[Paleopsych] TLS: John Gray: Ethically engineered
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John Gray: Ethically engineered
The Times Literary Supplement, 4.1.16
http://the-tls.co.uk/archive/story.aspx?story_id=2106404&window_type=print
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN NATURE. Jurgen Habermas. Translated by Hella
Beister. 128pp. Oxford: Polity. £40 (paperback, £13.99). - 0 7456 2986
5.
ENOUGH. Genetic engineering and the end of human nature. Bill
McKibben. 274pp. Bloomsbury. £17.99. - 0 7475 6536 8.
The development of genetic engineering opens up the possibility that
humans may be able to design future generations of humans. The Nazis
launched a hideous experiment in breeding a new humanity, but the
power of creating new humans beings eluded them. Mercifully, the
necessary scientific knowledge did not yet exist.
It exists now. There is some debate about when it will be practically
usable, but the technology itself is no longer the stuff of science
fiction. This new human power poses a fundamental difficulty for
liberal ethics. Nazi eugenic policies were based on racist
pseudoscience; genocide was their logical result. It is easy to see
the horror of what the Nazis attempted, but eugenic policies based on
good science and serving impeccably liberal ends have moral
difficulties of their own. Designing future humans to embody liberal
notions of the good life seems to involve treating them as instruments
of our ends -something forbidden by liberal notions of personal
autonomy. True, in doing this we would not be using them simply as
resources to satisfy our wants; we would aim to enhance their freedom
and well-being, by reducing their liability to hereditary disability,
for example, or increasing their intellectual capacities. But we would
still be intervening in their lives in the most radical way
imaginable. We would shape them irrevocably.
It seems we cannot help violating liberal values, even as we strive to
apply them.
There may be no such thing as liberal eugenics.
The contradictions of liberal values are a central theme of Jurgen
Habermas's thoughtful and stimulating new book, The Future of Human
Nature. Unlike most philosophers in anglophone countries, Habermas
does not take liberal ethics for granted. Even more unusually, he
understands that the root of the liberal ideal of autonomy is in a
religious conception of the person. He begins his inquiry with
Kierkegaard's explicitly theocentric account of an authentically human
existence. As a secular humanist, Habermas does not endorse
Kierkegaard's claim that authentic human selfhood is achievable only
in the presence of God; but he is insistent that the question of what
constitutes authentic human existence is central to thinking about the
new biotechnologies.
The tendency in analytical philosophy is to view such questions as
relics of metaphysics or - even worse - religion. A liberal philosophy
can be developed, it is believed, which does not depend on
controversial answers to murky - perhaps even senseless - questions
about the meaning of life. Yet such questions cannot be banished from
philosophy. If new biotechnologies make it possible to create new
human beings, they also make it impossible to avoid questions about
what it means to be human - questions that cannot be answered by
science. Many contemporary philosophers want not only to reject
religious belief but also to purge philosophy of religious questions
and categories of thought. One of the less obvious consequences of
biotechnology is that such a purely secular mode of thinking has
ceased to be a viable option.
Habermas's achievement in this short, dense, suggestive volume is to
reconnect contemporary thought in bioethics to the central traditions
of Western philosophy and religion. But by situating his inquiry in
this way, he does also limit it.
Habermas assumes without question that humans belong in a different
moral category from all other animals. He is right that profound
ethical issues are raised by the power to shape new human beings, but
why should that be more problematic than similar technological
interventions in the lives of other animals? The answer is that, like
almost all contemporary Western philosophers -not least those who
claim most stridently to be rigorously secular in their thinking -
Habermas takes his conception of the human subject from Christianity.
The notion that humans are separated from other animals by an
impassable gulf is a Christian inheritance. Pervasive in
post-Christian cultures, it is absent in most others. Hindus and
Buddhists acknowledge that humans have some distinctive
characteristics, but they do not believe that humans possess
extraordinary attributes - such as free will and an immortal soul
denied to their animal kin. It is scarcely accidental that it was a
pious Christian (Immanuel Kant) who first formulated the liberal idea
of personal autonomy. More to the point, it may not be fully coherent
when wrenched from a Christian view of humans and their place in the
world. Contemporary philosophers pride themselves on their
sophisticated understanding of moral concepts, but in taking the
categories of post-Christian cultures as the unquestioned framework of
moral thought they are being naive. After Habermas's new book this
innocence will be harder to sustain.
Enough: Genetic engineering and the end of human nature makes no
pretence to being a work of conventional philosophy, and it is all the
better for it. Written in a light, graceful style that does not aim
for false clarity or spurious precision, it is a lucid and
illuminating critique of the techno-utopian belief that by applying
scientific knowledge the human condition can be improved beyond
recognition. Bill McKibben does not deny that technology may change
human life irreversibly - on the contrary, that is precisely what he
dreads. It is not science itself he fears, but scientism: the belief
that science can render the pursuit of meaning through myth and
religion superfluous and redundant. If such a reductive utopia were
achievable, it would be at the cost of an immeasurable human loss.
In practice, those who seek to use science to undermine religion end
up turning it into a new religion - and one incomparably more
primitive than the traditional creeds that they aim to supplant. Older
religions help us come to terms with sadness and mortality. The new
ideology of salvation through science promises to eradicate
unhappiness and even do away with death. Showing an impressive
knowledge of the wilder shores of techno-utopian thinking, McKibben
quotes extensively from cryogenicists who seek immortality by having
their cadavers frozen, post-humanists who look forward to the
technological reconstruction of the human organism, and "extropians",
for whom having a body at all is an intolerable constraint on freedom.
These evangelists for science seem to be an endearingly eccentric
bunch, but they do an enormous amount of harm. By representing
technological advance as at once inevitable and somehow inherently
benign, they obscure the choices that we are actually making. In
McKibben's view, the most valuable human characteristic is the ability
to call a halt to technology. Given the new powers conferred by
biotechnology, we can choose to restrain ourselves, and say, enough.
This is an impassioned plea, but it is unlikely that technology can be
controlled by moral restraint. If history is any guide, humans will
use the new powers given by science to the limit. Whatever else it may
produce, the advance of technology will not bring about the world -
rational, hygienic and sterile -that McKibben fears. Instead it will
magnify the capacity of humans to act as they have always done. The
most predictable result of accelerating technological advance is to
increase the intensity of war. Human knowledge grows and changes, but
human needs - with all their attendant conflicts - stay the same. This
may seem a dispiriting prospect, but at least we can forget the
nightmare of a post-human world.
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