[Paleopsych] Wiki: Moral relativism
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Moral relativism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism
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Moral relativism is the position that [2]moral propositions do not
reflect [3]absolute or [4]universal truths. It not only holds that
ethical judgments emerge from social [5]customs and personal
preferences, but also that there is no single standard by which to
assess an ethical proposition's truth. Many relativists see moral
[6]values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries. Some
would even suggest that one person's ethical judgments or acts cannot
be judged by another, though most relativists propound a more limited
version of the theory.
Some moral relativists -- for example, [7]Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980)
-- hold that a personal and [8]subjective [9]moral core lies at the
foundation of our moral acts. They believe that public [10]morality is
a reflection of social convention, and that only personal, subjective
morality is truly authentic.
Moral relativism is not the same as moral [11]pluralism, which
acknowledges the co-existence of opposing ideas and practices, but
does not require that they be equally valid. Moral relativism, in
contrast, contends that opposing moral positions have no truth value,
and that there is no preferred standard of reference by which to judge
them.
Contents
[12]1 History
[13]2 Some philosophical considerations
[14]3 Critics of relativism
[15]4 See also
[16]5 References and sources
[17]6 External links
[[18]edit]
History
Moral relativism is not new. [19]Protagoras' (circa 481-420 BC)
assertion that "man is the measure of all things" is an early
[20]philosophical precursor to modern relativism. The [21]Greek
historian [22]Herodotus (circa 484-420 BC) observed that each society
thinks its own belief system and way of doing things are best. Various
ancient [23]philosophers also questioned the idea of an absolute
standard of morality.
The 18th century [24]Enlightenment philosopher, [25]David Hume
(1711-1776), is in several important respects the father of both
modern [26]emotivism and moral relativism, though Hume himself was not
a relativist. He distinguished between matters of fact and matters of
value, and suggested that moral judgments consist of the latter, for
they do not deal with verifiable facts that obtain in the world, but
only with our sentiments and passions, though he argued that some of
our sentiments are universal. He is famous for denying any objective
standard for morality, and suggested that the universe is indifferent
to our preferences and our troubles.
In the modern era, [27]anthropologists such as [28]Ruth Benedict
(1887-1948), cautioned observers not to use their own cultural
standards to evaluate those they were studying, which is known as
[29]ethnocentricism. Benedict said there are no morals, only customs,
and in comparing customs, the anthropologist, "insofar as he remains
an anthropologist ... is bound to avoid any weighting of one in favor
of the other." To some extent, the increasing body of knowledge of
great differences in belief among societies caused both social
scientists and philosophers to question whether there can be any
objective, absolute standards pertaining to values. This caused some
to posit that differing systems have equal validity, with no standard
for adjudicating among conflicting beliefs. The Finnish
philosopher-anthropologist, [30]Edward Westermarck (1862-1939) was
among the first to formulate a detailed theory of moral relativism. He
contended that all moral ideas are subjective judgments that reflect
one's upbringing. He rejected [31]G.E. Moore's (1873-1958)
intuitionism -- in vogue during the early part of the 20th century,
and which identified moral propositions as true or false, and known to
us through a special faculty of [32]intuition -- due to the obvious
differences in beliefs among societies, which he said was evidence
that there is no innate, intuitive power.
[[33]edit]
Some philosophical considerations
So-called descriptive or normative relativists (for example, [34]Ralph
Barton Perry), accept that there are fundamental disagreements about
the right course of action even when the same facts obtain and the
same consequences are likely to arise. However, the descriptive
relativist does not necessarily deny that there is one correct moral
appraisal, given the same set of circumstances. Other descriptivists
believe that opposing moral beliefs can both be true, though critics
point out that this leads to obvious logical problems. The latter
descriptivists, for example, several leading [35]Existentialists,
believe that morality is entirely subjective and personal, and beyond
the judgment of others. In this view, moral judgments are more akin to
aesthetic considerations and are not amenable to rational analysis.
In contrast, the metaethical relativist maintains that all moral
judgments are based on either societal or individual standards, and
that there is no single, objective standard by which one can assess
the truth of a moral proposition. While he preferred to deal with more
practical, real-life ethical matters, the British philosopher
[36]Bernard Williams (1929-2003) reluctantly came to this conclusion
when he put on his metaethicist's hat. Metaethical relativists, in
general, believe that the descriptive properties of terms such as
good, bad, right, and wrong are not subject to [37]universal [38]truth
conditions, but only to societal convention and personal preference.
Given the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals
will have a fundamental disagreement about what ought to be done based
on societal or individiual norms, and these cannot be adjudicated
using some independent standard of evaluation, for the latter standard
will always be societal or personal and not universal, unlike, for
example, the scientific standards for assessing temperature or for
determining mathematical truths.
Moral relativism stands in marked contrast to [39]moral absolutism,
[40]moral realism, and [41]moral naturalism, which all maintain that
there are moral facts, facts that can be both known and judged,
whether through some process of verification or through intuition.
These philosophies see morality as something that obtains in the
world. Examples include the philosophy of [42]Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1712-1778), who saw man's nature as inherently good, or of [43]Ayn
Rand, who believed morality is derived from man's exercising his
unobstructed rationality. Others believe moral knowledge is something
that can be derived by external sources such as a deity or revealed
doctrines, as would be maintained by various [44]religions. Some hold
that moral facts inhere in nature or reality, either as particular
instances of perfect ideas in an eternal realm, as adumbrated by
[45]Plato (429-347 BC); or as a simple, unanalyzable property, as
advocated by Moore. In each case, however, moral facts are invariant,
though the circumstances to which they apply might be different.
Moreover, in each case, moral facts are objective and can be
determined.
Some philosophers maintain that moral relativism devolves into
[46]emotivism, the movement inspired by [47]logical positivists in the
early part of the 20th Century. Leading exponents of logical
positivism include [48]Rudolph Carnap {1891-1970} and [49]A. J. Ayer
{1910-1989}. Going beyond Hume, the positivists contended that a
proposition is meaningful only if it can be verified by [50]logical or
scientific inquiry. Thus, [51]metaphysical propositions, which cannot
be verified in this manner, are not simply incorrect, they are
meaningless, nonsensical. Moral judgments are primarily expressions of
emotional preferences or states, devoid of cognitive content;
consequently, they are not subject to verification. As such, moral
propositions are essentially meaningless utterances or, at best,
express personal attitudes (see, for example, [52]Charles L. Stevenson
{1908-1979}). Not all relativists would hold that moral propositions
are meaningless; indeed, many make any number of assertions about
morality, assertions that they undoubtedly believe to be meaningful.
However, other philosophers have argued that, since we have no means
of analysing a moral proposition, it is essentially meaningless, and,
in their view, relativism is therefore tantamount to emotivism.
The political theorist, [53]Leo Strauss (1899-1973), subscribed to a
species of relativism, for he believed there are no objective criteria
for assessing ethical principles, and that a rational morality is only
possible in the limited sense that one must accept its ultimate
subjectivity. This view is very similar to the one advocated by the
existentialist philosophers, [54]Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and
Sartre. The latter famously maintained that ethical principles only
arise from our personal feelings at the time we act, and not from any
antecedent principles.
[55]Karl Marx (1818-1883) was a moral relativist, for he thought each
moral system was simply a product of the dominant class, and that the
movement of history will settle moral questions, not a fixed,
universal standard.
[[56]edit]
Critics of relativism
Those who believe in moral absolutes are often highly critical of
moral relativism; some have been known to equate it with outright
immorality or amorality. [57]The Holocaust, [58]Stalinism,
[59]apartheid, [60]genocide, [61]unjust wars, [62]genital mutilation,
[63]slavery, [64]terrorism, [65]Nazism, etc., present difficult
problems for relativists. An observer in a particular time and place,
depending on his outlook (e.g., culture, religion, background), might
call something good that another observer in a particular time and
place would call evil. Slavery, for example, was thought by many to be
acceptable, even good, in other times and places, while it is viewed
by many (though certainly not all), today, as a great evil. Many
critics of relativism would say that any number of evils can be
justified based on subjective or cultural preferences, and that
morality requires some universal standard against which to measure
ethical judgments.
Some relativists will state that this is an unfair criticism of
relativism, for it is really a metaethical theory, and not a normative
one, and that the relativist may have strong moral beliefs,
notwithstanding his foundational position. Critics of this view,
however, argue the complaint is disingenuous, and that the relativist
is not making a mere metaethical assertion; that is, one that deals
with the logical or linguistic structure of ethical propositions.
These critics contend that stating there is no preferred standard of
truth, or that standards are equally true, addresses the ultimate
validity and truth of the ethical judgments themselves, which, they
contend, is a normative judgment. In other words, the separation
between metaethics and normative ethics is arguably a distinction
without a difference.
Some philosophers, for example, [66]Michael E. Berumen {1952-} and
[67]R. M. Hare (1919-2002), argue that moral propositions are subject
to logical rules, notwithstanding the absence of any factual content,
including those subject to cultural or religious standards or norms.
Thus, for example, they contend that one cannot hold contradictory
ethical judgments. This allows for moral discourse with shared
standards, notwithstanding the descriptive propeties or truth
conditions of moral terms. They do not affirm or deny there are moral
facts, only that logic applies to our moral assertions; consequently,
they contend, there is an objective and preferred standard of moral
justification, albeit in a very limited sense. These philosophers also
point out that, aside from logical constraints, all systems treat
certain moral terms alike in an evaluative sense. This is similar to
our treatment of other terms such as less or more, the meaning of
which is universally understood and not dependent upon independent
standards (measurements, for example, can be converted). It applies to
good and bad when used in their non-moral sense, too: for example,
when we say, "this is a good wrench" or "this is a bad wheel." This
evaluative property of certain terms also allows people of different
beliefs to have meaningful discussions on moral questions, even though
they disagree about certain facts.
Berumen, among others, has said that if relativism were wholly true,
there would be no reason to prefer it over any other theory, given its
fundamental contention that there is no preferred standard of truth.
He says that it is not simply a metaethical theory, but a normative
one, and that its truth, by its own definition, cannot in the final
analysis be assessed or weighed against other theories.
[[68]edit]
See also
* [69]Analytical philosophy
* [70]Anthropology
* [71]Business ethics
* [72]Deontology
* [73]Emotivism
* [74]Ethics
* [75]Logic
* [76]Metaethics
* [77]Moral codes
* [78]Moral purchasing
* [79]Morality
* [80]Objectivism
* [81]Philosophy
* [82]Situational ethics
* [83]Subjectivism
[[84]edit]
References and sources
Curt Baier, "Difficulties in the Emotive-Imperative Theory" in
Moral Judgement: Readings in Contemporary Meta-Ethics
Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Mentor)
Michael E. Berumen, Do No Evil: Ethics with Applications to
Economic Theory and Business (iUniverse)
R.M. Hare, Sorting out Ethics (Oxford University Press)
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,
Editied by Tom L. Beauchamp(Oxford University Press)
G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press)
Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism" in
Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre, Edited by Walter
Kaufmann (World Publishing Company)
Leo Strauss, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism,
Edited by Thomas L. Pangle (University of Chicago Press)
Edward Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral
Ideas (Macmillan)
Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard
University Press)
[[85]edit]
External links
* [86]Objectivism and
Relativism (http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/ethics.htm#Metaphysi
cal%20Issues:%20Objectivism%20and%20Relativism)
* [87]Moral
Relativism (http://www.AllAboutPhilosophy.org/Moral-Relativism.htm
) A Christian Perspective.
[89]Categories: [90]Ethics | [91]Social philosophy
References
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_absolutism
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_universalism
5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Customs
6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Values
7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Paul_Sartre
8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective
9. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_core
10. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality
11. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluralism
12. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#History
13.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#Some_philosophical_considerations
14. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#Critics_of_relativism
15. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#See_also
16. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#References_and_sources
17. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#External_links
18.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Moral_relativism&action=edit§ion=1
19. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protagoras
20. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical
21. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek
22. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herodotus
23. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophers
24. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlightenment
25. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume
26. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism
27. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropologists
28. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruth_Benedict
29. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnocentricism
30. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Westermarck
31. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G.E._Moore
32. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuition
33.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Moral_relativism&action=edit§ion=2
34. http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ralph_Barton_Perry&action=edit
35. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialists
36. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Williams
37. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal
38. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth
39. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_absolutism
40. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism
41. http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Moral_naturalism&action=edit
42. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Jacques_Rousseau
43. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayn_Rand
44. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion
45. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato
46. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism
47. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivists
48. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolph_Carnap
49. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A._J._Ayer
50. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic
51. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical
52. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_L._Stevenson
53. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leo_Strauss
54. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Heidegger
55. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx
56.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Moral_relativism&action=edit§ion=3
57. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Holocaust
58. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalinism
59. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apartheid
60. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide
61. http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Unjust_war&action=edit
62. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genital_mutilation
63. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery
64. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism
65. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazism
66. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_E._Berumen
67. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R._M._Hare
68.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Moral_relativism&action=edit§ion=4
69. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytical_philosophy
70. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropology
71. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_ethics
72. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontology
73. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism
74. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics
75. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic
76. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaethics
77. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_codes
78. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_purchasing
79. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality
80. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivism
81. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy
82. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Situational_ethics
83. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivism
84.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Moral_relativism&action=edit§ion=5
85.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Moral_relativism&action=edit§ion=6
86.
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/ethics.htm#Metaphysical%20Issues:%20Objectivism%20and%20Relativism
87. http://www.AllAboutPhilosophy.org/Moral-Relativism.htm
88. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism
89.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Categories&article=Moral_relativism
90. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Ethics
91. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Social_philosophy
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