[Paleopsych] Wikipedia: Surveillance

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Surveillance - Wikipedia

    Surveillance is a process of close monitoring of [3]behaviour.
    [4]"Sur-Veillance" is French for to "watch from above". Note the all
    seeing "eye-in-the-sky" in this London Transport poster
    "Sur-Veillance" is French for to "watch from above". Note the all
    seeing "eye-in-the-sky" in this London Transport poster

    Although the word surveillance literally means (in French) "to watch
    from above" (i.e. a God's-eye view looking down from on-high) the term
    is often used for all forms of observation, not just visual

    However, the all-seeing eye-in-the-sky is still an icon of
    surveillance in general.

    It is commonly used to describe observation from a distance by means
    of electronic equipment or other [6]technological means, for example:
      * [7]eavesdropping
      * [8]telephone tapping
      * [9]directional microphones
      * [10]communications interception
      * [11]covert listening devices or 'bugs'
      * [12]Minox subminiature cameras
      * [13]closed-circuit television
      * [14]electronic tagging
      * military [15]reconnaissance
      * [16]Reconnaissance aircraft, e.g. [17]Lockheed U-2
      * [18]Reconnaissance satellites
      * [19]"trusted" computing devices
      * Internet and [20]computer surveillance

    However, surveillance also includes simple, relatively low-technology
    methods such as [21]postal interception, watching from nearby
    buildings with binoculars or similar and visiting properties in

    The term can also be used to describe the monitoring of [22]diseases
    by [23]epidemiologists.
    [24]1 Surveillance, counter-surveillance, inverse surveillance, and
    [25]2 Impact of surveillance
    [26]3 Telephones and mobile telephones
    [27]4 Postal services
    [28]5 Surveillance devices - 'bugs'
    [29]6 Computer Surveillance
    [30]7 Photography
    [31]8 Closed circuit TV
    [32]9 Documentation trails
    [33]10 Data profiling
    [34]11 Identities
    [35]12 Human operatives and social engineering
    [36]13 Personal counter-surveillance
    [37]14 Natural surveillance
    [38]15 See also
    [39]16 References
    [40]17 External links

Surveillance, counter-surveillance, inverse surveillance, and sousveillance

    [42]"Eye-in-the-sky" surveillance dome camera mounted atop a tall
    steel pole.
    "Eye-in-the-sky" surveillance dome camera mounted atop a tall steel

    Surveillance is the art of watching over the activities of persons or
    groups from a position of higher authority. Surveillance may be covert
    (without their knowledge) or overt (perhaps with frequent reminders
    such as "we are watching over you"). Surveillance has been an
    intrinsic part of human history. [44]Sun Tzu's [45]The Art of War,
    written 2,500 years ago, discusses how spies should be used against a
    person's enemies. But modern electronic and computer technology have
    given surveillance a whole new means of operation. Surveillance can be
    automated using computers, and people leave extensive records that
    describe their activities.

    Counter surveillance is the practice of avoiding surveillance or
    making it difficult. Before computer networks, counter surveillance
    involved avoiding agents and communicating secretly. With recent
    development of the Internet and computer databases counter
    surveillance has grown. Now counter surveillance involves everything
    from knowing how to delete a file on a computer to avoiding becoming
    the target of direct advertising agencies.

    Inverse surveillance is the practice of reversalism on surveillance,
    e.g. citizens photographing police, shoppers photographing
    shopkeepers, and passengers photographing cab drivers who usually have
    surveillance cameras in their cabs. A well-known example is George
    Haliday's recording of the Rodney King beating. [46]Inverse
    surveillance attempts to subvert the Panoptic gaze of surveillance,
    and often attempts to subvert the secrecy of surveillance through
    making the inverse surveillance recordings widely available (in
    contrast to the usually secret surveillance tapes).

    Sousveillance (French for "to watch from below") further includes the
    recording of an activity by a participant in the activity, in addition
    to [47]inverse surveillance. Recent [48]sousveillance workshops such
    as Microsoft's [49]Continuous Archival and Recording of Personal
    Experience (http://research.microsoft.com/CARPE2004/) are evidence of
    a growing sousveillance industry including Microsoft (wearable
    cameras), Nokia, Hewlett Packard ("Casual Capture") and many others.

Impact of surveillance

    [51]Image:Moving-camera.gif The greatest impact of computer-enabled
    surveillance is the large number of organisations involved in
    surveillance operations:
      * The state and security services still have the most powerful
        surveillance systems, because they are enabled under the law. But
        today levels of state surveillance have increased, and using
        computers they are now able to draw together many different
        information sources to produce profiles of persons or groups in

      * Many large corporations now use various form of 'passive'
        surveillance. This is primarily a means of monitoring the
        activities of staff and for controlling [52]public relations. But
        some large corporations actively use various forms of surveillance
        to monitor the activities of [53]activists and campaign groups who
        may impact their operations.

      * Many companies trade in information lawfully, buying and selling
        it from other companies or local government agencies who collect
        it. This data is usually bought by companies who wish to use it
        for [54]marketing or [55]advertising purposes.

      * Personal information is obtained by many small groups and
        individuals. Some of this is for harmless purposes, but
        increasingly sensitive personal information is being obtained for
        criminal purposes, such as [56]credit card and other types of

    For those who are peacefully working to change society, surveillance
    presents a problem. Particularly after the [58]September 11th, 2001
    terrorist attacks, many states now view [59]political dissent as a
    problem, and have introduced new laws to strengthen their surveillance
    powers. Many states have also redefined their legal definition of
    terrorism to not only include violent acts, but also types of direct
    action [60]protest. Even where groups have [61]no involvement in
    violence, states and corporations may try to use information obtained
    about groups or individuals to discredit their work. As the scope of
    surveillance increases, it is important that groups and individuals
    manage their exposure to different types of surveillance to limit the
    damage it can do to them, or their work.

    Modern surveillance cannot be totally avoided. If the state uses all
    of their resources to investigate a person's activities, they will be
    able to do so. However, non-state groups may employ surveillance
    techniques against an organisation, and some precautions can reduce
    their success. Some states are also legally limited in how extensively
    they can conduct general surveillance of people they have no
    particular reason to suspect.

    Note: In all the forms of surveillance mentioned below, the issue of
    patterns is important. Although in isolation a single piece of
    communications data seems useless, when collected together with the
    communications data of other people it can disclose a lot of
    information about organisational relationships, work patterns,
    contacts and personal habits. The collection and processing of
    communications data is largely automated using computers. See also:
    [62]traffic analysis

Telephones and mobile telephones

    The official and unofficial tapping of telephone lines is widespread.

    The contracts or licenses by which the state controls telephone
    companies means that they must provide access for tapping lines to the
    security services and the police.

    For mobile phones the major threat is the collection of communications
    data. This data not only includes information about the time and
    duration of the call, but also the geographical location where the
    call was made from and to whom. This data can be determined generally
    because the geographic communications cell that the call was made in
    is stored with the details of the call. But it is also possible to get
    greater resolution of a persons location by combining information from
    a number of cells surrounding the persons location.

    Mobile phones are, in surveillance terms, a major liability. This
    liability will only increase as the new third-generation (3G) phones
    are introduced. This is because the base stations will be located
    closer together.

    See the article [64]telephone tapping for more details.

Postal services

    As more people use faxes and email the significance of the postal
    system is decreasing (this may not be the case in all countries,
    certainly the case with international communications, but probably not
    local). But interception of post is still very important to the
    security services.

    There is no easy way to know your post is being read. The machines
    used to sort and stamp letters often rip up items anyway, so damage is
    no certain indicator that your post is being read.

    The simplest counter-measure to stop your post being opened is to put
    sticky tape along each edge and the seams of the envelope, and then
    sign the tape with an indelible marker. That prevents all but the most
    expert tampering.

    People used to send floppy disks via the post. Today these files can
    go easily by email. But [66]CDs and [67]DVDs of data are still
    regularly sent by post. To ensure that this data is not open to
    reading by anyone, even if its just wrongly delivered, you should
    encrypt the data.

Surveillance devices - 'bugs'

    Surveillance devices or 'bugs' are not really a communications medium,
    but they are a device that requires a communications channel. The idea
    of a 'bug' usually involves a radio transmitter, but there are many
    other options for carrying a signal; you can send radio frequencies
    through the main wiring of a building and pick them up outside, you
    can pick up the transmissions from a cordless phones, and you can pick
    up the data from poorly configured wireless computer networks or tune
    in to the radio emissions of a computer monitor.

    Bugs come in all shapes and sizes. The original purpose of bugs was to
    relay sound. Today the miniaturisation of electronics has progressed
    so far then even TV pictures can be broadcast via bugs that
    incorporate miniature video cameras (something made popular recently
    during TV coverage sports events, etc.). The cost of these devices has
    dramatically fallen.

    See the article on [69]bugging for more details.

Computer Surveillance

    At the very basic level, computers are a surveillance target because
    you confide your secrets into them. Anyone who can and access or
    remove your computer can retrieve your information. If someone is able
    to install software on your system they can turn your computer into a
    surveillance device.

    Computers can be tapped by a number of methods, ranging from the
    installation of physical bugs, to the installation of surveillance
    software or remote interception of the radio transmissions generated
    by the normal operation of computers.

    See the article [71]computer surveillance for more details.


    Photography is becoming more valuable as a means of surveillance. In
    recent years there has been a significant expansion in the level of
    stills and video photography carried out at public demonstrations in
    many countries. At the same time there have been advances in closed
    circuit television (CCTV) technology and computer image processing
    that enable digital images taken from cameras to be matched with
    images stored in a database.

    Photographs have long been collected as a form of evidence. But as
    protest and civil disobedience become an ever greater liability to
    governments and corporations, images are gathered not only as evidence
    for prosecution, but also as a source of intelligence information. The
    collection of photographs and video also has another important
    function - it scares people.

Closed circuit TV

    Closed circuit TV (CCTV) - where the picture is viewed or recorded,
    but not broadcast - initially developed as a means of security for
    banks. Today it has developed to the point where it is simple and
    inexpensive enough to be used in home security systems, and for
    everyday surveillance.

    The widespread use of CCTV by the police and governments has developed
    over the last 10 years. In the UK, cities and towns across the country
    have installed large numbers of cameras linked to police authorities.
    The justification for the growth of CCTV in towns is that it deters
    crime - although there is still no clear evidence that CCTV reduces
    crime. The recent growth of CCTV in housing areas also raises serious
    issues about the extent to which CCTV is being used as a social
    control measure rather than simply a deterrent to crime.

    The development of CCTV in public areas, linked to computer databases
    of people's pictures and identity, presents a serious risk to civil
    liberties. Potentially you will not be able to meet anonymously in a
    public place. You will not be able to drive or walk anonymously around
    a city. Demonstrations or assemblies in public places could be
    affected as the state would be able to collate lists of those leading
    them, taking part, or even just talking with protesters in the street.

    See the article [74]CCTV for more details.

Documentation trails

    Modern society creates huge amounts of data. Every time you use a bank
    machine, pay by credit card, use a phone card or make a call from home
    you clock up electronic records of transactions. In the past these
    would have been called 'paper trails'. But today many of these records
    are electronic. This information, if obtained by the state, or
    obtained through unofficial channels (sorting your rubbish/bribing
    those in charge of keeping the information) can also describe how you
    live and work.

    One of the greatest freedoms we have is to buy a book, or a newspaper,
    or to donate money to a cause, and do so with complete anonymity. When
    transactions are electronic, that anonymity is lost.

    Marketing and credit reporting agencies rival the state intelligence
    services for their collection of dossiers. Today a whole web of
    information is collected by marketing companies in order to sell you
    things, or determine how companies should run their marketing
    strategies. The details from a whole range of transactions, from
    credit agreements to the electoral register, are all purchased by
    market research companies to provide information on the habits of the
    public as potential customers.

Data profiling

    Most of the information described above is generalised - it identifies
    trends from large quantities of data, and the role of the individual
    in that is very minor. Data profiling on the other hand is a process
    whereby someone seeks to get as much information about you as possible
    - personally - in order to assemble a picture of your specific life
    and habits.

    Data profiling is very important in intelligence operations and has
    many applications - from deciding whether a person is vulnerable to
    bribery, through to conducting profiling of suspects to decide where
    they can be apprehended. The state has powers to do this by issuing
    orders that banks, credit companies or even your employer supply data
    to them. But even corporations and [77]private investigators can
    assemble this information if they are well connected.

    Much personal information is not very well protected, because small
    amounts of information is not considered sensitive. But once this
    information is brought together it can describe in detail the actions,
    habits and preferences of the individual.

    Historically, much information has been protected by practical
    obscurity, the difficulty of aggregating or analyzing a large number
    of data points. This has lead to unexpected results as birth records,
    property tax rolls, and other records are brought online, where they
    can be easily collated by computer.


    There are instances when we wish to hide our identity - to remain
    anonymous - for a whole range of reasons. To eliminate this will be a
    serious erosion of our civil liberties. This is possible as we move
    towards the development of 'electronic identities. There are two
    aspects to this:
      * the development of systems of credentials - where you carry a card
        or a document; and
      * the development of [79]biometrics - where you are recognised from
        your 'unique' biological characteristics.

    The development of identity systems is being pushed on two fronts:
      * The banking industry, who wish to find a more fool-proof system of
        verifying financial transactions than the possession of a plastic
        card or the use of a signature;
      * Law enforcement, who want a way of identifying individuals easily,
        even if they have no reason (i.e. evidence) to do so. (See
        [80]Stop and Search
        [81][1] (http://www.met.police.uk/stopandsearch/),
        [82][2] (http://www.blink.org.uk/pdescription.asp?key=1726&grp

    One of the simplest forms of identification is the carrying of
    credentials. Some countries have an identity card system to aid
    identification. Other documents, such as drivers licenses, library
    cards, bankers or credit cards are also used to verify identity. The
    problem with identity based on credentials is that the individual must
    carry them, and be identifiable, or face a legal penalty. This problem
    is compounded if the form of the identify card is 'machine-readable'
    (could you explain more) In this case it may create a document trail
    as it is used to verify transactions.

    As a means of combating the problem of people carrying or falsifying
    credentials, researchers are increasingly looking at biometrics -
    measuring biological or physical characteristics - as a way to
    determine identity. One of the oldest forms of biometrics is
    fingerprints. Every finger of every person (identical twins included)
    has a unique pattern, and these have been used for many years to help
    identify suspects in police enquiries. A finger/thumb print can be
    reduced to a brief numeric description, and such systems are being
    used in banks and secure areas to verify identity.

    A more recent development is DNA fingerprinting, which looks at some
    of the major markers in the body's DNA to produce a match. However,
    the match produced is less accurate than ordinary fingerprints because
    it only identifies people to a certain probability of matching.
    Further, identical twins have identical DNA, and so are
    indistinguishable by this method.

    Handwriting - primarily your signature - has been used for many years
    to determine identity. However other characteristics of the individual
    can also be used to check identity. Voice analysis has been used for
    some as a means to prove identity - but it is not suited to portable
    use because of the problems of storing a range of voice prints. But
    perhaps the two most viable portable systems, because identities can
    be reduced to a series of numeric data points rather than a detailed
    image or sound, are:
      * Iris recognition. Some banks are now using this method of
        security. The human iris has an almost unique pattern that can be
        reduced to a simple series of numeric descriptions. The iris
        reader matches the pattern of the iris to one stored and verifies
        the match.
      * Facial recognition. The configuration of the facial features can
        be used to accurately identify one individual from another. Again,
        the configuration can be reduced to a short numeric description.

    By combining some form of personal identifying feature, with a system
    of verification it is possible to do everything from buying food to
    travelling abroad. The important issue is how this information is
    managed in order to reduce the likelihood of tracking. If you were to
    combine a particular biometric system with new smart card technology
    to store the description, that system would be immune from tracking
    (unless the transaction produced a document/electronic trial). But if
    the identifying features are stored centrally, and a whole range of
    systems have access to those descriptions, it is possible that other
    uses could be made of the data; for example, using high resolution
    CCTV images with a databases of facial identities in order to identify
    people at random.

Human operatives and social engineering

    The most invasive form of surveillance is the use of human operatives.
    This takes two forms:
      * The use of operatives to infiltrate an organisation; and
      * The use of social engineering techniques to obtain information.

    In groups dealing with issues that are directly contrary to government
    policy the issue of infiltration often arises. Also, where groups
    oppose large corporations, infiltration by agents of the corporation
    is also feared. As well as operatives, the police and security
    services may put pressure on certain members of an organisation to
    disclose the information they hold on other members.

    Running operatives is very expensive, and for the state the
    information recovered from operatives can be obtained from less
    problematic forms of surveillance. If discovered, it can also be a
    public relations disaster for the government or corporation involved.
    For these reasons, the use of operatives to infiltrate organisations
    is not as widespread as many believe. But infiltration is still very
    likely from other organisations who are motivated to discover and
    monitor the work of campaign groups. This may be for political or
    economic motivations. There are also many informal links between large
    corporations and police or security services, and the trading of
    information about groups and activists is part of this relationship.

    It is not possible to guard against the infiltration of an
    organisation without damaging the viability or effectiveness of the
    organisation. Worrying too much about infiltration within the
    organisation can breed mistrust and bad working relationships within
    an organisation. Rather like other forms of surveillance, the
    professional infiltration of operatives into and organisation is
    difficult to guard against.

    Another more likely scenario, especially when dealing with the media
    or corporate public relations, is social engineering. Social
    engineering is where someone phones you, interviews you, or just talks
    to you in the street and tries to make you believe they are someone
    else, or someone with an innocuous interest in you. But their real
    interest is to obtain some specific information that they believe you

    You should develop clear procedures for handling enquiries about your
    work. For example, one day you get a phone call saying "hi, I'd really
    like to come on your demonstration against Company X, when is it?",
    or, "I'm calling for john, he's lost the password for the computer can
    you give it to me?". You have to guard against the disclosure of
    information in this way:

    Unless you have an extremely good reason to, you should never give any
    security-related information over the phone, and via the Internet you
    should encrypt security information.

    Social engineering is easily identified by asking a series a questions
    to see if a person is aware of facts or future plans that they should
    not have awareness of.

    Journalists for well known media organisation can be verified by
    phoning the editor of that organisation, but freelance or independent
    journalists should be treated with care - they could be working for

    There is of course a balance to be struck here. You need to be able to
    allow people a certain amount of access to your campaigns. But you
    also need to preserve the integrity of the groups of people most
    closely involved in the campaigns work. How you arrive at this balance
    is your own, difficult, problem to resolve. But however it is
    resolved, it must be agreed between all those involved in a particular
    issue in order that you have a consistent policy with all those

Personal counter-surveillance

    Counter-surveillance is reliant on good information security planning.
    Protecting information is the first stage of counter-surveillance. But
    counter surveillance must also be seen as a balancing of opposing

    If you are very good at restricting all information, that state or
    corporations will have problems monitoring you. However, you are also
    likely to become more isolated and secretive in the process.
    Therefore, like information security, counter surveillance requires an
    effort to protect those activities or information that are sensitive,
    whilst giving less emphasis to those activities that can be open to

    Information security is primarily based on protecting equipment with
    security procedures and barriers. Personal counter-surveillance is
    based on much the same process, but instead you provide security and
    barriers around your own personal habits. As humans we are creatures
    of habit. If we exhibit very predictable habits, this makes monitoring
    of our activities easier. But if on certain occasions we break our
    habits, it can also give away the fact that we are doing something at
    that time which is not part of our everyday work.

    The best way to begin thinking about avoiding surveillance is to think
    about breaking the regular patterns in your life. This masks regular
    activity, so making it harder to practice routine surveillance. But it
    also masks the times when you may undertake activities out of the

    Breaking regular patterns does not mean going to bed at different
    times, or working different hours everyday. Instead it requires that
    any activities you wish to avoid being the subject of surveillance are
    integrated into the other events in your life - but not to the extent
    that they become predictable. If you change the route you take to work
    or to shop on a random basis, you make it more difficult to monitor
    your movements. If you build irregular appointments into activities
    that might involve surveillance, it creates a background 'noise' in
    the pattern of your activities that masks any change in your habits.

    Securing the information on your computer will help your overall
    security. If you have a portable computer you are presented with a
    whole new problem because you move that system outside of your
    ordinary systems of security and access barriers. Therefore special
    care should be taken with portable computers:
      * The system should be secured with a [85]BIOS password to prevent
      * Use encryption of the hard disk, where possible, to prevent access
        to the contents of the hard disk if it is removed from the
      * Ensure that your portable computer has different passwords than
        those used on your static equipment.

    Securing your information is fairly easy. But the main issue you will
    have to deal with when considering personal surveillance is how to
    carry out meetings, and networking with people, when you need to
    discuss sensitive issues.

    Primarily, when dealing with sensitive information, avoid generating
    any kind of documentation or opportunities for surveillance. Think
    about implementing the following as part of your work:
      * Travel -
           + If you are travelling to a sensitive meeting take a different
             route going there and coming back, and if possible do not use
             the same bus or station when going to or leaving the location
             you are travelling to. This lessens the likelihood that your
             destination will be identified.
           + If travelling on sensitive business, try to use [86]public
             transport. Using you own private cars will provide a
             traceable identity.
           + To avoid the CCTV systems in public places move with the
             crowd; don't rush, don't cut corners, and don't look around
             for CCTV cameras.
           + If you can build in other events/appointments as part of your
             journey, that will help provide an alternate motive for
             travelling to that area of a town or city.
           + Facial recognition systems work primarily on the
             configuration of facial features. To work they need to get a
             good view of the face. Looking at a slight angle towards the
             ground, and wearing a hat with a brim, helps fool the system.
           + If you travel using public transport, [87]roaming tickets are
             preferable to tickets for a specific journey - they give you
             more flexibility over the route, and they are more difficult
             to associate a route travelled with a particular ticket
           + If you have the time available and you can obtain a roaming
             ticket, build in some extra time to your journey and change
             trains to make it hard to piece together your journey from
             CCTV and surveillance sources.
           + If travelling in a town, avoid moving through the major
             shopping areas, or 'controlled environments' such as shopping
             centres. These have the highest level of CCTV coverage.
           + Always assume that public transport vehicles have CCTV
             installed - travelling during peak hours will help mask your
           + To make following you in person or via CCTV more difficult do
             not wear distinctive clothes or carry distinctive objects -
             blend in.
           + Darkness aids anonymity, but is not a foolproof solution to
             the latest CCTV cameras which can see in the dark.

      * Mobile phones -
           + If in doubt, turn it off.
           + If travelling to a sensitive location, in an urban area do
             not use your phone within two or three miles of the location,
             or in rural areas do not use it within ten or fifteen miles
             of the location. This will prevent the creation of a trail
             that associates you with that location on that day.
           + If the location you are going to is nowhere near a route you
             regularly travel, turn off your phone before you start your
             journey there.
           + If you desperately need to mask your location, let someone
             else carry your phone around for the day - but this is only
             realistic if you take all precautions to prevent generating
             other document trails whilst you are moving around.

      * Payments -
           + If you are travelling to a sensitive location, don't pay by
             credit/debit card or take money from a cash machine.
           + If you need to spend cash when travelling to/working around a
             sensitive location, do not spend the notes taken directly
             from the cash machine (their sequential numbers may be
             logged). Keep a supply of notes received as change elsewhere
             and use those.
           + If you need to buy something when travelling to/working
             around a sensitive location, do not give any loyalty cards or
             personalised money off tokens as part of your purchases -
             they are traceable.

      * Communications -
           + If you need to make a sensitive phone call that must not be
             directly associated with you, do so from a public phone box.
             But beware, if you are associated with the person at the
             other end of the call, and the content of their calls (rather
             than just the data) is being monitored, your location at that
             date and time will be discovered.
           + If using public phone boxes, try to use them randomly across
             an area rather than the ones that are closest to you. Also,
             try to avoid phone boxes on direct transport routes to your
             home or place of work.
           + If you wish to send something sensitive through the post,
             wear gloves to prevent creating fingerprints when
             producing/packing the item, do not lick the envelope or
             stamps to prevent creating a DNA sample, and post it in a
             different location to where you normally post your letters
             (the further the better) using stamps bought on a different
           + If you need to send a sensitive fax, use a copy shop/bureau
             which has a self-service desk.
           + If you desperately need to keep in communication, buy a
             [88]pay-as-you-go mobile phone and only use it for a day or
             two whilst you are engaged in sensitive work.

      * Online -
           + Maintain a number of alternate personas on the Internet that
             give you access to web mail and other services should you
             ever need to use them.
           + If you need to use the Internet, use a [89]cybercafe, but
             make sure that you do not access your own Internet services
             from the cybercafe - use an alternate persona.
           + If you need to view material that you do not wish to be
             associated with as part of the server logs of your Internet
             service provider, use a cybercafe.
           + If you use cybercafes as part of your communications, try not
             to use the same one.
           + If you have a laptop computer, and you wish to mask your
             location, let someone you trust use it online whilst you are
             away on sensitive work.

      * Meetings -
           + When organising a private meeting, if you cannot send details
             to all involved in ways that will not be intercepted always
             try to agree on meeting in one location near to the meeting
             place. You can then direct people to the correct location as
             they arrive. By keeping the location of a private meeting
             limited, you lessen the likelihood of the location being
           + If meeting in the home or building of another person or
             organisation do not make a phone call from their phone to a
             number that is identified with you, or from a public phone
             box near to that building.
           + If the people going to a private meeting are likely to have
             mobile phones, ask them to turn them off before travelling to
             the meeting place (if all the mobile phones of a groups of
             people are in the same cell at the same time on the same day,
             it can be assumed that you have had a meeting).
           + If you require a private meeting place, do not keep using the
             same one. Alternate it as much as possible. Also, if you meet
             in a public place, pick somewhere with a high level of
             background noise, and with as many obstacles or partitions
             around the point where you meet, to prevent your
             conversations being overheard.
           + If you must pay for something whilst having a meeting, use
             cash. Or, if you cannot, get one person to pay. In this way
             you will not generate paper trails linking you together.
           + Meeting in public spaces, streets, in parks, or on public
             transport is not a good idea - many of these areas are
             surveilled by CCTV. But bars, cafes and restaurants tend not
             have their CCTV systems linked to a central control room, and
             what CCTV systems are installed are concentrated around the

    All forms of technical counter surveillance is achieved through the
    use or implementation of Technical Surveillance Counter Measures or
    [90]TSCM. These measures apply equally for the worried individual as
    to the diligent corporation. Corporate Espionage is on the increase,
    and because of this it is an ever increasing threat in day to day life
    and business.

Natural surveillance

    Natural surveillance is a term used in "Crime Prevention Through
    Environmental Practices"([92]CPTED) and "Defensible Space" models for
    crime prevention. These models rely on the ability to influence
    offender decisions preceding [93]criminal acts. [94]Research into
    criminal behavior demonstrates that the decision to offend or not to
    offend is more influenced by cues to the perceived risk of being
    caught than by cues to reward or ease of entry. Consistent with this
    research CPTED based strategies emphasise enhancing the perceived risk
    of detection and apprehension.

    Natural surveillance limits the opportunity for crime by taking steps
    to increase the perception that people can be seen. Natural
    surveillance occurs by designing the placement of physical features,
    activities and people in such a way as to maximize visibility and
    foster positive social interaction. Potential offenders feel increased
    scrutiny and limitations on their escape routes. Natural surveillance
    is typically free of cost however its effectiveness to deter crime
    varies with the individual offender.

    Jane Jacobs, North American editor, urban activist, [95]urban planning
    critic, and author of The Death and Life of Great American Cities
    ([96]1961), formulated the natural surveillance strategy based on her
    work in New York's Greenwich Village. Natural surveillance is
    naturally occurring. As people are moving around an area, they will be
    able to observe what is going on around them, provided the area is
    open and well lit. Supporting a diversity of uses within a [97]public
    space is highly effective. Other ways to promote natural surveillance
    include low landscaping, [98]street lights, street designs that
    encourage pedestrian use, removing hiding and lurking places, and
    placing high risk targets, such as expensive or display items, in
    plain view of legitimate users, such as near a receptionist or sales

    Included in the design are features that maximize visibility of
    people, parking areas and building entrances: doors and [99]windows
    that look out on to streets and parking areas, see-through barriers
    (glass brick walls, picket fences), [100]pedestrian-friendly
    [101]sidewalks and streets, and front porches. Designing nighttime
    lighting is particularly important: uniform high intensity "carpet"
    [102]lighting of large areas is discouraged, especially where lights
    glare into (and discourage) observers eyes. In its place is feature
    lighting that draws the observer's focus to access control points and
    potential hiding areas. Area lighting is still used, but light sources
    are typically placed lower to the ground, at a higher density, and
    with lower intensity and more controlled glare than the lighting it is
    designed to replace.

    Any [103]architectural design that enhances the chance that a
    potential offender will be, or might be, seen is a form of natural
    surveillance. Often, it is not just the fact that the offender might
    be seen that matters. It is that the offender "thinks" they will be
    seen that can help deter the opportunity for [104]crime.

See also

      * [106]ECHELON,
      * [107]Espionage,
      * [108]Information Awareness Office
      * [109]Inverse surveillance
      * [110]Mass surveillance
      * [111]RFID
      * [112]Surveillance aircraft
      * [113]Secure computing
      * [114]Sousveillance
      * [115]The Transparent Society
      * [116]Treaty on Open Skies
      * [117]TSCM



      * [119]David Brin (1998), The Transparent Society New York:
        Addison-Wesley: [120]ISBN 0-201-32802-X
      * [121]Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation; The Death of Privacy in
        the 21st Century. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. [122]ISBN
      * Jacobs, Jane ([123]1961) The Death and Life of Great American
        Cities New York: Random House. [124]ISBN 0-679-60047-7


External links

      * Much of the text of this article is taken from [126]"Living Under
        Surveillance" (http://secdocs.net/manual/lp-sec/scb7.html) written
        by Paul Mobbs for the Association for Progressive Communications,
        which is licensed under the [127]GFDL, and hence can be used in
      * [128]David Brin's web
        site (http://www.kithrup.com/brin/tschp1.html)
      * [129]Surveillance &
        Society (http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/) Free academic
        e-journal on surveillance. Includes resources
      * [130]International Workshop on Inverse
        Surveillance (http://wearcam.org/iwis/).

      * This page was last modified 00:24, 10 Jan 2005.


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  129. http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/
  130. http://wearcam.org/iwis/

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