[Paleopsych] JPSP: Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups
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Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A Sociofunctional
Threat-Based Approach to "Prejudice"
[INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES]
Cottrell, Catherine A.1,2; Neuberg, Steven L.1,3
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Volume 88(5), May 2005, p. 770-789
[This journal is put out by the American Psychological Association, the same
group that publishes _Psychology, Public Policy, and Law_ that featured the
Rushton-Jensen article in its June issue. Thanks to Ted for alterting us to
this article.
[First, some summaries:
Scholars: Prejudice a Complex Mechanism Rooted in the Genes
http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/news/printer.php?id=1041 Posted on:
2005-07-05 19:45:18
A recent study in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
(May 2005) defies longstanding social dogma to suggest that prejudice,
or an aversion to members of different groups, is genetically based
and arose to enable both group and individual survival. Arizona St.
University Professor Steven Neuberg and ASU graduate student Catherine
Cottrell, in Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A
Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to Prejudice, describe their
study of assessments by 235 European-American students at ASU of
possible societal threats posed by nine different groupsactivist
feminists, African-Americans, Asian-Americans, European-Americans,
fundamentalist Christians, gay men, Mexican-Americans, Native
Americans, and nonfundamentalist Christiansand the emotions registered
by the students at perceived threats associated with the different
groups. Rather than undifferentiated hostility to the other, Neuberg
and Cottrell found that different types of threatphysical,
ideological, or healthevoked different emotions (fear, anger,
disgust). Neuberg interprets these nuances as rooted in real threats
that led to an evolutionary response: It was adaptive for our
ancestors to be attuned to those outside the group who posed threats
such as to physical security, health or economic resources, and to
respond to these different kinds of threats in ways tailored to have a
good chance of reducing them. Whether Neuberg and Cottrells findings
will help to root out the calcified prejudices of such citadels of
professed anti-prejudice as the Anti-Defamation League, which
continues to proclaim that Hate is learned, remains to be seen.
References
1. http://www.physorg.com/news4341.html
2. http://www.asu.edu/news/research/prejudicestudy_053105.htm
3. http://content.apa.org/journals/psp/88/5
4. http://www.adl.org/issue_education/hateprejudice/Prejudice2.asp
------------------
Human prejudice in humans has evolved
http://www.physorg.com/news4341.html
5.7.1
Contrary to what most people believe, the tendency to be prejudiced is
a form of common sense, hard-wired into the human brain through
evolution as an adaptive response to protect our prehistoric ancestors
from danger.
So suggests a new study published by ASU researchers in the May issue
of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, which contends
that, because human survival was based on group living, "outsiders"
were viewed as and often were very real threats.
By nature, people are group-living animals a strategy that enhances
individual survival and leads to what we might call a tribal
psychology, says Steven Neuberg, ASU professor of social psychology,
who wrote the study with doctoral student Catherine Cottrell. It was
adaptive for our ancestors to be attuned to those outside the group
who posed threats such as to physical security, health or economic
resources, and to respond to these different kinds of threats in ways
tailored to have a good chance of reducing them.
Unfortunately, says Neuberg, because evolved psychological tendencies
are imperfectly attuned to the existence of dangers, people might
react negatively to groups and their members even when they pose no
realistic threat.
Neuberg and Cottrell had 235 European-American students at ASU think
about nine different groups: activist feminists, African-Americans,
Asian-Americans, European-Americans, fundamentalist Christians, gay
men, Mexican-Americans, Native Americans and nonfundamentalist
Christians. The researchers then had the participants rate these
groups on the threats they pose to American society (e.g., to physical
safety, values, health, etc.) and report the emotions they felt toward
these groups (e.g., fear, anger, disgust, pity, etc.).
Consistent with the researchers hypotheses, findings revealed that
distinct prejudices exist toward different groups of people. Some
groups elicited prejudices characterized largely by fear, others by
disgust, others by anger, and so on. Moreover, the different flavors
of prejudice were associated with different patterns of perceived
threat.
Follow-up work further shows that these different prejudices motivate
inclinations toward different kinds of discrimination, in ways
apparently aimed at reducing the perceived threat.
Groups seen as posing threats to physical safety elicit fear and
self-protective actions, Cottrell says. Groups seen as choosing to
take more than they give elicit anger and inclinations toward
aggression, and groups seen as posing health threats elicit disgust
and the desire to avoid close physical contact.
One important practical implication of this research is that we may
need to create different interventions to reduce inappropriate
prejudices against different groups, Neuberg says.
For example, if one is trying to decrease prejudices among new college
students during freshman orientation, different strategies might be
used for bringing different groups together.
Neuberg and Cottrell are adamant to point out that just because
prejudices are a fundamental and natural part of what makes us human
doesnt mean that learning cant take place and that responses cant be
dampened.
People sometimes assume that, because we say prejudice has evolved
roots, we are saying that specific prejudices cant be changed. Thats
simply not the case, Neuberg says. What we think and feel and how we
behave is typically the result of complex interactions between
biological tendencies and learning experiences. Evolution may have
prepared our minds to be prejudiced, but our environment influences
the specific targets of those prejudices.
Source: Arizona State University
--------------------
ASU News > Human prejudice has evolved, say ASU researchers
http://www.asu.edu/news/research/prejudicestudy_053105.htm
[9]Sharon Keeler, sharon.keeler at asu.edu
(480) 965-4012
June 1, 2005
Human prejudice has evolved, say ASU researchers
Our environment influences the specific targets of those prejudices and how
we act on them
Could it be that the tendency to be prejudiced evolved as an adaptive
response to protect our prehistoric ancestors from danger?
So suggest Arizona State University researchers in a new study in the
"Journal of Personality and Social Psychology," in which they contend
that, because human survival was based on group living, "outsiders"
were viewed as - and often were - very real threats.
"By nature, people are group-living animals - a strategy that enhances
individual survival and leads to what we might call a `tribal
psychology'," says Steven Neuberg, ASU professor of social psychology,
who authored the study with doctoral student Catherine Cottrell. "It
was adaptive for our ancestors to be attuned to those outside the
group who posed threats such as to physical security, health or
economic resources, and to respond to these different kinds of threats
in ways tailored to have a good chance of reducing them."
Unfortunately, says Neuberg, because evolved psychological tendencies
are imperfectly attuned to the existence of dangers, people may react
negatively to groups and their members even when they actually pose no
realistic threat.
Neuberg and Cottrell point out that just because prejudices are a
fundamental and natural part of what makes us human, that doesn't mean
that learning can't take place and that responses can't be dampened.
"People sometimes assume that because we say prejudice has evolved
roots we are saying that specific prejudices can't be changed. That's
simply not the case," Neuberg says. "What we think and feel and how we
behave is typically the result of complex interactions between
biological tendencies and learning experiences. Evolution may have
prepared our minds to be prejudiced, but our environment influences
the specific targets of those prejudices and how we act on them."
For their study, Neuberg and Cottrell had 235 European American
students at ASU think about nine different groups: activist feminists,
African Americans, Asian Americans, European Americans, fundamentalist
Christians, gay men, Mexican Americans, Native Americans and
nonfundamentalist Christians. The researchers then had the
participants rate these groups on the threats they pose to American
society (e.g., to physical safety, values, health, etc.) and report
the emotions they felt toward these groups (e.g., fear, anger,
disgust, pity, etc.).
Consistent with the researchers' hypotheses, findings revealed that
distinct prejudices exist toward different groups of people. Some
groups elicited prejudices characterized largely by fear, others by
disgust, others by anger, and so on. Moreover, the different "flavors"
of prejudice were associated with different patterns of perceived
threat.
Follow-up work further shows that these different prejudices motivate
inclinations toward different kinds of discrimination, in ways
apparently aimed at reducing the perceived threat.
"Groups seen as posing threats to physical safety elicit fear and
self-protective actions, groups seen as choosing to take more than
they give elicit anger and inclinations toward aggression, and groups
seen as posing health threats elicit disgust and the desire to avoid
close physical contact," says Cottrell.
"One important practical implication of this research is that we may
need to create different interventions to reduce inappropriate
prejudices against different groups," says Neuberg.
Keeler, with Marketing & Strategic Communications, can be reached at
(480) 965-4012 or (sharon.keeler at asu.edu).
--------------
PsycARTICLES - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology - Vol 88, Issue 5
http://content.apa.org/journals/psp/88/5
[Other interesting stuff in this issue, so I'll give the summaries. Let me know
if you'd like to get a copy of some specific article.]
1. Counterfactual Thinking and the First Instinct Fallacy.
By Kruger, Justin; Wirtz, Derrick; Miller, Dale T.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
725-735
Most people believe that they should avoid changing their answer when
taking multiple-choice tests. Virtually all research on this topic,
however, has suggested that this strategy is ill-founded: Most answer
changes are from incorrect to correct, and people who change their
answers usually improve their test scores. Why do people believe in
this strategy if the data so strongly refute it? The authors argue
that the belief is in part a product of counterfactual thinking.
Changing an answer when one should have stuck with one's original
answer leads to more "if only . . ." self-recriminations than does
sticking with one's first instinct when one should have switched. As a
consequence, instances of the former are more memorable than instances
of the latter. This differential availability provides individuals
with compelling (albeit illusory) personal evidence for the wisdom of
always following their 1st instinct, with suboptimal test scores the
result.
2. Feeling and Believing: The Influence of Emotion on Trust.
By Dunn, Jennifer R.; Schweitzer, Maurice E.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
736-748
The authors report results from 5 experiments that describe the
influence of emotional states on trust. They found that incidental
emotions significantly influence trust in unrelated settings.
Happiness and gratitude--emotions with positive valence--increase
trust, and anger--an emotion with negative valence--decreases trust.
Specifically, they found that emotions characterized by other-person
control (anger and gratitude) and weak control appraisals (happiness)
influence trust significantly more than emotions characterized by
personal control (pride and guilt) or situational control (sadness).
These findings suggest that emotions are more likely to be
misattributed when the appraisals of the emotion are consistent with
the judgment task than when the appraisals of the emotion are
inconsistent with the judgment task. Emotions do not influence trust
when individuals are aware of the source of their emotions or when
individuals are very familiar with the trustee.
3. Attitude Importance and the Accumulation of Attitude-Relevant
Knowledge in Memory.
By Holbrook, Allyson L.; Berent, Matthew K.; Krosnick, Jon A.; Visser,
Penny S.; Boninger, David S.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
749-769
People who attach personal importance to an attitude are especially
knowledgeable about the attitude object. This article tests an
explanation for this relation: that importance causes the accumulation
of knowledge by inspiring selective exposure to and selective
elaboration of relevant information. Nine studies showed that (a)
after watching televised debates between presidential candidates,
viewers were better able to remember the statements made on policy
issues on which they had more personally important attitudes; (b)
importance motivated selective exposure and selective elaboration:
Greater personal importance was associated with better memory for
relevant information encountered under controlled laboratory
conditions, and manipulations eliminating opportunities for selective
exposure and selective elaboration eliminated the importance-memory
accuracy relation; and (c) people do not use perceptions of their
knowledge volume to infer how important an attitude is to them, but
importance does cause knowledge accumulation.
4. Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A
Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to "Prejudice".
By Cottrell, Catherine A.; Neuberg, Steven L.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
770-789
The authors suggest that the traditional conception of prejudice--as a
general attitude or evaluation--can problematically obscure the rich
texturing of emotions that people feel toward different groups.
Derived from a sociofunctional approach, the authors predicted that
groups believed to pose qualitatively distinct threats to in-group
resources or processes would evoke qualitatively distinct and
functionally relevant emotional reactions. Participants' reactions to
a range of social groups provided a data set unique in the scope of
emotional reactions and threat beliefs explored. As predicted,
different groups elicited different profiles of emotion and threat
reactions, and this diversity was often masked by general measures of
prejudice and threat. Moreover, threat and emotion profiles were
associated with one another in the manner predicted: Specific classes
of threat were linked to specific, functionally relevant emotions, and
groups similar in the threat profiles they elicited were also similar
in the emotion profiles they elicited.
5. Policewomen Acting in Self-Defense: Can Psychological Disengagement
Protect Self-Esteem From the Negative Outcomes of Relative
Deprivation?
By Tougas, Francine; Rinfret, Natalie; Beaton, Ann M.; de la
Sablonnière, Roxane
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
790-800
The role of 2 components of psychological disengagement (discounting
and devaluing) in the relation between personal relative deprivation
and self-esteem was explored in 3 samples of policewomen. Path
analyses conducted with the 3 samples revealed that stronger feelings
of personal relative deprivation resulted in stronger discounting of
work evaluations, which in turn led to devaluing the importance of
police work. A negative relation between discounting and self-esteem
was observed in all samples. Other related outcomes of disengagement,
professional withdrawal and stress, were also evaluated.
6. Self-Esteem and Favoritism Toward Novel In-Groups: The Self as an
Evaluative Base.
By Gramzow, Richard H.; Gaertner, Lowell
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
801-815
The self-as-evaluative base (SEB) hypothesis proposes that
self-evaluation extends automatically via an amotivated consistency
process to affect evaluation of novel in-groups. Four minimal group
studies support SEB. Personal trait self-esteem (PSE) predicted
increased favoritism toward a novel in-group that, objectively, was
equivalent to the out-group (Study 1). This association was
independent of information-processing effects (Study 1), collective
self-esteem, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and narcissism
(Studies 2 and 3). A self-affirmation manipulation attenuated the
association between in-group favoritism and an individual difference
associated with motivated social identity concerns (RWA) but did not
alter the PSE effect (Study 3). Finally, the association between PSE
and in-group favoritism remained positive even when the in-group was
objectively less favorable than the out-group (Study 4).
7. Having an Open Mind: The Impact of Openness to Experience on
Interracial Attitudes and Impression Formation.
By Flynn, Francis J.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
816-826
This article considers how Openness to Experience may mitigate the
negative stereotyping of Black people by White perceivers. As
expected, White individuals who scored relatively high on Openness to
Experience exhibited less prejudice according to self-report measures
of explicit racial attitudes. Further, White participants who rated
themselves higher on Openness to Experience formed more favorable
impressions of a fictitious Black individual. Finally, after observing
informal interviews of White and Black targets, White participants who
were more open formed more positive impressions of Black interviewees,
particularly on dimensions that correspond to negative racial
stereotypes. The effect of Openness to Experience was relatively
stronger for judgments of Black interviewees than for judgments of
White interviewees. Taken together these findings suggest that
explicit racial attitudes and impression formation may depend on the
individual characteristics of the perceiver, particularly whether she
or he is predisposed to consider stereotype-disconfirming information.
8. Resilience to Loss in Bereaved Spouses, Bereaved Parents, and
Bereaved Gay Men.
By Bonanno, George A.; Moskowitz, Judith Tedlie; Papa, Anthony;
Folkman, Susan
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
827-843
Recent research has indicated that many people faced with highly
aversive events suffer only minor, transient disruptions in
functioning and retain a capacity for positive affect and experiences.
This article reports 2 studies that replicate and extend these
findings among bereaved parents, spouses, and caregivers of a
chronically ill life partner using a range of self-report and
objective measures of adjustment. Resilience was evidenced in half of
each bereaved sample when compared with matched, nonbereaved
counterparts and 36% of the caregiver sample in a more conservative,
repeated-measures ipsative comparison. Resilient individuals were not
distinguished by the quality of their relationship with spouse/partner
or caregiver burden but were rated more positively and as better
adjusted by close friend.
9. Gender Similarities and Differences in Children's Social Behavior:
Finding Personality in Contextualized Patterns of Adaptation.
By Zakriski, Audrey L.; Wright, Jack C.; Underwood, Marion K.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
844-855
This research examined how a contextualist approach to personality can
reveal social interactional patterns that are obscured by gender
comparisons of overall behavior rates. For some behaviors (verbal
aggression), girls and boys differed both in their responses to social
events and in how often they encountered them, yet they did not differ
in overall behavior rates. For other behaviors (prosocial), gender
differences in overall rates were observed, yet girls and boys
differed more in their social environments than in their responses to
events. The results question the assumption that meaningful
personality differences must be manifested in overall act trends and
illustrate how gender differences in personality can be conceptualized
as patterns of social adaptation that are complex and context
specific.
10. The Factor Structure of Greek Personality Adjectives.
By Saucier, Gerard; Georgiades, Stelios; Tsaousis, Ioannis; Goldberg,
Lewis R.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2005 May Vol 88(5)
856-875
Personality descriptors--3,302 adjectives--were extracted from a
dictionary of the modern Greek language. Those terms with the highest
frequency were administered to large samples in Greece to test the
universality of the Big-Five dimensions of personality in comparison
to alternative models. One- and 2-factor structures were the most
stable across variable selections and subsamples and replicated such
structures found in previous studies. Among models with more moderate
levels of replication, recently proposed 6- and 7-lexical-factor
models were approximately as well replicated as the Big Five. An emic
6-factor structure showed relative stability; these factors were
labeled Negative-Valence/Honesty, Agreeableness/Positive Affect,
Prowess/Heroism, Introversion/Melancholia, Even Temper, and
Conscientiousness.
----------------------------
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Volume 88(5), May 2005, p. 770-789
Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A Sociofunctional
Threat-Based Approach to “Prejudice”
[INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES]
Cottrell, Catherine A.1,2; Neuberg, Steven L.1,3
1Department of Psychology, Arizona State University.
2 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Catherine A.
Cottrell, Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ
85287-1104. E-mail: catherine.cottrell at asu.edu
3 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Steven L.
Neuberg, Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ
85287-1104. E-mail: steven.neuberg at asu.edu
Outline
* Abstract
* A Sociofunctional Approach
* The Goal Relevance of Discrete Emotions
* From Group-Relevant Threats to Discrete Emotions
* Hypotheses
* Other Contemporary Emotion- and Threat-Based Approaches to Prejudice
* Method
* Participants
* Procedure
* Measures
* Affective Reactions
* Threat Perceptions
* Results
* Composite Scores and Difference Scores
* Tests of Hypotheses
* Hypothesis 1: Different Groups Can Evoke Qualitatively Different
Profiles of Emotional Reactions
* Hypothesis 2: Measures of Prejudice as Traditionally Conceived Will
Often Mask the Variation Across Groups in Evoked Emotion Profiles
* Hypothesis 3: Different Groups Can Evoke Qualitatively Different
Profiles of Perceived Threats
* Hypothesis 4: General Measures of Threat Will Often Mask the Variation
Across Groups in Evoked Threat Profiles
* Hypothesis 5: Profiles of the Specific Threats Posed by Different
Groups Will Reliably and Systematically Predict the Emotion Profiles Evoked by
These Groups
* Multiple regression approach
* Cluster analytic approach
* Discussion
* Contributions of the Present Data
* Related Theoretical Perspectives
* Specificity of Emotion, Specificity of Threat
* Alternative Appraisal Theories
* Theoretical Breadth
* Closing Remarks
* References
We offer special thanks to Terrilee Asher and the members of the Friday
afternoon research seminar for their contributions to the early development of
these ideas, and to Eliot Smith, Jon Maner, Aaron Taylor, and Amy Cuddy for
their helpful suggestions and comments on previous versions of this article.
Received Date: January 9, 2004; Revised Date: August 3, 2004; Accepted Date:
September 15, 2004
Abstract <http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
The authors suggest that the traditional conception of prejudice—as a general
attitude or evaluation—can problematically obscure the rich texturing of
emotions that people feel toward different groups. Derived from a
sociofunctional approach, the authors predicted that groups believed to pose
qualitatively distinct threats to in-group resources or processes would evoke
qualitatively distinct and functionally relevant emotional reactions.
Participants' reactions to a range of social groups provided a data set unique
in the scope of emotional reactions and threat beliefs explored. As predicted,
different groups elicited different profiles of emotion and threat reactions,
and this diversity was often masked by general measures of prejudice and
threat. Moreover, threat and emotion profiles were associated with one another
in the manner predicted: Specific classes of threat were linked to specific,
functionally relevant emotions, and groups similar in the threat profiles they
elicited were also similar in the emotion profiles they elicited.
Jews are shrewd, religious, and wealthy. African Americans are noisy, athletic,
and “have an attitude.” Italians are loyal to family, loud, and tradition
loving. And the Irish are talkative, happy-go-lucky, and quick tempered. These
stereotypes, recently endorsed by American college students (Madon et al., 2001
), straightforwardly demonstrate that people hold different beliefs about
different groups. Researchers have long recognized this and have been
documenting since the 1930s the diversity of stereotypes used to describe
different groups (e.g., Devine & Elliot, 1995; Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman,
& Walters, 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933; Niemann, Jennings, Rozelle, Baxter, &
Sullivan, 1994).
Researchers have seemingly been less interested, however, in the diversity of
people's feelings toward different groups. Although Allport (1954) noted that
negative prejudice can include specific “feelings of scorn or dislike, of fear
or aversion” (p. 7), his own theorizing focused more on his macroscopic
characterization of negative prejudice as an unfavorable feeling toward a group
and its members. This latter conceptualization of prejudice, as a general
attitude or evaluation, has long dominated the research literature and has been
the focus of most theoretical and empirical approaches designed to explicate
the origins, operations, and implications of intergroup feelings (for a review,
see Brewer & Brown, 1998 ). As useful as this global view of prejudice has
been, we believe there is great value in contemplating seriously Allport's more
textured observation—that just as people may hold qualitatively distinct
beliefs about different groups, they may feel qualitatively distinct emotions
toward different groups.
A small set of researchers has begun to explore this possibility (e.g., Brewer
& Alexander, 2002; Dijker, 1987; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Fiske, Cuddy,
Glick, & Xu, 2002; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000 ); we review their approaches
below. Our own belief in the importance of understanding the textured emotional
reactions people have toward members of other groups emerges as an implication
of a broader “sociofunctional” approach we have been developing to better
account for a range of intragroup and intergroup phenomena (e.g., Neuberg,
Smith, & Asher, 2000).1
To anticipate our argument, we suggest that the specific feelings people have
toward members of other groups should depend on the specific tangible threats
they see these other groups as posing: From qualitatively different threats
should emerge qualitatively different, and functionally relevant, emotions.
From this perspective, the concept of prejudice as general attitude is
inherently problematic: Because the traditional prejudice construct aggregates
across qualitatively different emotional reactions (e.g., anger, fear, disgust,
pity, admiration, guilt)—each with its often distinct eliciting conditions,
phenomenologies, facial expressions, neurologic structures, physiological
patterns, and correlated behavioral propensities—it may obscure the rich
texturing of emotional reactions people have toward different groups.
Consequently, an exclusive focus on this traditional conceptualization of
prejudice is likely to hinder the development of effective theory and practical
intervention.
A Sociofunctional Approach <http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
By their nature, people are group-living animals. According to many
anthropologists, environmental challenges present in our evolutionary past
propelled ancestral humans toward life in highly interdependent and cooperative
groups (e.g., Leakey & Lewin, 1977). This “ultrasociality” (Campbell, 1982),
“hypersociality” (Richerson & Boyd, 1995), or “obligatory interdependence”
(Brewer, 2001 ) likely evolved as a means to maximize individual success: An
individual was presumably able to gain more essential resources (e.g., food,
water, shelter, mates) and achieve more important goals (e.g., child rearing,
self-protection) by living and working with other individuals in the context of
a group compared with living and working by oneself. Interdependent group
living, then, can be seen as an adaptation—perhaps the most important
adaptation (Barchas, 1986; Brewer, 1997; Brewer & Caporael, 1990; Leakey, 1978
)—“designed” to protect the human individual from the environment's many
dangers while also supporting the effective exploitation of the environment's
many opportunities.2
Group life has its costs, however (e.g., R. D. Alexander, 1974; Dunbar, 1988 ).
For instance, group living surrounds one with individuals able to physically
harm fellow group members, to spread contagious disease, or to “free ride” on
their efforts. A commitment to sociality thus carries a risk: If threats such
as these are left unchecked, the costs of sociality will quickly exceed its
benefits. Thus, to maximize the returns on group living, individual group
members should be attuned to others' features or behaviors that characterize
them as potential threats.
We note two distinct levels at which group members may threaten each other. The
benefits of group living depend not merely on the presence of others but on the
effective coordination of these individuals into a well-functioning group.
Individual group members should thus be attuned not only to those features and
behaviors of others that heuristically characterize them as direct threats to
one's personal success but also to those features and behaviors of others that
heuristically characterize them as threats to group success, which are our
focus here. This latter sensitivity to group-directed threats should be
especially acute for those highly invested in, and dependent on, their groups.
What events signal to individuals that the functioning of their group may be
compromised? Because groups enhance individual success by providing members
with valuable resources, members should be attuned to potential threats to
group-level resources such as territory, physical security, property, economic
standing, and the like. They should also be attuned to those group structures
and processes that support the group's operational integrity—to those
structures and processes that encourage effective and efficient group
operations. Effective groups tend to possess strong norms of reciprocity, trust
among members, systems of effective communication, authority structures for
organizing individual effort and distributing group resources, common values,
mechanisms for effectively educating and socializing members, members with
strong in-group social identities, and the like (e.g., Brown, 1991 ).
Individual group members should thus be especially attuned to potential threats
to reciprocity (because others are either unwilling or unable to reciprocate),
trust, value systems, socialization processes, authority structures, and so on
(Neuberg et al., 2000 ). Finally, mere attunement to threats cannot be enough:
Vigilance must be accompanied by psychological responses that function to
minimize—or even eliminate—recognized threats and their detrimental effects.
In sum, the sociofunctional approach is based on three simple, but fundamental,
propositions: (a) Humans evolved as highly interdependent social beings; (b)
effectively functioning groups tend to possess particular social structures and
processes; and (c) individuals possess psychological mechanisms “designed” by
biological and cultural evolution to take advantage of the opportunities
provided by group living and to protect themselves from threats to group
living. Ongoing research has used this approach to successfully predict the
traits people most value for members of different social groups and the
impressions of themselves they most want to present to others, to generate
hypotheses regarding the nature of gossip and other forms of communicated
social information, and to motivate explorations of similarities in formal
systems of social control across religious and criminal justice systems (e.g.,
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2004; Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2003; Neuberg & Story, 2003
). Here we use the sociofunctional approach, in conjunction with theory and
empirical findings on the goal-relevance of discrete emotions, to generate
specific predictions about the threat-driven nature of intergroup affect.
The Goal Relevance of Discrete Emotions
Emotions are critical to the natural goal-seeking process. They signal the
presence of circumstances that threaten or profit important goals (e.g., Carver
& Scheier, 1990; Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Higgins, 1987; Simon, 1967) and direct
and energize behavior toward the remediation of such threats or the
exploitation of such benefits (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Ekman, 1999;
Nesse, 1990; Plutchik, 1980, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990 ). Emotions organize
and coordinate ongoing psychological action (e.g., attention, motivation,
memory, behavioral inclinations) so that people might respond more effectively
to events related to individual survival and success.
There is a functional specificity to the emotional system: Different events
evoke different emotions. A shadowy figure quickly emerging from a dark alley—a
problem related to personal security—elicits fear, whereas the theft of one's
car—a problem related to personal resources—elicits anger. Moreover, distinct
emotions are affiliated with specific physiological, cognitive, and behavioral
tendencies, all of which operate to facilitate resolution of the problem. For
example, the fear felt toward the unfamiliar figure triggers psychological and
physical activity aimed at promoting escape from the potentially threatening
situation, whereas the anger felt toward the property thief triggers activity
aimed at promoting retrieval of the lost goods.
Emotions researchers have theorized about the perceived stimulus event classes
that elicit qualitatively distinct emotions and action tendencies (e.g., Ekman
& Friesen, 1975; Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Nesse, 1990;
Plutchik, 1980) and have arrived at some consensus. Table 1 highlights the
links among perceived stimulus event classes, discrete emotions, action
tendencies, and resulting functional outcomes for an illustrative set of
emotions. For example, perceiving the obstruction of valuable goals or the
taking of valuable resources produces anger and a tendency to aggress,
perceiving physical or moral contamination produces disgust and a tendency to
expel the contaminated object or idea, and perceiving a threat to physical
safety produces fear and a tendency to flee. These first three emotions—anger,
disgust, and fear—are often considered basic emotions, shaped by natural
selection to automatically address recurrent survival-related problems (Ekman,
1999).
Table 1 An Evolutionary Approach to Emotions
Pity, envy, and guilt, on the other hand, involve more complex cognitive
appraisals of social situations. These emotional reactions nonetheless progress
the individual toward important adaptive outcomes. Pity (as part of the
sympathy family of emotions) is hypothesized to be an important emotional
response involved in the regulation of the human altruistic system (Trivers,
1971 ), because it may motivate prosocial behavior toward others who are
temporarily disadvantaged for reasons beyond their control, thereby generating
gratitude from the recipient and subsequent reciprocity of the assistance back
to the helper in the future. Envy results from feelings of being deprived of
valuable resources possessed by another and produces a tendency to obtain the
desired objects (Lazarus, 1991; Parrott, 1991 ), thereby encouraging
individuals to pursue limited important resources. Guilt is produced by the
belief that one has engaged in a moral transgression that has harmed another
(especially a perceived in-group member) and elicits an inclination toward
reconciliatory behavior (Lazarus, 1991 ). Like pity, guilt may also be
important to the maintenance of reciprocal relations: Guilt may motivate the
wrongdoer to compensate for the harm caused and to follow appropriate rules of
reciprocal exchange in the future (Trivers, 1971).
From Group-Relevant Threats to Discrete Emotions
The more basic, “lower brain” emotions did not evolve for the purpose of
helping humans manage the threats and opportunities of sociality. Although one
must be wary of attributing emotional states to other animals, fear, anger, and
disgust, for example, appear to exist in creatures with an evolutionary history
much longer than humans' and in species that are barely social (e.g., Izard,
1978; Öhman, 1993; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993 ). Evolution, however, often
exploits existing adaptations for other purposes. For example, the infant
attachment system may have been co-opted by natural selection to encourage
romantic attachment between mates and thus enhance the survival and success of
offspring (Shaver, Hazan, & Bradshaw, 1988 ). Because humans have long been
ultrasocial, these valuable emotion-based psychological mechanisms likely
became used by natural selection for the additional purpose of helping people
protect valuable group resources and maintain the integrity of critical social
structures and processes. Just as the theft of an individual's property will
evoke anger, so too should the theft of a group's property—particularly among
those group members highly invested in and dependent on the group.
Other emotions, in contrast, may have indeed evolved to help social animals
manage the complexities of the repeated, relatively stable interdependence that
characterizes social life. For instance, unlike fear, anger, and disgust, the
emotions of pity, guilt, empathy, embarrassment, and shame are inherently
social and have as cognitive antecedents relatively complex appraisals that
explicitly involve actual, imagined, or implied others (e.g., Lewis, 1993 ).
Although these emotions likely evolved in the service of managing dyadic social
relations, they too may have been easily exploited by natural selection for the
additional purpose of managing group and intergroup relations.
Because human sociality developed to help individuals gain important tangible
resources (e.g., food, shelter, mates), we expect individuals to be most
attuned to threats to in-group success when there are tangible outcomes at
stake. These emotion-based psychological systems should therefore operate most
powerfully within interactions between groups perceived to be mutually
interdependent, that is, cooperating or competing to obtain valued tangible
outcomes (e.g., as in interactions between White and Black Americans). These
threat-emotion systems may operate less prominently within interactions between
groups defined primarily by divergent identities alone (e.g., interactions
between Honda and Toyota owners).
Integrating, then, the emotions research summarized in Table 1 and our
understanding of the fundamental structures and processes underlying effective
group operation, we have generated explicit predictions regarding the links
between specific threats to the effective functioning of groups (and the more
general classes of threat they represent) and the specific emotions they evoke;
we present the predictions emerging from this threat-based appraisal framework
in Table 2.
Table 2 Hypothesized Theoretical Connections Between Perceived Threats to the
In-Group and Elicited Primary and Secondary Emotions
Anger is elicited when people confront obstacles and barriers to their desired
outcomes, suggesting that intergroup anger is likely to occur when an out-group
is seen to gain in-group economic resources (e.g., jobs), seize or damage
in-group physical property (e.g., homes), diminish the freedoms and rights
provided to in-group members, choose not to fulfill reciprocal relations with
the in-group, interfere with established in-group norms and social
coordination, or betray the in-group's trust. As indicated in Table 2 , this
anger may then spur individuals to engage in functionally appropriate
aggressive behaviors aimed at removing the specific perceived obstacle.
Moreover, because all intergroup threats, in the most basic sense, obstruct a
desired outcome (e.g., physical safety, good health, rewarding reciprocal
relations), we hypothesize that anger may be a secondary emotional reaction to
an out-group perceived to carry a contagious physical illness, promote values
opposing those of the in-group, endanger the in-group's physical safety,
neglect a reciprocity-based relationship because of inability, or threaten the
in-group's moral standing. Whether immediate or subsequent, then, we suggest
that anger will accompany nearly all perceptions of out-group threat (Neuberg &
Cottrell, 2002).
Disgust is elicited when people encounter a physical or moral contaminant,
suggesting that intergroup disgust is likely to occur when an out-group is
thought to carry a contagious and harmful physical illness or when an out-group
promotes values and ideals that oppose those of the in-group. This disgust may
then motivate qualitatively distinct actions aimed at minimizing the physical
or moral contamination. Because threats to personal freedoms and reciprocity
relations (by choice) imply that an out-group may promote values that oppose
those of the in-group, we hypothesize that disgust may be a secondary emotional
reaction to an out-group seen to intentionally limit the in-group's personal
freedoms or violate the rules of reciprocal exchange.
Fear (and its associated tendencies toward self-protective behavior) should
predominate when others are perceived to threaten the group's physical safety.
We furthermore hypothesize that fear may be a secondary emotional reaction to
an out-group perceived to obtain in-group economic resources, seize or damage
in-group property, interfere with in-group social coordination, or betray trust
relations with the in-group, because each of these obstacle threats signals
potential uncertainty for future well-being. Because physical and moral
contamination may also heighten insecurity about the future well-being of
in-group members (especially susceptible individuals), fear may also be
elicited secondarily by perceived threats to group health or group values.
Pity should predominate when others, particularly those potentially existing
within an extended in-group, are distressed because they are unable to maintain
a reciprocity-based relationship for reasons outside their control (i.e.,
inability); this may impel prosocial behavior focused on increasing the
likelihood that others may be able to meet reciprocity-based obligations in the
future. In addition, pity may occur as a secondary emotional reaction to a
perceived threat to group health if the diseased others are not held
responsible for contracting or passing along their affliction (e.g., Dijker,
Kok, & Koomen, 1996; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).
Guilt should predominate when an out-group, suffering because of actions of the
perceiver's group, is believed to threaten the moral standing of the
perceiver's group. After committing such image-damaging moral transgressions,
individuals may then behave in ways to validate the in-group's position as good
and moral (e.g., Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Lickel, Schmader, &
Barquissau, 2004 ). Finally, envy should occur as a secondary emotional
reaction to others who acquire the in-group's economic resources, because these
others now possess a desirable object or opportunity that the in-group lacks.
Hypotheses <http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
From the above considerations we have derived five general hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Different groups can evoke qualitatively different profiles of
emotional reactions.
To the extent that different groups can be seen to pose different patterns of
threats—see below—they should evoke different profiles of emotional reactions.3
Hypothesis 2: Measures of prejudice as traditionally conceived will often mask
the variation across groups in evoked emotion profiles.
Because of its conceptualization as a general attitude or evaluation, the
traditional measurement of prejudice can obscure the qualitatively distinct
emotional responses people have to different groups. This hypothesis will be
supported if different groups elicit similar levels of general prejudice but
distinct emotion profiles.
Hypothesis 3: Different groups can evoke qualitatively different profiles of
perceived threats.
Different groups may be perceived to threaten group-level resources and group
integrity in different, and multiple, ways: Some may seize our territory and
advocate values and principles incompatible with those we cherish; others may
carry infectious diseases and fail to contribute their share to the common
good. Such groups should elicit distinct threat profiles.
Hypothesis 4: General measures of perceived threat will often mask the
variation across groups in evoked threat profiles.
Just as general measures of prejudice may obscure differentiated emotional
reactions to groups, general measures of perceived threat may conceal
differentiated threats ostensibly posed by different groups. This hypothesis
will be supported if different groups elicit similar levels of general threat
but distinct threat profiles.
Hypothesis 5: Profiles of the specific threats posed by different groups will
reliably and systematically predict the emotion profiles evoked by these
groups.
If our analysis is correct, profiles of emotional reactions should emerge
naturally from profiles of threat perceptions, as articulated in Table 2. This
hypothesis will be supported if we can demonstrate a systematic link between
the observed threat and emotion profiles.
Other Contemporary Emotion- and Threat-Based Approaches to Prejudice
We are not alone in recognizing the importance of moving beyond the traditional
view of prejudice as a general attitude (for a review, see Mackie & Smith,
2002). Moreover, others have explicitly explored the concept of intergroup
threat to tangible resources (e.g., LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966;
Stephan & Renfro, 2002 ). We briefly review these alternative approaches to
clarify important points of overlap with our sociofunctional approach as well
as to highlight some of the unique contributions made by the current research.
Esses and her colleagues (Esses & Dovidio, 2002; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993;
Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993 ) have assessed the discrete emotional reactions
(e.g., fear, anger, disgust), stereotypes (e.g., friendly, lazy), symbolic
beliefs (e.g., “promote religious values,” “block family values”), and general
attitudes (i.e., prejudice) associated with assorted ethnic and social groups
(e.g., French Canadians, Blacks, homosexuals). To explore the associations
among these constructs for each group, these researchers combined the valence
and frequency of each reaction to create a single, aggregate indicator for each
construct. Although an appropriate strategy given their theoretical interests,
such aggregations precluded the possibility of assessing within their samples
whether prejudice (as a general attitude) obscured the presence of differing
emotion profiles for their different target groups and whether aggregated
symbolic beliefs (constituting, perhaps, one form of threat) obscured the
presence of differing symbolic threat profiles for their different target
groups. Thus, although their data are potentially useful for exploring
Hypotheses 1 and 2, in particular, and Hypotheses 3–5 to a substantially lesser
extent, their analyses do not provide such tests.
In an examination of prejudice against ethnic out-groups, Dijker and his
colleagues (Dijker, 1987; Dijker, Koomen, van den Heuvel, & Frijda, 1996 )
assessed the emotional reactions native Dutch people experience toward
different ethnic minorities (e.g., Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan
immigrants). They, too, aggregated over discrete emotions to create, on the
basis of exploratory factor analyses, four affect categories (i.e., positive
mood, anxiety, irritation, concern). Despite this partial aggregation—and the
difficulty it causes for rigorously testing Hypothesis 1—their findings
nonetheless suggest the importance of considering specific emotions when
exploring intergroup affect (e.g., Surinamese, but not Turks or Moroccans,
evoked anxiety). Moreover, their data also suggest that certain threats may be
more strongly associated with some emotional responses than others (e.g., the
perception of danger was associated with anxiety more often than with
irritation or worry), a finding consistent with Hypothesis 5. Thus, although
far from a systematic and thorough test of our hypotheses, Dijker and
colleagues' findings do lend them some support.
The stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick,
1999 ) posits that people experience distinct emotions toward groups perceived
to differ on the dimensions of warmth and competence—pity toward high-warmth
but low-competence groups, envy toward low-warmth but high-competence groups,
admiration toward high-warmth and high-competence groups, and contempt toward
low-warmth and low-competence groups. With respect to numerous ethnic,
political, religious, and social groups within America, these researchers did
indeed observe the predicted differentiated emotional reactions to groups,
consistent with Hypothesis 1. We note, however, that (a) their four emotion
clusters aggregate across emotions typically believed to be discrete (e.g.,
anger and disgust are both in the cluster labeled “contempt”), (b) other
fundamental emotions (for example, fear) were never analyzed because they
failed to fit cleanly into one of these four empirically driven clusters, and
(c) the categorical nature of their framework (and accompanying analysis
strategy) does not suggest the conceptual possibility that different groups
elicit multiple emotions in different configurations (i.e., emotion profiles).
As a consequence, the findings from this approach likely underestimate the
diversity of emotional reactions people have to different groups; we present
evidence suggesting this very point below. Moreover, the aims of these
researchers were different than ours, and so we are not able to use their data
to test our Hypotheses 2–5.
Intergroup emotions theory (IET; Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002; E. R.
Smith, 1993, 1999; Mackie et al., 2000 ) arises from the melding of social
identity and self-categorization theories, on the one hand, with appraisal
theories of emotions, on the other. As with our approach, IET posits that
people experience a diversity of discrete intergroup emotions toward different
groups. In particular, when social identities are salient, individuals
interpret situations in terms of harm or benefit for one's own group and
experience specific emotions as suggested by assorted appraisal theories of
emotion (they cite Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988; C. A. Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985 ). The predictions generated from IET will overlap with the
predictions derived from our own framework to the extent that it uses a
similar, functionally grounded theory of discrete emotions (which it appears to
do) and a similar threat-based appraisal system (which is unclear); indeed, we
suspect that the five hypotheses proposed here would be seen by IET proponents
as consistent with that approach. Empirically, however, E. R. Smith, Mackie,
and their colleagues (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993,
1999; Mackie et al., 2000 ) have limited their explorations to the emotions of
anger and fear, within the context of having experimental participants imagine
interacting with groups designed to differ in the strength of threat they posed
to participant in-groups (e.g., individuals valuing social order vs. freedom;
fellow students at one's university). To this point, then, the data generated
by IET researchers do not test our Hypotheses 1–4 and provide only a partial
test of Hypothesis 5.
According to image theory (M. G. Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999; Brewer &
Alexander, 2002 ), specific configurations of appraisals on the dimensions of
intergroup competition, power, and status give rise to differentiated emotional
reactions (e.g., anger, fear, envy), cognitive images (e.g., out-group as
enemy, barbarian, or imperialist), and action tendencies (e.g., attack, defend,
rebel). This perspective is compatible with ours in its aim to link specific
threats to specific emotions, although image theory focuses more on the
sociostructural relations from which different threats and opportunities
emerge, whereas we focus more on particular threats and opportunities per se.
Recent empirical work examining relations among White and Black American high
school students supports the image theory notion that differentiated emotional
reactions are indeed associated with different out-group images (Brewer &
Alexander, 2002 ). The findings of these researchers are thus compatible with
our Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5, although we note that their categorical scheme,
like that of stereotype content theory, does not straightforwardly account for
the possibility that different groups elicit multiple emotions in different
configurations (i.e., that they may elicit different emotion profiles).
Finally, the revised integrated threat theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002 )
emphasizes the importance of threat for understanding prejudice. Revised
integrated threat theory posits that four umbrella categories of
constructs—realistic threats to the in-group, symbolic threats to the in-group,
realistic threats to the individual, and symbolic threats to the
individual—cause negative psychological (e.g., prejudice) and behavioral (e.g.,
aggression) reactions to groups thought to pose such threats. This perspective
focuses on a relatively small number of tangible threats, however, and like
realistic conflict theories before it (e.g., LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif,
1966 ) makes no claims as to how different specific threats would elicit
distinct, specific emotions. Thus, the data generated by this approach are
potentially relevant only to our Hypothesis 3.
Thus, although there exist clear points of convergence between our
sociofunctional approach and these other perspectives, the points of divergence
are also significant; we further compare the alternative approaches below.
Moreover, note that none of the empirical work emerging from these approaches
has explicitly tested Hypotheses 2 and 4—that general measures of prejudice and
threat may actually mask across-group differences in emotion and threat
profiles—or has tested Hypotheses 3 and 5 in a comprehensive manner.
To test our hypotheses and to provide a uniquely rich data set useful for
beginning the process of empirically differentiating among approaches, we
presented participants with an assortment of ethnic, religious, and ideological
groups within the United States and inquired about (a) the specific emotional
reactions they have toward these groups, (b) the general feeling (i.e.,
prejudice) they have toward these groups, (c) the specific threats they
perceive these groups as posing, and (d) the general threat they perceive these
groups as posing. We predicted that different groups would elicit different
profiles of discrete emotions and threats (Hypotheses 1 and 3); that
differentiations among these emotion and threat profiles would often be
effectively masked by simple valence-based measures of prejudice and threat
(Hypotheses 2 and 4); and that there would be systematic, functional links
between specific threats and specific emotions, as articulated in Table 2
(Hypothesis 5).
Two hundred thirty-five European American undergraduate students participated.
They were, on average, 20.60 years old (SD = 3.53), predominantly female (63%),
and self-identified as mainstream Christian (51%). The majority (64%) were
recruited from upper division psychology classes and received extra credit in
exchange for their participation. The remainder were recruited from the
introductory psychology subject pool and received required course credit in
exchange for their participation.
Participants from upper division psychology courses completed the questionnaire
packets out of the classroom, on their own time. Questionnaire packets were
distributed to the introductory psychology participants in small groups in the
laboratory; they completed the items at their own pace. Presentation of the
affective response and threat perception items for each group was
counterbalanced across all participants.
Presented in one of 10 random orders, participants rated a set of nine groups:
activist feminists, African Americans, Asian Americans, European Americans,
fundamentalist Christians, gay men, Mexican Americans, Native Americans, and
nonfundamentalist Christians. Because we expected few threats and little
threat-related emotion to be associated with one's own groups, the
participants' ethnic in-group (European Americans) and modal religious in-group
(nonfundamentalist Christians) were included to serve as baselines for
comparison with the other groups. We selected the additional target groups
because (a) our European American participants in the American Southwest likely
perceive themselves to be involved with these groups in mutually interdependent
relationships involving tangible outcomes, and (b) common stereotypes suggest
that these groups might be seen to pose a range of different threats—a
requirement if we were to appropriately test our hypotheses. To wit, we
suspected that activist feminists, fundamentalist Christians, and gay men would
be seen as threatening the values and personal freedoms of our student sample
and in somewhat different ways; that gay men would be seen as posing a threat
to health (via a perceived association with HIV/AIDS); that Asian Americans
would be seen as posing an economic threat; that African Americans and Mexican
Americans would be viewed as posing physical safety, property, and reciprocity
(by choice and inability) threats; and that Native Americans would be viewed as
posing threats to reciprocity (by inability). Note that the test of our
hypotheses does not depend on whether we are correct in the above presumptions
of which groups are associated with particular threats. Indeed, we could be
entirely wrong in the threats we expect each group to pose but receive perfect
support for our hypotheses—if the emotions elicited by a group are those that
map as predicted onto the threats that group is actually perceived by our
participants to pose. However, we were confident—on the basis of past research
(e.g., Cottrell, Neuberg, & Asher, 2004; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Esses &
Dovidio, 2002; Haddock et al., 1993; Haddock & Zanna, 1994; Hurh & Kim, 1989;
Yee, 1992 )—that the collection of groups selected would provide enough
variation in perceived threats to enable an adequate test of our hypotheses.
To assess affective responses to the selected groups, participants reported the
extent to which they experienced each feeling when thinking about a particular
group and its members (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely ). To assess overall
positive evaluation, participants reported the degree to which they liked and
felt positive toward each group; to assess overall negative evaluation,
participants reported the extent to which they disliked and felt negative
toward each group. In addition, we measured 13 emotional reactions with two
items each. Some of these emotions were selected because of their
straightforward relevance to our theory (see Table 2 )—anger, disgust, fear,
pity, envy, and guilt—or because they were longer lasting but less intense
instantiations of these (i.e., resentment, anxiety). Others were included
merely to provide participants with a broader emotional judgment context (i.e.,
respect, happiness, hurt, sadness, pride, security, and sympathy). All
participants completed these affective response items in the same random order
for all groups.
Threat Perceptions <http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
To assess perceived threats associated with the selected groups, participants
indicated the extent to which they agreed with statements regarding the general
and specific threats that each group poses to American citizens and society (1
= Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree ). To assess general threat,
participants reported the extent to which each group was dangerous and posed a
threat to American citizens. To assess specific threats relevant to our
sociofunctional approach (see Table 2 ), participants reported the extent to
which they believed the target group threatened jobs and economic
opportunities, threatened personal possessions, threatened personal rights and
freedoms, violated reciprocity relations by choice, threatened social
coordination and functioning, violated trust, threatened physical health, held
values inconsistent with those of the in-group, endangered physical safety, and
violated reciprocity relations because of a lack of ability.4 Two items were
included to measure each of these 10 threats. All participants completed the 2
general threat items followed by the 20 specific threat items in a random
arrangement.
Composite Scores and Difference Scores
As described, all participants completed two items designed to assess each
emotion and threat construct. These a priori item pairs correlated highly with
one another (all r s > .70), and so we averaged them to create composite scores
for each general and specific affective response and for each general and
specific threat perceived. Although it is not uncommon for researchers to
further aggregate such data on the basis of exploratory factor analyses, we
have chosen not to do so on technical and theoretical grounds. Technically,
because exploratory factor analysis is a data-driven approach, it runs the risk
of capitalizing on chance characteristics in the data and creating unstable and
incoherent factor solutions (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003; Fabrigar, Wegener,
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999 ). Theoretically, we believe that the individual
threat measures—though correlated with one other—assess distinct categories of
threat: Stealing a person's car is not the same as making the person ill or
assaulting him or her with a weapon. On similar grounds, as many emotions
researchers have emphasized, it is necessary to maintain firm empirical
distinctions among our measured emotions: Feeling angry is not the same as
feeling disgusted or feeling afraid. Indeed, growing evidence demonstrates that
unique universal signals, nervous system responses, and antecedent events
differentiate the basic emotions (e.g., anger, disgust, fear; Ekman, 1999 ).
This decision to maintain firm distinctions among our threat and emotion
constructs is supported by confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs).5 Moreover, if
we are incorrect in our belief that these threats and emotions are distinct
from one another—if, for example, anger, disgust, and fear functioned
identically for our participants—then the predicted textured patterning of
perceived threats and emotional patterns would not emerge, and our hypotheses
would be disconfirmed.
As noted above, our focus is on the potential patterning of threat-related
emotions. These reactions better describe the intergroup interactions of
interest, and focusing our report on them greatly streamlines the presentation
of a large amount of data. We thus created emotion composite scores for the
emotion constructs most relevant to our theoretical approach: anger/resentment,
disgust, fear/anxiety, pity, and envy.6 To create a measure of overall negative
prejudice, we subtracted the positive evaluation composite score for each group
from the negative evaluation composite score for that group; higher values on
this overall prejudice measure indicate more negative prejudice toward the
group.
To test Hypotheses 1–4, we used each participant's affect and threat ratings of
European Americans as a baseline for comparison against their ratings of the
other groups. Thus, we created and analyzed difference scores for each affect
and threat by subtracting each participant's affect and threat rating for
European Americans from his or her affect and threat rating for each other
group. The ratings reported below thus reflect mean difference scores (relative
to European Americans) for all participants in our sample. Because all
participants were European American, this approach serves to eliminate
idiosyncratic differences in participants' tendencies to perceive particular
threats and to experience particular emotions and greatly aids with the visual
identification and interpretation of affect and threat patterns. Note that our
conclusions regarding Hypotheses 1–4 remain unchanged if we instead analyze raw
(i.e., nondifference) scores.
Tests of Hypotheses <http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
Hypothesis 1: Different Groups Can Evoke Qualitatively Different Profiles of
Emotional Reactions <http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
We conducted a two-way (Target Group × Emotion Experienced) repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the mean difference emotion ratings; a
significant Target Group × Emotion Experienced interaction would reveal that
the emotion profiles do indeed differ across groups. As predicted, this
interaction emerged as highly statistically significant, F(28, 6384) = 31.03, p
< .00001, partial [eta]2 = .120; Table 3 presents the means and standard
deviations for all emotion ratings for all groups. These data provide
substantial support for Hypothesis 1. People may indeed report different
patterns of emotional experience toward different groups. For the purpose of
more clearly illustrating the diversity of emotional response to groups, we
highlight participants' affective reactions to two subsets of groups in Figure
1 (African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans) and Figure 2
(activist feminists, fundamentalist Christians, and gay men).
Figure 1. Participants' mean affective reactions to African Americans, Asian
Americans, and Native Americans, relative to affective reactions to European
Americans. A repeated-measures analysis of variance on the emotion ratings for
these three groups revealed a significant Target Group × Emotion Experienced
interaction, F(8, 1824) = 50.63, p < .00001, partial [eta]2 = .182, supporting
Hypothesis 1: Participants reported different patterns of emotional reactions
to these different groups.
Figure 2. Participants' mean affective reactions to activist feminists,
fundamentalist Christians, and gay men, relative to affective reactions to
European Americans. A significant Target Group × Emotion Experienced
interaction, F(8, 1824) = 15.98, p < .00001, partial [eta]2 = .065, emerged in
a repeated-measures analysis of variance on the emotion ratings for these three
groups, indicating that participants experienced different patterns of
emotional reactions to them.
Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations of Emotional Reactions (Relative to
European Americans)
Hypothesis 2: Measures of Prejudice as Traditionally Conceived Will Often Mask
the Variation Across Groups in Evoked Emotion Profiles
We have just seen that different groups can evoke different patterns of
discrete emotions. Hypothesis 2 would be supported if groups that elicit
distinct emotion profiles nonetheless elicit similar levels of general
prejudice. Such a finding would illustrate that prejudice can mask meaningful
patterns of underlying emotions. Indeed, as seen in Table 3 , many groups that
differed from one another in the emotion profiles they evoked also evoked
comparable degrees of general prejudice. We illustrate this general pattern
with the two subsets of groups presented in Figures 1 and 2.
As presented in Figure 1 , African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native
Americans differed significantly in the emotion profiles they elicited in our
participants. Moreover, they each evoked general negative prejudice: Prejudice
difference score for African Americans = 1.14, t(228) = 4.74, p < .001; for
Asian Americans, difference = 0.89, t(228) = 4.06, p < .001; and for Native
Americans, difference = 0.76, t(228) = 3.32, p < .001. Finally, supporting
Hypothesis 2, the prejudice ratings for these three groups did not
significantly differ from one another, F(2, 456) = 1.42, p = .24, [eta]2 =
.006. Thus, although our participants expressed similar overall negativity
toward African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans, they
nonetheless reported different discrete emotional reactions toward them. This
strongly suggests that measures of general prejudice can indeed mask a rich
diversity of discrete emotional reactions.
As presented in Figure 2 , activist feminists, fundamentalist Christians, and
gay men also differed significantly in the patterns of discrete emotions they
elicited in our participants. Moreover, they all elicited substantial amounts
of negative prejudice: Prejudice difference scores for feminists = 3.38, t(228)
= 11.20, p < .001; for fundamentalist Christians, difference = 3.37, t(228) =
10.51, p < .001; and for gay men, difference = 2.78, t(228) = 8.75, p < .001.
Yet here again, the prejudice ratings for these three groups did not differ
from one another, F(2, 456) = 1.47, p = .231, [eta]2 = .006. This pattern, too,
illustrates that measures of overall prejudice can mask a notable diversity of
discrete emotional reactions.
Hypothesis 3: Different Groups Can Evoke Qualitatively Different Profiles of
Perceived Threats <http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
We performed a two-way (Target Group × Threat Perceived) repeated-measures
ANOVA on the mean difference threat ratings; a significant Target Group ×
Threat Perceived interaction would reveal that different groups can indeed be
viewed as posing different profiles of threat. As predicted, this interaction
emerged as a significant effect, F(63, 14427) = 46.15, p < .00001, partial
[eta]2 = .168; Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for all
threat ratings for all groups. These patterns of perceived threats provide
substantial support for Hypothesis 3: People may indeed perceive different
patterns of specific threats from different groups. For the purpose of more
clearly illustrating this effect, we present in Figure 3 the patterns of
threats people perceived from activist feminists, African Americans, and
fundamentalist Christians.
Figure 3. Participants' mean threat perceptions for activist feminists, African
Americans, and fundamentalist Christians, relative to threat perceptions for
European Americans. A repeated-measures analysis of variance on the threat
ratings for these three groups revealed a significant Target Group × Threat
Perceived interaction, F(18, 4122) = 30.05, p < .00001, partial [eta]2 = .116,
indicating that participants perceived different patterns of threat from these
groups and thus illustrating support for Hypothesis 3. Reciprocity (Choice) =
nonreciprocity by choice; Reciprocity (Inability) = nonreciprocity by
inability.
[Graphic]
[Help with image viewing]
[Email Jumpstart To Image] Table 4 Means and Standard Deviations of Threat
Perceptions (Relative to European Americans)
Hypothesis 4: General Measures of Threat Will Often Mask the Variation Across
Groups in Evoked Threat Profiles
Our participants often believed that different groups threatened America in
different ways. Hypothesis 4 would be supported if groups that evoked distinct
threat profiles nonetheless evoked similar levels of general threat. Indeed, as
seen in Table 4 , many groups that differed from one another in the profiles of
specific threats ostensibly posed also evoked similar perceptions of general
threat. We illustrate this general pattern with the subset of groups presented
in Figure 3.
As presented in Figure 3 , our participants viewed African Americans, activist
feminists, and fundamentalist Christians as posing significantly different
profiles of threat. Moreover, these groups are all viewed as generally
threatening—the scores all differ from the European American baseline. For the
general threat posed by African Americans, difference = 0.87, t(229) = 7.27, p
< .001; for activist feminists, difference = 0.76, t(229) = 5.87, p < .001; and
for fundamentalist Christians, difference = 0.85, t(229) = 5.85, p < .001.
Finally, supporting Hypothesis 4, the general threat ratings for these groups
do not differ from one another, F(2, 458) = 0.24, p = .789, [eta]2 = .001.
Thus, just as a focus on general prejudice can mask an interesting and rich
diversity of functionally important emotions evoked by groups, a focus on
general threat can mask an interesting and rich diversity of specific threats
the groups are seen as posing.
We have seen, then, strong support for Hypotheses 1–4. In addition, we note
that Cottrell, Neuberg, and Asher (2004) used nearly identical procedures and
measures in three additional samples. These other studies demonstrate patterns
of threat perceptions and affective reactions strikingly similar to the ones we
reported here and thus strongly corroborate our findings.7
Hypothesis 5: Profiles of the Specific Threats Posed by Different Groups Will
Reliably and Systematically Predict the Emotion Profiles Evoked by These Groups
<http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
If intergroup emotion indeed represents a functional response to intergroup
threat, then we should observe the hypothesized threat-emotion links
articulated in Table 2 . We explored these hypothesized connections using two
essentially independent tests—one based on correlations among the measures, the
other based on means of the measures.
Multiple regression approach <http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2btn/ftup.gif>
To predict each discrete emotion from the 10 specific threats, controlling for
the influence of the other threats, we pursued a multiple regression strategy.
The intercorrelations among specific threats and between all threats and all
emotions were substantial, however, leading to special statistical problems
(e.g., multicollinearity, suppression) and rendering findings from these models
hard to interpret. We thus used instead the threat classes articulated in Table
2 . Specifically, we averaged the 6 threats from the “obstacles” category
(i.e., threats to economic resources, property, personal freedoms, reciprocity
[by choice], social coordination, and trust), and the 2 threats from the
“contamination” category (threats to group health and values). The 2 remaining
threats—of physical danger and nonreciprocity because of inability—were
represented as before.8
We examined threat-emotion relations across target groups. Recall that
participants rated all nine groups on threat perceptions and emotional
reactions. To avoid complex technical issues related to nonindependence of
data, each participant was randomly assigned to provide threat and emotion
ratings for only one of the target groups, thereby yielding approximately equal
numbers of entries for each group. This random sample of the complete data set
thus contained information on all four threat categories and all five discrete
emotions across the nine target groups; this enabled us to perform five
regression analyses, each predicting one emotion from the four threat
categories, thereby allowing us to assess the independent predictive ability of
each threat for each emotion. Because a huge number of different subsamples
could be randomly drawn from the complete sample, we conducted these analyses
on 50 randomly selected subsamples to reduce the likelihood of drawing
conclusions from data patterns idiosyncratic to particular chance samplings.
Though not identical, this strategy is somewhat similar to bootstrapping and
resampling procedures.
In Table 5 , we present the mean standardized regression coefficients, averaged
across the 50 random subsamples, for each threat category in the regression of
each emotion. Note that the general pattern of regression coefficients provides
yet another demonstration of the problem associated with conceiving intergroup
affect and threat as unidimensional constructs: Different intergroup emotions
are predominantly associated with different classes of threat. We turn now to
the regression analyses for each emotion, in turn.
Table 5 Regressions of Each Emotion on Threat Categories
In line with the hypothesized theoretical connections articulated in Table 2,
we expected anger to be independently predicted by obstacle threats; this was
clearly the case (average [beta] = .58, p < .001). We also hypothesized that
anger might be a secondary emotional reaction to threats to group health and
group values; the contamination category did indeed predict anger (average
[beta] = .11, p < .001). We also speculated that anger might be secondarily
associated with threats to physical safety and reciprocity (because of lack of
ability); these speculations were not supported.
Second, we expected that disgust would be independently predicted by
contamination; this hypothesis, too, was strongly supported (average [beta] =
.35, p < .001). We also thought that two of the obstacle threats in particular
(i.e., to personal freedoms and reciprocity relations) might secondarily
predict disgust; although obstacle threat as a general class did independently
predict disgust (average [beta] = .36, p < .001), the outcomes of our more
specific speculations were clearly mixed (see Table 6).
Table 6 Regressions to Test Exploratory, Secondary Predictions
Third, we expected that fear would be independently predicted by physical
safety threat. This hypothesis was strongly supported (average [beta] = .37, p
< .001), as was our general secondary prediction that obstacle threats might
also independently predict fear (average [beta] = .30, p < .001). A perusal of
Table 6, however, reveals that the success of our specific secondary
predictions regarding specific obstacles was mixed.
Fourth, we expected that pity would be independently predicted by the inability
to reciprocate, and this was clearly the case (average [beta] = .17, p < .001).
Our lone secondary hypothesis—that pity would also be independently associated
with the possibility of disease contamination—was supported as well:
Contamination in general predicted pity (average [beta] = .20, p < .001);
however, this was due to both the disease and the values components of the
contamination aggregate (see Table 6).
Finally, we expected that envy would be independently predicted by the obstacle
of economic threat. Consistent with this, envy was predicted by obstacle threat
in the aggregate (average [beta] = .18, p < .001). Moreover, a perusal of Table
6 reveals that this obstacles-envy link was indeed driven largely by economic
threat in particular.
In sum, our primary predictions regarding the functional links between threat
classes and their affiliated emotions find strong support in these data:
Obstacle threat emerged as an independent predictor of anger, contamination
threat emerged as an independent predictor of disgust, physical safety threat
emerged as an independent predictor of fear, and reciprocity threat because of
inability emerged as an independent predictor of pity. In addition, many of our
secondary predictions were borne out as well. Indeed, taking stock of the 20
entries in Table 5 , we see that (a) all four of our primary hypotheses (bolded
entries) were supported and (b) five of our eight secondary hypotheses
(italicized entries) were supported. As further support of our hypotheses, we
note that no threat class expected to show a secondary association with an
emotion emerged as a better independent predictor than the threat class
expected to show a primary association with that emotion. Though our accuracy
in predicting null findings (entries in conventional font) may appear less than
ideal, these mean regression coefficients are numerically rather small and, in
fact, never exceed a coefficient whose significance is expected as the result
of a primary or secondary prediction. This overall success rate can be
contrasted with the straightforward alternative that there is no specificity of
links between threat classes and emotions, operationalized such that no threat
classes independently predict specific emotions or that all threat classes
independently and equivalently predict all emotions—neither of which received
empirical support from our data.
Hypothesis 5 addresses the crux of our theoretical arguments—the notion that
specific threats elicit functionally focused emotions. To fully appreciate
intergroup emotions, then, the focus should be on specific threat perceptions
rather than on the particular group thought to pose a threat. In this sense,
the nine target groups considered in this research are secondary in interest to
the threats associated with each group. Threats, as compared with target group,
should be better predictors of emotions. This, of course, is an empirical
question: How well do target groups per se predict emotional response after
controlling for the four threat classes?
To better gauge the size of this effect, we dummy coded the target groups and
compared the proportions of variation in each emotional reaction explained by
four effects: effect of threats, effect of threats controlling for target
group, effect of target group, and effect of target group controlling for
threats. In Table 7, we present the mean [DELTA]R2 values, averaged across the
50 random subsamples for each of these effects in the regression of each
emotion. First, we note that the threat classes, as a set, account for a
substantial amount of variation in each emotion (especially in the cases of
anger, disgust, and fear). Moreover, this effect remains sizable after
controlling for the target group being rated. In comparison, target group tends
to account for a much smaller, though still significant, portion of variation
in emotional response. Crucial to our theoretical arguments, this effect
significantly decreases even further after controlling for the threat classes.
Threat perceptions therefore appear (at least) to partially mediate the
observed group differences in emotional reactions. In theory, we would have
hoped for complete mediation. Of course, even if complete mediation by threats
exists, it would be difficult to uncover in this investigation because (a) we
have not included in our analyses all threat perceptions relevant to emotional
reactions (we do not claim to be providing a veritable census of threats); (b)
for statistical stability reasons given our sample size, we only estimated main
effects of threat perceptions on emotional reactions, thereby not including any
of the ways in which the many possible interactions among our 10 threats might
account for apparent target group effects; and (c) none of our threat
perceptions and emotional reactions were measured perfectly, without error. It
is thus the case that the unique effects of target group on emotions, as small
as they are, actually overestimate their true sizes. Using the multiple
regression approach, then, we see strong support for Hypothesis 5.9
Table 7 Regressions to Compare Effects of Group Type and Threat Perceptions
Cluster analytic approach
Hypothesis 5 posits, generally, that emotion profiles map onto threat profiles.
In addition to the multiple regression approach, then, one can alternatively
test this hypothesis by assessing the extent to which groups seen to pose
similar patterns of threat also evoke similar patterns of emotion. To the
extent they do not, support for Hypothesis 5 would be weakened.
Cluster analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992 ) is a “technique for
grouping individuals or objects into clusters so that objects in the same
cluster are more like each other than they are like objects in other clusters”
(p. 265), and recent uses of this analysis (Fiske et al., 2002; Lickel et al.,
2000 ) have indeed proven valuable in identifying clusters of groups and their
common characteristics. As a multivariate technique, cluster analysis is
especially well suited for our purposes, because it can calculate similarities
and differences among mean profiles of multiple threat or emotion ratings. One
convenient technical implication of this is that cluster analysis is not
susceptible to issues of multicollinearity and suppression, both of which
complicated our attempt to perform simple multiple regression analyses using
the 10 specific threats. A second implication is that it essentially provides
an independent test of the hypothesis using the same data set.
We began by averaging the participants' ratings of each of the nine groups for
each of the 10 specific threats and each of the five discrete emotions. Though
we could cluster analyze threat and emotion scores representing differences
relative to the threat and emotion scores for European Americans (as we did
when testing Hypotheses 1–4, for the reasons discussed above), we chose to
average and analyze original threat and emotion ratings for all nine groups,
thereby including European Americans as a group in the cluster analyses. We
expected that the participants' in-groups (that is, European Americans and
nonfundamentalist Christians) might form a single cluster, with threat and
emotion profiles differing from those of the other clusters. The use of
original threat and emotion ratings for European Americans, as well as the
other groups, allows us to explore this idea and to better examine similarities
and differences in the profiles. We note that cluster analyses on the
difference scores and cluster analyses on the original scores yield identical
results (except for the necessary absence of European Americans from the
cluster solutions for difference scores).
Following the advice and example presented in Hair et al. (1992) , we used two
types of cluster analysis, each serving a different purpose. Hierarchical
cluster analysis is particularly useful to determine the optimal number of
clusters present in the data, whereas k-means cluster analysis is particularly
useful to determine the arrangement of the nine groups within these clusters.
Hierarchical cluster analysis operates on a similarity matrix containing
similarity indices among the objects being clustered (in this case, the nine
target groups), using some set of characteristics of each object (the profiles
of 10 threats or five emotions). These similarity measures, which involve no
decisions about the appropriate number of clusters within the data, offer an
additional straightforward test of Hypothesis 5: To the extent there exists a
positive correlation between threat similarity measures and emotion similarity
measures, then Hypothesis 5 is further supported. Because it is the most
commonly used measure of interobject similarity (Hair et al., 1992 ), we
calculated the euclidean distance between each pair of objects two times, once
using the threat profiles and once using the emotion profiles. The correlation
coefficient between these threat-based distances and emotion-based distances
was .41 (p = .013), indicating that groups that are similar on threat profiles
are also similar on emotion profiles, supporting Hypothesis 5.
We note above that these similarity measures offer no explicit information
about the optimal number of clusters in the data or the arrangement of groups
into the clusters. As an extension of the demonstrated relationship between the
threat and emotion similarity measures, however, we might reasonably expect the
specific arrangement of groups into “threat clusters” to map onto the specific
arrangement of groups into “emotion clusters.” Because our theoretical
framework assigns causal priority to perceived threats, we first performed
hierarchical cluster analysis (using Ward's method) on the ratings of the
specific threats ostensibly posed by the nine target groups. Although decisions
about the best fitting number of clusters are inherently subjective, we adhered
to conventional decision rules as outlined in Hair et al. (1992), Blashfield
and Aldenderfer (1988), and Everitt and Dunn (2001) . The agglomeration
schedule of a hierarchical cluster analysis specifies the groups that are
merged in each stage of the analysis and provides coefficients that indicate
the distances between these newly merged groups. Because a large agglomeration
coefficient indicates that two relatively different groups have been combined,
typical guidelines suggest selecting the number of clusters prior to a large
increase in the agglomeration coefficient. Guided by these decision rules, a
five-cluster solution offered the best fit to the threat profile data.
We next turned to k -means cluster analysis on the threat ratings to determine
how the nine target groups fit into the five clusters. Because differences in
the randomly chosen initial cluster centers may alter the final cluster
solution (Hair et al., 1992 ), we conducted this analysis multiple times on the
same data configured in different arrangements to establish the most stable
five-cluster solution, which is presented in the left side of Table 8.
Table 8 Five-Cluster Solutions From Threat and Emotion Cluster Analyses
Moving to emotional responses, k -means cluster analysis was next performed on
the ratings of the discrete emotions participants experienced when considering
these same nine groups. As noted above, we give causal precedence to perceived
threats. We therefore constrained this analysis of the emotion ratings to a
five-cluster solution, because this was the most appropriate solution for the
threat ratings. This cluster analysis was also performed multiple times to
establish the most stable five-cluster solution, which is presented in the
right side of Table 8.
As Table 8 clearly shows, there is great overlap between the clusters emerging
from the analysis of threat perceptions and the clusters emerging from the
analysis of emotional experiences: Groups seen as similar in the patterns of
threats they pose were also seen as similar in the patterns of emotions they
elicited. Indeed, the only difference between the two cluster analyses involves
the movement of Asian Americans: In the threat analysis, Asian Americans
clustered with Native Americans (Cluster 4) because of the perception that
these two groups both hold values inconsistent with mainstream American values.
In the emotions analysis, Asian Americans clustered with European Americans and
nonfundamentalist Christians because of the relatively little threat-related
affect elicited by these groups. Aside from this single change, however, the
two cluster solutions, derived from analyses of different judgments, are
strikingly similar. The probability of observing a perfect replication with all
nine groups considered in the calculation, merely by chance, is .00006. We
adjusted this value to account for the “defection” by the single group (i.e.,
Asian Americans); the probability of observing this slightly imperfect match
between the two cluster solutions merely by chance remains a very small
.0003.10 In sum, groups that clustered together on perceived threat also
(nearly perfectly) clustered together on elicited emotions, thereby providing
further support for Hypothesis 5.
Discussion
We derived five general hypotheses from our sociofunctional analysis of
intragroup and intergroup relations and tested them by examining European
American participants' reactions to a variety of ethnic, religious, and
ideologically oriented groups encountered frequently within the United States.
As predicted, (a) different groups can evoke different profiles of emotions;
(b) prejudice, as traditionally measured, can obscure the rich texture of these
emotional experiences; (c) different groups are often believed to pose
different profiles of threat to one's in-group; and (d) measures of general
threat can mask the rich texture of these threat perceptions. We believe these
data are the first to provide straightforward empirical support for Hypotheses
2 and 4.
Two sets of analyses also support our fifth hypothesis—that emotional
experience arises systematically from threat perception: (a) The perception of
particular threats predicted the experience of functionally associated
emotions, and (b) groups that elicited similar threat profiles also elicited
similar emotion profiles. Although each statistical technique has its own
limitations, the cumulative evidence from these analyses offers strong support
for Hypothesis 5. Of course, a stronger causal test of Hypothesis 5 is
impossible given the correlational nature of our data and participants'
preexisting feelings toward and beliefs about the real-world groups we
selected. A more rigorous test would require participants to respond to novel
or artificial groups about which we could systematically manipulate specific
patterns of threats and subsequently measure patterns of emotional response.11
Contributions of the Present Data
Our data illustrate quite clearly that the traditional operationalization of
prejudice—as a general attitude—can obscure the richness of emotional
experience that groups elicit from others: People do not merely experience
evaluative valence when encountering members of groups but instead experience
discrete emotions. Moreover, as our threat and emotion profiles make clear,
groups cannot be simply characterized as posing one particular threat or as
eliciting one particular emotion. Rather, groups are seen to pose multiple
threats and to elicit a variety of emotions, often in interesting combinations.
In all, then, the negative implications of adhering to the traditional view of
prejudice may be substantial.
Just as emotion profiles varied across groups, so did threat profiles. The
current data thus also suggest a complement to the traditional view of
stereotype as trait. Specifically, the sociofunctional approach presumes that
the most important stereotypical knowledge should be knowledge that is relevant
to the threats and opportunities the out-group provides for the in-group.
Indeed, we suspect that most stereotypical knowledge can usefully be framed in
terms of the stable beliefs about the threats and opportunities groups are seen
to pose. That is, particular groups are stereotypically characterized as lazy
because they are perceived to contribute less than their fair share, as
aggressive because they are perceived to threaten physical safety, and so on.
More generally, we should note the uniqueness of the data we report here. In
terms of affect, we have gathered data about a wide range of emotional
reactions people have toward a variety of groups. Although a few others have
assessed such a range of emotions, they have mitigated somewhat the value of
doing so by aggregating over them (e.g., Brewer & Alexander, 2002; Dijker,
1987; Esses et al., 1993; Fiske et al., 2002 ). In terms of beliefs, we have
begun to document a wide variety of threats that may be stereotypically linked
to a variety of groups well known within the United States; to our knowledge,
no similar data set exists. Because we have maintained the discrete nature of
the assessed emotions and threats, other researchers testing hypotheses of
intergroup affect and threat gain access to a useful, rich set of data. Beyond
their usefulness for testing our hypotheses, then, these data should also
provide researchers with textured descriptive data about how (at least some)
people view and feel toward a range of different groups.
We acknowledge, of course, that the reactions of our European American
university students to specific groups will not correspond perfectly with the
reactions of others in different places and at other times. The threats, and
resultant emotional reactions, that members of a particular group associate
with another group should emerge from the functional relationship between the
two groups as well as associated sociohistorical factors (e.g., Brewer &
Alexander, 2002; Fiske et al., 2002 ). Thus, the current sample should
represent well the emotional and stereotypical content held by other samples
only to the extent they share similar functional relationships with the groups
we have explored here. To the extent, however, that other samples have
different functional relationships with these target groups, they should form
different threat profiles and experience a different configuration of emotions.
For example, because African American and Mexican American respondents differ
in the threats they see European Americans posing to their own groups, they
should also differ in their emotional reactions to European Americans—and they
do (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2003).
Note, however, that such variation across perceiver samples in the specific
threat perceptions and feelings evoked by target groups does not imply that
these samples will exhibit different mappings between specific threats and
specific emotions: Regardless of sample, we expect that particular profiles of
emotional experience (e.g., those dominated by fear) will emerge systematically
from conceptually relevant profiles of threat (i.e., those dominated by
perceived threat to physical safety). In a similar vein, individuals who differ
from one another in their inclinations toward particular threat appraisals
(e.g., individual differences in perceived vulnerability to disease) should
differ from one another in the particular intergroup emotions they typically
experience (e.g., disgust; see Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003).
A careful look at the emotion profile for Asian Americans reveals a potentially
interesting discovery: Our European American participants reported significant
general negative prejudice toward Asian Americans but little or no specific
threat-related emotions. Across at least four data sets collected by our lab,
we have consistently found a similar affect profile for Asian Americans
(although slight envy emerges in some samples). This anomaly may be the result
of simple and relatively uninteresting causes. In particular, we might surmise
that reports of envy toward Asian Americans could appear unjustified or
“unsportsmanlike” in a society that so values meritocracy. That is, Americans
may tend to view Asian American successes as deserved achievements and thus may
be reluctant to admit to or report feeling envious of them. Alternatively, it
may be that the high status accorded to Asian Americans may be identity
threatening, leading individuals to experience specific emotions other than
those explored here, such as schadenfreude (pleasure in another's
misfortune)—an emotion potentially directed toward high-status groups that come
upon hard times.12 In all, we are intrigued by the various possibilities and
encourage other researchers to explore more deeply specific feelings toward
Asian Americans and other higher status groups.
Finally, because research findings lend support to the theoretical frameworks
that hypothesize their existence, the current data support the usefulness of
our broader sociofunctional approach. That these data may also be viewed as
consistent with predictions generated from alternative frameworks does not
preclude their value for the sociofunctional approach as well; we return to
this point below.
Related Theoretical Perspectives
We overviewed in the introduction other research programs and perspectives that
take seriously the potential roles that intergroup emotions and tangible
intergroup threats play in characterizing prejudice and intergroup relations.
Here, within the context of addressing several important theoretical issues, we
briefly highlight some similarities and differences among these alternative,
and sometimes complementary, approaches.
Specificity of Emotion, Specificity of Threat
Along with others, we propose that the traditional view of prejudice as general
attitude is too gross. As our data indeed demonstrate, prejudices go beyond
mere negative feelings toward groups to also reflect patterns of specific
emotions—anger, fear, disgust, and the like—patterns that conventional measures
of prejudice mask. This recognition is important because, as reviewed above,
qualitatively different emotions tend to be associated with qualitatively
different actions: People have the urge to aggress against those who anger
them, escape those who frighten them, and avoid close contact with those who
disgust them. Researchers who thus ignore the differences in emotion profiles
elicited by different groups will have great difficulty making fine-grained
predictions about intergroup behavior. Of course, if one's aim is only to
predict whether a group is likely to be discriminated against, in general, then
a general attitude assessment may indeed be sufficient. We suspect, however,
that there are important implications, theoretical and practical, of being
discriminated against via attack, avoidance, or quarantine, and so we prefer
the finer level distinctions.
Proponents of alternative models of intergroup affect generally share this
view, although there exist some important differences in preferred level of
emotion specificity. For instance, Dijker, Fiske, and their colleagues (Dijker,
1987; Dijker, Koomen, et al., 1996; Fiske et al., 1999, 2002 ) have used
exploratory factor analyses to reduce the number of specific emotions they
actually assess to a somewhat smaller set to be analyzed. We think this
strategy is less than ideal, for several reasons.
First, by its very nature, exploratory analyses force data aggregation in a
manner uninformed by insights from the emotions literature, which is
increasingly recognizing important distinctions among the different emotions
(e.g., Ekman, 1999 ). Second, such an aggregation strategy increases the
likelihood that functionally important emotions may be artificially eliminated
from investigation because of idiosyncratic features of the analysis (e.g., the
other emotions judged, the criteria chosen to select factor dimensions, the
relative reliabilities of the different items). Third, for the same reasons
that exploratory factor analyses may lead one to omit theoretically relevant
emotions, they may also lead one to overaggregate emotions. Finally, the
strategy of data-driven aggregation can lead to groups being characterized as
similar when they are not.
In the research we report here, we have chosen to maintain the demonstrated
distinctions among potential intergroup emotions. Note that if our choice of
this finer grain size were a poor one, the hypothesized differences in emotion
profiles across groups would not have materialized; if contempt, for example,
were the more appropriate level of analysis, then we would have observed no
differences in participants' reports of anger and disgust. Participants did
indeed make such differentiations, however, lending support to our chosen level
of affect specificity.
We have taken a similar view when contemplating the appropriate specificity at
which to consider intergroup threat. In particular, we rely on a theory-driven
analysis in which distinct threats remain empirically distinguished from each
other. Recall that the revised integrated threat theory (Stephan & Renfro,
2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000 ) posits that four general categories of
constructs—realistic threats to the in-group, symbolic threats to the in-group,
realistic threats to the individual, symbolic threats to the individual—are
important in intergroup relations. There is clearly some overlap in our
approaches. However, in the absence of finer distinctions among threats,
revised integrated threat theory will be unable to account for the observed
variation in emotional responses to different groups within each umbrella
category.
Alternative Appraisal Theories
The perspectives on intergroup emotions we discuss here share the assumption
that different emotions emerge from different appraisals. The approaches
differ, however, in their underlying appraisal frameworks. Our sociofunctional
perspective proposes that perceptions of specific threats to (and opportunities
for) tangible in-group resources and group structures and processes lead to
specific intergroup emotions. We articulate our underlying threat-based
appraisal theory in detail—see Table 2 —and have tested its usefulness via
multiple regression and cluster analyses. One implication of this appraisal
approach is that it allows for the possibility that groups can be perceived as
posing multiple threats to one's own group. This, in turn, suggests the value
of examining profiles of perceived threats—a value validated by the findings
reported here.
In contrast to our threat-based appraisal system, the stereotype content model
and image theory look for the sources of emotional response in appraisals of
the structural relationships between groups. The stereotype content model
(Fiske et al., 1999, 2002 ) proposes that intergroup emotions result from
individuals' assessments of other groups' warmth (warm vs. cold) and competence
(competent vs. incompetent), which emerge from perceptions of each group's
competition and status, respectively. These warmth and competence dimensions
combine to form a matrix of four possible general views of other groups, and
each quadrant engenders a different emotion. An implication of this framework,
then, is an exclusive focus on these four emotions (admiration, envy, pity, and
contempt). In addition to neglecting the common intergroup emotion of fear,
then, and aggregating across anger and disgust, this view does not
straightforwardly imply the usefulness of characterizing prejudices in terms of
emotional profiles. Along slightly different lines, image theory (M. G.
Alexander et al., 1999; Brewer & Alexander, 2002 ) suggests that emotional
responses arise from perceptions of other groups on three dimensions:
competition, status, and power. Different configurations of these appraisal
dimensions produce different images of the other groups, and each image evokes
unique specific emotions. Because groups are presumably represented by only one
image, image theory also does not straightforwardly suggest the value of
characterizing prejudices in terms of emotion profiles.
The comprehensive operating appraisal framework underlying IET (e.g., Mackie et
al., 2000 ) has not been explicitly articulated but appears to be based on an
integration of existing appraisal theories of emotion (prominently cited are
Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985 ).
That IET theorists have tended to focus their empirical work narrowly on
individual components of their apparent appraisal framework may explain an
empirical difficulty they recently encountered. Specifically, they predicted
that in intergroup situations involving potential threats to personal freedoms
and beliefs, participants would respond with anger toward the out-group if the
in-group was relatively strong and with fear if the in-group was relatively
weak; only the predicted anger reaction emerged, however (Mackie et al., 2000
). In a later study, however, in which participants faced a scenario involving
physical altercation, the predicted fear response was obtained (Devos et al.,
2002 ). These findings—though not initially predicted by the IET theorists—are
consistent with our threat-based appraisal framework, in which threats to
physical safety elicit fear, and obstructions of important goals elicit anger.
Nonetheless, some of the similarities between our two approaches appear
striking enough that we have suggested elsewhere that one might profitably view
the IET and a sociofunctional perspective as complementary, with the IET nested
within the broader sociofunctional approach (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002).
Theoretical Breadth
We note one additional difference between the sociofunctional framework and the
alternatives we have discussed here. Whereas these others are explicitly about
prejudice, intergroup affect, or stereotype content, ours is not. The
foundation of the sociofunctional framework is an understanding of the
universal nature of intragroup structures and processes, and from the
foundations of the developing theory, we have derived implications for
intergroup affect. However, we have also derived implications for the personal
characteristics and traits that people are likely to value (and devalue) for
different kinds of groups, for the aspects of self that people are likely to
present or manufacture in different social settings, for the kinds of social
information that perceivers are especially likely to seek and attune themselves
to, for the areas in which legal systems across the globe ought to be similar
(or different) from one another, for commonalities (and differences) in the
social teachings of different religions, and so forth. We have begun to
accumulate data in several of these domains, and they are proving to be
consistent with the sociofunctional approach (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2004;
Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2003; Neuberg & Story, 2003 ). The sociofunctional
framework is thus broader in its scope. All else being equal, this lends some
degree of advantage to it over alternative, but narrower, frameworks.
Closing Remarks
There can be little doubt that the concept of prejudice has been a useful one
and will remain useful to the extent that one is primarily interested in making
general predictions across a broad class of discriminatory behaviors. As with
most scientific endeavors, however, the deeper one wants to probe and the more
one wants to understand, the more precise and textured one's conceptual and
operational tools must become. The data reported here clearly illustrate that
the traditional view of prejudice—conceptualized as a general attitude and
operationalized via simple evaluation items—is often too gross a tool for
understanding the often highly textured nature of intergroup affect.
Moreover, we believe the sociofunctional approach is better able to account for
these findings than current alternatives, none of which make the full set of
predictions we have tested here. Finally, many of the currently dominant
theoretical explorations of prejudice focus on process—on how prejudices are
activated, how they influence cognition and action, how individual and group
variables influence these processes, and so forth. By focusing on the contents
of social and intergroup relations, we believe the sociofunctional approach
provides an important complement to these models.
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1In previous writings and presentations (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2003; Neuberg &
Cottrell, 2002) we have described this framework as biocultural. We have
changed our labeling of these ideas to sociofunctional to better capture our
focus on the functional psychological mechanisms that promote effective and
successful social living. Note that this is merely a change in label and not in
the content of our approach. [Context Link]
2 We are not suggesting that human sociality emerged because it benefits the
survival of the group (i.e., a group selection process; see Sober & Wilson,
1998; Wilson & Sober, 1994 ), but rather because it benefits the overall
fitness of the individual. Moreover, our evolution-based arguments should not
be interpreted as deterministic (nor, for that matter, should any
evolution-based argument); the social processes we propose to understand
intergroup affect are far from invariable and inevitable. Indeed, these
processes, once explicated, lend themselves nicely to effective practical
interventions to reduce the maltreatment of groups and people around the globe
(for further discussion, see Schaller & Neuberg, 2004 ). Finally, just because
we believe that an evolution-inspired analysis shines light on certain unique
complexities of intergroup affect does not in any way imply that the
psychological processes and outcomes revealed by our analysis are morally,
ethically, or legally justifiable. [Context Link]
3 Groups sometimes provide each other with opportunities as well as threats.
However, in light of the great bulk of existing prejudice and intergroup
relations research, we focus in this article on patterns of threats and related
discrete emotions. [Context Link]
4 In exploratory fashion, we included items designed to assess threats that
groups may pose to one's own group's moral standing in the hope that they would
uniquely predict feelings of guilt. Unfortunately, we worded the items poorly,
and the composite appears instead to capture a more general sense of threat. We
thus exclude this composite from all analyses to follow but note that including
it alters neither our findings nor our conclusions. [Context Link]
5 For each target group, a chi-square difference test revealed that our a
priori 10-factor threat model (10 specific threat factors, each represented by
an item pair) demonstrated a good fit to the data (as shown by comparative fit
index [CFI], root-mean-square error of approximation [RMSEA], and standardized
root-mean-square residual [SRMR] values) and fit the data significantly better
than a 1-factor threat model (1 general threat factor, represented by all
threat items). Similar support was found for our emotion model: Chi-square
difference tests revealed that our a priori 5-factor emotion model (anger,
disgust, fear, pity, and envy factors, each represented by an item pair)
demonstrated a good fit to the data (as shown by CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR values)
and fit the data significantly better than a 1-factor emotion model (1 general
emotion factor, represented by all emotion items), again for all target groups.
Because anger and disgust are sometimes grouped together by exploratory factor
analyses (as in research by Fiske et al., 2002 ), we also compared the 5-factor
emotion model with a 4-factor emotion model that combined anger and disgust
into 1 factor. For seven of the nine target groups, a chi-square difference
test revealed that this 4-factor model fit the data significantly worse than
the 5-factor model; for the remaining two target groups, the 4-factor model fit
worse than our preferred 5-factor alternative, although not significantly so.
In all, the CFAs strongly validate our theory-based decisions to use measures
of relatively discrete threats and emotions. [Context Link]
6 Because of our unsuccessful attempt to generate a valid measure of morality
threat (see Footnote 4), we were unable to conduct our focal threat-emotion
analysis for this threat's associated emotion (i.e., a test of the proposed
link between threat to in-group morality and guilt). As a result of this
failure to fully test our hypotheses related to guilt, we chose to discard
guilt from further analyses. Note that including the discarded items in
analyses does not alter any of our conclusions. These complete data are
available from the authors by request. [Context Link]
7Some of those findings were reported in preliminary form (Neuberg & Cottrell,
2002). The full data sets from these additional samples are available from the
authors on request. [Context Link]
8 CFAs also offer some empirical support for this decision to arrange the 10
specific threats into four threat classes. We tested a higher order threat
model with the second-order obstacles factor (on which six first-order threat
factors load), the second-order contamination factor (on which two first-order
threat factors load), the first-order physical safety threat factor, and the
first-order nonreciprocity (by inability) threat factor. For each target group,
this model demonstrated a marginally adequate fit to the data (as shown by CFI,
RMSEA, and SRMR values). Although this four-factor threat model may be less
than ideal to capture relationships among the threats, our current purposes
rest with explaining threat-emotion links. As such, we have chosen to use this
threat representation in which specific threats believed to elicit the same
emotion are clustered together into threat classes. Note that the less than
ideal status of this measurement model can only work against our hypotheses
relating obstacle threats to anger and contamination threats to disgust.
[Context Link]
9 We note two additional pieces of corroborative evidence for Hypothesis 5.
First, we tested the hypothesized threat-emotion links using group-level
multiple regression analyses with the threat and emotion ratings for each
target group averaged across all participants; these analyses are limited by
the small sample size (nine target groups), which leaves them drastically
underpowered. We also tested the hypothesized threat-emotion links using
multilevel models that clustered the target group ratings by participant; these
analyses provide an appropriate statistical means to account for the
nonindependence of target group ratings. In all, both the group-level
regression analyses and the multilevel models revealed similar patterns of
specific threat-emotion links to those obtained from the individual-level
regression analyses on the random samples. [Context Link]
10 Because we assign causal priority to perceived threat, we wanted to
calculate the probability of perfectly replicating the five-cluster solution on
the basis of threat ratings (as shown in the left side of Table 8 ) in the
emotion cluster analyses. After determining the probability of replicating each
individual cluster, we calculated the product of these individual probabilities
to obtain the probability of a perfect match between the five-cluster threat
solution and an emotion cluster solution. We calculated this probability to be
.00006. Because Asian Americans were the only group to “move” clusters from our
threat cluster solution to our emotion cluster solution, we recalculated this
probability without Asian Americans. For this probability of perfect
replication with only the eight remaining groups, we obtained a value of .0003.
Information on these calculations is available from the authors. [Context Link]
11We are currently collecting such experimental data. [Context Link]
12We thank Naomi Ellemers for suggesting this interesting possibility. [Context
Link]
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