and are actually more in line with features prevailing among Asian women. This trend is reinforced by mainstream validation of straight-out Asian beauties. For example, Miss USA/Miss Universe 1997 Brooke Lee, Miss America 2001 Angela Perez Baraquio and Miss Canada International 2001 Christine Cho are recent winners before largely western panels. Perhaps an even more convincing validation are the countless Asian female newscasters on American TV. Major media companies are betting market share on the power of their Asian faces to beguile American news viewers for entire half-hour broadcasts. And these aren't new-born infants but adults whose beauty standards are heavily tinted with the social overlay of their biases. Economics The century-long suppression of Asian immigration produced an anomalous situation during the 1970s, 80s and 90s in which relatively recent immigrants made up the majority of Asians in America. This fostered the perceptions that Asians are largely poor and unacculturated, seriously discounting the value of Asian beauty. This has been compounded by the fact that until the past two decades, Asia itself has been markedly less affluent than the U.S. and western Europe. Economics has traditionally imposed the most negative overlay on Asian beauty. The large and rapidly growing numbers of Asian Americans who make up the best-educated and most affluent segment of the American population, combined with the rapid rise of Asian economies, is adding an upscale overlay to Asian beauty among younger Americans. Culture Asia's long history and exotic cultures have always added a rich and complex backdrop against which Asian beauty has been showcased. On the one hand, the perception that Asian women have historically been raised to be docile has added a super-feminine overlay (largely unwelcomed by Asian American women) that makes Asian beauty less threatening and more appealing to many Americans, both men and women. On the other, the misconception that Asian women were traditionally considered second-class tends to detract from their perceived value. The industrialization of East Asian nations, and their association with advanced consumer products, is adding a chic, fun overlay to Asian beauty. Politics Since the 19th century, laws have been enacted to restrict or stop Asian immigration for motives of racial purity, economic competition and military threat. The U.S. military occupations of Japan, Corea and Vietnam and the resulting association with prostitutes and bargirls, have added an unsavory cast to perceptions of Asian women, especially among those old enough to remember these wars. This long history continues to add a mixed emotional charge toward Asian beauty as being both sexually alluring and potentially treacherous. Steadily warming due to U.S. quest for friends and allies in war against terrorism. [Caption: "Popular non-Asians beauties like Mandy Moore, Kate Hudson, Ren?e Zellweger, Shalom Harlow and Reese Witherspoon share facial features more commonly found in Asian women than in the average caucasian women."] [Caption: "Where Asian beauty encounters resistance is more often on the level of the associations that their features evoke in American minds."] Facial Proportions A key feature of beautiful female faces is the quality known as neoteny, or youthfulness. The eyes of adolescent women appear wider set relative to the distance from the brow to the tip of the nose. High cheekbones are also an important factor, as cheeks and eyes tend to droop with age. Asian women are favored with rounder faces that are more likely to possess these features, though a significant minority have faces that would be deemed overly broad. On the other hand many white women possess neotenous features, especially those of nordic, slavic or germanic ancestry. Skin Asian women are generally blessed with fine skin with small pores. Many also have light skin when not tanned. While the majority of white women have light skin with the pinkish hue considered universally appealing in females, many are freckly, and hairier. Nose On average Asian women have shorter noses but some are broad and fleshy. White women generally have longer noses though a significant minority have the small delicate noses universally admired in women. Lips Asian women tend to have full lips while white women tend to have thin lips. On the extremes, some Asian women can have lips that are too thick and coarse while many white women have lips that are too thin, creating a prissy look. Eyes Asian women tend to have smallish eyes that are generally upslanted. White women have larger eyes that are often downslanted. White women are more likely to have the larger eyes considered generally desirable in women. Also, the broader color palette of caucasian eyes allow for attractive hues not found in Asian eyes. ----------------- And a reply on this from another list: The single biggest surprise associated with my becoming a father for the first time at the age of 50 was that the experience brought me up hard against the age old question: Q: Why is "beauty" only skin-deep? The answer is, as I learned: A: Because "beauty" simply does not *need* to be any deeper than that! Of course I was not surprised that my new son was beautiful to my eyes, but I really never expected to have complete strangers make a special trip across the street to introduce themselves and share that same opinion with me. The most extreme reaction to his "cherubic" appearance has always been from Asians. I have found this amazing since it is biologically impossible that anyone from *their* "extended family" (Steve Sailer's characterization of the concept of "race") could ever possibly look like him. But just the other day my just-turned-6-year-old son and I dropped in on the local Chinese buffet restaurant, and we were positively *besieged* by the elderly (perhaps 10 years older than myself, so mid-60s?) proprietor. The kindly Chinese gentleman ran to meet us when we entered his establishment, and immediately squatted down to pepper him with all sorts of unanswerable questions like, "Are you really a boy? You are so pretty that I think you must be a girl!" He then returned numerous times to our table as we ate to compliment my son on his appearance. I got this same reaction from a Korean lady who is a fellow venture capitalist. Every time we meet, the *first* thing she want is not my assessment of where the latest big opportunities might be in the enterprise systems management software space, but to see the latest pictures of my son. It's as if there is something universal to the blond-haired/blue-eyed image of a "cherub" as the ideal look for a small child, even among peoples whose children will never look like that. Go figure. From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:02:27 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:02:27 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Walter Glannon: Genes, Embryos, and Future People Message-ID: Walter Glannon: Genes, Embryos, and Future People Bioethics, 02699702, Jul98, Vol. 12, Issue 3 ABSTRACT: Testing embryonic cells for genetic abnormalities gives us the capacity to predict whether and to what extent people will exist with disease and disability. Moreover, the freezing of embryos for long periods of time enables us to alter the length of a normal human lifespan. After highlighting the shortcomings of somatic-cell gene therapy and germ-line genetic alteration, I argue that the testing and selective termination of genetically defective embryos is the only medically and morally defensible way to prevent the existence of people with severe disability, pain and suffering that make their lives not worth living for them on the whole. In addition, I consider the possible harmful effects on children born from frozen embryos after the deaths of their biological parents, or when their parents are at an advanced age. I also explore whether embryos have moral status and whether the prospects for disease-preventing genetic alteration can justify long-term cryopreservation of embryos. INTRODUCTION Recent advances in reproductive biotechnology have given us the ability to intervene in the process of human biological development from embryos to people. One type of intervention is the testing of embryos for genetic defects that cause disease, which enables us to choose between allowing these embryos to result in disabled people or selectively terminating their further development. Alternatively, in the foreseeable future it may become possible to prevent disease by correcting a mutation in embryonic cells or by inserting a normal gene into these cells. It even may become possible to manipulate genes in such a way as to enhance people's normal cognitive and physical functioning. Still another form of intervention in the development of a human organism is the freezing of an embryo in liquid nitrogen to postpone the birth of a person who subsequently will come into existence from that embryo. All of these interventions give us considerable control over how many people will exist, when people will come into existence, and what sort of people there will be. I shall explore the moral implications of these technologies and argue that we are morally required to intervene in the process of biological development of human organisms by testing and selectively terminating embryos with genetic defects that cause people to exist with severe disease and disability. As a matter of beneficence, we have a duty to prevent avoidable pain and suffering in the people we bring into existence. As a matter of justice, we have a duty not to cause people to exist with cognitive and physical disabilities that will limit their opportunities for achieving a decent minimum level of lifetime well-being. Each of these claims is motivated by the following moral asymmetry thesis: we do not have a moral duty to bring people into existence with good lives; but we do have a moral duty to prevent the existence of people who would experience so much pain and suffering as to make their lives not worth living for them on the whole.(n1) Furthermore, in deciding whether to keep embryos frozen for long periods of time, we have to consider the psychological impact on children born from these embryos after the deaths of their biological parents, or when their parents are at an advanced age. In addition, we must consider whether we can justify keeping genetically defective embryos frozen until the time when inserting a missing gene or correcting a mutant gene become feasible practices. MORAL ASYMMETRY AND HARM The moral asymmetry thesis that I articulated above rests on three notions. The first is the person-affecting principle, which says that a person is benefited or harmed when her interests in what happens to her are satisfied or defeated.(n2) Once a person exists, she has an interest in not experiencing pain and suffering and thus can be harmed if she experiences these over the course of her lifetime. The second notion is the impersonal comparative principle, which says that, other things being equal, it is worse to cause a person to exist if it would be possible to cause a different, better-off, person to exist instead.(n3) It involves a comparison, not between the existence and non-existence of one person, but rather between two distinct lives of two distinct people. On the impersonal comparative principle, we evaluate two potential lives of two potential people who do not yet exist, while on the person-affecting principle we evaluate the life of one person who already exists. Yet we can appeal to both principles to support the claim that we are morally required to prevent the existence of people with lives that on balance are not worth living. That is, we prevent harm to the individuals we cause to exist by fulfilling their interest in not having to experience pain and suffering, and we avoid adding to the total amount of suffering in the world.(n4) The third notion on which the moral asymmetry thesis rests is the metaphysical relation between embryos and persons. 'Person' is a psychological concept, while 'human organism' is a biological concept. A human organism, in the form of a single-celled zygote, begins to exist at around the time of conception, when male and female gametes fuse.(n5) Thereafterr, the zygote develops into a multi-celled embryo, a presentient fetus, a sentient fetus, and then the body and brain of a person. The zygote, embryo, fetus, and person are distinct but biologically related stages in the development of a human organism. Up to about 14 days after fertilization there is the possibility of monozygotic twinning of the fused gametes. When it occurs, twinning causes two genetically identical but numerically distinct individual organisms to exist from the original zygote, and these subsequently develop into two distinct persons with distinct psychological properties. A person begins to exist when the fetal stage of the organism develops the structure and function of the brain necessary to generate and support consciousness and mental life. This is when the fetus becomes sentient, at around 23-24 weeks of gestation. Because the structure and function of the organism's brain which generate and support the psychological properties essential to personhood develop gradually, persons come into existence gradually. The zygotic, embryonic, and presentient fetal stages of the organism are related to the person who develops from them to the extent that they all have the same DNA in their cells and that the psychological properties of the person causally depend on the biological properties of the organism. But because a person's essential psychological properties are distinct from, and emerge later than, the biological properties that define these other stages in the development of an organism, a person is neither identical with any one of these stages nor with the organism itself.(n6) The embryo or presentient fetus is a potential person, not in the sense that it becomes a person, which implies numerical identity, but only in the sense that it has the potential to develop the biological structures and functions necessary to generate the consciousness and mental life constitutive of personhood.(n7) The metaphysical distinction between human organisms and persons has significant implications for the manipulation of genes in embryonic cells. The manipulation of one or more genes in these cells would not disrupt the identity of the organism, provided that its basic structure and function remained intact. Yet it would determine the identity of a different person. For, as Robert Elliot has pointed out, even slight changes to the biological properties of an organism at the zygotic or embryonic stage would cause different psychological properties to develop and thus select between which of a number of different people would come into existence.(n8) However, once an embryo has developed into a child with consciousness and mental life, genetic manipulation of its body's cells is more likely to be identity-preserving of personhood than identity-determining, since it already has developed a set of psychological properties. If this is correct, then the earlier genetic manipulation occurs in the development of a human organism, the more likely it is to determine that distinct people come into existence from it. On the plausible assumptions that only beings with interests can be harmed by the defeat of those interests, that having interests presupposes sentience, and that only late-stage fetuses and persons are sentient, it is morally permissible to terminate a human organism at an early stage of development. The termination affects no one who has interests. One might object that having interests does not presuppose sentience. For example, it may be said that future people, who do not yet exist and are not sentient, have an interest not to live in a polluted environment.(n9) But the core concept at issue here is harm, and harm consists in the defeat of particular interests of identifiable persons who already exist and can experience the defeat of these interests. Terminating the development of a human organism at the embryonic stage does not kill a person but only prevents a person from coming into existence. There is no one who could be harmed because there is no identifiable individual with particular interests who exists at that time. Similar reasoning underwrites the claims that we do not have a moral duty to bring people into existence, and that bringing someone into existence by itself does not benefit her, however good her life may be. We cannot say that being caused to exist is better for a person than she otherwise would have been, since otherwise she would not have existed. Put differently, there is no one who is caused to exist; rather, we make it the case that someone exists. Derek Parfit argues that the relation between existence and non-existence does not meet the 'Full Comparative Requirement', which says that we benefit someone only if we do what will be better for him.(n10) While causing someone to exist may be good for him, it cannot make him better off, since nonexistence is morally neutral and therefore neither good nor bad. We do not have a moral duty to benefit persons by bringing them into existence, because we benefit persons by satisfying their interests, and it is difficult to see how non-existing persons could have an interest in being caused to exist. However, while it is morally neutral to cause a person to exist with a life that on balance is good, it is morally wrong to bring a person into existence with a life that on balance is bad because of severe pain and suffering. For in this case there is someone who actually experiences pain and suffering and who is harmed by being caused to exist in such a condition. And since it is not morally neutral but wrong, we have a moral duty to prevent the existence of a person who would have such a life. Yet there is an air of paradox about the idea that, although we do not benefit people by bringing them into existence with lives that are good on the whole, we harm people by causing them to exist with restricted lives that are bad on the whole.(n11) Presumably, we harm someone by causing them to exist with a disability because we make them worse off than they otherwise would have been. But if they did not exist with the disability, then they would not have existed at all. Insofar as a person's life is worth living on the whole, being brought into existence with a cognitive or physical disability cannot be worse for her, because if we terminated the development of the embryo containing the gene that caused the disability, then she would not exist. This is a variant of what Parfit has called the 'Non-Identity Problem'.(n12) Jonathan Glover has devised a strategy to sidestep the Non-Identity Problem. Instead of trying to draw a comparison between the existence and non-existence of one identifiable individual, Glover maintains that the relevant comparison is between two distinct lives of two distinct people. It is 'impersonal' in the sense that 'harm can be done even though identifiable people are no worse off than they otherwise would have been'.(n13) Glover uses the following example to illustrate the impersonal comparative principle. Imagine that a factory emits a chemical that causes babies to be born blind. On the Non-Identity Problem, they are not made worse off than they otherwise would have been, since their lives are worth living and otherwise they would not have existed. But 'what we should say here is, not that the pollution made the blind children worse off than they would have been otherwise, but instead that their condition is worse than the condition of the other children who would have been born in the absence of the pollution.'(n14) The choice is between bringing different people into existence, while retaining the same number of people who will exist.(n15) Both person-affecting and impersonal harm principles give us reasons to bring a normal child into existence rather than a diseased or disabled one. We prevent actual people from experiencing pain and suffering and thereby avoid defeating their interest in having healthy lives, and we avoid adding to the total amount of suffering in the world. In some genetically caused diseases, severe cognitive and physical disability may make people's lives so restricted that they are not worth living. By definition, these lives fall outside the scope of the Non-Identity Problem. When we can predict that a disease would involve so much disability, pain, and suffering as to make life not worth living on the whole, we are morally required to prevent the existence of people who would have the disease. Or, if we do cause people to exist with such a disease, then we are morally required to either cure them or alleviate the severity of their symptoms, insofar as we are able. The first scenario that I described pertains to the impersonal sense of harm and potential persons, while the second pertains to the personal sense of harm and actual persons. One suggests genetic testing and selective termination of defective embryos as the appropriate strategy to prevent harm. The other suggests that the appropriate strategy to prevent or compensate for harm would be gene therapy or some other form of genetic alteration. A person is a further stage of development of the same human organism of which the embryo is an earlier stage. In this sense, embryos are potential persons, and failing to terminate a genetically defective embryo can cause harm by allowing it to develop into a diseased or disabled person.(n16) Because gene therapy is not yet feasible for most diseases, genetic testing and selective termination of genetically defective embryos appears to be the only medically effective and morally defensible way to prevent the sort of harm at issue. Before defending this claim, however, we should examine the different forms of genetic intervention and assess their medical and moral significance. GENETIC INTERVENTION There are three basic types of genetic alteration. (n17) Gene therapy consists in the correction or addition of genes in the somatic (body) cells of a person to treat a disease the person already has, where the aim of treatment is to cure the disease or alleviate its symptoms. By contrast, genetic alteration of germ cells (gametes; sperm and egg) at the zygotic or embryonic stage of the human organism prevents diseased persons from coming into existence. It is therefore mistaken to call this form of genetic manipulation 'therapy,' because when the gametes are altered, there are no existing persons who might benefit from this act.(n18) 'Therapy' implies that there is a disease to be treated or cured, and it is not zygotes or embryos but rather persons or late-term fetuses who are diseased. Defective genes in embryonic cells may be the causes of diseases, but the diseases do not manifest themselves until the organism has developed into a fetus or person. Unlike somatic-cell gene therapy, which preserves the identity of already existing persons who are treated, germ-line genetic alteration determines the identity of the person who would come into existence from the embryo in which a defective gene is corrected or replaced by a normal one. The intervention takes place before the process of cell differentiation and the development of tissues and bodily organs has begun, and thus determines that a biologically and psychologically distinct individual will come into existence from the one who would have come into existence from the same embryo had the defective gene not been corrected or replaced. Genetic enhancement involves non-therapeutic alteration of genes aimed at improving cognitive and physical functioning which already are at or above the normal level for persons. The three types of genetic alteration which I have mentioned are to be distinguished further from selective termination of embryos after genetic testing has revealed the presence of disease-causing genes, or markers for these genes, in the cells of embryos. (n19) Like germ-line genetic alteration, germ-line genetic testing and termination is not a therapeutic but a preventive strategy designed to avoid the existence of individuals who would be severely disabled and have restricted lives. Let us now further explore the four types of genetic intervention at the embryonic stage of development of a human organism. Somatic-cell gene therapy is not yet feasible for treating the majority of genetically caused diseases. This is because gene therapy is primarily relevant to single-gene disorders, and chromosomal disorders such as Down syndrome involve large segments of DNA which are not amenable to treatment. Moreover, the single-gene disorders that might be amenable to gene therapy are recessive rather than dominant disorders. Recessive disorders, where a single copy of the normal gene is sufficient for one to function within the normal cognitive and physical range for persons, may be treatable because inserting one copy of a normal gene into someone with a double dose of the defective gene may be enough to raise that individual's functioning or health up to the normal range. Dominant disorders, by contrast, result even when the affected person has only a single copy of the defective gene. These disorders might be prevented or cured by correcting the mutation within the gene. Presently, however, it is not possible to correct a mutation but only to insert an additional normal copy of a gene into cells, and therefore only recessive disorders can be treated through genetic intervention. In theory, a recessive disorder like cystic fibrosis (CF) could be treated by inserting a normal gene into the relevant cells so that the pancreas produced the necessary enzymes for food absorption, as well as to ensure proper function of the glands in the lining of the bronchial tubes. Similarly, in hemophiliacs, who are unable to produce normal amounts of a factor necessary for blood clotting, the missing gene could be delivered through injections. In practice, though, what has plagued the efforts of gene therapy to cure people of diseases, or at least effectively treat their symptoms, is the lack of suitable vectors to deliver therapeutic genes into human cells and maintain them in working order. Viral vectors have been the method used to date, specifically adenoviruses and retroviruses, which slice copies of their genes permanently into the chromosomes of the cells they enter. Yet this method has been largely unsuccessful because the stripped-down viruses that have been used do not provide a stable platform for the genes to operate efficiently. Some of these viruses are not large enough to carry a full human gene and its switches, while others may provoke an adverse response by the immune system. Work on hemophiliacs, children with severe combined immunodeficiency disease (SCID), and familial hypercholesterolemia has shown some promise. But for the majority of genetically based diseases, gene therapy is not yet an effective cure or treatment.(n20) Germ-line genetic alteration initially may seem more attractive than gene therapy. Manipulation or replacement of genetic abnormalities in germ cells at the zygotic or embryonic stage after in vitro fertilization (IVF) would correct a defect before it could manifest itself as a disease in an existing person. This type of alteration would affect the resulting cells in the process of differentiation and in turn the germ line of the person who develops from the embryo. The altered genes would then be passed on to future generations of the person's offspring. But it is questionable whether germ-line genetic manipulation would be desirable from an evolutionary perspective. Some degree of genetic mutation is necessary for species to adapt to changing environmental circumstances, and some genetic disorders confer benefits on certain populations. For example, the gene for sickle-cell anemia provides greater resistance to malaria. Altering a gene or genes at the germ line to correct one disorder may only lead to other disorders. This also raises the question of whether we have a duty to prevent passing on unforeseeable consequences of germ-line alteration to future generations, which is morally significant for two reasons. First, people existing in the future might be adversely affected by a policy to which they did not consent. Second, it would be extremely difficult to determine whether the benefits of such a policy would outweigh its harms, in which case it may be morally preferable to err on the side of caution and prevent such a policy from being implemented. In sum, there may be both medical and moral reasons against germ-line genetic alteration. Genetic enhancement is a non-therapeutic form of genetic intervention which aims to raise cognitive and physical capacities above the normal range of functioning for persons. But to the extent that people's actual cognitive and physical functioning enable them to achieve a decent minimum level of well-being, there are no compelling medical or moral reasons for genetic enhancement. Indeed, some would say that there are compelling reasons for prohibiting it. Insofar as genetic enhancement aimed at something over and above disease prevention and health promotion, it would threaten to introduce a program of positive eugenics which would unjustly discriminate against certain groups of people who are moderately disabled and whose lives, though somewhat restricted, are nonetheless worth living. I will return to the eugenics question in the last part of the next section. My analysis of the different forms of genetic alteration and the problem of their feasibility supports my earlier claim that genetic testing and selective termination of embryos with defective genes that cause people to exist with severe pain and suffering is the only medically effective and morally defensible way to prevent this state of affairs from obtaining. It will be instructive to cite some specific diseases that recommend such a preventive measure. WHICH LIVES SHOULD BE PREVENTED? Present biotechnology allows us to test embryonic cells for genetic abnormalities that lead directly to severe early-onset disorders, like Tay-Sachs disease, Hurler syndrome, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, and Canavan's disease, as well as late-onset disorders like Huntington's disease.(n21) We also can test embryos for genes that predispose people to chronic and ultimately fatal conditions like coronary heart disease and cancer. Genetic mutations play a causal role in many diseases by altering a crucial enzyme or other protein. The alteration may occur in differing degrees, depending on the extent of interaction between genes and the environment. In the specific diseases I mentioned above, though, environment plays little or no causal role in their occurrence. Either the defective gene necessarily causes the disease, or else it has a very high probability of causing it (95% with the Huntington's gene). In Tay-Sachs, for instance, babies appear quite normal at birth. But in the first year of life their nervous systems degenerate, and they usually die by the time they reach 3 or 4. This disease is caused by the presence of two copies of an abnormal gene, or mutant allele, at a particular site on one of the 23 chromosome pairs. Tay-Sachs is an autosomal recessive disorder, which effectively means that the child inherits one mutant allele from each parent. Through the fusion of the gametes in the zygote that develops into the embryo, fetus, and person, the parents transmit the disease to their child. Ideally, we would use gene therapy by inserting an additional normal copy of the defective gene into the relevant cells and thus cure the disease. But Tay-Sachs, like most recessive (and dominant) disorders, has not proven amenable to therapy. Alternatively, we can test and selectively terminate embryos with genes that cause this or other severely disabling diseases, preventing these diseases by preventing the existence of the people who would have them. This practice can be justified on two grounds. Beneficence requires that we not harm people by causing them to experience pain and suffering over the balance of their lives. In addition, justice requires that we not deny severely disabled people the same opportunities for achieving a good life as are open to others who are healthy or have only moderate cognitive or physical disabilities.(n22) Arguably, the justice requirement will apply to only a small number of people, since the idea of equal opportunity for a good life implies a certain number of years to undertake and complete projects for a decent minimum level of wellbeing, and most people with severe early-onset genetically caused diseases have relatively short lifespans. Perhaps this is not the case with a disease like CF, where people afflicted often live for 30 years or more. But I do not believe that this genetically caused disease is so severely disabling and painful that we can justifiably prevent the lives of the persons who would have it. Considerations of justice matter; but what matters more than ensuring equal opportunity for achieving a good life is preventing avoidable severe pain and suffering that people actually experience once they exist. These are what make lives not worth living on the whole. Indeed, it is often the severe pain and suffering associated with disabilities which preclude people from having the opportunities to achieve a decent minimum level of lifetime well-being. Testing of embryonic cells for genetic abnormalities may be done by extracting cells from preimplantation IVF embryos. To produce extracorporeal IVF embryos for this type of testing, fertility drugs such as Clomid or Pergonal can be given to a woman to induce superovulation and in turn produce a number of eggs that can be recovered for fertilization with sperm. One advantage of producing multiple embryos is that, if genetic abnormalities are detected in any one of the embryos, then it can be selectively terminated and another, normal, embryo can be implanted in the woman's uterus. This would enable parents to have a normal child instead of a disabled one and to avoid any burdens that such a child might have on them or, if they have other children, the rest of the family. Significantly, the capacity to produce multiple IVF embryos is largely what grounds the impersonal harm principle, since at least two embryos must be available for a parent or parents to choose to bring a normal child into existence instead of a disabled one. Another attractive feature of this method, as Robert Edwards explains, is that 'identifying embryos with genetic abnormalities would offer an alternative to amniocentesis during the second trimester of pregnancy, and the 'abortion' in vitro of a defective preimplantation embryo . . . would be infinitely preferable to abortion in vivo at twenty weeks of pregnancy or thereabouts as the results of amniocentesis are obtained'.(n23) Testing preimplantation IVF embryos for genetic abnormalities would be preferable to testing fetal cells for these abnormalities by amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling because, unlike these invasive procedures, it would not be painful to the pregnant woman and would avoid certain medical risks. Specifically, putting a needle into the uterus to extract cells from either the amniotic fluid or embryonic membrane triggers a miscarriage once in every 50 to 100 pregnancies. Moreover, villus sampling may cause limb deformities in the fetus. Terminating the development of one embryo and implanting a different embryo would mean that the life of one potential person was not allowed to become actual and that the life of a different potential person became actual instead. Thesame number of people would exist, but they would be different people. Yet whether one or a different potential person is allowed to exist does not matter morally. Rather, what matters morally is preventing avoidable pain and suffering that actual people will have to experience. And to the extent that an embryo containing a disease-causing gene will result in severe pain and suffering in the person who develops from it, we are morally required to prevent the disease, pain, and suffering by terminating the development of that embryo. What must be emphasized, however, is that the moral requirement to terminate embryos and thereby prevent certain people from coming into existence pertains only to those people who would have severe, not just moderately severe, diseases. Only severe diseases make people's lives not worth living on the whole. One consequence of not preventing genetically defective embryos from resulting in severely diseased or disabled persons is that a child caused to exist in such a condition could file a tort of wrongful life against his parents.(n24) Or, if the child is cognitively or physically unable to do so, a different person could file a tort on the child's behalf. Suppose that a boy has Duchenne muscular dystrophy, a recessive disorder traceable to a genetic defect on the X chromosome which adversely affects the dystrophin protein. This defect causes muscles to begin weakening at age 3 and subsequent respiratory failure, which gives children afflicted with the disease an average life expectancy of 16-20 years. If the boy's mother knew that she was a carrier of the defect and that there was a 50% chance of transmitting it to her son, was able to abort the embryo containing the defect, yet allowed the child to be born from that embryo, then the boy could claim that his parents acted in reckless disregard of his welfare, wronged and harmed him, and accordingly owe him compensation for causing him to exist with a condition that defeats his right and interest in having a life that is not severely restricted. The person-affecting principle would ground the child's claim against his parents. There would not be grounds for a tort of wrongful life, however, if the child claimed that genetic intervention other than testing and termination at the embryonic stage of development, such as adding a normal copy of the dystrophin gene, would have made a significant difference between the quality of life he actually experiences and what he might have experienced otherwise. For at the time of the intervention, there would not have been any identifiable individual to be benefited or harmed. Genetic alteration at such an early stage of development of the organism would have resulted in a completely different set of biological and psychological properties that would have belonged to a different person. So the child only could claim that the wrong or harm was committed by not terminating the defective embryo from which he developed, not by failing to add a normal copy of the gene. Gene therapy involving somatic cells at an early age after birth also would entail different subsequent biological and psychological properties as the child's life unfolded. Arguably, however, these would not be so radically different from the properties possessed before the therapy that they would be of a different person, since presumably the child who receives the therapy already has a fairly developed biological and psychological life. Although some of his properties would have changed, intuitively there would be enough biological and psychological continuity before and after the therapy to say that the child cured of CF or SCID by gene therapy would remain the same individual. If such a child's parents had access to affordable gene therapy that could cure his disease or treat the symptoms associated with it, but failed to seek such treatment, then perhaps the child could claim that his parents harmed or wronged him by defeating his interest in being cured of or treated for a disease that was amenable to gene therapy. But to the extent that the child already exists with a condition for which his parents are not completely responsible, strictly speaking this case would involve something other than the standard notion of wrongful life. The cases that I have just discussed involve physical disability. More difficult to assess would be gene therapy to correct severe cognitive disability at a fairly early stage of a person's life. This could have a significant effect on subsequent psychological properties that arguably would be those of a different person from the one who underwent cognitive gene therapy for the affected brain cells at an earlier time, given that the brain generates and supports the consciousness and other psychological properties necessary for personhood and personal identity through time. The medical prospects for cognitive gene therapy are even less promising than they are for physical gene therapy, and the moral implications of such therapy are so complex that I cannot address them adequately here. Nevertheless, cognitive and physical disability may very well have different relative weights in determining personal identity through time, as well as in determining whether or to what extent people can be harmed. I have claimed that the diseases that morally require us to prevent the existence of people who would have them must be so severely disabling that they make their lives not worth living on the whole. This is not the case with moderately severe genetic disorders like Down syndrome, where, although there is some cognitive and physical impairment, the lives of people with this disorder can be fulfilling and thus very much worth living. So there would be no moral grounds for preventing the existence of people with Down syndrome. But there would be no moral requirement to bring them into existence either, given that existence is morally neutral and entails no requirement to cause people to exist with good lives. A further distinction must be drawn between early-onset genetic disorders of the sort I have been discussing, which affect people from birth or early childhood, and late-onset genetic disorders, like Huntington's disease, which do not affect people until the adult stage of their lives. The onset of symptoms in people afflicted with Huntington's may range anywhere from age 30 to 50, and these include progressive loss of muscle control and dementia. Generally, they die within 15 years after onset. Prior to this time, they usually have normal lives with comparatively high levels of cognitive and physical functioning for a considerable number of years. In trying to determine whether people's lives are worth living on the whole, we should do so by evaluating the quality of their lives in terms of all the stages of their lives. But the radical difference in cognitive and physical functioning before and after the onset of symptoms in diseases like Huntington's makes it difficult to assess overall quality of life for the people who have them. With severe adult-onset diseases, perhaps the most plausible way to measure lifetime quality is to weigh the level of normal functioning per year lived against the level of disability per year lived and arrive at an average level of well-being for the person's entire lifespan.(n25) On this view, the earlier the onset of symptoms in the person's life, the longer the period of time between onset and death, and the more severe the disability, pain, and suffering associated with the disease, the stronger the reason will be for saying that the person's life is not worth living on the whole. Correspondingly, there will be a stronger reason for preventing that life by terminating the embryo with the gene that causes the disease. Thus, for a person afflicted with the degenerative physical and cognitive symptoms of Huntington's disease at age 30, the severity of the pain and suffering he experiences in his last 15 years may be bad enough to outweigh the normal functioning he had in his first 30 years and average out to a level of lifetime well-being which falls below the decent minimum. This in turn may lead us to conclude that his life is not worth living on the whole for him and that, if we could have foreseen this through genetic testing of the embryo from which he developed, then we should have terminated the embryo and thereby prevented him from existing. Or consider a more controversial variant of the same case. Suppose that genetic testing could predict that symptoms would not manifest themselves until age 50. One might claim that the pain and suffering caused by the disease in the last 10 or 15 years of the person's life would be so severe as to outweigh the good 50 years and thus make the person's average lifetime well-being fall below the decent minimum. Although it would be difficult to sustain, here too there may be a principled reason for terminating an embryo with the Huntington's gene. It may weigh the decision in favor of preventing the existence of a person who would have the disease over causing him to exist with a life that has a wretched last stage. Alternatively, one could take the view that, with adult-onset diseases, it is the victim's responsibility to decide whether to go on living beyond a certain point. This is consistent with the conviction that the value of a life is determined subjectively by the person whose life it is. But whether this view were to figure in any way in public policy would depend, among other things, on the legal climate in which the afflicted person was living.(n26) Pain and suffering in the last stage or years of a person's life must be weighed against the achievements afforded by normal cognitive and physical functioning in earlier stages. Fifty years of normal functioning should be enough for a person to complete many of the projects in his life plan and make for a life that is worth living. If so, then the fact that a person loses his normal functioning at age 50 by itself is not enough to support the claim that on balance his life is not worth living and that he should not have been allowed to come into existence. Indeed, some people have lives of thirty years that are full of achievements. A shorter life can be very well worth living. But if the pain and suffering in one's last years are severe enough, and if the number of these years is large enough, then this may weigh the decision in favor of preventing the person from coming into existence. The experience of severe pain and suffering, more so than what it implies about limited opportunities for achievement, grounds the claims that a person's life on balance is not worth living for him and that it is morally wrong to cause a person to exist with such a life. Two objections might be raised against the claim that people with severe disease or disability should not be brought into existence. Disabilities rights advocates might argue that intervention in the form of testing and selectively terminating genetically defective embryos would reduce the number of people with disabilities. Consequently, public support for persons who already have disabilities would erode. It would lead to a devaluation of the lives of the disabled and to discrimination against them. To rebut this objection, we can appeal to Allen Buchanan's point that 'it is not the people with disabilities which we devalue, it is the disabilities'.(n27) Buchanan further says 'we devalue disabilities because we value the opportunities and welfare of the people who have them -- and it is because we value people, all people, that we care about limitations on their welfare and opportunities. We also know that disabilities, as such, diminish opportunities and welfare, even when they are not so severe that the lives of those who have them are not worth living'.(n28) The underlying rationale for this position is that it is a matter of justice, not only beneficence, that we remove or prevent limitations on an individual's opportunities for a decent life. But the second passage cited from Buchanan leaves open the possibility that it is morally permissible to terminate embryos with genetic defects that would lead to people having lives with limited opportunities that are nonetheless worth living. Against Buchanan, I believe that we should terminate only those embryos with genetic defects that manifest themselves in severe disabilities that make life on balance not worth living. Still, we have to weigh the relative importance of cognitive and physical functioning for different people in assessing quality of life. Suppose it were discovered that the adult-onset motor neuron disease amyelotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) had a genetic cause and that the disease could be prevented only by terminating embryos whose cells contained the defective gene. The case of the brilliant theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking illustrates that a person can suffer from a severe physical disability as a symptom of ALS for well over the balance of his life yet maintain a high level of cognitive functioning which makes life for him very much worth living. It would be difficult to adduce reasons for preventing such a life from coming into existence, despite the fact that ALS is a severely disabling disease. On the other hand, for people who value physical functioning very highly (e.g. athletes, dancers), severe physical disability may lead them to judge that on balance their lives are not worth living, even if their normal cognitive functioning remains intact. Granted, people can adapt their preferences and life plans to adult-onset disabilities and the limited opportunities they entail. But it is not so easy to do this if one has to endure constant pain and suffering over a considerable period of time. Furthermore, in the case of someone like Hawking, if the pain associated with the physical disability were so severe that it adversely affected his cognitive functioning, then we might consider whether he would believe that his well-being was at a level high enough for him to judge that his life was worth living. A second objection to my view is that any form of genetic intervention is motivated by the desire to improve the human species through selection. This amounts to a program of positive eugenics, which would lead to a repeat of the inhumane treatment of people and a violation of their intrinsic worth which have occurred in recent history.(n29) To this objection, we can respond by saying that the aim of any medically and morally defensible form of genetic intervention should not be to enhance people's genotype or phenotypic traits, but only to ensure that the people we do cause to exist have normal, or close to normal, cognitive and physical functioning over the balance of their lives. In preventing the existence of people with severe disability, we are not aiming to enhance or improve lives that already are, or would be, at a decent minimum level of well-being, but only to ensure that the people we do bring into existence will not fall well below this level. This accords with the moral asymmetry thesis. We have no moral duty to bring people into existence with good lives. But if we do bring people into existence, we have a moral duty to ensure that their lives do not contain so much pain and suffering as to be not worth living for them on the whole. The negative eugenics I am defending has affinities with what Philip Kitcher calls 'utopian eugenics'.(n30) This involves a policy guaranteeing that people have reproductive freedom in choosing which embryos they allow to develop and subsequently the people they bring into existence. Their choices must be free of any socially coercive pressure to prevent people from existing for economic reasons or perfectionist ideals. Provided that genetic testing and selective termination of defective embryos are practiced in order to prevent extreme pain and suffering in people, not to enhance their cognitive and physical capacities above the normal range, and that reproductive technologies like IVF and genetic testing are affordable and accessible to all, utopian eugenics is a morally justifiable policy. LONG-TERM CRYOPRESERVATION Another practice made possible by reproductive biotechnology is the storing of frozen embryos in 'embryo banks' of liquid nitrogen. One attractive feature of this type of cryopreservation is that a woman could decide to preserve an embryo produced by IVF from her egg and a man's sperm in such a bank in order to pursue a career and later have the embryo implanted in her uterus for pregnancy and birth. Assuming that long-term storage does not entail a risk of genetic mutation in embryonic cells, she could undertake a later pregnancy without fear of birth defects regardless of her age because the embryo fertilized at the earlier time would be biologically optimal. Moreover, if genetic testing determines that an embryo has a genetic abnormality that likely will result in a severely diseased or disabled person, then storing multiple IVF embryos gives parents the choice to terminate the defective embryo and implant a normal one instead. In addition, cryopreservation of embryos for an extended period of time may make any genetic mutations they contain correctable by the insertion of normal copies of the relevant genes, if such a technique becomes feasible in the near future. This would determine the identity of the person brought into existence free from disease, who would replace the diseased individual who would have existed instead from the same embryo without the altered or additional gene. But it is worth repeating that it is not whether genetic alteration or therapy is identity-determining or identity-preserving which is morally significant, but rather the sort of experience the persons who are brought into existence will have. There are reasons to be wary of freezing and storing embryos for long periods of time, however. It is unknown whether this process might entail genetic mutations in embryonic cells which might result in disease and premature death in the individuals who come into existence in this way. Also, IVF and cryopreservation of embryos make it possible for a person resulting from such an embryo to have three distinct mothers: (1) the genetic, or biological mother, whose gamete contributes 23 chromosomes to the embryo and determines many of the subsequent biological and psychological properties of the child who develops from the embryo; (2) the gestational mother, in whose uterus the embryo is implanted and who gives birth to the child; and (3) the social mother who raises and cares for the child. The social mother is perhaps the most important of the three with respect to the child's interests, since she is the one who cares for the child when it has the requisite psychological properties for interests, rights, and a biographical self. To the extent that only individuals with interests and rights can be harmed, and these interests and rights can be affected directly by the social mother, she can directly affect the welfare of the child. But the relationship between a child and its biological parents can have a significant psychological impact on the child as well. If an embryo is frozen and not implanted until many years after fertilization, then it is possible for a child to be born from that embryo and come into existence after the deaths of its biological parents. Even assuming that there are no known genetic abnormalities in the embryo, the prospect of being born after the deaths of its biological parents may have harmful effects on the child's psychological identity, its sense of self. A mature self ordinarily will have a relationship with its biological parents which involves more than mere knowledge of who they are. There may be an even greater sense of harm to a child resulting from an embryo stored for a considerable period of time. Earlier, I said that storing embryos could allow a woman to pursue a professional career before having a child. But suppose that a woman's egg, fertilized when she was 30, is frozen and not implanted in her still normally functioning uterus (or that of a surrogate mother) until she is 60.(n31) She becomes pregnant and decides to bring the pregnancy to term. The increasing likelihood of disease with age may mean that the child or adolescent born from this pregnancy would have the burden of caring for her mother or both parents before she was emotionally mature enough to do so. It also would be an obstacle to her own emotional development as a person and thus have a deleterious effect on her overall well-being. With these issues in mind, it will be instructive to consider a well-known legal case in the United States involving frozen embryos. In December 1988, seven embryos produced in vitro from the gametes of Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis were placed in cryogenic storage for possible future implantation.(n32) In February 1989, the couple filed for divorce, at which time the question arose as to whether the right of Mrs. Davis (then remarried as Mrs. Stowe) to become a mother outweighed Mr. Davis' right not to become a father. Arguing in Mr. Davis' favor, John Robertson concluded that the right to avoid biological offspring should have priority over the right to reproduce using frozen embryos.(n33) While Robertson's argument is persuasive as far as it goes, it pays insufficient attention to the interests of the future children who may be produced from these embryos. More specifically, it does not adequately consider how long-term cryopreservation of embryos may adversely affect the well-being of children born from embryos implanted in surrogate mothers after the deaths of their biological parents, or if children are born when their biological parents are at an advanced age. These points underscore some of the disturbing implications of what amounts to altering the normal lifespan of a human organism and the normal reproductive cycle. In particular, it forces us to ask whether we have a moral obligation to impose some time limit after which frozen embryos should not be implanted. Indeed, the Human Fertilization and Embryo Act of 1991 in the United Kingdom stipulated a five-year limit on the storage of frozen embryos, after which time they were to be destroyed. Even if time limits on storage resolve the problems involving the length of a biological lifespan and the reproductive cycle, the question remains as to whether disposing of embryos is morally permissible. Bonnie Steinbock maintains that it matters whether we think that embryos should be preserved because of their symbolic value or because they have a right to life. The import of this question derives from a distinction she draws between moral status and moral value.(n34) Moral status is limited to beings with interests of their own, that is, sentient, aware, beings. Moral value concerns the symbolic value of entities, even if they lack moral status. The debate in the United Kingdom may be taken either from the point of view of moral status or from that of moral value. If, as the Church maintains, embryos have moral status and rights, then it is impermissible to deliberately destroy them. But if they lack moral status, then we still can discuss whether respecting them as symbols of human life is consistent with destroying them.(n35) By Steinbock's lights, destroying embryos is as respectful of human life as is keeping them frozen for long periods, and this understanding of moral value seems plausible. Nevertheless, the possibility that deletion of defective genes and insertion of normal genes in embryonic cells will become feasible in the near future may provide a reason for keeping embryos in frozen storage. This would be the case if parents wanted to have a normal child at some point not too late in their lives and were able to produce only one viable but genetically abnormal embryo from their gametes. Yet if they were able to produce multiple embryos and none of them was genetically abnormal, then, given that there is no moral obligation to bring people into existence, there would be no corresponding moral obligation to preserve any of these embryos on the basis of their presumed moral status. CONCLUSION I have examined two aspects of reproductive biotechnology -- genetic testing and selective termination of defective embryos, and long-term cryopreservation of embryos -- and have explored the ethical implications of each. In the first case, I have argued that we are morally required to terminate the development of embryos with genetic defects that cause severe disease or disability in people who develop from them. The moral justification for this view is that it is wrong to cause people to exist when the avoidable pain and suffering they experience make their lives not worth living on the whole. This claim is motivated by both the person-affecting and impersonal harm principles. If we cause these people to exist with severe disease and disability, then we defeat their interest in living without pain and suffering. Or, if we are considering whether to cause people to exist, then it is better, other things being equal, to prevent the existence of a person with severe cognitive and physical disability and instead bring into existence a person with normal cognitive and physical functioning. By doing so, we avoid gratuitously adding to the total amount of suffering in the world. In addition, considerations of justice support this position, because it means that people will not come into existence with a condition that will severely limit their opportunities for achieving a decent minimum level of lifetime well-being. Consistent with the idea of negative eugenics, we should prevent the existence of people who would have severe disease and disability, not in order to raise the average level of people's cognitive and physical functioning, but rather to prevent the pain and suffering that make people's lives not worth living on the whole. The aim of negative eugenics is disease prevention and health promotion, not enhancement of normal capacities. With respect to long-term cryopreservation of embryos, I have cited reasons for not preserving embryos for too long when it entails harmful psychological effects on a child born after the deaths of its biological parents, or when its parents are at an advanced age. However, if genetic technology develops in the near future to the point of making it feasible to correct genetic defects at the embryonic stage of development, then this may provide medical and moral grounds for preserving them. Such genetic alteration would mean that a biologically and psychologically different person would come into existence from the person who would have come into existence without genetic alteration to the embryo. Yet what matters morally is not who comes into existence, but that if we decide to bring a person into existence, we ensure, insofar as we can, that they not experience severe pain and suffering over the balance of their lives. In time, recessive genetic disorders may become amenable to somatic-cell gene therapy. Perhaps both recessive and dominant disorders will be prevented by germ-line genetic alteration at an early stage of a developing human organism. The latter would have profound medical and moral implications for the evolution of genetic mutation in the human species as well as for our obligations to generations in the distant future. But the genetic technology we presently have already gives us considerable power to determine which people will exist and the sorts of lives they will have in the near future.(n36) (n1) This thesis derives from Jan Narveson's claim that we do not have a moral duty to make happy people, but only to make people happy. He argues that the benefit of an act is the good it brings to already existing people and does not include the good of people who come into existence as a result of the act. See 'Utilitarianism and New Generations', Mind 76 (1967), pp. 62-72, and 'Moral Problems of Population', Monist 57 (1973), pp. 62-86. John Broome and Adam Morton discuss different aspects of the moral asymmetry thesis in 'The Value of A Person', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 68 (1994), pp. 167-98. (n2) Here I follow the definition of harm given by Joel Feinberg in Harm to Others (New York, Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 102-4, and Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock in Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 162-9. Broome, ibid., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), Part IV, and John Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 89, define personal harm in comparative terms. That is, a person is harmed when she is made worse off than she would have been otherwise. I avoid using the comparative sense of harm in considering whether being caused to exist with disabilities harms people, because these people would not exist without the disabilities they have, and a coherent comparison can be made only between two states of existence. The comparative sense of harm can be invoked only insofar as people exist and have interests. Otherwise, we should use an impersonal sense of harm, comparing two distinct potential lives of two distinct potential people. (n3) Parfit defends this principle in Reasons and Persons, Ch. 18, and 'Comments', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 858 ff., as does Jonathan Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', in Peter Laslett and James Fishkin, eds. Justice Between Age Groups and Generations (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 127-43. (n4) This idea is discussed by Parfit, Reasons and Persons, and Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, p. 90. (n5) See Michael Lockwood, 'When Does A Life Begin?', in Lockwood, ed., Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 9-31, Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 97 ff., Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson, and Peter Singer, 'The Syngamy Debate: When Precisely Does A Human Life Begin?', in Singer et al., eds., Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 19, Harris, pp. 61-5, and Jeff McMahan, 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 91-126. (n6) McMahan draws a similar distinction between persons and human organisms in 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', as does Robert Elliot in 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy', Bioethics 7 (1993), pp. 27-40, and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity', Bioethics 11 (1997), pp. 151-60. Compare these accounts with that of Ingmar Persson, who draws a three-fold distinction between a conceptus, a human being, and a person in 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 16-31. For a defense of the view that we are essentially human animals, see Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), and 'Was I Ever A Fetus?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), pp. 43-59. (n7) In Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), Glover says that a fetus is a potential person (p. 122), and Harris holds that embryos are potential persons, or 'pre-persons' (p. 58). Buckle subtly discusses the difference between the potential to become and the potential to produce in 'Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2 (1988), pp. 227 ff. Reprinted in Singer et al., Ch. 9. (n8) Elliot, 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene therapy', and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity'. McMahan explores the implications of the differences between genetic techniques that are identity-determining and those that are identity-preserving in 'Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice', Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996), pp. 3-35. (n9) Tom Regan first argued for this position in 'Feinberg on What Sorts of Beings Can Have Rights', Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (1976), pp. 485-98. (n10) Reasons and Persons, pp. 488-9. (n11) In 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', Philosophy &Public Affairs 11 (1982), pp. 93-112, Gregory Kavka defines a restricted life as 'one that is significantly deficient in one or more of the major respects that generally make human lives valuable and worth living' (p. 105). Yet Kavka says further that 'restricted lives typically will be worth living, on the whole, for those who live them' (p. 105). When I say that life is or is not worth living for a person, I mean it in the subjective rather than objective sense, or, what it is like for the person who lives it. McMahan offers insightful discussions of this and related issues in 'Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice', and 'Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist', in Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris, eds., Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). (n12) Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy &Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76. (n13) 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', p. 141. (n14) Ibid., p. 142. (n15) I assume that the same number of people will exist in the different outcomes. This avoids complications involving different numbers of people and having to determine which group is better or worse off than others. See Parfit's discussion of 'Same People Choices', 'Same Number Choices', and 'Different Number Choices' in Reasons and Persons, pp. 356 ff. See also Hanser, 'Harming Future People', and Heyd, Genethics. (n16) Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer claim that 'we can, of course, damage the embryo in such a way as to cause harm to the sentient being it will become, if it lives, but if it never becomes a sentient being, the embryo has not been harmed'. See 'Individuals, Humans, and Persons: The Issue of Moral Status', in Embryo Experimentation, p. 82. Furthermore, Harris maintains that 'harm done at the pre-person (embryo) stage will be harm done to the actual person she becomes. It is a form of delayed-action wrongdoing'. Wonderwoman and Superman, p. 153. I believe that persons can be harmed or wronged by what we do or fail to do to embryos even if embryos do not strictly speaking become persons. (n17) Patricia Baird provides an excellent overview of these issues in 'Altering Human Genes: Social, Ethical, and Legal Implications', Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 37 (1994), pp. 566-75. See also Leroy Walters and Julie Gage Palmer, The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997). (n18) Elliot and Persson fail to recognize this in their respective uses of 'gene therapy'. (n19) The diseases I discuss involve genetic defects in the nuclei of cells. Genes in the mitochondria of cells can mutate in the same way that the more familiar nuclear genes do. And like nuclear genes, mutations in mitochondrial genes may lead to disease. There are indications that familial Alzheimer disease may be caused by a faulty mitochondrial gene, though the research has not yet yielded any definitive conclusions. Moreover, my concern is with genetic testing rather than genetic screening. 'Genetic testing denotes the use of specific assays to determine the genetic status of individuals already suspected to be at high risk for a particular inherited condition because of family history of clinical symptoms; genetic screening involves the use of various genetic tests to evaluate populations or groups of individuals independent of a family history of a disorder.' Arno Motulsky et al., Assessing Genetic Risks: Implications for Health and Social Policy (Washington, D. C., National Academy Press, 1994), p. 4. (n20) But see R. M. Blaese et al., 'Treatment of Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID) Due to Adenosine Deaminase Deficiency with CD34+ Selected Autologous Blood Cells Transduced with a Human ADA Gene', Human Gene Therapy 4 (1993), pp. 521-7, M. Grossman et al., 'Successful Ex Vivo Gene Therapy Directed to Liver in a Patient with Familial Hypercholesterolemia', Nature Genetics 6 (1994), pp. 335-41, R. C. Boucher et al., 'Gene Therapy for Cystic Fibrosis Using El Deleted Adenovirus: A Trial in the Nasal Cavity', Human Gene Therapy 5 (1994), pp. 615-39, and Melissa A. Rosenfeld, 'Human Artificial Chromosomes Get Real', Nature Genetics 15 (1997), pp. 333-5. (n21) Canavan's is a degenerative disease that strikes infants, leading to the decay of the nervous system and early death. Hurler syndrome involves disruption of cognitive development in early childhood and usually death by age 10. Lesch-Nyhan syndrome causes both mental retardation and compulsive self-mutilation in boys. Philip Kitcher offers an insightful discussion of the genetic causes of these and other diseases in The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996). (n22) See Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability', and Allen Buchanan, 'Equal Opportunity and Genetic Intervention', Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995), pp. 105-35, and 'Choosing Who Will Be Disabled: Genetic Intervention and the Morality of Inclusion', Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996), pp. 18-46. (n23) R. G. Edwards and J. Purdy, Human Conception In Vitro (London, Academic Press, 1981), p. 373. (n24) See Feinberg, 'Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming', in Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 3-36, Heyd, Genethics, Ch. 1, Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, Ch. 4, and McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life'. (n25) Thomas Hurka presents a model that measures quality of life in terms of averaging achievements in earlier and later stages of life in Perfectionism (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 70 ff. See also Brock, 'Quality of Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics', in Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 268-324. (n26) I thank a referee for Bioethics for raising this issue. (n27) 'Choosing Who Will Be Disabled', p. 32. Emphasis added. (n28) Ibid., p. 33. (n29) See, for example, Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), an examination of the history of eugenics in the United States. (n30) The Lives to Come, p. 202. See also Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984), John A. Wagner, 'Gene Therapy Is not Eugenics', Nature Genetics 15 (1997), p. 234, and Buchanan, Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler, In the Shadow of Eugenics: the Human Genome Project and the Limits of Ethical Theory (forthcoming). (n31) Eight years ago, in 'Contemporary and Future Possibilities for Human Embryonic Manipulation', Mark Ferguson wrote 'it is unclear how well the ageing human female reproductive system would cope with such good embryos'. In Anthony Dyson and John Harris, eds., Experiments on Embryos (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990), p. 10. Yet recently a woman of 63 in Los Angeles gave birth to a healthy baby girl. See Gina Kolata, 'A Record and Big Questions as Woman Gives Birth at 63'. New York Times, April 24, 1997. (n32) Davis v. Davis 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn Cir 1984) rev'd 842 S. W. 2D 588, 597 (Tenn 1992). (n33) 'Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos', Hastings Center Report 19 (November-December 1989), p. 11. More recently, Robertson examines this and related issues in Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996). (n34) Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 5-41. (n35) I thank Bonnie Steinbock for pointing this out. (n36) I am grateful to Michael Burgess, David Donaldson, Chris McDonald, Bonnie Steinbock, and an anonymous referee for Bioethics for very helpful comments on an ancestor of this paper. Work on the paper was supported by a Killam Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Centre for Applied Ethics, University of British Columbia, which also is gratefully acknowledged. ~~~~~~~~ By Walter Glannon, Department of Philosophy University of Calgary From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:03:05 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:03:05 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Mark Levene: Why Is the Twentieth Century the Century of Genocide? Message-ID: Why Is the Twentieth Century the Century of Genocide? Mark Levene University of Warwick Journal of World History 11.2 (2000) 305-336 It has become almost a platitude, a statistical one at that: 187 million is the figure, the now more or less accepted wisdom for the number of human beings killed as a result of political violence--Zbigniew Brzezinski uses the unlovely term megadeaths--in this, our bloody century. 1 More killing than at any other time in history. And yet at the end of the twentieth century its relentlessness, as it passes across the television screens of those of us seemingly blessed with immunity from its catastrophic reality and consequences, continues to daze and bewilder. For the historian, him or herself inured to centuries if not millennia of mass atrocity, this picture of a special era of death and destruction invites, indeed demands further probing and analysis. Is "the Twentieth Century Book of the Dead" really so very different in scope or scale from previous ones? 2 It has been argued that the effects of the Taiping and other rebellions in China reduced its population from 410 million in 1850 to 350 million in 1873. 3 In southern Africa a couple of decades earlier, the emergence of Shaka's Zulu nation and the ensuing Mfecane or "great crushing" produced equally horrendous results relative to the population of the region. Go back a few centuries and [End Page 305] the devastation that the Mongol conqueror Timur wrought to Central Asia, the Near East, and Northern India impelled modern historian Arnold Toynbee to note that this exterminatory span of twenty-four years (between 1379 and 1403) was comparable to the one hundred and twenty of the last five Assyrian kings. 4 If this seems to be an argument, albeit a cynical one, for saying plus ?a change, plus c'est la m?me chose, the very use of the term genocide, as if we have in our current self-centered time suddenly stumbled upon a different order of things, is equally problematic. How do we find a separate niche for this exterminatory modus operandi when we are already familiar with the idea of massacre, civil war, revolution, man-made famine, total war, and indeed the potentiality for nuclear obliteration? The signposting of the scholars is, to say the least, contradictory. The international jurist Raphael Lemkin, who both coined the term "genocide" and was founding mover for its study, saw in it not so much modernity as a reversion or regression to past "barbarisms." If he perceived a difference in our century it was not in the destruction of peoples or nations per se but in the ability of international society, with international law as its right arm, to outlaw and ultimately prevent it. In spite of the catastrophe which overwhelmed his own family in the Holocaust, Lemkin was essentially optimistic about a modern global civilization founded on western enlightenment principles. The 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide is his great legacy. 5 Yet, Kosovo notwithstanding, the Genocide Convention has been more honored in the breach than in the practice. A considerable stream of current empirical thought, moreover, would challenge Lemkin's basic premise. Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, has not only forcefully rejected the notion that the Holocaust represented some "irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully eradicated residues of pre-modern barbarity" but on the contrary "arose out of a genuinely rational concern . . . generated by a bureaucracy true to it form and purpose." For Bauman, this quintessential genocide was a product of a planned, scientifically informed, expert, efficiently managed, coordinated, and technically resourced society like our own. Indeed, just in case anyone was in doubt as to his meaning, he not only reiterated that the Holocaust was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity and could not be "at [End Page 306] home in any other house" but that there was an "elective affinity" between it "and modern civilization." 6 If Bauman and Lemkin seem to offer very different perspectives on why this century might be considered the century of genocide, this article would submit that neither argument in itself offers a conclusive case. Implicitly, both have the added danger of being reduced to discussions about the form genocidal killing takes. The short hand for Bauman thus might read: "gas chambers": systematized, routinized, industrialized conveyer belt killings; albeit with a grand vision at its end "of a better, and radically different, society." 7 There is something compelling in this theme. If gas chambers suggest a 1940's state-of-the-art technology for the accomplishment of a particular type of mass murder, telegraphs and trains in the Ittihadist destruction of the Armenians or the provision of index registers of the Rwandese population as a basis for the selection of Tutsi and other victims in 1994 equally seem to point the finger at a type of social organization in which victims can be characterized as depersonalized freight or numbers and their perpetrators as pen pushers or technical operators who conveniently find themselves physically or psychologically "distanced" from the act of murder. All well and good. Except that recent studies, such as Goldhagen on the Holocaust, or Prunier on Rwanda, provocatively remind us that much of it is not like that; that genocide, whether perpetrated by a technologically advanced society like Germany or a relatively undeveloped one like Rwanda, still requires the active mobilization of hundreds of thousands of their "ordinary" citizens to pull triggers or wield machetes; that this involves not a spatial removal but a direct confrontation between perpetrators and victims; and that in consequence genocide in action can be every bit as passionate, vicious, and messy as the massacres of the Peloponnesian or Punic wars. 8 By a different route, we seem to be back with Lemkin's barbarism. Except that neither the Romans nor Greeks saw themselves as barbarians but rather as the most advanced and sophisticated societies of their time. If then, as Michael Freeman would assert, the argument cannot be about modernity per se but only about civilization and if we were to pursue this train of thought further by tracing in the classical and pre-modern [End Page 307] record the capability of societies--despite their usually politically diffused and decentralized nature--to deport or exterminate whole populations, where is our case for a particular relationship between genocide and the twentieth century? 9 This article would contend in response that form is not the primary issue whereas framework most definitely is. Or, to put it another way, we cannot begin to understand genocide without grappling with history, by which is implied not only the historical context of each individual genocide which necessarily must tell us a special and unique story but rather the macrohistorical record, the broad and moving canvas in which we might chart and hopefully analyze the emergence and development of the current international system. Indeed, its first proposition is that the origins of something which we specifically call genocide, followed by the persistence and prevalence of this phenomenon into the contemporary world, is intrinsically bound up with that emerging system and is indeed an intrinsic and crucial part of it. If this line of argument is correct then genocide cannot be simply cordoned off as an aberration which afflicts states which have become too ideological, totalitarian, prone to revolution, to war, or internal conflicts which are the result of ethnic division and stratification. These may be significant features and important determinants of genocide. And they may tell us also something about why certain countries--Germany, Russia, China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Turkey, Rwanda, Burundi--have been particularly genocide prone. But none of these examples can be understood purely in domestic isolation. Nation states, notes Anthony Giddens, "only exist in systemic relations with other nation-states." 10 Yet the global system of nation states which we now take for granted has only come to full fruition in this last century. Genocide is thus not only a by-product of particular national trajectories as they attempt state building in order to operate within, circumvent, or possibly confront that system, but a guide to and indeed cipher for its own dysfunctional nature. But why should this be? The answer, on one level, is closely enmeshed with what Marxist or neo-Marxist analysis would call "the dynamics of uneven historical development." 11 Thus, the international [End Page 308] system was not created all of a piece but was primed and taken forward by a small coterie of western polities. Their economic and political ascendancy determined the system's ground rules and ensured that its expansion and development would be carried forward and regulated primarily in their own hegemonic interests. As a result, not only have "international relations been co-eval with the origins of the nation-state" but this process from its eighteenth-century origins was peculiarly dependent upon the fortunes of its leading players, most notably Britain, France, and the United States. 12 We do not ourselves have to be westernocentric to acknowledge this problematic reality or the essential thrust of Immanuel Wallerstein's developmental thesis in terms of a dominant western core surrounded by semi-peripheral and peripheral zones. 13 Yet Wallerstein himself would be the first to acknowledge that this development was not naturally preordained, nor did it have to lead to the permanent ascendancy of specific states. Rather, it was the outcome of a long series of inter-European power struggles fought increasingly in a global arena, in which some proto-modern states, such as Spain, fell by the wayside while others, notably Prussia and Russia, came into frame as serious contenders for primacy. If all this had and continues to have something of a social Darwinian quality about it, nevertheless, "the intersection of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state," which were the primary ingredients enabling western state supremacy in the first place, remain the enduring features of the system as globalized, while also ensuring the continuing hegemony of a somewhat broader but still relatively small group of states (with a number of key western institutions and corporations also now involved), even though the relative position of these may be quite different from that of the late eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. 14 This relationship between genocide and an emerging international system demands further scrutiny. Was it, for instance, the avant-garde states who committed genocide in their drive for hegemony, or latter-day contenders? And whichever it was, where do we locate our first modern example? Aspects of the Iberian thrust to the Canaries, the Caribbean, and then the New World mainland are horribly suggestive, as are, in the Spanish and Portuguese domestic frames, the disgorging or forcible integration of Jews and Moriscos. Similar early modern trends are perhaps to be found in the destruction of Albigensians and [End Page 309] Anabaptists en route to the consolidation of French and German state-religious unities and later still in the English or Anglo-Scottish campaigns to "clear" Catholic Irish and Gaelic Highlanders from their frontier hinterlands. The process could be said to have been carried forward in a still wider global frame with the British onslaught on the native peoples of Australasia, the American expulsions, subjugations, and massacres of their remaining unsubdued Indian nations, closely replicated in Latin American countries, notably Argentina, not to say in the Russian anti-Circassian drive to consolidate the Caucasus firmly within the Czarist empire. Yet while the scale of these killings, particularly in the case of the sixteenth-century Americas, not only equals but arguably surpasses instances of twentieth-century mass murder, the specificity of "genocide" cannot be confirmed or denied from this litany. If the corelationship to the emerging system is the critical issue, a possibly more authentic first contender might be the 1793-94 revolutionary Jacobin onslaught on the Vend?e region. Here we can observe a premeditated, systematic, if albeit geographically limited attempt at people-destruction closely linked to rapid nation-state building within the context of a much broader crisis of interstate relations. But if the Vendee is an important signpost for a type of mass murder which has become particularly prevalent and persistent in the twentieth century, its inclusion as a case study has to contend with objections that Frenchmen killing other Frenchmen cannot be "genocide." 15 Interestingly, this contrasts with a contention from an entirely different quarter which protests at any attempt to pick and choose between which mass killings are genocides and which are not. 16 Even were we to put aside this perfectly understandable, ethically grounded restraint, the bewildering diversity of the situations that perpetrator and victim groups outlined so far confronts this writer, no less than others, with the obstinate question: what exactly is it that we are discussing? "At the most fundamental level," it has been asserted, "we presently lack even a coherent and viable description of the processes and circumstances implied by the term genocide." 17 And this despite enormous [End Page 310] and continuing efforts by sociologists and jurists to provide taxonomies and etiologies of the phenomenon not to say a legal framework for criminalizing it. Leo Kuper, doyen of its study, sounds almost despairing. There is, he says, "no single genocidal process" and, to boot, probably no basis for developing "a general theory of genocide." 18 Similarly, Helen Fein warns that "comparisons based on either the Holocaust or the Gulag Archipelago as a single archetype which assume there is one mechanically recurring script are bound to be misleading." 19 Fein is correct. Each genocide is different. The problem is knowing what falls within the rubric in the first place, her very reference to the Gulag being an interesting example of how potentially we might obscure rather than clarify our focus. Fein's example also highlights a general tendency to conflate the act of "genocide" with "genocidal process," of which there is a great deal more. The latter, involving all manner of draconian or coercive measures, ranging from the forcible assimilation of a group at one end of the spectrum through to physical murder at the other, does not have to culminate necessarily in a program of systematic people-annihilation, that is, "genocide." Even then it is rarely sustained to an attempted completion. This is perhaps one reason why the Holocaust remains so central to our vision of what constitutes genocide, as if in Weberian terms we had found our "ideal" type. Nevertheless, this argument contends, in contradistinction to Kuper, that with appropriate terms of reference it is possible not only to discern a pattern of genocide which in some way is relatable to the unfolding of contemporary history but which also, at least in terms of academic study, can be viewed as having a coherent identity. My approach revolves around the two obviously interlinked questions: "what is genocide" and "why does it occur"? The first might be answered in a preliminary sense by proposing that genocide is, as in Lemkin's formulation, a type of state-organized modern warfare. But this statement requires elucidation. Though not all warfare in history has been conducted by states, the ability of a state to wage war is both a prime indicator of its power vis-?-vis other states and of its relationship to its domestic populace. Additionally, a recourse to war tells us much about the self-perception of a state leadership and of its willingness, ideologically motivated or otherwise, to pursue what it views as state's interests or agendas by these means. Yet war, by definition, is a high-risk strategy, which, even where carefully prepared, can be comprehensively [End Page 311] demolished by contingent events. It also requires prodigious inputs of manpower, resources, and capital. If the war fails these may be lost in part or entirety to the great if not fatal detriment of the state. Alternatively, successful war may result in great material and psychological benefits. This may sound paradoxical with regard to genocide but is in fact as true for it as for the two other main types of state-organized modern war. Indeed, genocide often is conducted simultaneously or in parallel with them. Equally importantly, all three types have a common relationship to the nation state's place within the broader international system. Type One warfare is between recognized and usually powerful sovereign states within the system. In the twentieth century the "totalization" of these interstate struggles, particularly in the way that, for instance during the Second World War, adversaries have indiscriminately targeted and murdered millions of the noncombatants of the opposing side, has led some writers not only to describe this type of warfare as "genocidal" but to discern similar psychological, technological, and political processes at work as those which inform genocide. 20 This, however, is to confuse the issue of moral repugnance with the observation of means and ends. The bombing of Dresden and Hiroshima, or for that matter the creation and active mobilization of nuclear arsenals capable of producing global annihilation, are arguably, no less "crimes against humanity" than Auschwitz or Treblinka. They also suggest the obsolescence of either traditionally grounded or more recently formulated codes of military conduct which are supposed to act as brakes on unlimited warfare between combatants. Nevertheless, in this type of war there remains, however residually, and even where one side demands the unconditional surrender of the other, a Clausewitzian notion that the struggle is fought between "legitimate" adversaries and that at the end of the day negotiation rather than extermination will determine the position of both victor and vanquished within the postwar world order. The same is not true of the second type of warfare, however. This type is particularly characterized by circumstances in which a sovereign state, often a powerful one, acts against another state which it perceives to be "illegitimate." Usually the second state is much less powerful; one thinks of the British versus the Boer states at the turn of [End Page 312] the century, Austria against Serbia in August 1914, Nazi Germany in its onslaught on Poland a global war later, or two decades later still, the United States versus North Vietnam. The Japanese post-1937 invasion of China, or the Nazi post-1941 invasion of the Soviet Union might also, arguably, be included in this list, even though the perceived illegitimate states in question were relatively powerful ones, or, at the other end of the "power" spectrum, the Nigerians vis-?-vis a briefly secessionist Biafra. The diversity of these examples warns us that too much can be made of their common features. Nevertheless, the nature of the Type Two warfare is characterized by the supposedly "legitimate" side dispensing in entirety with Geneva Convention-informed restraints on the grounds that the opposition are little more than "terrorists," "saboteurs," or "bandits" incapable of fighting conventional, "civilized" war. Worse, they are succored by a native population whose cultural and social level is beneath contempt. Racism invariably confirms this judgmental verdict. In the circumstances, all "necessary" measures for the liquidation of resistance are allowable: mass aerial bombardment, scorched earth, counterinsurgency, mass deportation, environmental devastation, as well as repeated retributive or disciplinary massacre without regard to the age or gender of victims. These features of indiscriminate warfare inevitably bear close resemblance to warfare Type Three which often (though not always) involves genocide. Interestingly, Type Two is also much closer to Type Three in terms of its justification, the "enemy" in its resistance and obdurate unwillingness to submit being perceived to threaten the integrity of the agenda, or indeed existence, of the "legitimate" state. It is, therefore, "they," the adversary populace, by their misguided actions and belief systems, not to say their atrocities against "us," who are accused of culpability and responsibility for the perpetrator's "war of self-defense" which, as a result, has to be fought ? la outrance and without mercy. Type Two warfare becomes Type Three warfare when the enemy is no longer a perceived "illegitimate" state but a perceived "illegitimate" community within the territorial definition or imperial framework of the perpetrator state. Very unusually, as in the case of the Holocaust, this can be extended to embrace population groups within allied, vassal, or subject states. Strictly speaking, however, genocide is only a variant of Type Three, given that in many cases where a sovereign state assaults elements of its own subject population or citizenry it does so without resorting to total warfare against them. For instance, the British struggle against the Irish, while undoubtedly vicious and punctuated by atrocity at its crisis stage in 1919-21, never spilled over into mass people-killing. The French struggle against the Algerian independence [End Page 313] movement, in the 1950s and early '60s, teetered on its brink. The Nazi post-1939 occupation of Poland arguably went over it, not only in its extermination of the country's Jews and Roma, but in its response to Polish national resistance. At stake here is what Vahakn Dadrian has referred to as the issue of "preponderant access to overall resources of power." 21 Whitehall may never have contemplated genocide against the Irish not only because of inherent institutional restraints and humanitarian sensibilities but because it was ultimately unwilling to commit major resources to the struggle. Having assessed that the enemy could not be defeated, it opted to find another, diplomatic strategy which would involve a degree of compromise and the avoidance of catastrophe. In other instances where the state is weak but possibly resistant to recognizing it, the ability to deliver genocide may be limited by lack of military or manpower capabilities and/or by the strength of the communal "enemy." The struggles in the southern Sudan, Iraqi Kurdistan, the Karen and other hill tribe regions of Burma, or the northern Tamil part of Sri Lanka, where the recognized government's monopoly of violence has been for much of the period of conflict far from absolute, and where in practice its administrative hold has been limited to the major towns as opposed to countryside, all provide contemporary illustration of this point. Nevertheless, these examples are also highly relevant to the study of genocide inasmuch as they point to a sequence of events in which the states in question, increasingly frustrated by their inability to defeat these insurgencies, have lurched towards more radical all-embracing solutions culminating, as in some of these cases, in genocide. Thus I argue that "genocide occurs where a state, perceiving the integrity of its agenda to be threatened by an aggregate population--defined by the state in collective or communal terms--seeks to remedy the situation by the systematic, en masse physical elimination of that aggregate, in toto, or until it is no longer perceived to represent a threat." 22 Yet clearly there is something perplexing, not to say bewildering, in this proposed state-communal equation. Genocide research is predicated on the proposition that whatever genocide is, it cannot be considered warfare in the normally understood sense between two armed combatants--however unequally matched they may be--but an entirely one-sided affair in which a group of absolute perpetrators [End Page 314] apply instruments of terror, violence, and unremitting massacre against entirely defenseless, not to say innocent men, women, and children. 23 Thus, to ascribe threat from the people who are mass murdered appears not simply to define genocide as a two-sided dynamic relationship between a state and an element of its population but to potentially infer that the perpetrator's actions are both legitimate and justifiable. Indeed, where a state goes down this path it is invariably accompanied by the claim--as witness recent Serbian behavior with regard to Kosovo--that it is defending itself against an imminent danger to its national security, territorial integrity, or even sovereignty, while at the same time it is going to inordinate lengths not only to conceal the evidence for mass murder but to deny that it has killed anyone. This discrepancy between an actual threat--where it exists at all--and what the perpetrator claims to be a threat is at the very heart of what one might call the genocide conundrum. Yet, paradoxically, this is the very reason that the perpetrator's claims cannot simply be dismissed out of hand but requires very careful examination and evaluation not only in the forensic sense of proving whether mass killing did or did not occur but equally importantly in providing a necessary insight into the perpetrator's mindset. The repeated tendency by perpetrators to conjure up or imagine enemies, or to make of real ones something much more terrifying and dangerous than they actually are, represents a clearly cultural and/or psychological dimension to the genocide phenomenon and one to which I will return later. But cracking the conundrum cannot be achieved in isolation. Indeed it may be that it can only be found in the intersection between this dark--and essentially unquantifiable--side of the human condition and the level of state and interstate relations where leaderships are assumed to behave rationally in the best interests of their polities and societies. Yet there is already a second conundrum here. Those who do not commit genocide, or at least have not done so in a twentieth-century time scale, do not necessarily look askance or in horror on those who have. Take, for example, this statement by a British observer of the first authentic twentieth-century example committed--in 1904-05--by the Germans against the Herero and Nama people in South West Africa (Namibia): "There can be no doubt, I think, that the war has been of an almost unmixed benefit to the German colony. Two warlike races have been exterminated, wells have been sunk, new water-holes discovered, the country mapped and covered with telegraph [End Page 315] lines, and an enormous amount of capital has been laid out." 24 The unmistakably upbeat tenor of this comment stands in marked contrast to the language of the United Nations Convention in which genocide is reviled as an "odious scourge." In principle, of course, leading politicians stand shoulder to shoulder alongside human rights activists and religious leaders in their condemnation of what in the popular mind is considered the most heinous of crimes. In practice, however, they tend to be much more selective, not to say circumspect, before leveling the accusation. Nor is this simply a case of narrow state interest. At the highest, supposedly most moral level of international relations, Kuper asserts "that for all practical purposes" the United Nations defends the right of "the sovereign territorial state . . . as an integral part of its sovereignty . . . to commit genocide." 25 There is, thus, clearly something quite schizophrenic about the international community's response to genocide. On the one hand it treats it with repugnance and has a Convention, signed by a majority of its states, which seeks to outlaw it; pours opprobrium on those who commit it; is in the process of creating a permanent international tribunal to bring its perpetrators to book; and yet, at the same time, has powerful members who either look the other way, or condone or even actively support incidents of it. Time after time. Could it be then, that states that have not committed genocide within the last one hundred years nevertheless see in those that have too close a reflection of their former selves? Some scholars, notably R. J. Rummel and Irving Louis Horowitz, have posited the argument that the avoidance of genocide in western societies lies in the strength of their civic institutions, the separation of their executive and legislative branches, and above all, in their democratic, liberal traditions. 26 Thus, societies which are tolerant, open, and democratic do not commit genocide. Yet these assumptions involve a remarkable historical and more contemporary sleight of hand. True, polities that before 1900 had already experienced prolonged periods of nation and state building, that were well advanced in their industrializing and infrastructural development, and that consequently felt reasonably [End Page 316] secure of their position within a wider geo-strategic context have been much less likely candidates, since then, for committing it. But in order to arrive at this happy condition, the leading modernizing states certainly did commit, at the very least, proto-genocides as well as a number of other practices, which under today's international rule book--created largely out of western Enlightenment thought and practice--would be considered dubious if not downright illegal. These included repeated recourse to war, conquest, and above all slavery. These practices, however, were crucial in providing these states with shortcuts to capital accumulation, which in turn fueled their technological cutting edge and industrial revolutions and which, by the mid- to late-nineteenth century, had assured for them an entirely hegemonic position around the globe. Not only was this the beginning of a new world order, but a "new world pecking order," in which these states set the tune and everybody else was expected to dance to it. 27 This would suggest that the twentieth century practice of genocide has more in common with states which are new, or are heavily engaged in the process of state and nation building, or are redefining or reformulating themselves in order to operate more autonomously and effectively within an international system of nation states. Thus, polities which were latecomers to it, including potentially very powerful ones like Russia and Germany, finding themselves at a disadvantage vis-?-vis the frontrunners, had to consider how best they could make up lost ground. Willingly or unwillingly taking on board much of the leaders' administrative, military, and infrastructural aspects, superficially seemed the only way forward. The ensuing cultural, social, and institutional borrowings set in motion the most profound reformulation of economies and societies. One of the key dilemmas for such late nation states, however, was not simply the requirement to borrow from a culturally alien template but, once acknowledged as players within the system, how to keep up with it. Its regulators and supervisors--the leader states--demanded of new candidates an implicit undertaking that they would transform themselves into polities which would operate effectively and coherently according to its rules. But being fundamentally and dynamically fueled by capitalism--by its very nature a cutthroat business--no new state could afford to stand still and had, rather, to find ways and means of staying afloat within this dominant political economy. True, some states were able to do so by finding for [End Page 317] themselves a secondary position under the economic or geo-political aegis of the leading nations, while a few, sometimes by dint of their geographic position, found for themselves a relatively comfortable niche by acting as trading intermediaries or entrep?ts. Still other later arrivals, particularly postcolonial newcomers, were able to trade on their poverty and underdevelopment to become major recipients of Western aid. These, interestingly, included a number of states which were to commit genocide. This deterministic explanatory framework clearly has its limits and limitations. To restate a list of some of the main genocide perpetrators of this century--Germany, Russia (the USSR), the Ottoman empire (later Turkey), Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi--is hardly an invitation to obvious communality. The range of this group in terms of wealth and power, not to say political and cultural background, represents a major disincentive while any attempt to suggest ideological proclivities or totalitarian systems as the connecting thread would either be stretching the point to the ridiculous or demanding comparison with other ideologically hard-line or authoritarian prone regimes who have not been notable offenders. Moreover, where do we find the distinction between those modernizing states who have committed genocide and the generality of those who have not? To argue that all such polities have the potentiality is all well and good but would require us to offer explanation for specific instances essentially on the basis of circumstance. Undoubtedly, circumstance is a crucial factor. But is it sufficient? A final thrust of the deterministic approach might posit that what all our genocidal practitioner states share is a particularly acute anxiety about the wide and ever-increasing gap between themselves and the global leaders within the international system but in relationship to their special sense of a historic, or even mythic, tradition of premodern coherence, authority, or imperium, both in regard to their own societies and/or in a broader regional or continental arena. Thus, genocide states/societies have been the ones with the strongest and most persistent complexes about having been blocked off from a position within the international system which they believe, on past historic record, ought to be theirs; have been the ones most prone to support leaderships who articulated this anger and resentment; and, consequently, also have been the ones mostly likely to radicalize their domestic arrangements as well as foreign policies in ways that consciously contravened or challenged the system's "liberal," inclusivist ground rules. This state of mind is perhaps best encapsulated in the poem, "Esnaf Destani," written by the famous Turkish nationalist, Ziya Gok?lp soon [End Page 318] after a series of catastrophic Ottoman defeats in Tripolitania and the Balkan wars: We were defeated because we were so backward. To take revenge, we shall adopt the enemy's science. We shall learn his skill, steal his methods. On progress we will set our heart. We shall skip five hundred years And not stand still. Little time is left. 28 The genocidal mentality, in other words, is closely linked with agendas aimed at accelerated or force-paced social and economic change in the interests of "catching up" or alternatively avoiding, or circumventing, the rules of the system leaders. If this gets us a little closer to the wellsprings of the genocide phenomenon, it still falls somewhat short of explaining why and how state/societal frustrations are unleashed on specific domestic populations. After all, the enemy in Gok?lp's message appears to be the West. As a result, rapid infrastructural overhaul and military industrialization should logically have geared Ottoman Turkey only toward Type One warfare as the route to break out from the system's perceived straightjacket. And we might at this juncture also note that other states at various times have adopted this formula without obvious recourse to genocide. Wilhelmine Germany in its 1914 bid for "Weltmacht oder Niedergang"--world power or collapse--did not unleash its fury at this point against the Jews. Nor in my understanding of the term did Japan commit genocide a global war later when it attempted its own dramatic breakout, despite its repeated Type Two mass atrocities against the Chinese and other Asian peoples. Perhaps this is because since its early-seventeenth-century near-extirpation of its Christians, Japan contained no ethnic, religious, or social grouping who could fulfill an obvious role as inside "enemy." Indeed, notwithstanding its now tiny and isolated northern Ainu population--subdued in much earlier times--Japan's rather unusual national homogeneity makes its contemporary era perpetration of genocide unlikely. The same, however, cannot be said of Ottoman Turkey at the time of Gok?lp's writing. Thus, if the specificity of genocide over and above a drive to rapid nation building is also bound up with the social and ethnic composition of a state's population, at what point does this become toxic? The Ottoman Empire, for instance, was historically, on [End Page 319] the whole, a rather successful multi-ethnic entity. Even with the emergence of modernity and, thanks to the events of 1789, the explosion of the French nation-state model onto the wider world, there was no particular reason why the Sublime Porte should not have been able to refashion its diverse ethnographic and religious elements along these lines into good Ottoman citizens. After all, there were no given blueprint or guidelines as to what constituted the nation. Even Gok?lp's "imagined" Turkish community presumably did not exclude his half-Kurdish self. Indeed, the first eighteenth-century nation states, in France and the United States--to which Gok?lp and other nationalist theoreticians would have looked for inspiration--were in principle both universalist and highly assimilationist, embracing people of different religious and ethnic origins under the rubric of citizenship. By a somewhat different route, a hybrid British "nation" also followed these contours. Inclusive citizenship thus became the recognized code for all nineteenth-century aspirants to sovereignty, followed, for instance, by post-1871 Germany with regard to its Jews (and Catholics), and for that matter--at least on paper--by an Ottoman state desirous of international recognition of its territorial integrity. Another late-nineteenth-century entrant into the nation-state system, Japan, as we have seen, was fortunate in starting out from a base line of people-homogeneity, while the post-1917 (countersystem) Soviet state proposed to circumvent the national issue, at least in part, by founding itself on internationalist principles which supposedly provided for a genuinely color-blind and all-embracing citizenship. The major weakness with the early liberal universalist French and Anglo-Saxon models was that what they proclaimed and what they actually did in practice were quite at variance with one another, most blatantly when it came to their colonial black populations. When, thus, latter-day ideologues of the Gok?lp ilk sought to scrutinize the source of western state advantage and to adapt the recipe for their own societies' benefit, what they most readily latched onto was not the modernizing impulses or technological innovation per se but the ability to mobilize a supposedly distinct national people--the ethnos--into a coherent and powerful unity. In retrospect, what is most interesting--and alarming--in Gok?lp's poem is his emphasis on a thoroughly exclusive "we," that is, those "authentic" ethnic components of the Ottoman population which had supposedly in the past made the empire great and glorious and which consciously reassembled as a tool for national regeneration would return it to greatness once again. Gok?lp was hardly alone in his search for national ur-man. Across nineteenth-century Europe, leading scholars and academicians in the [End Page 320] new disciplines of history, archaeology, philology, and literature had already drawn the contours for the study of the remote "national" past, not only for its own sake but as an instrument by which to "mobilize change in the future." 29 Even that most forceful nineteenth-century counterblast to the national thesis, namely Marxism, claimed to be able to construct the genuinely universal modern man--the prototype for homo sovieticus--on the basis of a scientific examination of man's ascendance from his natural history. All these historical and prehistorical reinventions were not only highly selective but often utterly spurious. Nevertheless, this did not prevent them from becoming received wisdoms which, adopted and adapted by the elites or would-be elites of other "latecomer" states, would serve radical agendas. It is perhaps no coincidence, moreover, that the primary frontrunner and exemplar for these lines of enquiry should be that nineteenth-century latecomer state par excellence, Germany. Nor that it should be Germany again which would most strikingly appropriate new racial lines of thought in this national quest. The flip side to these national and indeed antinational constructions, however, was that they all implicitly assumed the existence of population groupings which not only would not fit the prescribed model but which, in some critical sense, threatened to contaminate it. Again the crystallization of this tendency can be located in European, scientifically informed wisdoms from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In particular, medical science's "discovery" of death-dealing bacteria and bacilli not only coincided with mass epidemics in the new urban and metropolitan centers but also with new and obsessive Social Darwinian discourses about the "survival of the fittest." Fears of communal weakness and febrility thus became associated with anxieties that "foreign bodies" operating from within the body-politic might undermine or contaminate the physical and mental health of the nation, leading in turn to further medically informed but supposedly value-free prognostications on how to protect or improve the national stock by eugenics or other programs of social engineering. These fin-de-si?cle anxieties were a common feature of the western or western-orientated world at large. But they arguably played or were to play more prominent roles among political elites in latecomer states who perceived their national weakness keenly and who sought radical policies to overcome or transcend their limitations. One tendency we have already noted with regard to these elites is the extreme lengths to which they have gone in order to achieve these goals. Another we [End Page 321] should note is the tendency to blame supposedly corrupting internal "foreign bodies" whenever these strategies go wrong. The two aspects, indeed, are intimately connected in the sense that by their very effort to attain what is usually unattainable such state strategies are likely to come unstuck, leading not only to increased frustration but with it the further rationalization that this must be the result of the insider enemy or enemies' conscious sabotaging of the state's heroic not to say Herculean efforts. Thus, genocide scenarios regularly crystallize in crisis situations in which a regime's conscious effort at break out from its perceived fetters encounters obstacles which recall some previous failure, either of its own or that committed by a predecessor. The classic example, the Holocaust, whose full-scale implementation began during an early stage of the Nazis' life and death struggle with the Soviet Union in 1941, makes no sense without reference back to the previous major crisis of German state and society in 1918-19, in which by popular consent, Jews qua Jews were held to be responsible. By the same token, the Stalinist drive against the "kulaks," Ukrainian and other "ethnic" peasantries, from 1929 to 1933, has to be set against the crisis of revolution and civil war between 1917 and 1921; the Ittihadist extermination of the Armenians in 1915-16, against the repeated crises of Ottoman state from 1878 through the 1890s, culminating in the Balkan wars of 1912-13; the Indonesian military's extermination of the countrywide communist movement (the PKI) in 1965 against the attempted PKI challenge to nationalist rule in 1948; the Rwandese "Hutu Power" extermination of the Tutsi in 1994 against the backdrop of counterrevolutionary efforts to destabilize and destroy the new postcolonial regime in the period 1959-64. Indeed, the only major example of genocide being perpetrated without notable prequel is the Cambodian Khmer Rouge destruction of ethnic and political groupings from 1975 through 1979, an example which nevertheless points to a quite extraordinary sequence of immediately preceding catastrophes as the grist added to the Khmer Rouge mill. Even with this example, however, what is here termed the perpetrators' "Never Again" syndrome applies: the regime locating in some historic context a communal adversary, or adversaries, supposedly intent on the disruption or sabotage of its transformative-salvationist agenda. 30 An obvious conclusion one might wish to draw from this picture is that perpetrators of genocide are stridently ideological or authoritarian [End Page 322] regimes more often than not led by unhinged, psychopathic dictators. Popular portrayals of Hitler, Stalin, Saddam Hussein, or Pol Pot only reinforce the sense that their actions against "imagined" enemies are essentially symptoms of extreme paranoia, delusion, and projection. The very fact that in some instances, as for example in the case of the "kulaks," the construction of a coherent and identifiable adversary took place in the heads of the Stalinist leadership and bore no relationship to social realities, only adds to the view that our subject is one primarily for clinical psychological investigation. Indeed, Nazi ranting and raving about Jewish world conspiracy as just cause for their actions would suggest that worst cases of genocidal behavior are not simply deeply irrational but completely mad. The problem with this line of reasoning, however, is threefold. First, while the alleged "madness" of the above genocide instigators is not easily verifiable one way or the other, an extended list which might, for instance, include Atat?rk, Mao, and Milosevic would be hardpressed to support the generality of this assumption. Second, even where genocidal states are totalitarian and heavily policed, they are founded on a domestic support base--however limited or narrow that may be--which must itself at least in part be mobilized as accomplices in the perpetration of genocide. It must therefore follow that either this support base is itself suffering from similar delusions as its leaders, or alternatively believes that the leadership is acting rationally in the best interests of polity and people. In fact, the two positions are not necessarily irreconcilable. Norman Cohn provocatively demonstrated some thirty years ago the manner in which fantasies reminiscent of medieval times took strong hold of a significant proportion of post-1918 German society, including, indeed especially, amongst many highly educated and professional people, in the form of the notion that worldwide Jewry, despite its dispersal, minority status and history of persecution, was actually spearheading an international, even cosmic conspiracy to emasculate and ultimately wipe out not only the German people but all western civilization. 31 Fears of sexual, cultural, and mental contamination, of the spread of disease, and the consequent debilitation of a healthy, virile volk by races of Jewish or gypsy antimen, it could be argued, [End Page 323] did not so much have to be manufactured by the Nazis but simply echoed and then amplified as the visceral instincts of a vox populi. In this way, it could be further argued, state organized genocide is actually constructed not from the top down, but bottom-up from hate models provided by grass-roots societal phobias. This is, of course, the well-known Goldhagen position in which genocide is plausible because it is deeply embedded within the cultural archetypes of a society. But Goldhagen does not conclude from his study of ordinary German participants in the Holocaust that they were anything other than normal, simply that they were impelled toward often sadistic killing of Jews by an eliminationist anti-Semitism. Undoubtedly, Goldhagen's thesis is important for the issue of comparative research in its implicit demand for further consideration of the genocidal interconnections as well as stepping stones between popular culture and state-building agendas. What is missing from Goldhagen is the context. Traditional anti-Semitism within large sections of the German population crystallized into something utterly toxic only during 1918-19, in other words in quite extraordinary circumstances of mass trauma and disorientation. This provides a third reason why blaming "mad" or "evil" regimes alone for genocide will not suffice if this fails to take heed of the circumstances in which those regimes arise. It is surely no accident that the first great wave of contemporary genocides comes out of the actuality and aftermath of that great twentieth-century catastrophe and watershed, the First World War, in which particular states--the ones which collapsed, or were defeated, or were most obviously embittered by the war and postwar outcome--and not least by the post-1929 economic aftershock--were also the ones which increasingly discarded the received wisdoms of the liberal-capitalist system in favor of alternative "second" or "third" ways to progress and ultimate triumph. Ordinary people did not initiate the genocides which were sometimes consequent. But the manner of their response to these domestic convulsions, either in their enabling, or possibly in their inability to resist or put the brakes on new masters with their programs for a radical reshaping of society, were critical to these outcomes. What thus emerges from the period 1914 to 1945 is a pattern of genocide, which is closely linked to the supercession or overthrow of discredited or bankrupt traditional regimes and their replacement by at least in part popularly legitimized radical ones with maximalist agendas for social and/or national regeneration. All these regimes were "revisionist" in the sense that they sought to challenge, circumvent, or transcend the terms of either the pre- or post-Versailles world order. And all, in their efforts to socially engineer a streamlined people-coherence, both for its own sake and also for this wider purpose, were [End Page 324] to greater or lesser degrees ready to reject or abandon former policies aimed at integrating or assimilating ethnic, religious, or social groupings which did not easily or obviously "fit" into the state's organic conception of itself. Bauman sees in these strivings, and most particularly in Nazism and Stalinism, "the most consistent, uninhibited expressions of the spirit of modernity." 32 In other words, a highly rational project. Yet when we look at the Nazi onslaught on the Roma, or, again under Nazi aegis, Romania's extermination of its Bessarabian and Bukovinan Jewry, or Stalin's genocidal deportations of Tatar, Chechen, and other minority peoples, or lesser known examples such as the Iraqi "Assyrian affair" of 1933, or almost coincidentally, Mussolini's extirpation of the hill peoples of Cyrenaica, one cannot but be struck by their perpetrators' irrationality. Their victims did not ultimately suffer genocide simply because they did not "fit" a regime's perception of people-homogeneity. They suffered it because the finger was pointed at them as the group or groups accused of actively disrupting or polluting the state's drive to transcend its limitations. We are back with the massive or hyperinflated imaginings of the state, which another acute observer, Ron Aronson, has described as a "rupture with reality." 33 However, Aronson does not propose that this has no relationship to modernity. On the contrary, what he argues is that in situations where modernity is harnessed as an instrument for the realization of impossible goals what you end up with is a dialectical set of tensions between power and impotence, reason and madness. In a critical sense the gargantuan nature of a regime's agenda may indicate in advance the degree to which it has already lost touch with reality. But the actual attempt at implementation, "the realization of the unrealizable" as he calls it, is likely to result in a crisis in which, having boxed itself into a corner from which it is unable to retreat, the regime finds that its only recourse is in "reshaping what resists," that is, massive violence. 34 Interestingly, Aronson suggests that it is not only in instances of genocide that this extreme and seemingly irrational behavior can occur. The United States, for instance, in its attempts to obliterate first much of North Korea in the early 1950s, and then North Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, not to say the rest of Indochina, speaks volumes about the contradictions between an apparently all-powerful hegemon and the actuality of its inability to reorder the world in its own assured image. The discrepancy between [End Page 325] hubris and humiliation does not have to be the prerogative of a recognized genocide state, nor necessarily taken out on a communal scapegoat. Attempted crisis resolution could as easily be in the form of an aggressive Type One warfare; Germany's 1914 attempted breakout from perceived encirclement, for instance, or Iraq's Type Two 1990 invasion of Kuwait or, as a latter day extension of either of these trajectories, the unleashing of nuclear weapons, a scenario--bar the somewhat different culminating sequence of World War Two--narrowly avoided to date. What all these scenarios share in common is the state leaderships' conviction of the malevolence of forces "out there" that have conspired not only to frustrate the realization of their agenda but to harm and even possibly physically eradicate their own people. This does not rule out instances where these anxieties have some grain of truth in them. However, the most extraordinary examples of genocide are those notable for the complete absence of any concrete evidence to suggest that a communal group qua group has the intention, let alone ability, to carry through such a maleficence. The Nazi assertion that "the Jew is the German people's most dangerous enemy" perhaps represents the most thoroughgoing example confirming Aronson's rupture thesis. 35 But the statement made in the Serbian parliament in 1991 that "the truth is (my italics) that all non-Serb ethnic groups, especially the Croats, are at this very minute preparing the genocide of all Serbs" suggests that such projections are hardly exclusive to the era of Stalinism and fascism. 36 Indeed, the persistence and prevalence of genocide since the destruction of Nazism--running to an average of almost one case a year since 1945--must lead one to further ponder what motor continues to drive this seemingly irresistible lunacy? 37 The immediate aftermath of the Second World War, with its trials of German and Japanese war criminals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the inauguration of the United Nations, and with it both its Charter on Human Rights and Genocide Convention, should have been crystal-clear signals from the international system leaders that its perpetration by newcomer states [End Page 326] would not be tolerated. Yet, paradoxically, it was the willingness of these very same leaders at this very same time to acquiesce or condone, or even officially sponsor, former wartime allies such as the Czechs or the Poles in their sub-genocidal ethnic cleansings of millions of Germans and other unwanted peoples from their territories, not to say of the Soviet Union's continuance of its prewar reordering of communal populations primarily by mass deportation, which seemed to offer a quite different and hardly subliminal countermessage. It was as if human rights were being put on a frozen pedestal of abstract principle for the foreseeable future in order to enable states created or recreated in a postwar context to get on with the creation of social conditions appropriate to their rapid modernization and consolidation. Indeed, the message seemed to be that it was expected that the practical achievement of these goals would involve ethnic standardization, the removal or dissipation of troublesome or difficult population groups, or those who, perhaps because of their "primitive" and "backward" cultures, were deemed obstacles in the path of progress. These imperatives would suggest, ? la Bauman, that genocide would be committed by new state leaderships for perfectly rational reasons, associated with their developmental blueprints to operate and compete within an increasingly integrated international political economy. The very fact that genocide, which in the interwar years was most associated with new or newly remodeled states in Europe and the Near East, became a global phenomenon in the post-1945 ebb of the European imperial or neo-imperial tide must give some credence to this line of thought. Superficially, for instance, the genocidal behavior of a number of South American and South Asian countries against tribal peoples, in their efforts to reach out, connect, and integrate rich forest and other extractive resources of geographically peripheral hinterlands for the benefit of their already advancing metropolitan economies, would suggest a wholly developmental logic. But even in these largely "off the map" instances of contemporary genocide, such logic has been rarely quite so one dimensional. The name of the game in these instances has been that of former Bangladeshi President Zia's "develop or perish," in other words, the pursuit of crash courses in rapid modernization, whatever the consequences. 38 The fear of being left behind in the global race for position, or much worse, being forced back into a perpetual dependency, thus [End Page 327] has always had in the contemporary era something of an air of desperation about it. That native peoples have particularly been the casualties in this process, however, has not been a case simply of their inhabiting territories designated for roads, mines, or hydroelectric dams. Rather, in the eyes of notably Brazilian, Indonesian, or Bangladeshi technocrats, it has been their failure to behave to some preconceived primitive, barbarous, and preferably passive type who, recognizing their allotted station in the great scheme of things, would consequently and conveniently fade away into oblivion as soon as the first bulldozers or transmigratory settlers appeared. On the contrary, the refusal of, for instance, the jumma in Bangladesh or Papuans in Irian Jaya (West Papua) to lie down and die quietly but instead organize and fashion themselves into modern "fourth world" identities in order to more effectively resist state encroachment, provides a potent clue both as to the intensification of the genocidal onslaughts upon them and the perpetrators' repeated justification that behind them must be some other more organized outside force directing their sabotage of the state developmental agenda. This notion that the targeted victim group are really the proxies, stooges, or agents of a much more malevolent but dissembled or hidden power intent on denying the state its own, self-directed mission towards unfettered independence and genuine integrity seemingly gravitates us back yet again toward an explanation for genocide in the much murkier waters of psychological mindsets where the perpetrator sees international conspiracies in everything. In the post-1945 world of Cold War-dominated international politics, such accusations have flown thick and fast with devastating results. Tagging whole populations as "communist" in the Indonesia of 1965, East Timor a decade later, or the Guatemala of the early 1980s provided state justification for genocide. But so too, in the Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia, did diverse branding as "cosmopolitan," "Soviet revisionist," or "stooge of US imperialism." In the most extreme of these examples, the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, not only were specific ethnic minority populations of Chinese, Vietnamese, and Muslim Chams particularly vulnerable to such charges, but literally anyone who had the misfortune to have been living or seeking refuge in the US-backed government zone around Phnom Penh when it fell to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975. The ensuing division of society, into "true" Khmer who would enjoy the fruits of the country's projected "super great leap forward" and "new" people slated for perpetual hard labor and probable death, was founded on the assumption that the latter, however fleetingly, were tainted by their association with western [End Page 328] imperialism. Even then, as the regime's closed utopian experiment ground to a halt and began disintegrating under the weight of the impossible tasks it had set itself, the list of "enemies" shifted and expanded further still to embrace anyone that the regime deemed foreign or inauthentic. Here, however, we come face to face with anxieties which go much deeper than any set in motion simply by Cold War ideologies. The historic enemy perceived to have denied the Khmer their rightful greatness were the neighboring Vietnamese. Communist Vietnam in 1978, of course, was supposed to be a fraternal ally. Yet in that year the genocidal trajectory of the Khmer Rouge reached both its apogee and nemesis when practically the whole population of its Eastern Zone were provided with blue scarves for their deportation and then extermination on the collective indictment that their Khmer bodies were occupied by "Vietnamese minds." 39 The episode of the blue scarves ought to throw doubt on arguments which treat genocidal victim groups as fixed entities as in some Linnaean system of plant and animal classification, instead of as the products--often entirely imaginary ones--of the perpetrators' assemblage of social reality. Lemkin's formulation of genocide based on genos (race) in this sense is a disservice to our well-rounded comprehension of the phenomenon. Certainly, Lemkin's focus on the destruction of the "biological structure" of a communal group was correct and appropriate inasmuch as a distinctiveness of genocide lies in the mass murder of women of all ages equally and without discrimination from the men who are their blood relatives and with the purpose of denying or seeking to deny their biological as well as social reproduction. 40 But how this group of people identifies itself, or whether it does so at all, in ethnic, religious, or political terms is immaterial to either a "genocidal process" of human rights abuse and persecution or the actuality of systematic liquidation. When it came to legalizing discrimination against Jews the Nazis' conceptualization of them as a "race" proved to have no empirical or juridical foundation. By the same token, Himmler's engagement of academics and special institutes to isolate the authentic Roma achieved nothing but contradictory messages. In the end, state perpetrators exterminate groups of people because they perceive them as a threat and find racial, ethnic, or social tags for them as convenient for this purpose. [End Page 329] This, however, does not mean that a group need necessarily be a tabula rasa waiting to be victimized. What is important to know is what it is about "the group" that challenges or appears in the perpetrator state's mind to challenge its authority, legitimacy, or integrity. The jumma in Bangladesh, Karen in Burma, Dinka and Nuer in southern Sudan, Kurds in Iraq, or Tutsi in Rwanda may not have objectively represented mortal dangers to their respective states, but the fact that significant elites of each have sought a more pluralistic framework of state, or an autonomy within it against the grain of centralist-minded agendas, may have been enough for them to be viewed as such. Add to this a historic association of these groups with former imperial rulers and one can begin to itemize common ingredients which might provide for a genocidal recipe. Of the Kurds in Saddam's Iraq, Kanan Makiya specifically notes that they "suffered more than others not because they were Kurds, but because they resisted and fought back hard." 41 Not all Kurds, though. Some were considered "loyal" and fought on the Ba'athist side. In another significant case, that of the Tibetans in the Chinese onslaught of 1959, it was perhaps not only their bid to reassert their autonomy which represented a territorial challenge to the People's Republic but a cultural one to its hegemonic and monolithic wisdom. In other words, the threat of a bad example. One can note many similar cases where a people have become a thorn in the side of a regime not so much for their "ethnic" or "national" characteristics but for what they socially or even morally represented, the idea, for instance, that power and resources might be shared between different communal groups or political tendencies; that society need not be homogenous but diverse and multicultural; or perhaps simply that there are other ways of looking at the world. George Steiner has spoken of the Jews in the context of Christianity and European civilization as the incarnation, "albeit wayward and unaware--of its own best hopes." When Europe, in the shape of the Nazis, attempted to extirpate them, it was thus not only a form of "self-mutilation" but a "lunatic retribution" against the "inextinguishable carriers of the ideal." 42 All this surely brings us back less to the victim groups and more to the nature of the driven regimes which commit genocide, what it is that impels them and, as a necessary corollary to that, what most frightens or haunts them. Our argument has rested on the proposition [End Page 330] that the drive to genocide is a function of states with a particularly marked or latent tendency to dispute the discrepancy between the way the world is and the way they think that it ought to be. The era of Cold War and of bipolar, including potentially nuclear-armed, struggle undoubtedly gave an added edge and intensity to the toxic potential inherent in this condition. "Enemies within" or "enemies of the people" were regularly conjured up by both hard-pressed communist regimes and their most vehement or geographically sensitive opponents in the "free world" camp as justification for the extirpation of ethnic or other elements in the population perceived to stand as obstacles to their monodirectional paths to progress. Competition between the superpowers, in their support or opposition to given states, also directly affected some of these outcomes. Supporting ethnic insurgencies, for instance, as the United States covertly did with regard to the Mimang Tsogdu in Tibet in the 1950s, or the Kurdish pesh merga in the 1970s, not only seemed to make tangible Chinese or Iraqi state fears that there really were international plots aimed at undermining them, but in so doing vastly increased the vulnerability of ordinary Tibetans and Kurds to genocide. Likewise, US geo-strategic obsessions as to the imminence of South East Asia's collapse to communism, in the wake of Phnom Penh's fall in 1975, provided one of the most stark examples of a state--Indonesia--being given the green light the following year to extirpate the marxisant-led and newly liberated Portuguese colony of East Timor to the tune of one-third of its million-strong inhabitants. Western backing for Indonesia's advantage, of course, stands in marked contrast to the simultaneous, self-willed and utterly autarkic drive by the Khmer Rouge to overcome the limitations of Cambodia's perceived febrility. Of all twentieth-century genocidal scenarios, that of late-1970s Cambodia in many respects demonstrates its nature in extreme crystallization. By clearing away everything deemed to be non-Cambodian debris the Khmer Rouge aimed to begin again, as it were, from scratch. In so doing they assumed that this would provide the necessary springboard from which Cambodia's innate power would be dramatically unleashed, returning the country to its twelfth-century glory days in a matter of years. Yet if on one level this marks out the Khmer Rouge's agenda as both peculiarly salvationist, not to say utopian, as well as unusually dependent on a narrow and unwavering set of ideological assumptions in order to arrive at this transcendent destination, there is a danger in reading too much into this perspective. Ideological Pol Pot and his followers certainly were. And good communists--in their own eyes--too. But ultimately what so desperately [End Page 331] impelled them was an intense Khmer patriotism which demanded their revitalization of an ancient not to say mythic Khmer state against the grain of an unjust, hostile, and bloody world. One might go further and say that what mattered most to the Khmer Rouge was less the ideology which would get them there and more a simple, brazen reassertion of Wille zu Macht. We have seen something of the same functional pragmatism in more recent genocides. While Serbia's Milosevic and Croatia's Tudjman happily changed spots from communist to arch-nationalist on their roads to war and subgenocide in Bosnia and beyond, Rwandese Hutu leaders sought to defy regional pressure and international accords for power sharing with former Tutsi exiles by attempting to eliminate all perceived opponents. That this latter great end-of-the-century genocide came after the collapse of the Cold War and in an era in which, according to American guru Francis Fukuyama, the ideological alternatives to liberal capitalism had been comprehensively trashed on the slag heap of history, must surely give us pause. 43 Events in Kosovo surely confirm that contrary to Fukuyama there does remain one great ideological underpinning for genocide as strong now, at the onset of the twenty-first century as it was at the end of the nineteenth: nationalism. Indeed, one might posit that the emergence of new nation states out of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia in the wake of communist demise both there and more generally, represents the most marked reassertion of toxic tendencies in world historical development from the pre-1914 record. Kosovo should remind us that these tendencies never truly went away. Their continuity can perhaps be illustrated best by brief reference to a Serbian opinion-former and policymaker who had much to say on the Kosovo issue. Vaso Cubrilovic was one of the group of young terrorists, alongside Gavrilo Princip, who had planned the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Unlike Princip, however, Cubrilovic survived the Great War to become a respected historian at the University of Belgrade, where he wrote policy papers for the Yugoslav government advocating, in effect, state terrorism to get rid of the country's Muslims and in particular, Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. He also regularly attended, in the 1930s, the Serbian Cultural Club in Belgrade, where quasi-scientific discussions, initiated by the government and the general staff office, reiterated this extirpatory theme. In one such paper for the Club, Cubrilovic regretted that there had not been a more systematic [End Page 332] removal of the "foreign element" as had been practiced in pre-1914 Serbian state building and concluded that the only solution to the Arnaut (Albanian) problem was to make them leave the country. "When it is possible for Germany to force tens of thousands of the Jews to emigrate, for Russia to transfer millions of people from one part of the continent to another, a world war will not break out just because of some hundreds of thousands of displaced Arnauts." 44 At the end of the Second World War Cubrilovic reappeared as adviser to the Yugoslav communist regime, advocating in essence the same "Albanian" policy. Of course one riposte to this illustration might be to argue that, in the light of the contemporary realities extolled by Fukuyama, today's Cubrilovices are actually yesterday's men peddling nationalisms that are a redundant irrelevance. Of the hundred most important economic units currently in the global political economy, only half of them are nation states; the others are transnational corporations (TNCs). Or to put it another way, of some 180 nation states in the world, 130 of them have smaller economies than the fifty largest TNCs. 45 Yet it is exactly in this rapid globalizing trajectory that we should be able to discern why the Cubrilovices and Milosevices of the world, rather than disappearing, will continue to have a following and why, consequently, genocide will in fact be more prevalent in the near future than it was fifty or a hundred years ago. Nation states will not readily give up their power or their promise to the forces which drive the global economy, however inexorable those forces may appear to be. One might add that this may well continue to be particularly true for state regimes which because they are economically faltering may attempt to compensate by amplifying the national self-esteem message and conversely, the malevolence of the international system towards them. We forget at our peril that Rwanda (and Burundi) had a political coherence and sense of cohesive identity which long preceded the colonial era, perpetuated since then, albeit in fiercely competing Tutsi and Hutu narratives. Or that Milosevic's bid to create a greater Serbia out of the carcass of Yugoslavia was predicated not only on a Serb self-perception of a special mission [End Page 333] dating back to the nineteenth century but even further back to some supposedly mythic Serb civilization from medieval times. In both Rwandan and Serbian instances, war and genocide represented the crisis-response of state regimes to their inability to achieve their national agendas by other accepted means. They tore up the apparent rules of the international system and instead gambled on radical, high-risk shortcuts to a solution. Yet the great irony is that until 24 March 1999--the day of the opening of the Kosovo air campaign --so long as such efforts were contained within the territorial confines of the state's own sovereignty or had no noticeable impact beyond it, international anxiety about human rights violations or even genocide hardly translated into international censure, let alone action. In this sense, Cubrilovic's 1930's assessment of international inertia has remained accurate until almost the present day. And there is a simple reason for this: the nation state has remained sacrosanct, which is hardly surprising given that it is the basic building block of the global system. 46 As a result, nobody censured Democratic Kampuchea for its genocides despite the fact that by the late 1970s these were already quite well known and documented. Instead, the Western-led international community became incandescent with anger when it was invaded by its Vietnamese neighbor. Nor, while followers of Pol Pot continued to hold the Cambodian seat at the United Nations long after they had been ousted, did the international community complain when another genocidal state, Saddam's Iraq, attempted in 1988 in increasingly full public view, to liquidate its most troublesome Kurds in the notorious Anfal campaigns. However, it did respond when Saddam made the mistake of invading oil-rich Kuwait. It could thus be argued that the New World Order, which the US-led military campaign against Iraq supposedly heralded, is very much like the old when it comes to genocide. True, the Western allies set up a "safe haven" in Northern Iraq for millions of fleeing Kurds but only primarily because they more greatly feared the consequences for their NATO ally Turkey--with its own "troublesome" Kurdish population--should it have had to admit [End Page 334] the refugees. Fears of the impact of millions of displaced persons also played some role in the very belated postgenocide decisions of the "powers" to act with regard to Rwanda and Bosnia. In the latter case, Bosnia's initially uncertain status as a sovereign state certainly did not help its plight anymore than the earlier case of East Timor, whose continued subjugation by Indonesia remained--until very recently--largely a subject of international acquiescence. The Kurdish safe haven withers on the vine; Tibet remains off the international agenda; the international community upholds Tudjman and Milosevic's ethnic carve-up of Bosnia through the Dayton Accords. The message, it might appear, is rather clear. Despite international tribunals on Rwanda and Bosnia and the prospect of a permanent court to try crimes against humanity, including genocide, the leading states who constructed the international system and continue to be its prime movers have demonstrated not only an ability to live with states who commit genocide but even to applaud its successful consequences. Is Western action over Kosovo, therefore, the herald of a new beginning? Or, even of a new era in which genocide will be finally expurgated from the human experience? Undoubtedly, the willingness of the international system leaders, through their military arm NATO, to respond specifically to gross human rights violations in another sovereign state does represent a remarkable and possibly quite unprecedented departure. But the fact that this happened under the auspices of today's Great Powers rather than at the behest of the UN also recalls a more familiar pattern of self-interested international action in the past which, very far from being universally benign, was actually highly selective. If this pattern reasserts itself, the Western system leaders may act in the future to prevent or halt genocidal threats where they are sure of being able to do so with minimal military, political, or economic consequence to themselves--in other words against very weak states --but not against, for instance, Russia, China, or Turkey--all states with significant potential for genocide--where Western self-interest would dictate a strictly hands-off policy. Thus with the UN and other genuinely international institutions marginal to the real conduct of international affairs, Western powers will be able to pick and choose where they wish to intervene against actual or would-be genocidal perpetrators. Yet even this sobering prediction in the light of post-Kosovo analysis and assessment may be too optimistic. Despite the euphoria in early June 1999, when Milosevic agreed to the new peace deal and removed his forces from Kosovo, the fact that this had been achieved less by [End Page 335] seventy-plus days of constant NATO bombing and more by a deal heavily reliant on the Russians suggests the strict limits upon Western willingness to pursue, let alone punish, those who commit genocide. A final, ominous historical example. Back in 1923, at the treaty of Lausanne, Turkey, having smashed its way to modern nation-statehood out of the imperial hulk of the Ottoman Empire, was duly recognized and welcomed into the concert of nations by the great Western powers. En route to this goal, the Ittihadist and subsequent Kemalist regimes deported, massacred, or ethnically cleansed many more than two million Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, and Assyrians. There had been much Western outrage in earlier years, particularly about the genocidal fate of the Armenians, and even plans to try the perpetrators before an international court. But as Richard Hovannisian has noted of the Lausanne protocol: "The absolute Turkish triumph was reflected in the fact that in the final version . . . neither the word Armenia, nor the word Armenian, was to be found. It was as if the Armenian Question or the Armenian people themselves had ceased to exist." 47 In other words, Turkey's blatant repudiation of the "official" rules of the game in favor of a series of accelerated shortcuts--including genocide--toward statehood were ultimately conveniently ignored and even condoned by the treatymakers of Lausanne. On the contrary, they reciprocated by entering into a series of long-term diplomatic, commercial, and ultimately military relations with Turkey. Talaat Pasha, prime mover in the 1915 destruction of the Armenians, said at the time: "I have the conviction that as long as a nation does the best for its own interests, and succeeds, the world admires it and thinks it moral." 48 Translated into the present the message might be to Saddam, Milosevic, and other would-be emulators: be bloody minded, batten down the hatches, and let Western self-interest do the rest. Notes 1. Eric Hobsbawn, Age of Extremes, The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London, 1994), p. 12. 2. The title of the path-breaking work by Gil Eliot, Twentieth Century Book of the Dead (London, 1972). 3. John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985 (New York, 1986), p. 81. 4. Quoted in Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the 20th Century (New Haven, 1981), p. 12. 5. For more on Lemkin's seminal role, see Kuper's introductory chapter to Genocide; Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, DC, 1944). For the text of the UN Convention, see Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide (New Haven and London, 1990), pp. 44-49. 6. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Oxford, 1989), pp. 17, 89, 88. 7. Ibid., p. 91. 8. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners, Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (London, 1996); Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide 1959-1994 (London, 1995). 9. Michael Freeman, "Genocide, civilization and modernity," The British Journal of Sociology 46 (1995): 207-23. 10. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge, 1985), p. 4. 11. Ron Aronson, "Societal madness: Impotence, power and genocide," in Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, ed. Israel W. Charny (Boulder and London, 1984), p. 136. 12. Giddens, Nation-State, p. 4. 13. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge, 1979) and The Modern World System, 3 vols. (New York, 1974-88). 14. Giddens, Nation-State, p. 5. 15. Reynauld Secher, Le genocide franco-fran?ais, La Vend?e-Venge (Paris, 1986) for the main source of this controversy. 16. See, for instance, Israel Charny's ultra-inclusivist definition of genocide: "Unless clear-cut self-defense can be reasonably proven, whenever a large number of people are put to death by other people, it constitutes genocide," in Israel W. Charny, ed., Genocide, A Critical Bibliographical Review (London, 1988), vol. 1, p. xiii. 17. Ward Churchill, "Genocide: Toward a functional definition," Alternatives 11 (1986): 403. 18. Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the 20th Century (New Haven, 1981). 19. Helen Fein, "Genocide, A Sociological Perspective," Current Sociology 38 (1990): 56. 20. See, for example, Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat (New York, 1990); Eric Markusen and David Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing, Genocide and Total War in the 20th Century (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1995). 21 Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The structural-functional components of genocide" in Victimology: A New Focus, eds. Israel Drapkin and Emilio Viano (Lexington, MA, 1975), 4: 123. 22. Mark Levene, "Is the Holocaust simply another example of Genocide?" Patterns of Prejudice 28 (1994): 10. 23. See Chalk and Jonassohn's definition, in History, p. 23. 24 Quoted in Tilman Dedering, "A Certain Rigorous Treatment of all Parts of the Nation: The Annihilation of the Herero in German South West Africa, 1904," in The Massacre in History, eds. Mark Levene and Penny Roberts (Oxford, 1999), p. 217. 25. Kuper, Genocide, p. 161. 26. Irving Louis Horowitz, Taking Lives, Genocide and State Power (Brunswick, NJ, 1980); R. J. Rummel, "Democide in Totalitarian States: Mortacracies and Megamurders," in The Widening Circle of Genocide, ed. I. Charny, vol. 3 of Genocide, A Critical Bibliographical Review (New Brunswick and London, 1994), pp. 3-39. 27. The term is borrowed from Misha Glenny's BBC broadcast, "All Fall Down," Radio 4, 31 March 1995. 28. Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gok?lp (London, 1950), p. 79. 29. Giddens, Nation-State, p. 12. 30. For more on this argument, see Mark Levene, "Connecting Threads: Rwanda, The Holocaust and The Pattern of Contemporary Genocide," in Genocide: Essays Towards Understanding, Early Warning and Prevention, ed. Roger W. Smith (Williamsburg, 1999), pp. 27-64. 31. See Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide, The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (London, 1967); The Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary milleniarians and mystical anarchists of the Middle Ages (London, 1970); Europe's Inner Demons: An Inquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-Hunt (New York, 1975). 32. Bauman, Modernity, p. 93. 33. Ronald Aronson, The Dialectics of Disaster, A Preface to Hope (London, 1983), p. 169. 34. Ibid. p. 136. 35. Quoted in Uriel Tal, "On the Study of the Holocaust and Genocide," Yad Vashem Studies 13 (1979): 7-52. 36. Quoted in Paul Parin, "Open Wounds, Ethnopsychoanalytical Reflections on the Wars in Former Yugoslavia," in Mass Rape, The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. Alexandra Stiglmayer (Lincoln and London, 1994), p. 50. 37. See Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 359-71, and more recently their "Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995," in Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences, ed. Albert J. Jongman (The Hague, 1996), pp. 33-58. 38. The rallying cry of President Zia of Bangladesh, in the late 1970s, coinciding with the onset of the genocidal onslaught on the Chittagong Hill Tracts. See Veena Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, (New Delhi and London, 1991), p. 164. 39. Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, Race, Power and Genocide (New Haven and London, 1996), p. 408. 40. Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 79. See Fein's definition in "Genocide, A Sociological Perspective," p. 24. 41. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World (London, 1993), p. 219. 42. George Steiner, In Bluebird's Castle (London, 1971), pp. 41-42. 43. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London, 1992). 44. Quote from H. T. Norris, "Kosova and the Kosovans: Past, present and future as seen through Serb, Albanian and Muslim eyes," in The Changing Shape of the Balkans, eds. F. W. Carter and H. T. Norris (Boulder and London, 1996), p. 15. For more on Cubrilovic, see also Noel Malcolm, Kosovo, A Short History (London and Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 284-85, 322-23. 45. Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas (London, 1996), p. 158. 46. Thus, at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the UN, in September 1979, Western and ASEAN delegates were successful in pointing out "that the United Nations charter is based on the principle of non-interference and that UN membership has never been granted or withheld on the basis of respect for human rights. If it were, a large proportion of the governments presently there would have to leave." Quoted in William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (London, 1984), p. 138. 47. Richard G. Hovannisian, "Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question, 1878-1923," in Armenian Genocide in Perspective, ed. R. G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick, NJ and London, 1986), p. 37. 48. Quoted in Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence and Oxford, 1995), p. 383. From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:03:52 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:03:52 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Amazon.com: Books: Imperfect Conceptions Message-ID: Imperfect Conceptions http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0231113706/qid=1109119275/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/103-0151741-8716631?v=glance&s=books Imperfect Conceptions by [37]Frank Dikotter "The People's Republic of China passed a law in 1995 aimed at restricting births deemed to be imperfect..." List Price: $35.50 Price: $35.50 & This item ships for FREE with Super Saver Shipping. Editorial Reviews From Book News, Inc. In 1995, the People's Republic of China passed a controversial Eugenics Law, stressing prevention of "inferior births." Using this statute as a springboard, the author explores the contexts and history of eugenics in Communist and Republican China. He shows how Western eugenics was imported and combined with existing fears of cultural and biological degeneration in Chinese society, and demonstrates how Chinese assumptions about the relationship of the individual to society form the core of their attitudes to procreation. Product Description: In 1995 the People?s Republic of China passed a controversial Eugenics Law, which, after a torrent of international criticism, was euphemistically renamed the Maternal and Infant Health Law. Aimed at "the implementation of premarital medical checkups" to ensure that neither partner has any hereditary, venereal, reproductive, or mental disorders, the ordinance implies that those deemed "unsuitable for reproduction" should undergo sterilization or abortion or remain celibate in order to prevent "inferior births." Using this recent statute as a springboard, Frank Dik?tter explores the contexts and history of eugenics in both Communist China and Taiwan. Dik?tter shows how beginning in Late Imperial China, Western eugenics was imported and combined with existing fears of cultural, racial, or biological degeneration in Chinese society, leading to government regulation of sexual reproduction. is a revealing look at the cultural history of medical explanations of birth defects that demonstrates how Chinese assumptions about the relationship of the individual to society form the very core of their attitudes toward procreation. Dik?tter explains the patrilineal model of descent, where a person is viewed as the culmination of his or her ancestors and is held responsible for the health of all future generations. By this logic, a pregnant woman?s behavior and attitude directly influence the well-being of her baby, and a deformed or retarded child reflects a moral failing on the part of the parents. Dik?tter also shows how the holistic medicine practiced in China blurs any distinction between individual and environment so that people are held responsible for illness. Drawing on cultural, social, economic, and political approaches, Dik?tter goes beyond a simple authoritarian model to provide a more complex view of eugenic policy, showing how a variety of voices including those of popular journalists, social reformers, medical writers, sex educators, university professors, and politicians all disseminate information that supports rather than questions the state?s program. reveals how Chinese cultural currents -fear and fascination with the deviant and the urge to draw clear boundaries between the normal and the abnormal -have combined with medical discourse to form a program of eugenics that is viewed with alarm by the rest of the world. _________________________________________________________________ Product Details * Hardcover: 226 pages * Publisher: Columbia University Press (November 15, 1998) * ISBN: 0231113706 * Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 5.7 x 0.7 inches * Shipping Weight: 12.8 ounces. * Average Customer Review: based on 1 review. * Amazon.com Sales Rank in Books: #1,047,094 _________________________________________________________________ Citations This book cites 1 book: * [66]The Cambridge History of China: Volume 14, The People's Republic, Part 1, The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-1965 (The Cambridge History of China) by Roderick MacFarquhar on [67]page 121 _________________________________________________________________ Customer Reviews 6 of 11 people found the following review helpful: [stars-4-0.gif] A look at China's eugenics., January 19, 2001 Reviewer: [69]Matt Nuenke http://eugenics.home.att.net (Chicago, Illinois United States) - [70]See all my reviews This short but fascinating book looks at eugenic programs in China, both past and present. China, with its one-child policy is in the perfect position to start a genetic war with other nations to breed a superior race. That is, the state has already taken control of all reproductive rights, and with the recent eugenics laws past in 1995 for the collective improvement of the quality of the 'yellow race', they could be destined to surpass other nations in the quality of their people --- that is the average intelligence in China will surpass all other races except the Jewish race (with and average IQ of 117 due to their own form of eugenics practiced over the last 2000 years as part of the Jewish religion). Few voices in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) question eugenic practices. Historically they have always understood the need for racial hygiene, and more so than in the West they shun deformations or inferior offspring. And with a centralized government, with its support of its eugenic programs, the few voices who believe in the sanctity of life over the betterment of the race can be suppressed, not unlike the reverse in the United States where concerns for dysgenic trends by the underclass are ignored or suppressed. In the United States, we propagandize and redistribute wealth to the underclass under the pseudoscientific claims of radical environmentalism as promoted by Gould et al. and now proclaimed by President Clinton. "Anyone can rise to be anything they want to be with enough will and determination!" Bunk! Nations rise and fall on their genetic quality, typically their average intelligence. The Chinese firmly believe that there will be biological competition between the 'white race' and the 'yellow race' and they are moving forward to win. They want to develop the 'model race' and in fact are in a unique position to win. They already control reproduction; all they have to do is continue to suppress the births of low intelligent/genetically defective couples while encouraging multiple births by 'gifted couples.' They can discourage some marriages, use forced sterilizations, while providing incentives to others. They have complete freedom to promote and national eugenics program without criticism from the press or independent voices if they so choose. Even minor defects like harelip are aborted. In a country with poor medical care, the costs to correct the condition are greater than the worth of the child. It is more cost effective to just have another child. Euthanasia and infanticide are openly discussed condoned from strong voices in the government for the benefit of the nation. The health of the race supercedes any moral questions with regards to 'zero worth' individuals. This book goes a long way in showing that eugenics as viewed in the West is radically different than in Asia. With a more collectivist perspective, individuals are willing to make sacrifices now for the benefit of the nation later -- that is an investment in the genetic capital of the people. We are getting a peak at the future eugenic wars that will be an integral part of competition between nations in the decades to come. Will the West join third world status as Asian nations actively embrace eugenic programs? References 37. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books&field-author=Frank%20Dikotter/103-0151741-8716631 66. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/052124336X/ref=sid_dp_dp/103-0151741-8716631?%5Fencoding=UTF8&v=glance 67. http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0231113706/ref=sib_ab_dp_pg/103-0151741-8716631?%5Fencoding=UTF8&p=S03R&checkSum=673buSbxE9CkqMkRT9B3%2FqGAWvwECxwfOgbgl2s9588%3D 70. http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/A3VW11SKSST2A7/ref=cm_cr_auth/103-0151741-8716631?%5Fencoding=UTF8 From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:04:33 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:04:33 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Wilson Quarterly: Popular Eugenics: The Sperm-Bank Industry Message-ID: Popular Eugenics: The Sperm-Bank Industry http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay&essay_id=105210 2005 Winter "Procreative Compounds: Popular Eugenics, Artificial Insemination, and the Rise of the American Sperm Banking Industry" by Cynthia R. Daniels and Janet Golden, in Journal of Social History (Fall 2004), George Mason Univ., 4400 University Dr. MS 3A2, Fairfax, Va. 22030-4444. You have a better chance of getting into Harvard than of becoming a sperm donor. That's because sperm donation has evolved into a multimillion-dollar industry with an eagle eye for quality control. Sperm donors and their "donations" are subjected to stringent testing and screening. At most banks, men must be between 21 and 35 years old, between 5'8" and 6'2" tall, and meet weight targets. Adopted men or those with a family history of certain diseases (nearly 100 are listed) are disqualified. Would-be donors also are nixed if they've had sex with another man, with a woman who has had sex with a bisexual man, or with more than a specified number of partners. But donor recipients seek more than health safety assurances, write Daniels and Golden, professors of political science and history, respectively, at Rutgers University. Most U.S. sperm banks (there were 28 in 2001) produce glossy catalogs lush with virile-looking models and donor resum?s that provide SAT and GRE scores, educational attainment, musical ability, social characteristics (e.g., "quietly charismatic"), religion-even, in some cases, handwriting samples, hat size, and favorite pet. From the beginning, consumers and the medical establishment have seen artificial insemination as a way to build a better baby. The first known case in which a donor's sperm (as opposed to a spouse's) was used occurred in 1884, when a Philadelphia physician chloroformed a woman he was treating for infertility, under the pretext of performing minor surgery, and inseminated her with the sperm of his supposedly best-looking medical student. By the 1930s, however, artificial insemination had become a quasi-respectable practice widely reported in medical journals. With the introduction of cryopreservation, first employed in the cattle industry in the 1950s, sperm could be frozen and then thawed for use. Public acceptance came slowly, but when cases of HIV transmission were reported in the 1980s and '90s, cryopreservation became a necessity, as it allowed sperm to be kept "on ice" until it tested clean. Currently, tens of thousands of children are conceived in the United States each year with semen purchased from sperm banks. At companies such as California Cryobank, the samples are stored in numbered and color-coded vials: white caps for Caucasian, black for African American, yellow for Asian, and red for "all others." Donors who best match the ideal Euro-American standard are most desired. Yes, consumers are disproportionately white, but even within other racial and ethnic categories, the most marketable donors are fair, tall, and slender. With the birth of sperm banks, power to select donors shifted from the paternalistic physician to the consumer who paid for the product. What troubles Daniels and Golden is that the business has proven a breeding ground for "popular eugenics," and heritable traits are often lumped with those that aren't-such as religion or a Ph.D. Today, sperm banks dangle the prospect of a kid with the genetic right stuff to run fast, ace math, and go to Sunday school. When artificial insemination was still a dirty little family secret, doctors sought sperm that would produce a child who looked like the presumed proud papa, or at least like a relative. No more. Tall, blond donors produce dozens of children, but the 4'7" man need not even apply: Nobody wants the little guy to father Little Johnny. From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:05:30 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:05:30 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] John Derbyshire: Eugenics Alive: Coming soon to a country near you. Message-ID: John Derbyshire: Eugenics Alive: Coming soon to a country near you. http://www.nationalreview.com/derbyshire/derbyshireprint022701.html Mr. Derbyshire is also an NR contributing editor February 27, 2001 9:10 a.m. The current (March 5th) print version of National Review carries an [1]exchange between Dinesh D'Souza, a frequent NR contributor, and Ronald Bailey of [2]Reason magazine, about the morality of "genetically enhancing" human beings, most especially by way of custom-designing our children. The exchange follows on from a long piece by Dinesh titled "Staying Human" in our January 22nd issue. It's a fascinating debate, on a topic we should all be thinking about. I'm not going to get into it here; I just want to make one point that didn't get covered in those pieces. Here is the point: Fretting about the ethics of these issues is a thing that only Western countries are going to do. Elsewhere, eugenics -- including "genetic enhancement" -- will not be fretted about or debated, it will just be done. To see what I mean, check out an article titled Popularizing the Knowledge of Eugenics and Advocating Optimal Births Vigorously" by Sun Dong-sheng of the Jinan Army Institute, People's Republic of China. "[3]An English translation of the article can be found on the web. The translators note, in their preface, that: "The taboo on this subject is not as strong in East Asia as in the West. One might hypothesize that Asians, and more particularly the populations of the Han cultural zone (Japan, North and South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and possibly Vietnam), take a more pragmatic, less structured and ideological, and more far-seeing approach (eugenics, after all, is, by definition, a long-run program) to the development of human capital, than do Westerners." Sun Dong-sheng takes a quick canter through of the history of eugenics, not omitting the disgrace which the whole subject fell into by association with Nazi "racial science." As the translators note, though, Dr. Sun shows no sign of feeling that he is dealing with a "hot" or taboo topic. He just goes right on into proposals for raising public awareness of eugenics (in China, that is -- the whole piece is intended for a Chinese audience) and reasons for including eugenic policies as a part of "socialist modernization." The progress of the argument is held up for a while by some ideological shucking and jiving the author feels obliged to perform. From the point of view of theoretical Marxist-Leninism and dialectical materialism, still a compulsory part of the curriculum in Chinese schools, the entire field of genetics is a bit suspect. In all nature-nurture debates, traditional Marxists are the purest of pure nurturists. What's the point of having a revolution if you can't change human nature? (Remember Lysenko?) Dr. Sun easily negotiates his way through this little patch of ideological white water, concluding that: With genetics as its basis, the field of eugenics is established on an objective, materialistic foundation. So that's all right then, and we can move right on with: As eugenic research becomes widespread and acquires depth, the legal code of China will include more regulations concerning the ways by which the idea of healthier offspring can be given reality. And: Socialist modernization urgently needs a reduction or elimination of genetic diseases and hereditary defects. Only by promoting the births of better offspring can we improve the genetic quality of our population I don't want to make too much of this document. I can't say that I found it particularly chilling or offensive in any way; and some of Dr. Sun's points cannot be disagreed with -- e.g. his call for an attack on China's appalling levels of pollution so that environmentally caused birth defects can be reduced. The significance of the article is that it is perfectly ethics-free. There is no discussion of the morality of eugenics and genetic engineering. It is just assumed that to "improve the genetic quality of our population" is a thing that everybody should support, and that the methods of doing it can safely be left in the hands of scientists and politicians. The mentality here is basically that of a cost accountant, arguing that a poor country like China simply does not need the extra burden of "useless mouths" -- the omniscient party, of course, getting to decide who is "useless." You do have to make an effort to remember, reading this piece, that communist China is a nation whose government has not scrupled to involve itself in its citizens' most intimate family affairs, that it has imposed a draconian policy of compulsory family planning -- including forced abortions -- and that when Dr. Sun talks about "more regulations concerning the ways by which the idea of healthier offspring can be given reality," he means yet more state intrusion into people's decisions about who to marry, and whether or not to have children. A rough kind of eugenics has, in fact, been practiced in China for a long time. Several years ago, when I was living in that country, I mentioned Down's Syndrome in conversation with a Chinese colleague. She did not know the English term and I did not know the Chinese, so we had to look it up in a dictionary. "Oh," she said when she got it. "That's not a problem in China. They don't get out of the delivery room." As I said: While we are agonizing over the rights and wrongs of it, elsewhere they will just be doing it. Apology. I owe NRO readers an apology. In my February 22nd column I said: "At 21, Pitt the Younger was Prime Minister of England." This was a gross error. Pitt got into Parliament at age 21; he didn't make prime minister until he was 24. I am sorry for the slip, and grateful to the two readers who pointed it out (and a bit depressed, on behalf of the educational system, that it was only two). This kind of thing would never have got by the phalanxes of factcheckers that guard the integrity of the print NR, but web journalism has up to now been a more down-and-dirty business, and while our stuff gets a speedy once-over from the editors before being posted, it is not factchecked in detail. We have recently begun some initiatives to improve things, to the degree that improvement is possible, given the speed and transience of web postings. Look for an ever more polished NRO, with fewer lapses like that one. References 1. http://www.nationalreview.com/05mar01/dsouza030501.shtml 2. http://www.reason.com/ 3. http://www.mankind.org/man22.htm From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:06:03 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:06:03 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] Plausible Futures: Niche construction as a means to eugenic communities Message-ID: Niche construction as a means to eugenic communities http://plausible.custompublish.com/index.php?id=167091&cat=6698&printable=1 4.7.6 EUGENICS Floating around in the back of my mind has been that nagging question: How will eugenics come about; what do we need to do to make it happen? This is not a question that I think must be answered, because in the end, eugenics will come about on its own. However, it is asked by many who want to see something happening sooner rather than later. As the technology advances and the importance of genes becomes apparent to more people, the desire will drive the application. Whether it will be primarily applied at the family level, the tribal level, or the national level is unpredictable. Nevertheless, most assuredly once it is implemented by enough people, the threat of those practicing eugenics will become problematic to others. They will try either to emulate or to stop eugenics. Like nuclear proliferation, where there is a desire to obtain new technology, human genetic engineering will be impossible to stop. Unlike nuclear proliferation, eugenics can be undertaken without the complexities of hiding radioactive material, building large facilities for enrichment, and then hiding a quite useless weapons system because to use it means almost sure retaliation. Eugenics can be undertaken in secrecy or belligerently by simply ignoring any future global sanctions or prohibitions. Most of us who embrace eugenics would like to have our own nation-state based on eugenics. Unfortunately, we can speculate how to bring that about but there is no action I can see other than a slow change in people's attitudes. Like libertarianism, it takes a great deal of intelligence to understand and appreciate the underlying principles of a nation based on inegalitarianism towards outsiders. Even ethnocentrism is a problem for eugenicists who argue that kin or race should be the boundaries for inclusion in the breeding population. An indicator for how ethnocentric a race is may lie in the degree to which they allow or discourage intermarriage. However, how much this is based on culture is hard to factor out of the equation. I am also unaware of any valid tests for ethnocentrism. Nevertheless, by all observable measures (MacDonald, 2002a), Whites suffer from low ethnocentrism and high moral universalism, which has become highly dysgenic for us in a multicultural world. Our wealth and our culture are being systematically undermined by more ethnocentric races that have particularly targeted the West (that is Whites) for scapegoating their own failures, and demanding compensation, both nationally and globally. Even eugenics itself, while being attacked as pseudoscience by the Left, is simultaneously being included now in egalitarian proposals to make sure that eugenics is equally shared among all races and classes. That is, at the same time it is condemned, the left is taking no chances that when people finally do embrace it, it must be shared equally with all. It seems apparent to me that the very flurry of books and articles declaring that race is a social construct and that eugenics must never again be contemplated, is due to the fact that unraveling our genetic code and the new tools being developed for human genetic engineering has the Left in a state of panic. They are now so desperate that the only way to keep the lid on the genetic genie is to try to suppress freedom of speech, as has been done in most Western nations under hate speech laws. Mention racial differences and go to jail. The United States alone has the constitutional right to freedom of speech, but even here there are attempts to take away this basic right because with the Internet, discussions about eugenics and racial differences cannot be easily contained. After reading Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution by F. John Odling-Smee, Kevin N. Laland, and Marcus W. Feldman, 2003, and rereading The Fratricidal Global Village: The Theory of Hypertrophic Group Formation, By Elliott White, 2001, I felt it was time to put together some thoughts on how a eugenic community could be formed, maintained, and prosper. But first, some basic assumptions: it is not a utopian project based on a goal of human perfection, but rather it is a process based on the member's desire to undertake it. That is, like any adventure, it does not promise anything but involvement and discovery. In addition, while the goal is not based on any moral or ethical precepts, its formulation is securely grounded in empirical data about human behavior. That is, my vision of a eugenic community is to make it rewarding to be a part of it. To do that, we must know how humans behave and try to anticipate the common problems that groups encounter repeatedly. Lastly, I do not intend to discuss the genetic boundaries of the group. That is, though I have my racial preferences on a sliding scale, it would be up to the group to decide who will be included or excluded. In the end, the winner will be based on just how well informed each group is with regards to eugenic principles and human behavior. The number of ways eugenics may be practiced is too indeterminate to argue for one way or another. The one thing I am sure of is that it will eventually lead to a eugenics' arms race. If you want to know how serious this is, just try discussing eugenics on Internet forums. People simultaneously will argue that it can't be done, shouldn't be done, etc. displaying moral panic. This could only happen if they really do believe that it is possible and that it is coming rapidly. Silly ideas are ignoreddangerous ones are condemned. In fact, with gender selection, in vitro fertilization, assortative mating, testing for genetic diseases; we are well on our way to personal eugenics driven by the desire for children who have the very best genes money can buy. GROUPISHNESS I am not at all convinced that humans have an innate commitment to their own kind, but rather a need to form coalitions for advantage and defense. Before civilization of course, kin was the fundamental building block for tribal defense and social control, but we have been adapted primarily to be easily led and indoctrinated. White calls the penchant for forming large groups hypertrophy: "Successful macro self-selection yields hypertrophic group formation. This process involves the following factors: (a) at least minimal opportunity; (b) self-selection, selective migration, upward mobility ; (c) clusters of like-minded group or network members; (d) a critical mass, especially likely to occur if the selective process occurs in a large population; (e) hypertrophy." He explains that we see hypertrophy in the media, where self-selection is so prevalent that the public sees a very biased presentation of the news, leading more people to turn to other sources like the Internet. Self-selection has also been noted in government, where like-minded people surround a president to the point where no dissenting voices are heard, and truth becomes grounded in absolutes. Hypertrophy is seen in the formation of international terrorist organizations to the formation of fanaticism among sports fans. Wherever humans are allowed to self-select, they will form groups. Today, under government political programs in most Western nations advancing multiculturalism and diversity, any self-selection based on race is condemned if it includes Whites, but is encouraged if it involves minorities. Whites are expected to capitulate to minority demands, or be vilified as racists. Interestingly, this could only happen because many Whites have been indoctrinated through guilt or possibly self-promotion, to self-select for inclusion in the academic left's reformulation of Marxism from class struggle to minority group identity politics. Marxism's march through the institutions never lost a step after the collapse of Communism. White explains: "Thus it should be clear that locals and cosmopolitans may draw different in/out group distinctions. For the local, anyone outside his more immediate area and not belonging to his religion and ethnic or racial group is likely to be part of the out-group. That will include any cosmopolitan who seems to threaten the traditional values and identifications of his community. For the cosmopolitan, on the other hand, it is the local who often constitutes the out-group." I am not sure of the terms, but cosmopolitan versus rural (local) attitudes is a theme that keeps reoccurring, and the rural is losing. Religious fundamentalists, conservatives, liberals, and multiculturalists are all relatively non-empirical when it comes to understanding human nature. They all tend to either reject evolution or they reject that it has any significance for humans. But it does seem that the rural faction is in retreat while the Left is winning the war against Western culture. For this reason, any eugenics movement must accept the fact that our politicians, athletic and media stars, the elite in academics and business, will for the most part self-select away from their own kind for the comfort of their own hypertrophic group based on occupation or class interest, rather than race. I personally assume that any politician will betray not only their own race but also their own country to serve the interests of the elite, as we see with regards to immigration. Open immigration hurts not only the poor, but also even the Hispanic citizen community when more illegal Hispanics keep flooding into our country. So to keep the cheap labor coming, the elite has merely redefined what America stands for: "We are a nation of immigrants" and the discussion ends. The people have been properly indoctrinated. As White explains it, cooperation in nature is abundant. Inclusive fitness or for humansgroup evolutionary strategiesfor promoting selfish genes is not the dominant factor in racial group formation. We had better not rely on anyone's innateness to stand by their own kind, it is too weak of a force. Cohesiveness needs to be established by creating a niche where members of the eugenic group can thrive, even while living amongst "the other." ACTIVISTS AS OUT-GROUPS It is important to understand the enemy, and I am going to try to summarize the motivation behind the radical Left. Many religious fundamentalists and conservatives will also oppose any notion of eugenics, but I believe they are motivated more from fear and ignorance. For this reason, they are less of an immediate threat to genetic engineering than the well disciplined Left. Reading numerous books on the battle between the Left and the Right, it has occurred to me that both groups are driven more by a need for power than any real ideological agenda or concern for other groups. In Niche Construction they write: "For instance, much human (and animal) social learning is characterized by a positive frequency dependence or conformity, in which individuals bias their adoption of cultural information toward that expressed by the majority. In fact, a theoretical analysis by Boyd and Richerson (1985) found that most of the conditions under which natural selection favors social learning also favor the evolution of conformity. This 'when in Rome do as the Romans' principle can result in conventions that only loosely track environmental change and, at least in the short term, may generate maladaptive traditions. In addition, members of a group may be particularly prone to adopting cultural variants exhibited by particularly authoritative or charismatic individuals, a process Boyd and Richerson (1985) describe as 'indirect bias.' Theoretical models have demonstrated that cultural processes can lead to the transmission of information that results in a fitness cost relative to alternatives, and strong cultural evolutionary processes will frequently be independent of genetic control. While socially learned smart behavioral variants will subsequently be tested by the individuals that adopt them, even nonreinforcing or maladaptive behavior may be expressed again if it is socially sanctioned, or if individuals are locked into conventions that penalize nonconformists. As a result, some cultural information may be propagated even when it is detrimental to individual fitness." Docile humans follow their leaders, however that is defined, and conform to norms that may not be to the best interest of the individual or to a particular group. Few people show the independence and/or the character to challenge beliefs that have been set up by the prevailing ethos at any one time. I came across this short response by Jay Feierman to a Yahoo discussion group: "The high status persons of each society create the list of the human rights [and values systems] that in the long term serve their own best interest. Governments, which are controlled by high status individuals, codify and then enforce the exercise of approved human rights and suppress the expression of the unapproved human rights [and values systems]." (See the complete article in appendix.) So who are these reoccurring radicals that crop up continuously, trying to overthrow the established order? Well, they are you, me, and all the other activists out there who do not like the status quo. And for a very simple reason as White explains: "Cosmopolitans, moreover, need not be tolerant in their teachings. Marx and Engels divided the world up between the exploiting and the exploited, and Lenin and Mao took this in/out group dichotomy quite seriously. Only the elimination of one social class by the other would bring the desired classless society. It would appear that when able people feel the denial of opportunity, they become susceptible to ideological formulations that involve hostility directed against the social order implicated in such denial." Quite simply, radicals take up causes because they feel left out, they need intellectual challenge and are motivated to act. Moreover, there is no race that is more motivated and intellectually capable than Jews, and I think that is the reason they are quite often, but not always, behind radical movements (MacDonald 2002b). It has little to do with the movement itself, but rather a means of gaining power and prestige in societies where they feel they have not achieved the status they deserve, as individuals. As a race, they are far wealthier and powerful than any other group, but some of the tribe's members want more than just the knowledge that the tribeas a groupis doing well. Power for many is an insatiable desire. Note that this is not a condemnation of Jewish behavior, but recognition as to why they seem to be such an integral part of radical movements. Whites on the other hand seem far more inclined to go along, get along, and are not usually as motivated to excel. We then become the victims of our own conformist weakness per Niche Construction: "Conformist transmission may potentially be exploited by powerful individuals, groups, or institutions, which dominate the dissemination of information through societies to promote their own interests. In preagricultural egalitarian societies this was probably not very important since in such societies inequalities of power and wealth are typically both temporary and minimal. However, in post-agricultural societies that display rankings, and in complex civilized states that display class stratifications, significant economic inequalities occur, and power networks develop. In these societies powerful and coercive cultural parents may stand to gain considerably from persuading other less powerful humans to conform, perhaps by recruiting extra assistance in modifying environments in ways that benefit them rather than the helpers. These processes can be amplified by tool use, for instance, by the technology of modern media, by weapons, by art, or by deceit. Religious, commercial, and political propaganda, for example, may all be used to persuade, trick, or coerce conformity from individuals against their personal interests in favor of the interests of a dominant class of cultural transmitters." The history over the last fifty years or more then has seen a reshaping of American value systems from a less socialistic, free market meritocracy, into one that is inherently anti-Western. When the intellectual elites universally promote without dissent, acceptance of multiculturalism, diversity, redistribution of wealth, racial quotas, and open immigration, then our culture has been high jacked by a core of ideological radicals that have used our own cooperative nature to accept their moral demands. "The niche-construction statement on conflict in section 7.3.1 should also extend to the human cultural level, with the qualification that at this level other processes may be operating as well. Group selectionists commonly focus on the positive repercussions of group selection (that is, within-group altruism) and neglect the negative repercussions (that is, between-group selfishness, hostility, and conflict). Group selection does not directly favor altruistic individuals so much as selfish groups. The group-level traits most effective in promoting group replication may also engender outgroup hostility, intergroup aggression and conflict, fear of strangers, slanderous propaganda concerning outsiders, and so on. The same processes that underlie the best of human motives may also favor the worst attributes of human societies." The above tactics have been evident in the science wars, where anyone who engages in research with regards to group differences in intelligence or raises concerns about dysgenic social policies, is labeled as a fascist, a racist, a Nazi, but probably all three and then some. With these tactics, the radicals have been able to transform our culture by recruiting others to follow them, in what appears to be a concern for human betterment everywhere. However, the singular hatred and vilification of only White Western society belies their true objectives. It is not the world they want to make right, but to replace the dominant, technological culture of the West with their own. It is warfare with the parasites from within. Christopher Boehm (Bloom & Dees, 2003) discusses another problem with regards to racial conflict in modern societies. The cultural elites, no matter what race or religion they belong to, take it upon themselves to settle disputes between rival groups. As the dominant power brokers, they have an interest in keeping disputes under control, and they are willing to do so even if it means giving preferences to other races or groups while disenfranchising their own. We see this with George Bush's pandering to Mexican illegals and Bill Clinton's pandering to Blacks. It is reproductively self-serving for the power elite to sacrifice their own kin in order to maintain order. In so doing, it means that when one race is more successful than another, peace between the groups must be won by giving preferences and transferring resources from one group to another. Again, it must always be assumed that except for a few rare exceptions, the power elite will go against their own race in favor of preserving their favored position of hierarchical dominance over all others. As Boehm points out, chimpanzees show this same pattern of alpha males settling disputes for the benefit of group. Beyond the level of the tribe however, this behavior is inimical to the interests of eugenicists. Political power brokering will mean an escalation of socialism and coercion against more successful groups. The reason for this short discussion of opposition from the Left (and from our own elite), is because if we are truly committed to implementing eugenics based on an unbiased understanding of human nature, then we cannot delude ourselves in thinking that we will convince others based on empirical arguments, and we must break off on our own, silently, and get on with our mission. Eventually, human genetic engineering will be ubiquitous, with the outcomes so beneficial, that opposition will cease on its own. As long as we can attract clusters of like-minded individuals, with "the capacity to transcend one's immediate space and time conceptually" for an improved human genome, our mission remains viable even in the face of extreme opposition from fundamentalists, self-serving revolutionaries, and the elite. EUGENIC NICHE CONSTRUCTION "I will arguethat hominid minds are not adapted to a Pleistocene average. Rather, they are adapted to the variability of hominid environments: to the spread of variation, rather than to its peak. Our evolutionary response to variation is phenotypic plasticity. Humans develop different phenotypes in different environments" (Sterelny, 2003). There is an increased recognition that humans create niches, and that niche construction can change human culture and/or human genetic frequencies. In Niche Construction they state, "In such cases, and to the extent that cultural processes cease to buffer culturally induced environmental changes, the latter are likely to give rise to culturally modified natural selection pressures. There may then be changes in allelic frequencies in human populations. For example, suppose there is no technology available to deal with a new challenge created in an environment by cultural niche construction, or suppose that the available technology is not exploited, possibly because it is too costly or because people are unaware of the impact that their own cultural activities are having on their environments. If such a situation persists for a long enough time, then genotypes that are better suited to the culturally modified environment could increase in frequency." While the above is true, it seems too simplistic in that as niche constructors, humans are constantly altering both their environments and their gene frequencies. The theory of evolution dictates that where the environment changes rapidly, there will be changes in gene frequencies. There is no condition that I am aware of where rapid and pronounced ecological changes have zero influence on the selection for genes. What is so fascinating then is not this simple truism, but the almost universal denial that humans are undergoing evolutionary change. It is recognized and discussed by evolutionary theorists, while denied or ignored by most of society: politicians, religionists, secular leftists, conservatives, liberals, Marxists, cultural constructivists, and even a lot of libertarians. Only within a small slice of educated humanity, is the reality of evolutionary change understood to be a present and ongoing process. On empirical evidence, it can't be any other way, and we are capable of detecting these changes from past evidence. Obvious to a few, it is only now getting more attention from neo-Darwinists. In Niche Construction they observe that "[there] is a third major consequence of niche construction. Where niche construction affects multiple generations, it introduces a second general inheritance system in evolution, one that works via environments. This second inheritance system has not yet been widely incorporated by evolutionary theory. We call this second general inheritance system ecological inheritance." MacDonald (2002b) discusses the consequences of creating niche construction, primarily around racial and/or religious groups. The contrast for example between the niche construction of the Gypsies, where average intelligence declined, versus Ashkenazi Jews, where average intelligence increased, over hundreds of years, is a vivid example of how niche construction can mold the genes of those who stay within the tribe. The common theme today however is to ignore evolution, and preach a new ethos: the peoples of the world will meld together and all differences will disappear. That is, we will breed, slowly over time, to become one brown skinned race, where any differences, if they did exist, will exist no more. White however sees another humanity: "We live increasingly within a global village, but it is one that remainsand threatens to remainstubbornly fragmented. It is split, of course, along ethnic, racial, and linguistic lines as well as by socioeconomic inequalities. But even within the same ethnic group or socioeconomic stratum, fissures appear, at times deep, that are not readily papered over." As some people will intermarry and become perhaps nondescript racially, this will not lead to a single racial genome. Hypertrophy as described by White, and increasingly others, describes humans as incapable of cooperation on a global scale. Those who hope for world peace based on global cooperation fail to understand human nature. This group evolutionary perspective has shifted over the last few decades, and it is safe to say confusion is still the norm. The story goes like this: evolution can only occur at the level of the organism because at the group level, the free rider problem arises. Free riders are those that dodge the draft, don't pay their fair share of the restaurant bill, etc. They are not altruistic cooperators, so they will be selected for and will overtake others that are more altruistic. The discussion of altruism, group selection, kin selection, reciprocal altruism has filled volumes over the last few decades. But one thing was missed with regards to humans: we have language, can form coalitions, and can take action against free riders. Thousands of years ago, the free rider was killed, harassed, or banished. Tribes were often engaged in warfare with neighboring tribes, and they could not afford to tolerate dissent. We see this today in stiff penalties for army deserters; the most dangerous situation for a state is to not have the young men willing to die for its defense. White describes intratribal conflict: "A second environmental basis for conflict among intimates arises when renegades emerge within otherwise homogeneous settings. Simmel remarks that the hatred directed against the dissenter originates 'not from personal motives, but because the member represents a danger to the preservation of the group.... Since this hatred is mutual and each accuses the other of responsibility for the threat to the whole, the antagonism sharpensprecisely because both parties to it belong to the same social unit.' Lewis Coser comments that 'the group must fight the renegade with all its might since he threatens symbolically, if not in fact, its existence as an ongoing concern.' As an example, Coser sees apostasy as striking 'at the very life of a church.'" Over the last ten years then, group evolutionary strategies are better understood, and it is realized that humans are uniquely positioned to solve the free rider problem. In fact, if global peace ever were obtained through international agreements along with totalitarian controls on human freedom, the free rider problem would begin to return under universal socialism. To my knowledge, this aspect of world cooperation has never been addressed, or dare I say even pondered, by most evolutionists, who remain mostly egalitarian. As long as groups can form then for cooperative benefit against other groups, hypertrophy will take place, coalitions will develop, and breeding will continue along lines of blood or common interestor both. The rich and powerful will continue to encourage their children to marry other offspring of other rich and powerful people; the underclass will breed with little regard for anything but immediate needs and desires, and others will fragment into groups between the top and the bottom feeders. Humans, given the failure to maintain racial boundaries via geographical boundaries, will divide along other salient group selection criteriaand new niches will be created and reinforced as others melt and merge. But group selection, in my opinion, with the help of eugenics will be accelerated. White notes: "As sociobiological theory would have it, quantitative genetic similarity should underlie ethnic group membership. On the other hand, qualitative genetic similarity should underlie Dobzhansky's 'aptitude aggregation.' In other words, insofar as an open class society becomes attained, class positions should be occupied by people sharing similar genetically influenced aptitudeseven though their ethnic and racial backgrounds may diverge greatly." However, this depends on the aptitude one is looking at. Perhaps it is true that sports fans may coalesce say around a athletic team because of locality, where race and or religious affiliation is muted for the sake of the school or city where the team is situated. Music likewise is often quite open racially, because music ability is not as concentrated in certain races, though it does seem to be more prevalent among Whites, Blacks and Jews. On the other hand, when it comes to say high intelligence, 'aptitude aggregation' may very well be concentrated among the intelligent racesi.e. East Asians, Whites and Jews. Likewise, Jews dominate fields that require verbal skills, and we may see more and more East Asians dominate fields that require visuospatial skills. From all available data then, aptitudes in fact do follow racial lines, making quantitative and qualitative aggregation not that different. In a cosmopolitan world, where different races come together and interact, and once the dogma of na?ve environmentalism begins to fade and race realism returns, people will build new cooperative communities. Since genes underlie aptitude, race will remain the primary determinate of which races will dominate which economic niche. In addition, since people still prefer to be with their cognitive equals, social niches will most likely follow economic niches. Niche Construction explains: "Moreover, this dual role for phenotypes in evolution does imply that a complete understanding of the relationship between human genes and cultural processes must not only acknowledge genetic inheritance and cultural inheritance, but also take account of the legacy of modified selection pressures in environments, or ecological inheritance. Again, it is readily apparent that contemporary humans are born into a massively constructed world, with an ecological inheritance that includes a legacy of houses, cities, cars, farms, nations, e-commerce, and global warming. Niche construction and ecological inheritance are thus likely to have been particularly consequential in human evolution. "Less familiar, but equally deserving of attention, are empirical data and theoretical arguments suggesting that human cultural activities have influenced human genetic evolution by modifying sources of natural selection and altering genotype frequencies in some human populations. Cultural information, expressed in the use of tools, weapons, fire, cooking, symbols, language, agriculture, and trade, may also have played an important role in driving hominid evolution in general, and the evolution of the human brain in particular. There is evidence that some cultural practices in contemporary human societies continue to affect ongoing human genetic evolutionary processes." We can expect evolutionary change to accelerate as we increasingly change our environments through technology, environmental pollution, warfare, changes in religious attitudes, and especially human genetic engineering. White explains: "[G]enetic diversity is of central significance in understanding the human condition. As I have pointed out elsewhere, it underlies both human evolution and history, for neither could take place without it. It is also responsible, directly or indirectly, for much of the cooperation, as well as the conflict, found within and between human societies. A society comprised of only one kind of person, no matter how gifted, could not function. A population composed of a million clones of a Mozart or an Einstein could not establish an effective division of labor. But genetic diversity also ensures conflict. First, it fosters individual competition. Sociobiologists argue that, insofar as each person has a unique set of genes, he or she has a uniquely individual set of interests linked to the perpetuation of those genes. And the defense of those intereststhat is, the desire for a suitable mate, home, and jobis bound to compete if not conflict with the interests of others. Humans are not alone here." It may be true that a civilization of clones would not be a happy place where a division of labor is required, but I would add that this does not mean, as some people argue, that a society of highly intelligent people, with different interests, could not adapt to specialization. When people are intelligent, they will find ways of automating the most tedious of tasks. In addition, even intelligent people often times prefer physicality to desk-bound mental pondering. Many highly intelligent people would, if they could for the same status and pay, prefer more physical work because one feels better, healthier and more alivedepending on one's personality. The important thing is that people differ in what they like to do, even if they do not necessarily differ in ability or potential. Even the brightest are asked to go to war and die for their country, a fate far more devastating than driving a garbage truck. What will be critical is that a new race of humans be so cohesive and singularly directed, that even if humans alter their environments in such a way as to make our very existence unsustainable under current conditions, that the eugenic few can survive while the rest of humanity will succumb to a deteriorated environment. Most humans are brought up in and inculcated by dogmas that make it difficult for them to change and adapt. In Niche Construction they note that, "In particular, components of the social environment, for example, traits related to family, kinship, and social stratification, may have been increasingly transmitted from one generation to the next by cultural inheritance to the extent that contemporary human populations may have become largely divorced from local ecological pressures. Support for this argument comes from Guglielmino et al.'s (1995) study of variation in cultural traits among 277 contemporary African societies, in which most of the traits they examined correlated with cultural (linguistic) history, rather than with ecological variables. If this study is representative, then socially transmitted cultural traditions are a lot more important than most evolution-minded researchers studying human behavior would admit." If culture can be so ingrained as to make people inflexible to their changing environments, any eugenics' program must ensure that as a group, we are not caught in the same cultural trap. We have to both indoctrinate our children and/or members to act cohesively for the good of the group, while maintaining cultural and intellectual flexibility to react to changes in society as they come along that will increase the group's resources. EUGENIC COMMUNITIES Recently, the Libertarian Party, after careful deliberation, selected New Hampshire as a state worth migrating to to establish a libertarian niche. How many libertarians will actually move there, and how it will increase the state's already libertarian leanings, only time will tell. However, it does show the increasing willingness of groups to advocate separation over accommodation, and eugenicists need to consider similar plans. Constructing our own niches of like-minded people allows eugenicists to live within alien and degenerate cultures, by isolating ourselves from the most corrosive forces like crime, race mixing, and being forced to pretend to be tolerant, while taking collective advantage of the rich resources available. That is, as long as the group does better financially and emotionally by living in urban areas, while resisting the debilitating aspects of the local ecology, we are better off forming small communities for advancing eugenics than hoping for a grander scheme of separation that may never come about. The most important principle in forming a eugenic community is compatibility. That is, by selecting participants that can work together, play together, and be with one another rather than interacting outside of the group, the group can protect itself from outsiders, while still tolerating as necessary diversity in the workforce and during commutes. Even during travel, attempts can be made to travel together for safety and separation from the many unwholesome types that infest urban areas. In no way am I a prude or do I shun the enjoyment of observing the many human types one comes across in large cities. I enjoy the challenge; I am probably a natural cosmopolitan. Always however, my main concern is with the value and safety of my property, along with the wellbeing of my family. These areas of concern should be easy to address as a collective, targeting specific areas for development, control and protection and therefore increasing the value of owned property. Establishing eugenic communities that can establish new value systems, especially for children, and reinforcing each other's desired goals and objectives, it becomes a lot easier to fight the impulse to conform to the status quo. As stated in Niche Construction: "Gene-culture coevolution is relevant here because it captures two central features of our evolutionary perspective. First, through their expression of socially learned information, humans are explicitly recognized as niche constructors, capable of modifying their own selection pressures. Second, the information underlying this niche construction is inherited from one generation to the next by an extragenetic inheritance system. Although cultural inheritance clearly differs in several important respects from ecological inheritance, the most notable being the informational content of the former, it may nevertheless generate modified natural selection pressures." Once the community starts to grow, it can naturally fission along differing lines of self-selection. Just like in tribal clans, once a certain size is reached, social control becomes more difficult. It is better to split apart, maintain social control, but keep contacts between groups to compare the success of differing adopted policies. It should be a competitive relationship between the differing groups, but one based on mutual interests in learning what works and what doesn'tfirmly grounded in empirical data on human behavior. Of course, as this process continues, there will always be those leaving the group and those joining. This is a natural process of selection for certain types of people, and should proceed along lines of common interests and common genes. There is a myth that hybrid vigor comes about from interracial marriage. In actuality, there is enough variability in human genes that inbreeding can be very beneficial for consolidating those genes sought afterfor intelligence and ethnocentrism for examplebringing in new genes with occasional outbreeding. The important thing is that "Cultural processes may bias human mating patterns, they may bias other human interactions, such as trade or warfare, or they may bias the choice of which infants are selected for infanticide." Tough minded eugenic communities can sublimate dysgenic attitudes into purposefully directed ones that benefit the group. With a value system driven by a culture that is focused on breeding the best, human weakness can be overcome. Children in a eugenic community must of course be the focus of any egalitarianism. That is, some people may not want to have their own children, but would like to promote the propagation of genes like those that they carry. Others may prefer the nurturing of children to the fast paced corporate life style. The community then should provide for the children, but should also not be obsessed with the children either. There is no eugenic benefit to coddling children (Krebs in Crawford & Salmon, 2004). We are learning that the human brain develops slowly after birth because it progresses along a fixed plan of learning, change and eventually pruning back unused neuronal connections. Na?ve environmentalists assume that children's learning can be accelerated, and junior will be more accomplished by force-feeding them every learning experience and every opportunity. But research has shown that an aggressive approach to teaching children too much does not make them smarter, but may just make them anxious. I propose that children be taught, not too aggressively, the value system of the eugenic community. That is, inegalitarianism for society in general, with a preference for their own kind. That is, prepare them defensively for immersion into a multicultural society, one that they will be able to negotiate within without drawing hostility from others. When it comes to pushing them into programs, sports, learning regimens, etc. however this should be resisted. Children should be socialized to interact with the group, and to be encouraged to find what they like best within the confines of the community. That is, with a highly intelligent community of children (and adults), there will be plenty of stimulation for their maturation and intellectual growth. As children get older, they will seek out their own areas of interest and pursue them efficiently, hopefully leading to a rewarding choice of interests that will carry them into successful careers. A good example of trying to make children too well rounded, as if they can master every area of culture and learning, is music. I love music, and as a kid I took up many instruments, joined the band, etc. However, I was not disciplined enough or dedicated enough to master any instrument well, and eventually left it all behind mewithout any regrets. I love music, but am more than happy to let others create it and perform it, while I just listen. My younger brother on the other hand taught himself how to be a rock-n-roll drummer when it suited him in his teens, and he mastered it magnificently. He started his own band, and was well on his way to a typical music career with lots of fun but eventual failure and a return to a more mundane existence decades later. My main point here is that music today is one vocation that can be very rewarding for a very small fraction of people, it can be enjoyed by many more for personal reasons, but for the vast majority it is usually just abandoned as the time constraints of pursuing different interests takes over. The point is, look for the few children who may really excel playing a musical instrument or singing, but don't assume they have to pursue one or the other or they will be somehow deprived of a needed talent or experience. There are simply too many areas of interest to explore for children to be exposed to all of them without taking away those areas of interest that they are genetically inclined to pursue. We live in an age of specialization, and we should allow everyone the chance to naturally make the best fit between their abilities, their interests, and what currently is of value. The other reason for not pampering children is simply that it can detract from enjoying life as an adult. For those who want to be around children, let them pursue that end. For those who prefer the company of adults, let the children be off by themselves as much as they like. That is, when children intrude on adults or vice versa, neither is benefited. In the end, some of the children will migrate out of the community, which is good because that is part of the selection process. The more committed will stay, and with each generation hypertrophy will accelerate the process of selection, niche construction, finer selection, the fissuring of large communities into smaller and more cohesive ones, etc. As White states, "Let us return to the aptitude aggregations. The successful formation of these in elite areas of talent and knowledge will, we recall, be characterized by hypertrophic tendencies that will enhance their level of performance. These tendencies will encompass the cooperative as well as the competitive. Like-minded individuals who share similar talent but not temperaments may be driven to outdo the others; those who share both the same talent and temperament may be more apt to cooperate in an effort to surpass others. Either way, higher levels of achievement are likely to be attained. And that is precisely the point, especially when the most successful in any endeavor are contrasted with the least successful. That is to say, the distance between the two groupings in Dobzhansky's world becomes greater than ever." Obviously, the eugenic community I am describing could become a highly competitive one, where internal friction could lead to conflict. The type of people attracted to such an adventure may be more independent, aggressive, and demanding of perfection than average. On the other hand, the community will be focused on understanding human behavior, and hopefully with a better understanding of what makes humans tick, the internal divisions can be kept in check and used to the advantage of the community. For example, research shows that the more complex a social system is, the more susceptible it is to exploitation by cheaters (Krebs in Crawford & Salmon, 2004). This is one reason that socialism is so terribly flawed. Efforts to help the needy are instead used by cheaters for personal gain, and the system slowly becomes more and more inefficient as more and more people take advantage of a free ride rather than producing their fair share. In addition, "Making people continually aware of their own and others' selfish motives by emphasizing these in an excessive system of rules intended to catch cheaters, may actually reduce levels of self-deception and thus cooperation. Cooperating in a sea of defectors is a maladaptive, costly strategy" (Surbey in Crawford & Salmon, 2004). It is important then to teach out-group selfishness but to minimize in-group criticism of selfish behavior, in order to reduce tensions and over zealous accounting of member's behaviors. A eugenic society could become too cynical, if fault-finding was overemphasized, and should be kept in balance. That is, we must not try to be perfect cooperators but just make sure that everyone is better off by being in the group than on their own. Very few rules then should be createdjust enough to keep the system together to meet eugenic goals. Also in Surbey and CrawfordTimothy Ketelaar discusses in detail the relationship between cooperators (who want to maximize group outcomes), individualists (who want to maximize their own outcomes), and competitors (who will reduce their own maximum outcome in order to gain an advantage over others). From a vast amount of research, it seems that there is a natural ratio of cooperators to individualists to competitors of 4:2:1. Ketelaar is not clear what social groups follow this evolutionary stable strategy, but I assume it is a typically Western one. Nonetheless, It does show that when a nation operates on egalitarian principles that assume that everyone is the same, the system will break down in several ways. First, the competitors are extremely destructive. Second, after a point even the individualists will reduce their own level of cooperation. Third, as things get even worse, there will remain a large number of too-nice do-gooders within the 57% of cooperators who will lobby for even more resource reallocation from the haves to the have-nots. (With a ratio of 4:2:1, 4/7=57% cooperators.) Therefore, a eugenic community would want to maintain a very low level of competitors, but also it would not want nice cooperatorsthat is people who would be tolerant or forgiving towards competitorsand also free-riders and/or destructive psychopaths. (Note that some psychopathy is linked with creativity and technological advancement. See Eysenck, 1999 and Lynn, 2001.) So what types of people would we ideally want in a eugenic's community? The above is just a rough stab at some of the criteria, but fundamentally, I would state categorically that we cannot tell for sure, but as niche builders, it will be our intention to find out. The communities should do one thing that is lacking in Western countries when it comes to policy decisionskeep records. That is, any community's progress, problems, failures or successes should be statistically tracked and verifiable to so changes can be made in the future. It needs to be fully flexible, ever changing, evolving system in order to win the genetics arms race. There is no room for anecdotal stories, that predominate in modern culture's narrative style of social enquiry. Matt Nuenke April 2004 See www.neoeugenics.com website for bibliography. Appendix The following was posted to the Yahoo site [evol-psyh] by Jay R. Feierman, March 4, 2004: Evolution and Human Rights Legislation Douglas Galbi says, "Human rights speak of rights flowing from the nature of every living being" and then asks, (1) "In what way are humans different from other living beings? and (2) In what ways are all human beings equal?" In terms of (1) we are different from other living species in that we are a brain-specialized species with a highly evolved neocortex, which has the ontogenetic capacity to creatively find novel solutions to thwarted goals and to ontogenetically create more time- and material-efficient ways of solving novel problems, which we then culturally pass within and across generations to our kin (and others) by imitation learning. In terms of (2) we all have similarities (equalities) as well as differences (inequalities) depending on which we are looking to delineate. Far from being a part of our nature, "human rights" are culturally concocted and transmitted, arbitrary creations of our highly evolved neo-cortices. They are not species-typical traits. What are human rights in one society are not so in another. The high status persons of each society create the list of the human rights that in the long term serve their own best interest. Governments, which are controlled by high status individuals, codify and then enforce the exercise of approved human rights and suppress the expression of the unapproved human rights. In one society freedom of speech and religion and the right to bear arms (own guns) are considered basic human rights, whereas in other societies there are no freedoms of speech or religion or the right to bear arms but wealth is redistributed so that everyone is given food, healthcare and a place to live as their basic human rights. Obviously, there is no other specie that has a list of basic rights for each member of the species. In some human societies equal opportunity is considered a basic human right, which is the so-called "level playing field" concept. In other societies, equal outcome is considered a basic human right and resources are redistributed by the government and some humans are given preferential treatment to make the outcomes more equal. The concept of human rights always requires a government to establish and enforce them, since they are arbitrary. So I would take issue with Douglas's Galbi's basic premise that "human rights . . . flow from the nature of every living being." Instead, it appears that what are called human rights are culturally arbitrary access, denial and redistribution rules that in the long run have to serve interest of the rule makers. In the United States we are told that it is our "God given right" for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. So even these so called rights are considered "God given" and not part of our basic human nature. Oh Natural Selection, where did my idealism of youth go? From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:06:44 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:06:44 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] New Scientist: India special: The next knowledge superpower Message-ID: India special: The next knowledge superpower http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg18524876.800&print=true 5.2.19 THE first sign that something was up came about eight years back. Stories began to appear in the international media suggesting that India was "stealing" jobs from wealthy nations - not industrial jobs, like those that had migrated to south-east Asia, but the white-collar jobs of well-educated people. Today we know that the trickle of jobs turned into a flood. India is now the back office of many banks, a magnet for labour-intensive, often tedious programming, and the customer services voice of everything from British Airways to Microsoft. In reality, the changes in India have been more profound than this suggests. Over the past five years alone, more than 100 IT and science-based firms have located R&D labs in India. These are not drudge jobs: high-tech companies are coming to India to find innovators whose ideas will take the world by storm. Their recruits are young graduates, straight from India's universities and elite technology institutes, or expats who are streaming back because they see India as the place to be - better than Europe and the US. The knowledge revolution has begun. The impact of the IT industry on the economy has been enormous. In 1999 it contributed 1.3 per cent of India's GDP. Last year that figure had grown to 3 per cent. And what's good for one science-based industry should be good for others. India has a thriving pharmaceutical industry which is restructuring itself to take on the world. And biotech is taking off. The attitude is growing that science cannot be an exclusively intellectual pursuit, but must be relevant economically and socially. The hope among some senior scientists and officials is that India can short-cut the established path of industrial development and move straight to a knowledge economy. For the New Scientist reporters who have been in India for this special report, many features of the country stand out. First, its scale and diversity. With a population of more than a billion, the country presents some curious contrasts. It has the world's 11th largest economy, yet it is home to more than a quarter of the world's poorest people. It is the sixth largest emitter of carbon dioxide, yet hundreds of millions of its people have no steady electricity supply. It has more than 250 universities which catered last year for more than 3.2 million science students, yet 39 per cent of adult Indians cannot read or write. These contrasts take tangible form on the outskirts of cities from Chennai to Delhi, Mumbai to Bangalore. Here, often next to poor areas, great gleaming towers of glass are growing in which knowledge workers do their thinking. These images of modernity are a far cry from stereotypical India - a place bedevilled alternately by drought and flood, of poor farmers and slum-dwellers. Yet both sets of images are real - and many others besides. High-tech is not the sole preserve of the rich. Fishermen have begun using mobile phones to price their catch before they make port, and autorickshaw drivers carry a phone so that customers can call for a ride. Technology companies are extending internet connections to the remotest locations. Small, renewable electricity generators are appearing in villages, and the government is using home-grown space technology to improve literacy skills and education in far-flung areas. These efforts are often piecemeal, and progress is slow. "Illiteracy today is reducing only at the rate of 1.3 per cent per annum," says R. A. Mashelkar, director-general of the government's Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. "At this rate, India will need 20 years to attain a literacy rate of 95 per cent." He is hopeful that technology can speed up this process. Science too has its role to play. Critics of India's investment priorities ask why the country spends large sums on moon rockets and giant telescopes while it is still struggling to find food and water for millions of its citizens? The answer is that without science, poverty will never be beaten. "You cannot be industrially and economically advanced unless you are technologically advanced, and you cannot be technologically advanced unless you are scientifically advanced," says C. N. R. Rao, the prime minister's science adviser. Rise of the middle class The knowledge revolution is already swelling the ranks of India's middle class - already estimated to number somewhere between 130 million and 286 million. And the gulf in spending power between the poor and the comfortably off has never been more apparent. Take cars. Sales are rising at more than 20 per cent a year. Before India opened up its economy in the early 1990s, only a few models were available, almost all home-built. Today, top-end imported cars have become real status symbols. Another consequence of the knowledge revolution is that the extreme wealth of a new breed of young, high-tech yuppies is challenging traditional gender roles and social values. Whether the new-found prosperity and excitement of present-day India can be sustained will depend crucially on how the government guides the country over the next few years. Cheap labour and the widespread use of English do not guarantee success, and there are major obstacles that the country will need to tackle to ensure continued growth. Take infrastructure. Where China has pumped billions into water, road and rail projects, India has let them drift. Likewise, companies complain that bureaucracy and corruption make doing business far more difficult than it ought to be. One of the critical issues facing India is the gulf between the academic world and industry. The notion that scientific ideas lead to technology and from there to wealth is not widespread. This stems in large measure from the attitudes prevalent before 1991. Before economic liberalisation, competition between Indian companies was tame, so they were under no pressure to come up with new ideas, nor did academics promote their ideas to industry. India's attitude to patents are a product of that mindset. The country has no tradition of patenting, and only recently have institutions and academics started spinning off companies and filing for patents in earnest. Most applications filed in India still come from foreign companies. Until this year, the country did not recognise international patent rules, a failure that hampered interactions with foreign companies. The suspicion remains that Indian companies are out to steal ideas, says Gita Sharma, chief scientific officer of Magene Life Sciences, a start-up company in Hyderabad. "We are not yet able to wipe away that image." And while India has now adopted those international rules on paper, there are still concerns about how strictly they will be enforced. "It will take a couple of years before the full implications play out," says Sankar Krishnan, a biotechnology analyst for McKinsey and Company in Mumbai. Bringing research round to a more commercial way of thinking is not the only issue that academia must face up to. Another cultural problem, according to some scientists, is that too often institutions have an ethos of playing safe. Researchers who devise and test daring theories are criticised if they fail, discouraging the kind of ground-breaking research that India needs. There is a widespread view that the entire university system needs an overhaul. India awards only 5000 science PhDs a year, says Mashelkar, yet it should be producing 25,000. There are funding problems and political interference in the running of some universities, particularly those run by state governments. In response, central government has decided to select 30 universities, give them extra money, and mentor and monitor them to create a series of elite institutions. But such changes will be for nothing if students choose not to study science. In recent years, increasing numbers have chosen to study IT and management because that's where money is to be made. "IT and outsourcing has improved the economy and quality of life of people, but has had a negative effect on science," Rao says. Mashelkar hopes that as science-based companies grow, and demand for fresh blood increases, salaries will rise and more students will opt for science. Chasing China These problems must be solved if India is to capitalise on its recent gains, and there are hopeful signs that Indian science is improving in the global scheme of things. Its share of the top, highly cited publications has increased, but it is starting from a very low base. The government spends only $6 billion a year on research and it still has fewer scientists per head of population than China or South Korea. India's greatest rival has always been its giant neighbour to the north. While IT and services are helping India log 6 per cent year-on-year increases in GDP, China's vast manufacturing base is raising its GDP by around 9 per cent a year. Even in India's strong suit of knowledge-based industries, China could still steal the march on it, not least because its Communist government can command change, while in India the democratic government can only guide national development. Nevertheless, the rewards for India of a thriving science-based economy could be huge. The investment bank Goldman Sachs estimates that if India gets everything right it will have the third largest economy in the world by 2050, after China and the US. India is not yet a knowledge superpower. But it stands on the threshold. From checker at panix.com Sat Apr 2 16:07:18 2005 From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker) Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2005 11:07:18 -0500 (EST) Subject: [Paleopsych] David Goetze and Patrick James: Evolutionary Psychology and the Explanation of Ethnic Phenomena Message-ID: David Goetze and Patrick James: Evolutionary Psychology and the Explanation of Ethnic Phenomena http://human-nature.com/ep/articles/ep02142159.html Evolutionary Psychology 2: 142-159 5.1.22 David B. Goetze, Department of Political Science, 0725 Old Main Hill, Utah State University, Logan, Utah 84322-0725, USA. Patrick James, Political Science Department, 113 Professional Building, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, MO 65211, USA. Abstract: In a recent series of articles, Hislope (1998, 2000) and Harvey (2000a, 2000b) have raised questions about the usefulness of "evolutionary theory" especially for any purpose other than identifying "distal" causes of ethnic phenomena. This article responds to those views and argues that evolutionary psychology shows great promise in contributing to the explanation of contemporary ethnic identities and ethnic conflict. The authors argue that an evolutionary psychology approach embraces research conducted through conventional social science approaches, helps to complete explanations of the proximate causes of ethnic conflict, and can recast thought and encourage new areas of research about important issues in the ethnic conflict field. Illustrations are provided in support of each of these points. Some of these arguments have been heard before with respect to the general role of evolutionary theory in explaining social phenomena but they are arguments we think bear repeating and illustrating in the context of the study of ethnic phenomena. Before examining the ways that evolutionary psychology can contribute to social science explanation of ethnic phenomena, we summarize the general evolutionary psychology approach to the study of social behavior. Keywords : affective intelligence model, Balkans, Bosnia, ethnic conflict, fitness cliff, inclusive fitness, intolerance, kinship bonding, martyr, nationalism, proximate cause, Rwanda, social norms, threat. _________________________________________________________________ Evolutionary Psychology Approach An elaborate description and defense of the general evolutionary psychology approach to the study of social science phenomena is found in Tooby and Cosmides (1990, 1992), Cosmides and Tooby (1994) and Buss (1995). Because ethnic phenomena and ethnic conflict are human social phenomena there is no obvious reason why evolutionary psychology cannot be applied to their study and, indeed, ample reason why it makes sense to do so. Van den Berghe (1981), Johnson, (1986) and Salter (2000), for example, have strongly suggested that psychological mechanisms revolving around kinship bonding are pivotal in generating ethnic behaviors. More broadly, an evolutionary psychology approach posits that, through the process of natural selection, humans have acquired a diverse array of mental mechanisms. Each one is designed to respond to the demands of a specific environmental problem or task that is relevant to the survival and reproductive success of the individual and has been repeatedly encountered by humans in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. Persistent exposure to a particular environmental problem over large numbers of generations results in the evolution of a well-defined adaptation in the form of a psychological mechanism. In general, evolved psychological mechanisms are thought to operate in an algorithmic fashion. Scanning and filtering functions of a mechanism identify environmental stimuli that constitute a particular environmental problem or task and elicit specific emotions and behaviors that address the problem or task in ways that contribute to its adaptive resolution. Evolved psychological mechanisms are thought to exist for addressing innumerable problems and tasks such as: mate choice, hunting, alliance formation, and reputation-building, to name only a few. Among the problems and tasks relevant to ethnic phenomena are: group bonding and cooperation for both benign and malevolent purposes, and responses to the menace of group threat and conflict. Embracing Conventional Research Research that adopts an evolutionary psychological approach can be quite complementary with traditional social science research that addresses these same ethnic phenomena. When developed insights of evolutionary psychology are brought into the analysis explanations can be expanded and given more meaning. To the point, an especially crucial aspect of the explanation of ethnic phenomena involves the description of human nature. The most common way of facilitating explanations among traditional researchers is to adopt ad hoc and implied assumptions about human nature and to investigate causal factors consistent only with those assumptions. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists do not take "nature" for granted and, instead, hypothesize about the relevant mechanisms of the human brain that come into play as humans engage in ethnic behaviors. They bring novel elements to an explanation by fleshing out hypotheses about the possible connections among environmental stimuli, mental activity, and actual behaviors that generations of adaptations have given us. Evolutionary psychology approaches synthesize traditional dichotomies between so-called nature and nurture by acknowledging the interaction between environment and culture on the one hand and the genetically-inspired mechanisms and molds of human social behaviors on the other. Ultimately, behaviors result from these interactions as environmental events trigger mental mechanisms, shape the paths of human development, and even co-evolve with the mechanisms themselves (Ridley, 2003; Marcus, 2003). The evolutionary concept of "inclusive fitness" (developed by Hamilton (1964, 1970, 1971) and West-Eberhard (1975) and popularized by Wilson (1975) and Dawkins (1979, 1982)) has provided a dramatic boost to the explanation of social behavior. Inclusive fitness refers to the idea that humans enhance the spread of genes like their own by acting beneficently towards close kin and that natural selection would have favored genes that expressed such beneficent behavior. While the basic concept is widely accepted in the evolutionary psychology field, the role of inclusive fitness in explaining the existence of altruism and bonding for groups larger than families and clans is still developing. Van den Berghe (1981) and Johnson (1986) have emphasized evolved mechanisms that activate kinship bonding whenever humans recognize appropriate "markers" in others (i.e., encounter specific initiating environmental stimuli) such as ethnic features, language, and mere association. These markers serve as indicators for whomever might qualify as remote or perceived family among the multitudes of contemporary societies. Rushton (1989) identifies phenotypic similarities as the stimuli that initiate kinship bonding mechanisms. Goetze (1998) argues that all of these psychological mechanisms likely evolved in hunter-gatherer society but their ability to generate bonding in large-scale groups derives, in part, from the mobility of modern humans and the difficulties in mobile societies of actually locating real kin. Hence, humans exhibit at least minimal bonding emotions and behaviors with large numbers of surrogate family. In traditional research, debate about the depth and durability of ethnic attachments has been carried on between the primordialists who see such bonding as strong, extremely durable and originating far into a sometimes mysterious past and circumstantialists who see group bonding as ephemeral and interest-driven (Scott, 1990). While not sealing the case for primordialism, inclusive fitness concerns provide at least some scientific footing for the position and reduces some of the mystery about group origins by demonstrating how strong, durable ethnic group attachments might have formed and persevered. An historian, Peter Mentzel (2000) utilizes the concept of a kinship bonding mechanism to explore variation in the origins of nationalist loyalties and viable nation-states in the Balkans, especially as they developed under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. To begin, he notes that nationalism, the politically active expression of ethnic identity, resulted in more effective and stable nation-states in Croatia, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria than in the territories largely populated by Albanians. The former can all point to politically autonomous units emerging as the cohesion and strength of the Ottoman Empire waned. By the 19th century, Serbia established a full-fledged nation-state that would endure through the Yugoslav period and maintain its cohesiveness despite disastrous attempts by Serbian political elites to establish a Serbian Empire all its own, despite the essential loss of the region of Kosovo, and despite the economic deprivations imposed by NATO bombing and a regime of economic sanctions. In contrast, an Albanian political entity did not develop until the Yugoslav era, failed to incorporate the lion's share of the adjacent Albanian population, and has continued in a status so fragile that a collapsing pyramid scheme nearly tore the fledgling Albanian state asunder. A traditional issue for scholars and for Mentzel is explaining the development of nations or nation-states and in the particular case, why the Croats, Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks, and even Bosnians have been successful at state-building and the Albanians were relatively unsuccessful. A traditional answer has been to assert that nationalisms are constructions of political elites designed to serve their political ends and that elite manipulations are the focal point for understanding the building of nation-states (See, for example, Rothschild, 1981; Mason, 1994). This approach begs the question, however, of why such constructions would have resonated with mass populations or why they would have failed to do so. Mentzel's analysis provides a persuasive connection between elite manipulations and the responses of the masses. Following the work on kinship bonding and especially that of Johnson (1986), he argues that kinship is the foundation stone for the often cooperative, emotional and fairly durable attachments that individuals make to larger social associations and, ultimately, to national groups. The evolved psychology of kinship is not perfectly refined and humans react in kin-like manner (forge strong attachments to nonkin) when the triggers of kinship attachment are invoked. Calls to protect the Motherland, for example, can stir the sacrificial behaviors of broad classes of unrelated peoples. This can work even when political leaders - and institutions more generally - lack a democratic base of public legitimacy. The archetypal case is Josef Stalin's appeal to fight for 'Mother Russia' against the German invaders. Not everyone listened, but the point is that even Stalin eschewed an ideological or personal appeal in this instance, understanding at a fundamental level that kinship had the best chance of working under the most dire of conditions. Mentzel's unique contribution here is in showing how a layered development of ever larger associations could produce national level associations and how the absence of this line of development serves as an obstacle to the leap from direct kin-based groups to the enormous and often demanding associations of nations and nation-states. He argues that clan-based associations needed to pass through intermediate associations that were constructed on evocation of kin sentiments before they could make the leap to national groups. In the Balkans, the intermediate associations that would perform those functions were the "autonomous confessional associations," more commonly thought of as religious associations. Except for Croatia, the growth of Balkan nationalisms could be traced to the religious "millets" organized in the Ottoman Empire. According to Mentzel, these formal, nonterritorial associations were coterminous with the less formal religious groups that had developed as large-scale, transcendent replacements for earlier clan associations. The evocation of kinship had enabled these religious associations to emerge and were given added impetus by Ottoman organizational schemes. These events had succeeded in pushing social organization into large-scale associations that were, nonetheless, cemented by deep-seated emotional attachments. The final step in the transition to nationalisms was to define territories and add political status to these large-scale associations. Nation-states in the Balkans can be seen as territorial and political extensions of religious associations or, as in the Bosnian case, as more or less tenuous alliances among these associations. Albania is the exception. Religious associations apparently never succeeded in forging clan associations into transcendent associations. Albanians adhere in significant numbers to Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam but those faiths did not serve to organize clans or to evoke extensively the triggers of kinship affiliation that an organization of clans would have enabled. Interclan relations and amalgamations were not coterminous with religious affiliation. Lacking religious grounds, elites attempted to build national identity out of a sense of common language, but this effort was limited by the obvious reality that Albanians spoke two distinct languages. In Mentzel's (2000, p. 251) own words: To restate all of this one could argue that Albanian nationalists faced such a difficult task precisely because they needed to confront (and attempt to co-opt) kinship relations such as the Albanian clans directly without being able to use confessional group attachments as an intermediary or disguised kinship association. Hence, Albanian nationalist intellectuals stressed linguistic nationalism in their attempts to build an Albanian national consciousness, an effort made difficult because of the Gheg/Tosk division. Efforts to develop national identities and states in most Balkan communities succeeded because of a progressive effort to expand the scale and depth of associations that elicit kin-based affiliations. Efforts to forge a national identity in Albania have not yet culminated in comparable success because the evocation of kinship affiliation was not or could not be used to forge a progression of supra-kin associations. In paralleling traditional scholarship and in studying the construction of national identity, Mentzel has rendered the variation in a truly important and widely studied political phenomenon more understandable by elaborating on a fundamental concept from the repertoire of evolutionary psychology. Hopefully, Mentzel's work will inform and enrich the continuing work of traditional scholars in this field. Completing Explanations The categories of research examined here are by no means exclusive. Mentzel's research was clearly directed at completing an explanation of national identities. Because it was so firmly embedded in traditional historical research, we chose to use it as an example of the first category, "embracing conventional research." The research reported on below could also be placed in the same category. We place it in the category of "completing explanations," however, because of its potential in making complete an explanation of ethnic conflict where the lack of completeness is especially salient. This research (Goetze and Smith, 2004) demonstrates how evolutionary psychology has the potential for playing an important role in constructing explanations of ethnic conflict that include the proximate causes of ethnic conflict. This suggestion actually runs counter to the positions of Hislope and Harvey who, in a previously noted series of articles (Hislope, 1998; 2000; Harvey, 2000a; 2000b), review the contributions of evolutionary theory to the study of ethnic conflict. These authors argue that evolutionary theory has the capacity to identify only the distal causes of ethnic conflict. While acknowledging that evolved traits are important in such distal explanations, Hislope (2000, pp. 161-162) prefers to focus on "culture" as the source of proximate explanations: A second reason for the inclusion of genetic factors when a dependent variable appears explained by culture revolves around the difference between proximate and distal explanations. While culture may stand in an unmediated and direct causal path to any given behavioral trait, what makes the cultural factor possible could be a certain biological predisposition, a gene, or a novel turn in the evolutionary history of the species. Hence, exploring distal causal factors helps to complete the chain of causation and provides an understanding of why things are the way they are. If sociobiologists were to frame their study in such exploratory "distal" terms, it is likely they could silence some of their more severe critics. Later, Hislope (2000, p. 174) offers his view on the extent of the reach of evolutionary theory - the longest reach being in the cultural evolutionary variant: The argument advanced herein is that the articulation of cultural evolutionary theory represents theoretical progress over sociobiology, but its explanatory payoff remains limited due to the role of contingency in human affairs and the significance of non-evolutionary, proximate causal factors. While evolutionary theory undoubtedly elucidates the development of all organic life, it would seem to operate best at macro-levels of analysis, "distal" points of explanation, and from the perspective of the long-term. Hence, it is bound to display shortcomings at micro-level events that are highly contingent in nature. Likewise, Harvey (2000b, p. 184) finds evolutionary theory wholly inadequate for even contributing to the explanation of micro events such as the outbreak of war and ethnic violence: Research on evolutionary theory, phenotype matching and kinship affiliations is extremely useful for understanding the root causes of patriotism, nationalism (both ethnic and non-ethnic), xenophobia, and even racism. But it cannot explain ethnic war - that particular subset of human social interaction that involves a high level of inter-group violence and hostility. Nor can it account for variations in the severity and timing of ethnic violence more generally. Stronger explanations for this variability focus on environmental forces, some of which underscore the prominent role played by ethnic elites in the mobilization process. We can easily share the observation that evolutionary theory has previously offered little in the way of adding to proximate explanation of ethnic conflict. That condition is, we believe, only temporary and Hislope and Harvey have underestimated the potential that evolutionary psychology offers in forming proximate explanations of social behavior including the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Again, we do not claim that evolved mechanisms are the only source for constructing explanations of social behaviors. We agree with Hislope that monocausal explanations of social phenomena are unlikely to be sustainable. We do argue, however, that evolved psychological mechanisms typically play large roles in accounting for most social behaviors including the outbreak of ethnic conflict. And, what often seem to be cultural events independent of and cut off from evolutionary processes may themselves have evolved as functional adaptations that complement or activate embedded psychological mechanisms. In a preliminary study of the triggers of ethnic conflict, Goetze and Smith (2004) report on a mechanism derived from evolutionary psychology premises that illustrate these interactions in the context of group mobilization for conflict. In particular, they posit an alarm mechanism that disposes individuals to organize in the defense and offense of their ethnic group when viable and deadly threats to the security of their group are experienced. The behavioral manifestations of this mechanism are precisely the organization of group defense and offense when threats are encountered and, as activating stimuli, the dissemination of threats (cultural phenomena) by political elites who wish to engender a conflict situation. Why would humans possess such a mechanism? Alexander (1979, section 4) has speculated that humans developed alarm mechanisms that might even be specific to human threats as a result of cumulative experiences in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. Once humans had emerged as the dominant species able to defend against nonhuman predators, their most feared competitors were other humans and especially other humans who were organized as a group for the purpose of predatory mayhem. Behaviors that served as responses to threats from other humans may have been necessary for immediate survival and became adaptive as threat circumstances were repeated over the generations. One can imagine that an array of menacing stimuli provokes defensive reactions and that an array of behaviors could manifest those reactions. A plausible speculation is that murderous threats and actions directed at members of an ethnic group due to their ethnic identity are included among the array of menacing stimuli. Likewise, behavioral dispositions to organize group defense or offense in the face of those threats are included among the array of adaptive reactions. Empirical evidence that such connected stimuli and behaviors are universal across cultures and group conflict conditions would constitute considerable support for believing them to be part of an evolved psychological mechanism - their universality arguing for adaptations formulated early and effectively in the EEA. Goetze and Smith (2004) report on two such cases of intense, violent ethnic group conflict in Bosnia and Rwanda, respectively, and examined the circumstances that preceded the outbreak of organized hostilities in each case. In Bosnia in 1995, the contagion effect of group hostilities in neighboring regions was clearly in play. Croat and Serb (officially, Yugoslav) forces had recently engaged in a full-scale war and tensions in Bosnia about what Serbs in the region might do next were certainly high. Serbian elites within Bosnia who controlled television transmissions began disseminating reports of Muslim atrocities against Serbian villagers in which the latter were reportedly murdered by the former. No documentation that these events actually occurred has been put forward suggesting very strongly that the reports were concocted by Serbian elites in order to send off alarm bells in the minds of the Serbian masses. In many Serbian villages, the organization of militias soon followed and these militias were, in turn, often organized into more regular forces for carrying on systematic hostilities within Bosnia. These media messages about Muslim atrocities were, of course, available to Muslim elites and masses and one would expect that Muslims would organize militias in alarm over Serbian activities. Yet initially, Muslims did not commence organization of communal militias on a widespread basis. Perhaps the messages did not deliver the same provocative stimuli as they delivered to the Serbs. More likely, however, reactions are conditioned by the degree of vulnerability of the group to assaults by other groups. Groups that are most vulnerable and relatively defenseless against communal assaults, as the Muslims were at that time, have often tended to keep a low profile reminiscent of the "freeze" tactics that other small mammals assume when confronted with superior predators. A "rational" explanation of this behavior is that individuals in vulnerable groups assess that their own defense preparations could provoke other groups into preemptive assaults and that the balance of forces does not offer favorable outcomes to the vulnerable group. Humans surely make calculations of this sort but only evolutionary psychology offers an explanation as to why some manner of calculation clicks on in these types of situations - such situations have been repeatedly encountered in the environment of evolutionary adaptation and selection favored mental mechanisms that could generate behaviors that optimally responded to the threats to survival and reproduction. In Rwanda in 1994, Hutu elites disseminated messages over mass media that made reference to Tutsi atrocities committed against Hutu villagers, but Hutus required little convincing as the reality of recent Tutsi assaults on Hutus in neighboring Burundi was common knowledge. Again, the atmosphere was already tense and Hutu elites needed only to persuade Hutus that similar massacres could easily occur in their own country. In fact, the media campaign was geared primarily to spurring the organization of Hutus for the purpose of massacring Tutsis and eliminating the latter from the country. At least within Rwanda itself, Tutsis lacked resources to mount any kind of defense against what developed as genocidal killing. Hence, in most regions of the country, their reaction was predictably oriented toward the "freeze" alternative and little organization was observable among them to combat Hutu assaults. Only the regions bordering Uganda experienced a military response. Tutsis had held important positions within the Ugandan army and constituted an important proportion of its manpower. Out of that military diaspora, a Rwandan army (Rwandan Population Front or RPF) was forged that ultimately invaded Rwanda and drove out the Hutu militias as well as the regular Hutu army units. All of this happened despite the relatively small numbers of Tutsis in the Rwandan population (at any time no more than 20%) and despite the nearly successful attempt at massacring the entire Tutsi civilian population. Perhaps two-thirds of the Tutsi population would be slaughtered before the RPF would take control of the country. The massive acquiescence of the Rwandan Tutsis was notable for its uniformity of form -- almost no civilians attempted any resistance or attempted to organize a resistance - and its universality - all civilians appeared to react in the same fashion. An evolved psychological mechanism that generates uniform behaviors in response to similar and powerful stimuli offers as much explanation as any for the lack of variation in behaviors, a pattern that seems anomalous from a common sense point of view. At the same time, variation in response to murderous threats was clearly apparent across the Balkans and Rwandan cases and across the groups within the Balkans. Goetze and Smith posit that a complex of stimuli that include murderous threats and perceived military capabilities affect whether freeze or mobilization responses emerge. Another possibility is that perceived credibility of reports of murderous assaults shapes mobilization responses. Clearly, false reports of group assault will encounter different responses from one society to the next. Some societies will be disposed to accept these reports as true. Others will dismiss them rapidly as without substance. In the USA, reports from white supremacists groups that Jews and African Americans are murdering whites are generally not believed. The important issue then becomes: what are the environmental conditions that nurture disbelief in one society or, conversely, what are the environmental conditions that make such reports credible? Recasting Thought Evolutionary theory can recast thought, encourage new areas of research, and generate novel hypotheses about important issues in the ethnic conflict field and help to determine which areas of research are especially important. Threat Mechanism A unique question raised by an evolutionary psychology approach is exactly how does an evolved psychological mechanism function? How do specific behaviors connect algorithmically with specific environmental stimuli? Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse (1998) attempt to isolate the workings of what they call a threat mechanism. In particular, they develop a model that connects specific environmental stimuli with a set of behaviors that they label intolerance. They are interested in intolerance directed at members of an out-group, typically some manner of ethnic or racial group. The primary problem, as they see it, is to identify the environmental stimuli that provoke intolerant behaviors. Identifying the right stimuli can be accomplished, however, only by gaining understanding of the process through which stimuli are translated into behaviors. They begin their model-building task by first reviewing features of two general models that have been used to explain threat behaviors - a rational actor model and a symbolic politics model. The salient features of a rational actor model include an assessment mechanism that initiates intolerance behaviors whenever threatening stimuli are perceived. More specifically, the mechanism surveys the environment and assesses the probability of a dangerous event occurring. Intolerance behaviors are seen as coping devices designed to ameliorate or nullify the danger. An individual might attempt to deprive a group of political rights, for example, if members of that group are engaging in behaviors that have a high probability of infringing on the status of one's own group. A symbolic politics model identifies provocative behavior as the mere presence of a member of a group that is associated with a threat earlier in one's life or the presence of some symbol of the group. People respond to these symbols in intolerant ways not because they pose real threats or even a probability of real threat in the contemporary environment but because the symbols acquired a negative valence (through cultural transmission or conditioning) at a distant time in the past. Environmental stimuli are not assessed through rational calculation that evaluates the degree of threat but almost subconsciously in a way that arouses emotional responses. By triggering affect and emotion, intolerant behaviors are set in motion. The type of stimuli that initiate this sequence are deviations from norms - an action, event, or person that represents a violation of the status quo and carries the associated negative valence. Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse (1998) find fault with these models and propose a new model that corrects for deficiencies. They cite previous work (Kinder and Sears, 1981) that demonstrates that the degree of threat posed in a contemporary environment fails to elicit appropriately measured intolerance responses and other studies (Hamill, Wilson, and Nisbett, 1980; Jennings, Amabile, and Ross, 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Nisben and Ross, 1982) that show that the human brain may not be adept at processing threats in a conscious calculated manner. They note that rational calculation of threat is unlikely to be the process invoked in threatening circumstances because rational calculation is a relatively time-intensive process and threats need rapid responses. Hence, the subconscious, affective system of processing is more likely to be invoked because this system processes stimuli at very rapid speeds. However, the notion that even the affective system is triggered to produce coping responses by high values on a differentiated threat dimension may by misguided. The degree of immediate danger is not likely to be the activating stimuli. Instead, the authors suggest that threat responses tend to be provoked when out-groups are perceived to be engaging in violations of accepted societal norms - in other words, alarm bells tend to go off when out-groups are disrupting the societal environment - an intriguing conclusion that suggests a new class of behaviors that ought to be examined in the search for proximate causes of ethnic conflict. In a clever experimental design, Marcus, et al (1995) tested the validity of the rational choice model, the symbolic politics model, and their own affective intelligence model. First, subjects were given the opportunity to rate a wide variety of different groups according to their likes and dislikes. This procedure enabled subjects to "rely on their previously secured affective disposition ..." Two weeks later the same subjects were confronted with alternative scenarios involving actions of groups that they had rated as "least-liked." The actions were distinguished by whether the disliked groups were moving into positions in society where they could pose danger to the subject or by whether the actions of the group violated accepted norms of social or political behavior. Thus, the scenarios created an opportunity to assess, on the one hand, the likelihood of threat and, on the other hand, the violation of social norms. In an initial study, the subjects were presented with written scenarios and in a subsequent study, subjects were presented with actual news broadcasts. The results were similar in both studies. They found that the degree of threat did not provoke differences in tolerance/intolerance evaluations as measured by a post-experiment questionnaire. However, violations of social norms did elicit more intolerant responses, thereby, supporting that aspect of the affective intelligence model that identifies norm violations as the environmental activators of the mechanism that generates intolerant behaviors. In a follow-up experiment; Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse (1998) also measured the affective-anxiety levels of subjects as they were being exposed to news broadcasts that did or did not display violations of social norms. They found that anxiety levels were significantly higher when violations of social norms were present in the news broadcasts, again lending credence to the notion that processing of the threat was taking place on an emotional level rather than on the level of rational calculation. Many real-world cases of conflict offer at least casual support for the affective intelligence model. Recent developments in the Arab-Israel conflict comprise a case in point. During that summer of 2000, President Clinton attempted to broker an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority that would settle longstanding, even ancient, land claims. The bargaining focused on what percentages of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be controlled by the Palestinian Authority, after further devolution of authority from Israel. While no meaningful agreement on the main issues emerged between representatives of the respective sides, both Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak seemed open to continuing negotiations, with either Clinton or (more likely) someone else as the intermediary. In other words, the "peace process," as it became known, seemed to be moving forward in an incremental fashion, subject to the usual short-term disappointments such as those experienced in the summer meetings. The likelihood of violence in the conflict, in at least an impressionistic sense, seemed at an all-time low. All of this changed dramatically and in a manner consistent with the framework of affective intelligence soon after n