[Paleopsych] Routledge: David B. Wong: Moral Relativism
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David B. Wong: Moral Relativism
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Often the subject of heated debate, moral relativism is a cluster of
doctrines concerning diversity of moral judgment across time,
societies and individuals. Descriptive relativism is the doctrine that
extensive diversity exists and that it concerns values and principles
central to moralities. Meta-ethical relativism is the doctrine that
there is no single true or most justified morality. Normative
relativism is the doctrine that it is morally wrong to pass judgment
on or to interfere with the moral practices of others who have adopted
moralities different from one's own. Much debate about relativism
revolves around the questions of whether descriptive relativism
accurately portrays moral diversity and whether actual diversity
supports meta-ethical and normative relativism. Some critics also fear
that relativism can slide into nihilism.
1. Descriptive relativism
2. Meta-ethical relativism
3. Normative relativism
4. Relativism and moral confidence
1. Descriptive relativism
From the beginnings of the Western tradition philosophers have debated
the nature and implications of moral diversity. Differences in customs
and values the Greeks encountered through trade, travel and war
motivated the argument attributed to the sophist Protagoras in Platos
Theaetetus: that human custom determines what is fine and ugly, just
and unjust (see Protagoras). Anthropologists in the twentieth century,
such as Ruth Benedict (1934), have emphasized the fundamental
differences between the moralities of small-scale traditional
societies and the modern West. For example, many traditional societies
are focused on community-centred values that require the promotion and
sustenance of a common life of relationships, in contrast to both the
deontological morality of individual rights and the morality of
utilitarianism that are the most prominent within modern Western moral
philosophy. Within this philosophy itself moral diversity is
represented by the debates between utilitarians and deontologists, and
more recently criticism of both camps by defenders of virtue theory
and communitarianism (see Deontological ethics; Utilitarianism; Virtue
ethics; Community and communitarianism). Such differences have
motivated the doctrine of descriptive relativism: that there exists
extensive diversity of moral judgment across time, societies and
individuals, and that it concerns central moral values and principles.
Critics of descriptive relativism argue that it fails to account for
important moral similarities across cultures such as prohibitions
against killing innocents and provisions for educating and socializing
the young. A relativist response given by Michael Walzer (1987) is to
argue that shared norms must be described in an extremely general way
and that once one examines the concrete forms they take in different
societies, one sees significant variety, for example, in which persons
count as 'innocent'. The descriptive relativist might go so far as to
assert that no significant similarities exist, but an alternative
position is that broad similarities exist that are compatible with
significant differences among the moralities human beings have held.
Critics of descriptive relativism also argue that many moral beliefs
presuppose religious and metaphysical beliefs, and that these beliefs,
rather than any difference in fundamental values, give rise to much
moral diversity (see Religion and morality §3). Also, differences in
moral belief across different societies may not arise from differences
in fundamental values but from the need to implement the same values
in different ways given the varying conditions obtaining in these
societies. One relativist reply is that while such explanations apply
to some moral disagreements, they cannot apply to many others, such as
disagreements over the rightness of eating animals or the moral status
of the foetus or the rightness of sacrificing an innocent person for
the sake of a hundred more.
2. Meta-ethical relativism
The most heated debate about relativism revolves around the question
of whether descriptive relativism supports meta-ethical relativism:
that there is no single true or most justified morality. There is no
direct path from descriptive to meta-ethical relativism; the most
plausible argument for meta-ethical relativism is that it is part of a
larger theory of morality that best explains actual moral diversity.
Critics of meta-ethical relativism point out that moral disagreement
is consistent with the possibility that some moral judgments are truer
or more justified than others, just as disagreement among scientists
does not imply that truth is relative in science. Some relativists are
unimpressed by the analogy with science, holding that disagreements
about the structure of the world can be sufficiently radical to
undermine the assumption that there is an absolute truth to be found.
This defence of meta-ethical relativism amounts to founding it upon a
comprehensive epistemological relativism that expresses scepticism
about the meaningfulness of talking about truth defined independently
of the theories and justificatory practices of particular communities
of discourse (see Epistemic relativism).
An alternative relativist response is to take a nonrelativist stance
towards science and to drive a wedge between scientific and moral
discourse. Defenders of such a morality-specific meta-ethical
relativism argue that scientific disagreements can be explained in
ways that are consistent with there being a nonrelative truth about
the structure of the physical world while moral disagreements cannot
be treated analogously. For example, much scientific disagreement may
be traced to insufficient or ambiguous evidence or distortions of
judgment stemming from personal interests. Relativists have argued
that such explanations will not work for moral disagreements such as
the ones mentioned above concerning the eating of animals, abortion,
and the sacrifice of an innocent to save more lives.
In offering alternative explanations of moral disagreement,
morality-specific relativists tend to adopt a 'naturalistic' approach
to morality in the sense that they privilege a scientific view of the
world and fit their conceptions of morality and moral disagreement
within that view. They deny that moral values and principles
constitute an irreducible part of the fabric of the world and argue
that morality is best explained on the theory that it arises at least
in part from custom and convention. On Wong's view (1984), for
example, a good part of morality arises out of the need to structure
and regulate social cooperation and to resolve conflicts of interest.
Meta-ethical relativism is true because there is no single valid way
to structure social cooperation.
Morality-specific relativism divides into cognitive and non-cognitive
versions (see Moral judgment §1). On C.L. Stevensons emotivist view
(1944), for example, moral discourse merely expresses emotion and
influences the attitudes and conduct of others (see Emotivism).
Cognitive relativists, such as Mackie, Harman, Foot and Wong,
interpret moral judgments as expressing belief, on the grounds that
moral judgments are often argued or judged true or false on the basis
of reasons. Within cognitive relativism, there are those who believe
that there is no single true morality because more than one morality
is true, and those who believe that there is no single true morality
because all are false. J.L. Mackie (1977) represents the latter camp,
on the ground that while morality actually arises out of custom and
convention, the meanings of moral terms presuppose a mistaken
reference to sui generis properties that provide everyone with a
reason for acting according to morality (see Value, ontological status
of). Other cognitive relativists see no need to construe moral terms
as containing a reference to nonexistent properties and instead tie
their cognitive content to certain standards and rules.
According to such a standards relativism, moral language is used to
judge and to prescribe in accordance with a set of standards and
rules. Different sets of standards and rules get encoded into the
meaning of ethical terms such as 'good', 'right' and 'ought' over
time, and into individuals, groups, or societies in such a way that
two apparently conflicting moral beliefs can both be true. Though
under a relativist analysis the beliefs express no conflicting claims
about what is true, they do conflict as prescriptions as to what is to
be done or as to what kinds of things are to be pursued. The
disagreement is purely pragmatic in nature, though parties to the
disagreement may not be aware of this if they erroneously assume they
share the relevant standards.
Another crucial question for the standards relativist concerns whose
standards and rules apply when someone makes a moral judgment. Suppose
that Jones makes a moral judgment about what Smith ought to do, but
that the standards Jones applies to guide his own conduct are not the
same as the standards Smith uses to guide hers. One possibility is
that Jones uses Smith's standards to judge what she ought to do.
Another possibility offered by Harman in some of his writing about
relativism is that one must judge others by standards one shares with
them. His theory is that morality consists of implicit agreements for
the structuring of social cooperation. Moral judgments implying that
the subjects have a reason to do what is prescribed make sense only as
prescriptions based on what the speakers and subjects (and the
intended audience of the judgments) have agreed to do. Other standards
relativists observe that people use their own standards in judging the
conduct of others, whether or not they believe these others to share
their standards.
There are radical and moderate versions of meta-ethical relativism.
Radical relativists hold that any morality is as true or as justified
as any other. Moderate relativists, such as Foot (1978), Walzer and
Wong (1984), deny that there is any single true morality but also hold
that some moralities are truer or more justified than others. On
Wong's view, for instance, certain determinate features of human
nature and similarities in the circumstances and requirements of
social cooperation combine to produce universal constraints on what an
adequate morality must be like. It may be argued, for example, that a
common feature of adequate moralities is the specification of duties
to care and educate the young, a necessity given the prolonged state
of dependency of human offspring and the fact that they require a good
deal of teaching to play their roles in social cooperation. It may
also be a common feature of adequate moralities to require of the
young reciprocal duties to honour and respect those who bring them up,
and this may arise partly from role that such reciprocity plays in
ensuring that those who are charged with caring for the young have
sufficient motivation to do so. Such common features are compatible
with the recognition that adequate moralities could vary significantly
in their conceptions of what values that cooperation should most
realize. Some moralities could place the most emphasis on
community-centred values that require the promotion and sustenance of
a common life of relationships, others could emphasize individual
rights, and still others could emphasize the promotion of utility.
3. Normative relativism
Does meta-ethical relativism have substantive implications for action?
Normative relativism - the doctrine that it is morally wrong to pass
judgment on or to interfere with the moral practices of others who
have adopted moralities different from one's own - is often defended
by anthropologists, perhaps in reaction to those Western conceptions
of the inferiority of other cultures that played a role in
colonialism. It also has application to disagreements within a society
such as that concerning the morality of abortion, where the positions
of the disputing parties seem ultimately to be based on fundamentally
different conceptions of personhood.
As in the case of descriptive and meta-ethical relativism, however,
there is no direct path from metaphysical to normative relativism. One
could hold consistently that there is no single true morality while
judging and interfering with others on the basis of one's own
morality. Wong has proposed a version of normative relativism
consistent with the point that nothing normative follows
straightforwardly from meta-ethical relativism. Meta-ethical
relativism needs to be supplemented with a liberal contractualist
ethic to imply an ethic of nonintervention. A liberal contractualist
ethic requires that moral principles be justifiable to the individuals
governed by these principles. If no single morality is most justified
for everyone, liberal normative relativism may require one not to
interfere with those who have a different morality, though the
requirement of noninterference may not be absolute when it comes into
conflict with other moral requirements such as prohibitions against
torture or the killing of innocents (see Liberalism).
4. Relativism and moral confidence
A reason why relativism has been feared is the thought that it could
easily slide into moral nihilism. Could one continue living according
to one's moral values, which sometimes require significant personal
sacrifice, if one can no longer believe that they are truer or more
justified than other values that require incompatible actions? One
relativist response is that one may reasonably question the importance
of certain features of one's morality upon adopting a view of their
conventional origin. Consider that duties to give aid to others are
commonly regarded as less stringent than duties not to harm them.
Gilbert Harman (1975) has proposed that this difference results from
the superior bargaining position of those with greater material means
in the implicit agreement giving rise to morality. Those with lesser
material means may reasonably question this feature of morality, if
they are persuaded of Harman's explanation. Notice, however, that it
is not merely the supposition that this feature arose from convention
that may undermine one's confidence in it. With regard to other
features of one's morality, one may adopt a relativist view of them
and continue to prize them simply because they are as good as any
other and because they help to constitute a way of life that is one's
own.
Admittedly, people who condemn torture and unremitting cruelty as an
offence against the moral fabric of the world may possess a certitude
not available to relativists and may find it easier to make the
personal sacrifices morality requires. Moral certitude has its own
liabilities, however, and has itself contributed to the unremitting
cruelty that human beings have inflicted upon each other.
See also: Morality and ethics; Relativism; Social relativism
References and further reading
Benedict, R. (1934) Patterns of Culture, New York: Penguin. (Argues
that different cultures are organized around different and
incommensurable values.)
Foot, P. (1978) Moral Relativism (The Lindley Lectures), Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press.
NOTE: (Defends a form of moderate relativism.)
Harman, G. (1975) 'Moral Relativism Defended', Philosophical Review
84: 3-22.
NOTE: (Argues that morality is founded on implicit agreement and
that moral 'ought to do' judgments presuppose that speaker, subject
and intended audience share the relevant moral standards.)
Harman, G. (1984) 'Is There a Single True Morality?, in D. Copp and
D. Zimmerman (eds) Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the
Foundations of Ethics, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld. (Discusses
the relation between a naturalistic approach to morality and
relativism.)
Harman, G. and Thomson, J. (1996) Moral Relativism and Moral
Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
NOTE: (Most comprehensive statement of Harman's relativism.
Modifies some earlier positions taken.)
Herskovits, M. (1972) Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural
Pluralism, New York: Vintage Books. (Anthropologist argues for
meta-ethical and normative relativism.)
Krausz, M. (1989) Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation,
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Besides the
articles from this volume specifically identified here, this is a
good survey of different perspectives on descriptive and
meta-ethical relativism.)
Ladd, J. (1973) Ethical Relativism, Belmont, MA: Wadsworth. (A
collection of philosophical and anthropological essays on
descriptive and meta-ethical relativism.)
MacIntyre, A. (1988) Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
NOTE: (Accepts a strong version of descriptive relativism in which
different moral traditions contain incommensurable values and
standards of rational justification, but argues against
meta-ethical relativism on the grounds that traditions may be
compared with respect to their ability to resolve internal problems
and to explain why other traditions have failed to solve their own
problems.)
Mackie, J.L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,
Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Defends a sceptical form of relativism
under which moral judgments lack the objectivity they purport to
have. Hence no standard moral judgments are true.)
Nagel, T. (1986) The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford University
Press. (Criticism of arguments for meta-ethical relativism from
moral diversity.)
Plato (c.380-367 BC) Theaetetus, in The Collected Dialogues of
Plato, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1961.
NOTE: (Statement of a conventionalist and relativist view of
morality attributed to Protagoras.)
Scanlon, T.M. (1995) 'Fear of Relativism', in R. Hursthouse, G.
Lawrence and W. Quinn (eds) Virtue and Reasons: Philippa Foot and
Moral Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Discussion of why
relativism appears to be a threat to the importance of morality.)
Stevenson, C.L. (1944) Ethics and Language, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press. (Defends a noncognitivist theory of moral
judgment.)
Walzer, M. (1987) Interpretation and Social Criticism, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
NOTE: (Defence of moderate meta-ethical relativism based on the
theory that the meaning of general values is given through specific
practices.)
Williams, B. (1972) Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, New York:
Harper & Row. (Criticism of some versions of meta-ethical and
normative relativism.)
Wong, D. (1984) Moral Relativity, Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press. (A defence of moderate relativism based on a
naturalistic approach. Some chapters presuppose contemporary
philosophy of language that some may regard as technical.)
Wong, D. (1991) 'Three Kinds of Incommensurability', in M. Krausz
(ed.) Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press. (Discusses ways in which value
differences between cultures may result in different criteria for
the rationality of belief about the world.)
Wong, D. (1996) 'Pluralistic Relativism', Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 20: 378-400.
NOTE: (More discussion about the constraints that all adequate
moralities would have to meet.)
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