[Paleopsych] Matt Nuenke reviews Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement by Nicholas Agar.
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Matt Nuenke reviews Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement by
Nicholas Agar.
http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/agar.htm
A review of Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement by
Nicholas Agar.
Bioethicists have been very active in helping to set policy or
legislation with regards to what procedures should and should not be
allowed for genetic engineering, cloning, distributive justice, etc.
In Liberal Eugenics: In Defense of Human Enhancement, 2004, Nicholas
Agar argues for allowing everyone to use whatever technology is
available, except in a few cases, to enhance their children's genetic
opportunitiesfree of disease, low intelligence, small stature,
ugliness, and anything else that can be improved upon.
One thing struck me as very odd however: neither Agar nor any of the
other bioethicists he discusses give any value to the genetic
interests of parents in producing children that will be fitter to
continue reproduction. For example, I would assume that parents leave
their money to their children because not only do they want their
children to live betterhappier lives, but they also want to equip
their children with additional resources to have more children. This
is such a well-studied subject in evolutionary biology, that to ignore
it for human reproduction places most bioethicists outside of science
altogether; they are merely a new secular priesthood.
That being said, I found many interesting speculations in this book,
as well as rebuttals to other's ethical arguments against genetic
engineering, making it great fodder for discussing numerous peripheral
aspects of eugenics. Agar states that, "The improvement of human stock
is no business of the eugenics that this book preaches. Indeed, I do
not presume to make any judgments about what to count as such an
improvement and how it might be accomplished. Twentieth-century
eugenicists thought that bettering humanity would require the strict
regulation of reproduction. The eugenics defended here differs in
being primarily concerned with the protection and extension of
reproductive freedom. Reproductive freedom as it is currently
recognized in liberal societies encompasses the choice of whether or
not to reproduce, with whom to reproduce, when to reproduce, and how
many times to reproduce. What I call liberal eugenics adds the choice
of certain of your children's characteristics to this list of
freedoms. At the book's center are powerful genetic technologies that
will enable prospective parents to make such a choice. More
specifically, I will argue that prospective parents should be
empowered to use available technologies to choose some of their
children's characteristics."
With the above disclaimer, he then goes on to discuss eugenics as if
it had no long term consequences for society, parents, or groups that
practice it, as if genetic enhancement is like having your children's
teeth straightened: a one time procedure with no consequences for your
children's children. Perhaps Agar is aware of eugenics' goal of not
only improving one's children's characteristics, but making those
improvements available on down the genealogical path to all future
generations. We constantly hear how we do not want to leave our huge
national debt to our children, then too many ignore future generations
genetic debts such as disease, low intelligence, irrationality, and
all the other genetic debts that have accumulated over millions of
years of genetic meandering.
Today, the two most practical methods used for genetic engineering
enhancement are Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) where
multiple fertilized eggs are tested for any known disease, with the
most disease free egg(s) implanted for reproduction, and sperm and egg
banks, where donors supply eggs or sperm from the elitethose who are
tall, attractive, intelligent, athletic, and free of disease or
emotional problems.
With PGD, parents use natural variation to select the best of possible
children to be born. With sperm banks, the best donors are selected.
It is also possible of course to purchase the best two of the best
donors, then select the most disease free fertilized eggs using PGD
for implantation into a surrogate mother. When cloning becomes
possible, then these super-selected children could be reproduced in
abundance, without knowing exactly which genes are involved in traits
such as high intelligence. The winning combinations will just be
multiplied and reassembled as desired, leading to a new elite
population group.
Agar has some interesting comments on race: "When one chooses a mate
one is often also choosing what kind of person will contribute genes
to one's children. We accept that racist people can refuse to have
children with members of a race they despise because we think that who
one is attracted to and repelled by is beyond state regulation. Our
negative judgments about their characters do not lead us to force them
into relationships with people for whom they claim no attraction. By
analogy, perhaps no moral reason could be sufficiently strong to
justify the state's intruding on individuals' eugenic choices.
Insisting that racism be no motive for the use of enhancement
technologies would, in effect, be like insisting that people be
sexually attracted to others regardless of skin color."
Note that he is judgmental against the assumed characteristics of
racists, but racists are to have no judgment about the characteristics
of other races or people. Is a racist any different from a person who
hates people who litter, drives recklessly, or has low intelligence?
Most normal people have emotions of disgust or aversion towards some
types of other people, whether those emotions are based on individual
characteristics or characteristics that are common to a religion,
political party, sports fans, or races. So why are racists the only
group not allowed to have a preference for their own kind? I would
also submit that most people are therefore racists, based on Agar's
criteria, because most people prefer their own kin likeness.
With brain imaging technology, it may be possible to confirm that
feelings of hostility between human races is part of our reptilian
brain, and not easily subject to modification, any more than we could
intellectually alter our sexual attraction to another gender change
our preferences from attractive to ugly people. These are not acquired
feelings; they are built in and deep, beyond easy access. Our more
advanced human brains however are very adept at deception,
self-deception, and manipulation of others for their own benefit.
Antiracism then is just the latest attempt to transfer wealth from
Western nations to third world nations or to third world people living
in Western nations.
Agar quotes Steven Pinker in why there should not be too much
enthusiasm for genetic engineering by futurologists. They are
essentially technological limitations, and he ignores the political
ramifications of genetic engineering. Once it becomes common knowledge
that the differences between groups is primarily genetic, especially
intelligence, the current egalitarian political zeitgeist will turn
away from socialism to a more free wheeling capitalism, where those
who have will keep, and those who don't will slide further behind.
Parents will realize that it is far better to make sure that their
children are born innately intelligent, and let them develop naturally
as nature intended. Pushing children too hard too fast, as Agar shows
later in the book, is not beneficial. Naïve environmentalism will be
replaced by a more balanced interactionist perspective when it comes
to having children: start with good genes, let them develop naturally,
and they will grow up productive and happyon average.
This realization will also have another major impact on world
population distributions. Once it is fully understood that Blacks from
South Africa or Amerindians from Mexico have a very low probability of
success in a technology demanding culture, where they will be an
economic drag on the economy, the open borders will be slammed shut.
Eugenics will then in fact be in play at least with regards to who we
let in to the West, and how far we are willing to allow those already
here reproductive freedom when they are incapable of supporting a
family. Reproductive rights also means reproductive responsibility.
Agar states, "The idea that my clone would resemble me in every
significant respect relies on one of the most pervasive contemporary
misunderstandings of biology. This misunderstanding is genetic
determinism, the view that our genes dictate all but superficial
aspects of our phenotypes, or visible traits. Genetic determinism lies
behind many of the misguided hopes and fears about the new genetic
technologies." He makes this claim about whom? I am not aware of any
scientist, eugenicist, or educated person who believes that identical
twins are exactly alike, nor would clones be exactly alike. However,
identical twins reared apart are generally quite similar in such
features as attractiveness, height, intelligence, and athleticism.
Therefore, he sets up a straw man. If anything, we are still in denial
with regards to genes, and the environmental determinists are still in
the majority, denying any racial differences in average intelligence.
Then he states, "The twin or clone of a genius might easily miss out
on the precise combination of early educational or nutritional
influences required for the making of great intelligence." Now he is
guilty of environmental determinism. Yet, no one has been able to show
that environmental factors have much influence on adult intelligence.
Any potentially highly intelligent child will do just fine with a
typical education, nutrition, and avoidance of any mishaps like
playing too much soccer that can cause brain damage.
Bioethicists seem especially concerned with human aspirations that
compared to futurists border on messianic zealotry. Agar states,
confusingly, "This theory [utilitarianism] comports better with our
intuitions about the way we should live. Most of us do not set the
accumulation of units of pleasure as life's single aim; rather we
pursue goals involving family, careers and friends and we consider a
good life to be one in which many of these significant goals are
achieved. Preference utilitarians can readily grant that being
naturally somber does not stand in the way of a satisfactory
existence; many people who have sunny temperaments nonetheless fail to
satisfy their most important desires, something that many of the less
temperamentally buoyant achieve. This variant of utilitarianism also
gives strongly counterintuitive answers to questions about human
genetic engineering. For example, Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer wonder
whether it would be possibleand desirable?to attempt to genetically
engineer people whose capacities and goals, while possibly truncated,
are in harmony with their limited passions? The goal of designing
humans who are both limited to easily satisfiable preferences and meet
the criteria for personhood is likely to pose technological
difficulties for enhancers. But the claim that if feasible it should
be mandatory seems even more absurd than the idea of compulsory
[enhanced mood] therapy."
If you are confused by the above, so was I. The most eugenicists want
to do is equip people with higher average intelligence, normal
stature, pleasant looks, athleticism, and to be free of disease. I
have never heard any eugenicists discuss much in the way of improving
a person's behavioral traits or level of natural contentment.
Nevertheless, no genetic enhancement say in overall happiness, would
in any way lead to some sort of disharmony. I really have no idea how
an enhanced person could in any way be truncated, in disharmony, have
limited passions, etc. Humans have enough trouble understanding what
it means to be conscious, much less fine-tuning the meaning of life in
its various forms.
These discussions beg an even broader question: What is the purpose of
an egalitarian ethics that calls for redistributive justice? Are
humans really happier because of how much wealth they have
accumulated? If yes, then it is advantageous to accumulate as much
wealth as possible and not give to those in need. If wealth is
relative, then it is even more advantageous to obtain greater wealth,
as much as possible, because it means little to have absolute wealth
if all those around you are wealthier still. That is, humans compete
for resources because having greater resources means out competing
one's competitors.
Looked at in this way, being destitute in sub-Saharan Africa means
little in terms of relative happiness, if everyone around you is in
the same situation. The same is true at Ivy League universities, it
means little to the average student that they can afford a cell phone,
an iPod, fly home for vacation, etc., because of family wealth when
those all around you have the same level of wealth. Evolution has
equipped humans with a homeostatic level of relative contentmentsex,
food, shelter, dominance, killing off a competingneighboring tribe
along with the excitement of the killthese proximate emotions were
evolutionary successful at promoting life and reproduction. Just
accumulating more wealth for its own sake means little in terms of
happinesshumans merely readjust their ambitions upward and start the
struggle all over again. This is the idiocy of egalitarianismit has no
basis in human nature.
Agar concludes that, "it is hard to see how someone could be harmed by
being brought into existence as a human clone. Had he not been created
by somatic cell nuclear transfer, he simply would not have existed at
all. Utilitarian lawmakers who accepted a person-affecting condition
on moral discourse could avoid making [mood enhancing] therapy
compulsory by pointing out that their moral principle simply does not
apply to the countless different kinds of people we could bring into
existence. The problem is that person-affecting utilitarianism avoids
the aforementioned absurd conclusions only by offering no guidance on
how we should use enhancement technologies. Kantians also seem forced
to choose between absurdity and silence when they confront enhancement
technologies. According to the version of Kant's Categorical
Imperative most often used to resolve bioethical dilemmas, one should
never treat another person exclusively as a means to an end."
He then goes on to discuss those who would clone for a means to their
own ends (or not end in death): "The Raelians would create special
kinds of human beings merely to satisfy the vanity of those who
misguidedly see somatic cell nuclear transfer as a means of
perpetuating their own existences. But first appearances are
deceptive. People have always had selfish motives for reproducing.
They want kids to save marriages, to ensure pampered retirements, or
to find some new purpose in life. This selfishness in respect of
individuals who do not yet exist seems perfectly compatible with
proper parental concern once children's lives are under way. The fact
is that it is hard to have non-instrumental motives in respect of a
person who does not yet exist. Compare the aforementioned instrumental
motives with the absence of motive that anticipates the existence of
children whose parents were just too drunk or drugged to remember to
use contraception. These children don't seem better off simply in
virtue of the fact that there were no instrumental reasons for their
existence."
I think he makes a very good point here. When people say, "I want the
best for my children," they mean they want their children to be happy,
but also they want their children to be successful and to pass on the
genes that we all use temporarily while we are alive. In fact, in a
modern technological world, it is hard to justify having children for
any reason other than because a) we just want children and/or b) we
want children to pass on our genes. In a modern society, one would be
better off setting up a savings account and putting money aside for
retirement, rather than rely on one's children to take care of you in
old age.
Children are used by society however. We spend large amounts of money
on educating our children to be productive workers, we teach them to
be patriotic so that they will fight and die for their country if the
need arises, we imbue them with virtues that are beneficial for the
society but not necessarily good for the individual, etc. Children, as
far as society sees them, are instrumental for the future prosperity
of the country; they are a means to an end.
Agar continues, "Philosophers have thought hard about whether
potentially rational human embryos have a moral entitlement to be
born. The advent of enhancement technologies raises the issue of
whether human embryos have any moral claim on a rational existence.
Those who argue against any right to rational existence would point
out that the discovery of human intelligence genes and the invention
of techniques for transferring them into non-human embryos may herald
an era in which every mammalian embryo is potentially a rational
being. Kant seems to have little to contribute to this particular
exchange on enhancement technologies beyond the idea that if we do
deliberately create non-rational beings in place of rational ones, our
treatment of them will not be constrained by the Categorical
Imperative."
There was a great debate apparently eons agoI have lost the reference
and if anyone knows of it I would like to hear from you. Anyway, the
debate was about whether life is worth living, and how can we prove
that it is. It seems that when bioethicists debate a "right to be
born," they suffer a multitude of objections: is the life going to be
a good life, is the planet already overpopulated, but more
importantly, is it wise to add humans and what kinds of humans to the
existing billions of people already here? The history of humanity has
always been one of overpopulation followed by warfare, genocide,
starvation or disease (Keeley 1996; LaBlanc 2003). I find little
support to any claim that life in itself has value outside of various
evolutionary drives to reproduce.
Agar continues, "Utilitarianism and Kantianism orient our intuitions
about right and wrong towards certain kinds of moral problemthose
involving people whose existence is not at issue. We can use these
theories to help us to decide whether or not we are permitted to end
someone's existence, but not to decide whether or not someone should
ever exist."
Agar then discusses Leon R. Kass who is on the President's Counsel on
Bioethics, "Kass is very impressed by the queasiness that typically
accompanies contemplation of the possibility of cloning humans. He
proposes that this unease is 'the emotional expression of deep wisdom,
beyond reason's power to fully articulate it.' Kass continues: 'We are
repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings . . . because we
intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of
things that we rightfully hold dear.' In chapter 2 I argued that we
must make the new genetic technologies morally transparent. According
to Kass, significant parts of morality itself are not transparent. We
often know that we are disgusted by a certain practice without
understanding precisely why we are disgusted. Kass asks of other
abhorrent activities such as 'fatherdaughter incest (even with
consent), or having sex with animals, or mutilating a corpse, or
eating human flesh, or even just (just!) raping and murdering another
human being whether anybody's failure to give full rational
justification for his or her revulsion at these practices make that
revulsion ethically suspect.' The contention that there is no decisive
argument against human cloning should be understood not as support for
cloning, but instead as an expression of rationality's impotence when
faced with an issue that bears on human existence in such a
fundamental way. Instinctual disgust is the only reliable guide."
I find these types of arguments so shallow and absurd because they
smack of intolerant religious dogma. Its as if we should have
suppressed the revelation that the earth was a ball, floating in
space, rather than flat, because people would be terrified of falling
off otherwise. Just like other scientific trends, many people hate new
technologies and change, while others embrace it. Kass may be
"repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings," but I am equally
repelled by miscegenation, especially between Blacks and Whites, as
well as having that sinking feeling when I see Blacks in my
neighborhood. I would argue that my lizard brain's emotional disgust
is a much deeper part of human nature than feeling disgust from
various changes in values and technologies that are new to our only
recently evolved executive brains.
He continues, "Kass makes the same kinds of points against human
genetic engineering. The embryo that a couple offers to a genetic
engineer for modification may contain nuclear DNA from both of them.
But the attempt to improve upon sex's power to provide the kinds of
children we want threatens the meanings of love and of making families
that we humans have layered on to the biological functions of sex and
reproduction. Transhumanists deny that enhancement technologies
destroy meaning. They speak of 'aesthetic and contemplative pleasures
whose blissfulness vastly exceeds what any human has yet experienced'
and 'love that is stronger, purer, and more secure than any human has
yet harbored.' Deciding who to believe requires moral images
constructed from other cases in which a technology has separated the
satisfaction of a desire from its customary foundation. We can use our
judgment about whether this separation has destroyed meaning as a
guide to what to say about the similar propensity of enhancement
technologies."
Well, circumcision comes to mind, a painful ritual to make a people
different and deter others from joining the tribe, as well as natural
childbirth versus being sedated. I see no reason why a couple that
would take the time, expend the money, go through the somewhat painful
process of harvesting eggs, etc. to make their children healthier,
happier and wise would not be making a much greater commitment to
reproduction than those who procreate because they happen to be horny
and failed to discuss the consequences. The future of our children
will be far more secure, safe, and productive when sex is finally
separated from reproduction. Nature no longer needs horniness to make
humans reproduce. After all, reproduction between lizards is
essentially an act of rape, not love. If humans maintained that form
of reproduction, would Kass be arguing that giving up rape as part of
reproduction some how diminishes the "meaning of rape and of making
families?"
Agar continues, "Kass presents the use of genetic technologies to
treat disease 'by eliminating the patient' as a 'peculiar innovation
in medicine.' But he is wrong. Consider the following example. Women
who drink during pregnancy sometimes give birth to children suffering
from fetal alcohol syndrome, a condition characterized by abnormal
facial features, stunted growth and central nervous system problems.
Suppose a woman who is currently drinking heavily asks her doctor for
advice about whether or not she should get pregnant. He responds that
she should not get pregnant until she has cut down on her drinkingin
effect advising that she substitute the child she would have while not
drinking for the one she would have while on alcohol. Does the fact
that the healthy child would not exist at all had his mother become
pregnant earlier make him a beneficiary of therapy? If we count his
existence as a benefit conferred by the doctor, then we should be
similarly generous to a skeptical father who postpones his daughter's
marriage, thereby delaying the birth of her first child. This does not
seem right. The important point is that, however we understand the
case of the doctor advising his patient to cut down on her drinking
before getting pregnant, it is not medical malpractice. We would not
accuse the doctor of recklessly straying outside of the therapeutic
domain. Perhaps no one is benefited, but disease is still prevented,
and if so, the moral image of therapy can encompass PGD and gene
therapy on gametes or early embryos. Both conventional doctors and
gene therapists act morally in allowing a healthy baby to be born in
place of an unhealthy one [by genetically selecting the healthiest
eggs for implantation]."
Kass seems to be oblivious to alternative moral or ethical norms. In
Mother Nature, Hrdy portrays humans as routinely killing or abandoning
their children as a practical matter under varying ecological
circumstances (Hrdy ??). Sometimes, the elite didn't want to be
bothered by raising children and sent them off, poor people often
abandoned their children to die, and numerous cultures killed their
newly born children whenever prospects looked poor or the children
were deemed unfit or cursed. That has been the norm for thousands of
years, it is still practiced in many parts of the world, and it seems
to be quite moral for humans to make decisions about the viability of
their childrenlet this one die, and invest in another later on with
better potential for survival. That is human morality as it was
practiced before the modern age, and it has merit. Why should a family
or society invest resources in less than ideal children when we have
the ability to select the quality of the children that we wish to
raise to adulthood? Far too many families are torn apart because a
child is disabled. It would be better for all to terminate the
defective at birth, and have a healthy babya decision that benefits
the whole family and society in general. Disabled children demand an
inordinate amount of resources that should be diverted to the children
with more potential for the future.
Turning back to genetic determinism Agar states, "Genetic determinists
make the formation of a person's embryo an extremely significant event
for her identity. According to them, the formation of a person's
genome causally necessitates her every significant characteristic. In
chapter 2 I suggested that genetic determinism fails to take account
of the important role of the environment. The question of the relative
significance to human beings of environmental and genetic influences
has occasioned many an academic spat. Genetic determinism finds its
ideological counterpart in environmental determinism."
Agar is wrong in his assumption that eugenicists think only in terms
of genes and not development, especially in raising children. I and
many others in the particularistracialist eugenics' movement are very
concerned about how to raise our children so that they will feel bound
to their tribe, prosper emotionally and intellectually, and be
provided with an environment that allows them to find their own
nicheas long as it is not becoming a self-hating White. Eugenicists I
believe would be much less demanding of their children in their early
years, because being aware of their intellectual potential, pushing
children too hard and too early, is not beneficial. Children need to
develop at a slow enough pace to learn how to think, not just what to
think. So contrary to Agar's conjectures, eugenicists believe in
balancing nature and nurture. It is the egalitarian Left that rejects
the interactionist concept of development.
Even more bizarre than Kass's philosophy, Agar goes on to Fukuyama's.
"Fukuyama's account of human nature is a fusion of two different
scientific ideas. He says that human nature comprises 'the species
typical characteristics shared by all human beings qua human beings.'
'Species typical' is to be understood in the way that biologists do
when they say 'pair bonding is typical of robins and catbirds but not
of gorillas and orangutans.' Fukuyama also invokes genes, saying
'human nature is the sum of the behavior and characteristics that are
typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than
environmental factors.' He allows that genes do not fix traits like
intelligence or height. Instead, they set 'limits to the degree of
variance possible.' Fukuyama elaborates on this idea, saying that 'the
finding that IQ is 40 to 50 percent heritable already contains within
it an estimate of the impact of culture on IQ and implies that even
taking culture into account, there is a significant component of IQ
that is genetically determined.' His point is best explained by
reference to something that E. O. Wilson has called the genetic leash.
This softer version of genetic determinism specifies that although
genes do not precisely fix traits, they fix limits within which traits
can vary. Fukuyama says 'there are limits to the degree of variance
possible, limits that are set genetically: if you deprive a population
of enough calories on average, they starve to death rather than
growing smaller, while past a certain point, increasing calorie intake
makes them fatter, not taller.' This, according to Fukuyama, is what
morally separates changes to a person's genes from changes to her
environment. While the consequences of environmental changes could
never be of sufficient magnitude to take our humanity from us, the
consequences of genetic changes may be. No leash limits the efforts of
genetic engineers. They can insert as many NR2B genes [that makes mice
smart] as their scruples allow. In doing so, they corrupt human nature
by going beyond the maximum extension of the leash. Genetic engineers
who want only to treat Alzheimer's and diabetes do not corrupt human
nature because they respect the leash."
The last few sentences are a bit confusing, but what Agar is trying to
say is that when we mess with germline genetic changes, we change
humans genetically into the future. However, how does this change
human nature? For example, if a group used PGD along with IVF to
select the brightest future child out of a dozen genetically tested
embryos, they are only selecting for the best, just like entrance
exams to a university. Human nature is not changed, just the average
human intelligence. It only changes the frequency of some genes
(actually alleles or gene variants) over others, which is how humans
evolved and races differ. If this changes human nature, then there
must be more than one human nature out there, contrary to what
Fukuyama and many evolutionary psychologists claim.
Agar continues, "The best way to introduce concerns about the
biotechnology's impact on liberal social arrangements is by way of
Fukuyama's reflections on both of these topics. His 1992 book, The End
of History and the Last Man, established him as a leading defender of
liberal democracy. In it, Fukuyama declared that history, considered
as a progression of political arrangements, was over. Soon, and
evermore, all human societies would be liberal democratic ones.
Fukuyama spent much of the 1990s rebutting arguments for the staying
power of various illiberal social arrangements. With the 2002
publication of Our Posthuman Future, he turns his attention towards
biotechnology, a threat that he finds more potent than communism or
religious fundamentalism. According to Fukuyama, biotechnology has the
power to restart history by replacing humans with posthumans.
Posthumans may have imposed upon them, or perhaps even choose,
political arrangements very different from liberal democratic ones."
I find this assertion by Fukuyama to be so bizarre that he is
definitely on the fringe. First, there is no reason why our current
liberal democracies have any forgone staying power just because
Fukuyama says so. If humans fall into a dysgenic trend, say with an
average IQ of 85 around the world, liberal democracy cannot be
sustained. It takes knowledgeable people to keep democracy safe from
its inherent corroding influences (Somit & Peterson 1997; Hoppe 2001).
Democracy is not a stable political system by any means.
In addition, if we can increase the average intelligence of a
population group, we can replace representative democracy with direct
democracy with constitutional guarantees to protect segments of the
population from the possible oppressiveness of direct democracy. A
highly intelligent population group is far better equipped to think
for themselves, rather than being manipulated by politicians, the
media, interest group propaganda, etc. Fukuyama wants to stop the
natural progression that the enlightenment, freedom, and innate
intelligence has made possible. Could anyone really claim that today's
democratic liberalism is the solution to all of the world's present
and future problems? Absurd, we will always be trying to improve our
political systems.
Agar then tries to address the truly strange human trait of effort:
"The human marathon runner feels totally exhausted at Mile 23, but at
least he can claim the credit for having got that far. The posthuman
athlete, still feeling good, deserves no congratulations. She is
simply performing up to her design specifications. Eric Juengst
suggests the label 'biomedical Calvinism' for the view that those who
win races because they have taken performance-enhancing drugs or had
their genomes modified are denied the possibility of putting in the
effort that would make their apparent achievements worthwhile. If
there is any credit due for the victory won by the genetically
engineered athlete, it should go to the person who did the work
modifying his genome. However, if an athlete's winning advantage
derives from the chance recombination of his parents' DNA, then there
is no other agent for the credit to default to; his parents did not
choose which of their genes to pass on to him. He truly deserves his
medal."
Do humans really think this way? Do we look at someone who is
beautiful versus ugly and dismiss their good fortune because no effort
was put into being beautiful, just the luck of the genes? How about a
lawyer that passes the bar exam on her first try, not because she
studied hard, but because she is just plain brilliant. Does another
lawyer get congratulated more enthusiastically after passing the bar
exam after the sixth time? Probably not, I doubt that they would brag
about how much effort they put in. More than likely, they would be
just a tad embarrassed. Humans do not normally weigh deservedness when
it comes to accomplishments; we give credit for the outcome even when
they have natural abilities, like the Kenyan marathon runners. Whether
parents pay special athletic coaches or educational tutors for their
children's environmental enhancement, or whether they use genetic
engineering to enhance their children's ability, in the end it is the
same. "Effort" is not something that most people want to face when
seeking goals, they would far prefer to have the ability to make the
task easier, then go on to more difficult tasks.
Agar then discusses the outcome of one of the children from Graham's
Repository for Germinal Choice [2](see my review of The Genius
Factory). He notes that one particular gifted child with an IQ of 180,
ended up studying comparative religion rather than scienceas if this
was some kind of failure. With the flawed logic spewed out by the
current crop of bioethicists, we could certainly use some enhanced
intelligence in the non-scientific fields. But even more important,
unlike pushing this gifted child into scienceonly to have them turn
their back on it by pushing environmental enhancementsthe genetic
enhancements are available for future generations. The genius baby
turned religious scholar will pass on to his children more
intelligence genes, then they in turn can decide how to use their
enhanced intelligence. Genetic intelligence is forever; environmental
enhancements have to be repeated every generation. Which approach is
more economical? Genetic selection of the best fertilized-eggs for
implantation currently costs about $10,000. To educate a child for one
year currently costs about the same. You do the math of where we
should be spending our money if we want smart, educable children in
the future.
Agar returns to Kass: "The beneficiaries of genetic engineering to
boost intelligence, like the beneficiaries of the best educations,
ought to be capable of more than others, but this does not mean that
they live lives without character building struggle; it does not make
their achievements meaningless. Consider the following objection to
human genetic engineering made by Leon Kass: '[T]he price to be paid
for producing optimum or even genetically sound babies will be the
transfer of procreation from the home to the laboratory. Increasing
control over the product can only be purchased by the increasing
depersonalization of the entire process and its coincident
transformation into manufacture. Such an arrangement will be
profoundly dehumanizing ...'"
Well maybe to Kass, but it seems that many people don't feel any
dehumanizing when they use alternative means to reach an intended
goal. Is a man dehumanized because he needs to take Viagra to have
sex? Does masturbation to video porn now dehumanize masturbation
because instead of our imaginations, the new machines don't require
any imagination? Many single moms who are financially sound are
getting pregnant at "the factory" and they do not report the child
that results or themselves as "dehumanized." To many, feeling
dehumanized is being turned down by a mate for sex, being denied that
anticipated promotion, or being unable to perform an assigned task at
work. Another example is someone feeling dehumanized by getting a face
lift at the cosmetic surgery factory, rather than applying tons of
makeup to cover up wrinkles at home (or worse still while driving to
work).
Agar rebuts Kass, "Once we accept that environments also make
personalities, we should be prepared to pass the same judgment on
'manufacture by education' as we do on 'manufacture by genetic
engineering.' If some forms of education are innocent of the charge of
manufacture, then likewise so are some forms of genetic engineering."
On the other side, Blacks are always being held up and praised for
doing better on performance tests as a result of "teaching to the
test," Head Start programs, additional schooling during the summer
months, special tutoring, etc. Shouldn't we also be able to make the
claim that these exceptional environmental enhancement programs'
outcomes are equally undeserved using Kass's argument for
undeservedness via environmental enhancement?
Agar then turns to Jurgen Habermas objections to genetic enhancement:
"Habermas identifies what he thinks is a difference between
environmental and genetic improvements. Unlike the latter,
environmental enhancements can be questioned or challenged by the
person who receives them. One has the option of rebelling, perhaps
unsuccessfully, against after-school math lessons. No similar option
exists in respect of genetic engineering. One is simply born with
one's genome engineered to include a parental 'fifth column.' Habermas
describes the likely experiences of a genetically enhanced adolescent:
'To the extent that his body is revealed to the adolescent who was
eugenically manipulated as something which is also made, the
participant perspective of the actual experience of living one's own
life collides with the reifying perspective of a producer.... The
parents' choice of a genetic program for their child is associated
with intentions which later take on the form of expectations addressed
to the child, without, however providing the addressee with an
opportunity to take a revisionist stand. The programming intentions
...have the peculiar status of a one-sided and unchallengeable
expectation.'"
Agar has his own means of dismissing Habermas, but I will provide my
own: however parents open up a child's options in life, whether they
are environmental or genetic enhancements, they are merely expanding
opportunity, not directing the child's ultimate goal. I have no doubt
that when genetically enhanced children reach puberty, the hormones
will be raging, and they will follow their own paths as they desire,
just like any other adolescent. They will not feel any different from
any other child, except learning will be easier, they will have fewer
genetic diseases, they will not be short, they will be reasonably
athletic, they will be attractive, and they will be smart. It seems to
me that this is the perfect formula for providing eugenically enhanced
children with the most open of futures. Whatever they desire, they
will be better equipped to seek itunless of course they have some
strange desire to be in a circus freak-show.
Agar goes on to explain how extreme environmental enhancements can
leave children damaged: it is called "hothousing." Parents take
extreme measures to teach their children early and well, only to have
them become zombies of rote learning, without the ability to organize
facts and search out solutions to problems on their own. These
children are suffocated, not developing in a natural way, that leads
to destroying any option of a "right to an open future." Their
overbearing and demanding parents drive them beyond what they are
naturally capable of for their age. Genetic enhancement does
thisprovide children with the talent to pursue many different
opportunitiesthen lets them do what suites them the best. As Agar
notes, "Infertile couples are now offering financial inducements of up
to US $100,000 for the eggs of women with demonstrated Ivy League
educations, attractiveness, elite scholastic aptitude scores, specific
ethnicities, and backgrounds free of major family medical issues."
Agar states, "The moral image of nurture helps us to understand a
popular objection against genetic enhancement. According to this
objection, we should not allow enhancement because attributes like
increased intelligence, stronger muscles and more charming
personalities are positional goods. Positional goods are sought
because they give a competitive advantage over others. Suppose the
great cost of enhancement means that only the rich will have any real
freedom to enhance their children. Inequalities resulting from genetic
enhancement layered on existing educational and dietary inequalities
will turn the gap between the rich and the poor into a gulf between
their children." Greatlet this speciation event commence so that we
can move those capable of understanding and appreciating genetic
enhancement beyond the reach of the bottom feeders that we have
tolerated for too long already. But what about justice for all?
Agar notes, "I stressed that enhancement technologies present us with
problems that seem quite unlike those we have confronted before.
However, the challenge I have just described seems quite familiar.
Isn't it just the issue, long pondered by philosophers, of what counts
as a just distribution of the goods required for a good life?
Political philosophers have proposed a number of accounts of how
houses, doctors' visits and retirement moneys should be distributed
and of how best to achieve what they deem a just distribution. Why
shouldn't we see enhancements as just more goods to feed into a
society's distributive apparatus? John Rawls's distributive scheme
currently enjoys the most widespread philosophical support. Rawls
proposes a 'difference principle', which allows deviation from equal
distribution of goods such as liberty and opportunity only when an
unequal distribution helps everybody, most especially the worst off.
Were we to entrust enhancements to Rawls we would grant the rich
better access only if the worse off were to be benefited by this
pattern of access. We would be confident about the fairness of this
way of allocating enhancements to the extent that we were confident
about Rawls's theory of justice." Fortunately, Rawls's theory of
justice is dead on arrival. It has no scientific basis other than feel
good socialism. It is a failed philosophy.
Agar then turns to manipulating behavioral traits: "The moral image of
NURTURE can help us to respond to such a use of enhancement
technologies. R. Paul Churchill argues that parents have an obligation
to educate their children to be moral altruists. He claims that the
aim of raising healthy, happy and autonomous human beings does not
conflict with, indeed is often promoted by, the goal of raising
altruists. It does seem unlikely that parents would benefit their
children by making them psychopaths. Those completely devoid of
empathy may flourish in the short term, but they are usually exposed
in the end. Perhaps geneticists will find genes that can be modified
so as to reduce but not entirely eliminate the capacity to empathize.
It seems to me that even slight moral impairment is likely to handicap
many life plans. A person who is incapable of acknowledging the full
moral worth of others is likely to find forming meaningful
relationships with them more difficult. However, even if enhancement
by way of moral impairment did not harm its recipients, it should be
banned. This should be apparent once we take into account the plights
of those whose spouses, neighbors and colleagues are morally
impaired."
This is where the debate gets down and dirtyAgar along with other
bioethicists are out of touch with evolutionary realities. It is true
that when humans were confined to small bands of huntergatherers,
psychopaths could be held in check. If they became too much of a
liability, they were banished or hacked to death. The same is true in
small villages, where psychopaths, through gossip, could be countered
by alerting others to the danger they posed. In a modern, cosmopolitan
society however that is no longer truean intelligent psychopath can do
very well in terms of reproductive success and economic success. They
can go after whatever they want without the shame, guilt, or shyness
that many of us feel if we don't conform to accepted behaviors. Today,
it is the empathetic suckerthe altruistthat will do less well. Trivers
and Hamilton in addition have shown that altruism is merely a means to
advance reproductive success for cooperation in the environment of
evolutionary adaptiveness. That world no longer exists.
As Agar notes, "Moral and political philosophers have defended a
variety of views about reciprocity's significance. According to some,
it is at the heart of morality. Moral rules emerge from the needs of
rational beings to cooperate with one another to generate goods and
protect against threats."
Then Agar returns to the bizarre, "Conceiving of diversity as only
instrumentally valuable makes it vulnerable to enhancement
technologies. It is the manifest diversity in conceptions of the good
life that supplies much of the motivation for the liberal doctrine. As
enhancement technologies eliminate or reduce differences between
people, they eliminate or reduce the need for laws protecting
citizens' rights to make unpopular choices about the good life."
This seems not to be incorrect, just highly indeterminable. First, we
don't know yet whether enhancement technologies will increase the
differences between people or reduce them. That all depends if it is
the elite who will take advantage of genetic engineering, or it will
be the state(s) policy to raise everyone up to at least a minimal
level of enhancementor both at the same time in different parts of the
world. Second, with enhancement will come a whole new set of values.
Highly enhanced people could be egalitarians, inegalitarians,
indifferent to lesser human beingswe will not know until it happens.
One thing is fairly certain because it exists todaythe elite will
dictate the policy and the value system of the state using the media,
and control of resources.
Agar goes on to warn, "The morally noxious homogenizing influence that
I will focus on is prejudice. A program of liberal enhancement would
prevent a state from using the reproductive acts of its citizens to
implement its bigoted ideology. But no society is entirely free of
prejudice. Despite efforts to protect them, people suffer because of
their genders, racial backgrounds, religious commitments and sexual
orientations. Often this prejudice is subconscious but, conscious or
not, it can still influence enhancement choices. Enhancement
technologies will turn reproduction into another means of expressing
prejudice. They will grant racism and homophobia an unprecedented
efficacy. While today these attitudes make many people miserable, in
the future genetic technologies may enable them to shape successive
generations. The progressive elimination of psychological and physical
characteristics that, for whatever reason, attract prejudice will
dramatically reduce diversity. Many racists wrongly believe that the
color of one's skin indicates the possession of particular
intellectual, moral and physical virtues. Racism has the great
advantage, from the perspective of the genetic engineer, of focusing
on superficial characteristics of human beings."
Of course, all people have their prejudices, including those who hate
prejudiced people. That is the conundrum of value systems, they change
but there are always those behaviors and kinds that are in and those
that are anathema to most people. Humans are easily indoctrinated into
changing many of their attitudes, but I believe that the more
intelligent human being will be better equipped to bias their
prejudices towards those values, actions, and human kinds that are
truly inimical to society. For example, will an enhanced intellect be
more or less prejudiced towards pedophiles? Well, if they understand
the organic nature of the condition (if that is what it really is)
they would be less condemning but would also perhaps be more
protective in keeping pedophiles away from children. Again, Agar
speculates too much about human nature when we still do not understand
if humans are even truly rationalStanovich et al. would say we are not
(Stanovich 1999, 2004; Gigerenzer & Todd 1999; Giovannoli 1999).
Bioethicists seem to be all about speculation, as if X always leads to
Y. With regards to racistsor what eugenicists call race realiststhose
who are educated know that the color of one's skin has no meaning
whatsoever with regards to intelligence, behavioral traits or anything
other than just the amount of melanin produced. Race is not about
color, it is about real differences in the frequency of genetic
alleles that have taken place within breeding populations. Blacks have
low intelligence, they act out, they are more violent, and with their
own form of racism, they blame all of their problems on Whites and
Jews.
Racism is coalitional psychology: it is found in the chimpanzee, our
closest ancestor, as well as in humans. In addition, assortative
mating is the norm among animals. Sexual selection is strongly
influenced by the likeness between mating pairs, and is a powerful
component of speciation (Jernvall in Hall 2003). It is highly likely
that as the world becomes more multicultural, and some races or
population groups interbreed, others will be in the process of sorting
themselves based on intelligence, looks, personality, etc. Some humans
will breed for intellect, while others for athletic ability, because
both can pay off big time (sports is a long shot of course, while
intellect is a sure bet for at least a highly prestigious job if not
enormous wealth). Now, along with a diaspora form of racial separation
based on selected traits, speciation can be driven by technology.
Agar states that, "Leon Kass worries that the advent of reproductive
cloning will create an immoral market in Michael Jordan's genome. The
combination of genetic engineering and cloning may enable people to
become the parents of a white Mike."
It is interesting that the same people who deny that athletic talent
or intelligence is highly genetic, now worry that evil Whites will
steal athletic Black genes, then make the child look White. These are
some bizarre science fiction scenarios, not on the technical side but
the value laden moral side. Likewise, Blacks could clone a White
genius but change their genes so that they are Black in color. But is
color a factor? The last time I looked at the young and old women
alike at the health club, getting a tan was still very much in, even
with the risks of skin cancer. I saw one young women at the club who
was very dark with a very attractive caramel color, and I couldn't
determine if it was the new spray-on tan or the real thing. More than
likely, when we can alter skin color through genetic engineering, the
color selected could be dark just as easily as white, and the
preference would probably change over time. Dark skin has more sexual
appeal when it is combined with White features, and it would also
protect sun lovers with ultraviolet light protection.
Agar continues these absurd speculations, "Racism may become relevant
to decisions about the welfare of future persons in another, more
insidious, way. It does not have to be a motive of parents-to-be for
it to influence their enhancement choices. Although prospective
parents may recognize that the claims of homophobes or racists are
false, they should nevertheless acknowledge that these claims make up
part of the social environment in which their children will live.
Consider this fact in the light of my appeals in chapter 5 and chapter
6 that we ought neither to reduce our children's real freedom, nor to
infringe their autonomy. Racism and homophobia are threats to real
freedom and autonomy. A person may think about the transmission of his
dark variants of the melanin-producing genes in the same way as he
does about passing on his asthma-risk genes. This prospective parent
is unlikely to be fooled into thinking that being black or having
asthma reduces one's moral worth. He may feel that his conception of
himself has been formed by these characteristics, and hence be
reluctant, or even find it impossible, to imagine his life as a white
non-asthmatic. However, he may at the same time understand that the
path of the person he is about to bring into existence will be easier
if he is white and non-asthmatic."
Agar above conflates science, religion and preferences of humans. What
does he mean by "claims of homophobes or racists are false?" From a
religious perspective, homosexuality is often taboo, while culturally
it is celebrated in many cosmopolitan niches. As for science,
homosexuality is studied just like introversion or neuroticism. And it
is the same with racismanyone not of the chosen people are lesser
people, some people regard other races preferentially or
disparagingly, and science looks to behavior genetics to determine how
races differ from environmental influences versus genetic influences.
As to what he means by "racism and homophobia are threats to real
freedom and autonomy" I cannot determine. The fact that I am not
"hung" like Michael Jordan certainly has reduced my freedom to pursue
women like those that I would have liked. The same can be said for
homely people, short people, shy people, and a host of other traits
that are limiting in a very judgmental world. As for autonomy, in the
world we live in today, to be Black gives one a great deal of autonomy
on making claims or excuses for why they should be given preferences
for jobs, education and benefits over those that cannot use their
minority status for special freedoms and opportunities. Only
minorities are allowed to form special interests groups based on
raceWhites are condemned if they try it.
Agar elaborates, "Helping a person to escape prejudice by changing his
genome misdiagnoses the problem. Being black or gay is not a
disability. It is a mistake to seek biotechnological solutions to
problems that have nothing at all to do with genes. The fault is in
the attitudes of racist people, not in the genomes of the people they
hate. We should change the attitudes, not the genomes. We would block
the homogenizing combination of enhancement technologies and prejudice
by banning choices that collude with unjust environments."
Agar misses the primary objective, conscious or not, as to why parents
use genetic enhancements: it is to give their children the ability to
prosper and procreate, if they so choose, thus passing their genes to
future generations. If your child is a homosexual they perceptually at
least may not procreate or will not do so with as high a numbers on
average as heterosexuals. In addition, parents have the right to apply
enhancements that they feel are more desirable like attractiveness,
height, and athleticism as an aesthetic concern. If parent(s) find
homosexuals disgusting, then they have a right to try to avoid that
behavioral type. If lesbians find heterosexuals disgusting, they can
opt for birthing homosexuals. To be human is to have prejudices, but
with greater intelligence, we equip ourselves to check on our
prejudices to see if they make sense. Not all prejudice is wrong or
immoral.
Agar argues that, "By analogous reasoning, the fact that dark-skinned
people suffer only because they live in a social environment shaped to
some extent by morally wrong racist attitudes does not make any less
real their suffering. If light-to-dark skin gene therapy is justified
to avoid the ill effects of UVB then why should not dark-to-light skin
therapy be justified to avoid the ill effects of racism? Both ozone
depletion and racism are ugly realities, but they are realities
nonetheless. Of course, it would certainly be preferable to eliminate
racism, but prejudice, racial or otherwise, is an entrenched feature
of most societiesit cannot be changed overnight. Optimists may think
that education can reduce prejudice, but they would not deny there is
still much to do. Parents have little control over whether their child
will be born into a society in which there are many racistsbut they
can use enhancement technologies to prevent the child from being
harmed by this morally defective environment.
"The logic of the above reasoning can be summarized as follows. The
mere recognition that a certain harm has its origins in a morally
defective environment does not alter its reality. If parents are
allowed to use enhancement technologies to spare their children the
harms imposed by mild asthma then they should also be allowed to spare
them the same amount of harm inflicted by racists and homophobes.
"However, there is a difference between using genetic engineering to
escape the harmful effects of ozone depletion, on the one hand, and
using it to escape the harmful effects of prejudice, on the other. In
the former case, collusion with injustice may remove part of the
motivation for addressing the real problem, but it does not prevent us
from doing something about it. The technologies that would make a
future person's skin darker are not themselves ozone-depleting. We can
darken people's skins while still fighting to reduce emissions harmful
to the ozone layer. This two-pronged approach to the problem should be
motivated by the recognition that the thinning of the ozone layer not
only harms humans, it also harms the environment. Some philosophers
think that the environment is valuable in itself. Even those who deny
that nature has intrinsic value think that humans derive a wide range
of goods from it. Ozone depletion threatens these goods.
"Now consider parents who replace dark with light skin alleles in the
genomes of their future child. The value of a procedure that
transforms a black fetus into a white one depends to some extent on
the continuing existence of people to serve as targets for the
prejudice that is avoided. Prospective parents may succeed in sparing
their child the burden of prejudice, but, in doing so, they increase
the burden on children who continue to be born with the dark variants.
Whether they intend it to or not, their complicity with prejudice will
be seen as endorsing the idea that moral value really is determined by
one's skin color. The complicity is likely to make racism more
efficacious, encouraging the very idea of prejudice. The same points
apply to genetic engineering to change sexual orientation. The perhaps
accidental endorsement of homophobia will make it worse for the gay
people who remain in our society. It is hard to imagine a successful
fight against prejudice in the very society in which there is a widely
exercised freedom on the part of parents to remove from their children
the characteristics that would make them objects of prejudice.
"Suppose, improbably, that therapy to alter sexual-orientation genes
and skin color genes were not only to be made universally available,
but also that every prospective parent used them to make their
children invisible to bigotry, and furthermore that they are
universally successful. There would be no more black or gay people
left to hatebut the arbitrariness of bigotry allows the same motives
that underlie the prejudice whose targets we have eliminated to fix on
other targets. They would default to other morally irrelevant
attributes of people. Those who would have been homophobes could find
some part of the broad spectrum of heterosexual behavior to focus on
with equivalent vehemence. The hatred of racists would be replaced
with loathings fixed on other easily recognizable distinguishing
characteristics of people, such as their religious beliefs or sporting
affiliations. Thus, in order to put an end to prejudice, the processes
of homogenization would need to proceed to the point of making us all
indistinguishable from one another.
"It is because of this close connection between the moral badness of
racism and the action of removing dark skin alleles that we should not
allow parents to choose this modification for their children. We
imagine a widely exercised prerogative to use genetic engineering to
spare one's future child the harmful effects of UVB being combined
with a successful struggle against the agents damaging the ozone
layer. Neither the gene therapy nor sun-blocks prevent us from
recognizing and acting against the wrongness of the circumstances that
necessitate them. This is not the case when we deflect bigotry by
genetically modifying skin color or sexual orientation."
Agar seems to be singularly obsessed with racism and homophobia, but
he fails to realize that if Blacks used genetic enhancement to
increase their intelligence and conscientiousness, reduce their
violence, becoming productive members of society, their dark skin
would be irrelevant. It is not skin color that causes Whites, Jews,
East Asians, and very dark Indian Asians from fleeing Black
neighborhoods, it is in recognition that Blacks' high levels of
violence and low intelligence leads to neighborhood decline.
Agar and the rest of his liberal eugenic' advocates have also
forgotten that very near and dear segment of the world's population,
the ubiquitous indigenous people. Their advocates want to preserve
their tribal way of life, free of modernism's corrupting influence,
and preserve the lands they occupy as they have for thousands of
years. If the rest of us cosmopolitan genetic progressives use
enhancement technologies to change our racial characteristics, will
these indigenous natives become just another attraction like an
African safariwhere we can use them to look back at our primitive
past? They will eventually be left so far behind that we will see them
being closer to apes than to enhanced humans.
Throughout the literature of bioethicists is a common theme: there is
a denial that intelligence is primarily genetic while at the same time
there is a fear that genetic enhancement for intelligence will not be
distributed equally to everyone. The elite will have ever more
children that are more intelligent, leading to a gradual speciation
between enhanced humans and the unenhanced underclass. They want it
both ways, to deny any innate differences in average intelligence
between races, while arguing for a redistribution of intelligence
genes to bring Blacks, Amerindians, and others up to the innate
intelligence of Whites, Jews and East Asians.
It was not too many years ago that everyone was declaring that
eugenics was dead; it was a pseudoscience. Now, they are scrambling to
try to make the implementation of eugenics an egalitarian mandate of
the socialist society. I am confident however that we are getting very
close to a point where eugenicistsfuturists will start to split away
from others, forming our own societies for accumulating wealth, to
produce children that are as perfect as possible to win the
evolutionary arms race to the top.
The separation of course does not have to be complete physical
separation. We can continue to live in the resource rich cosmopolitan
environment, working with others not like ourselves, but retreat in
our leisure hours to our own communities to raise our children within
a eugenic value system. No altruism or empathy towards outsiders, no
socializing with outsiders, and no sharing of any sort with outsiders.
The good life will be one where we share in the awe and passion of
intellectualism, futurism, wealth accumulation, and producing children
to carry on after we depart.
---
published 10/21/2005 by Matt Nuenke
References
2. http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/Plotz.htm
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