[Paleopsych] Matt Nuenke reviews Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement by Nicholas Agar.

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Matt Nuenke reviews Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement by 
Nicholas Agar.

    A review of Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement by
    Nicholas Agar.

    Bioethicists have been very active in helping to set policy or
    legislation with regards to what procedures should and should not be
    allowed for genetic engineering, cloning, distributive justice, etc.
    In Liberal Eugenics: In Defense of Human Enhancement, 2004, Nicholas
    Agar argues for allowing everyone to use whatever technology is
    available, except in a few cases, to enhance their children's genetic
    opportunitiesfree of disease, low intelligence, small stature,
    ugliness, and anything else that can be improved upon.
    One thing struck me as very odd however: neither Agar nor any of the
    other bioethicists he discusses give any value to the genetic
    interests of parents in producing children that will be fitter to
    continue reproduction. For example, I would assume that parents leave
    their money to their children because not only do they want their
    children to live betterhappier lives, but they also want to equip
    their children with additional resources to have more children. This
    is such a well-studied subject in evolutionary biology, that to ignore
    it for human reproduction places most bioethicists outside of science
    altogether; they are merely a new secular priesthood.
    That being said, I found many interesting speculations in this book,
    as well as rebuttals to other's ethical arguments against genetic
    engineering, making it great fodder for discussing numerous peripheral
    aspects of eugenics. Agar states that, "The improvement of human stock
    is no business of the eugenics that this book preaches. Indeed, I do
    not presume to make any judgments about what to count as such an
    improvement and how it might be accomplished. Twentieth-century
    eugenicists thought that bettering humanity would require the strict
    regulation of reproduction. The eugenics defended here differs in
    being primarily concerned with the protection and extension of
    reproductive freedom. Reproductive freedom as it is currently
    recognized in liberal societies encompasses the choice of whether or
    not to reproduce, with whom to reproduce, when to reproduce, and how
    many times to reproduce. What I call liberal eugenics adds the choice
    of certain of your children's characteristics to this list of
    freedoms. At the book's center are powerful genetic technologies that
    will enable prospective parents to make such a choice. More
    specifically, I will argue that prospective parents should be
    empowered to use available technologies to choose some of their
    children's characteristics."
    With the above disclaimer, he then goes on to discuss eugenics as if
    it had no long term consequences for society, parents, or groups that
    practice it, as if genetic enhancement is like having your children's
    teeth straightened: a one time procedure with no consequences for your
    children's children. Perhaps Agar is aware of eugenics' goal of not
    only improving one's children's characteristics, but making those
    improvements available on down the genealogical path to all future
    generations. We constantly hear how we do not want to leave our huge
    national debt to our children, then too many ignore future generations
    genetic debts such as disease, low intelligence, irrationality, and
    all the other genetic debts that have accumulated over millions of
    years of genetic meandering.
    Today, the two most practical methods used for genetic engineering
    enhancement are Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) where
    multiple fertilized eggs are tested for any known disease, with the
    most disease free egg(s) implanted for reproduction, and sperm and egg
    banks, where donors supply eggs or sperm from the elitethose who are
    tall, attractive, intelligent, athletic, and free of disease or
    emotional problems.
    With PGD, parents use natural variation to select the best of possible
    children to be born. With sperm banks, the best donors are selected.
    It is also possible of course to purchase the best two of the best
    donors, then select the most disease free fertilized eggs using PGD
    for implantation into a surrogate mother. When cloning becomes
    possible, then these super-selected children could be reproduced in
    abundance, without knowing exactly which genes are involved in traits
    such as high intelligence. The winning combinations will just be
    multiplied and reassembled as desired, leading to a new elite
    population group.
    Agar has some interesting comments on race: "When one chooses a mate
    one is often also choosing what kind of person will contribute genes
    to one's children. We accept that racist people can refuse to have
    children with members of a race they despise because we think that who
    one is attracted to and repelled by is beyond state regulation. Our
    negative judgments about their characters do not lead us to force them
    into relationships with people for whom they claim no attraction. By
    analogy, perhaps no moral reason could be sufficiently strong to
    justify the state's intruding on individuals' eugenic choices.
    Insisting that racism be no motive for the use of enhancement
    technologies would, in effect, be like insisting that people be
    sexually attracted to others regardless of skin color."
    Note that he is judgmental against the assumed characteristics of
    racists, but racists are to have no judgment about the characteristics
    of other races or people. Is a racist any different from a person who
    hates people who litter, drives recklessly, or has low intelligence?
    Most normal people have emotions of disgust or aversion towards some
    types of other people, whether those emotions are based on individual
    characteristics or characteristics that are common to a religion,
    political party, sports fans, or races. So why are racists the only
    group not allowed to have a preference for their own kind? I would
    also submit that most people are therefore racists, based on Agar's
    criteria, because most people prefer their own kin likeness.
    With brain imaging technology, it may be possible to confirm that
    feelings of hostility between human races is part of our reptilian
    brain, and not easily subject to modification, any more than we could
    intellectually alter our sexual attraction to another gender change
    our preferences from attractive to ugly people. These are not acquired
    feelings; they are built in and deep, beyond easy access. Our more
    advanced human brains however are very adept at deception,
    self-deception, and manipulation of others for their own benefit.
    Antiracism then is just the latest attempt to transfer wealth from
    Western nations to third world nations or to third world people living
    in Western nations.
    Agar quotes Steven Pinker in why there should not be too much
    enthusiasm for genetic engineering by futurologists. They are
    essentially technological limitations, and he ignores the political
    ramifications of genetic engineering. Once it becomes common knowledge
    that the differences between groups is primarily genetic, especially
    intelligence, the current egalitarian political zeitgeist will turn
    away from socialism to a more free wheeling capitalism, where those
    who have will keep, and those who don't will slide further behind.
    Parents will realize that it is far better to make sure that their
    children are born innately intelligent, and let them develop naturally
    as nature intended. Pushing children too hard too fast, as Agar shows
    later in the book, is not beneficial. Naïve environmentalism will be
    replaced by a more balanced interactionist perspective when it comes
    to having children: start with good genes, let them develop naturally,
    and they will grow up productive and happyon average.
    This realization will also have another major impact on world
    population distributions. Once it is fully understood that Blacks from
    South Africa or Amerindians from Mexico have a very low probability of
    success in a technology demanding culture, where they will be an
    economic drag on the economy, the open borders will be slammed shut.
    Eugenics will then in fact be in play at least with regards to who we
    let in to the West, and how far we are willing to allow those already
    here reproductive freedom when they are incapable of supporting a
    family. Reproductive rights also means reproductive responsibility.
    Agar states, "The idea that my clone would resemble me in every
    significant respect relies on one of the most pervasive contemporary
    misunderstandings of biology. This misunderstanding is genetic
    determinism, the view that our genes dictate all but superficial
    aspects of our phenotypes, or visible traits. Genetic determinism lies
    behind many of the misguided hopes and fears about the new genetic
    technologies." He makes this claim about whom? I am not aware of any
    scientist, eugenicist, or educated person who believes that identical
    twins are exactly alike, nor would clones be exactly alike. However,
    identical twins reared apart are generally quite similar in such
    features as attractiveness, height, intelligence, and athleticism.
    Therefore, he sets up a straw man. If anything, we are still in denial
    with regards to genes, and the environmental determinists are still in
    the majority, denying any racial differences in average intelligence.
    Then he states, "The twin or clone of a genius might easily miss out
    on the precise combination of early educational or nutritional
    influences required for the making of great intelligence." Now he is
    guilty of environmental determinism. Yet, no one has been able to show
    that environmental factors have much influence on adult intelligence.
    Any potentially highly intelligent child will do just fine with a
    typical education, nutrition, and avoidance of any mishaps like
    playing too much soccer that can cause brain damage.
    Bioethicists seem especially concerned with human aspirations that
    compared to futurists border on messianic zealotry. Agar states,
    confusingly, "This theory [utilitarianism] comports better with our
    intuitions about the way we should live. Most of us do not set the
    accumulation of units of pleasure as life's single aim; rather we
    pursue goals involving family, careers and friends and we consider a
    good life to be one in which many of these significant goals are
    achieved. Preference utilitarians can readily grant that being
    naturally somber does not stand in the way of a satisfactory
    existence; many people who have sunny temperaments nonetheless fail to
    satisfy their most important desires, something that many of the less
    temperamentally buoyant achieve. This variant of utilitarianism also
    gives strongly counterintuitive answers to questions about human
    genetic engineering. For example, Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer wonder
    whether it would be possibleand desirable?to attempt to genetically
    engineer people whose capacities and goals, while possibly truncated,
    are in harmony with their limited passions? The goal of designing
    humans who are both limited to easily satisfiable preferences and meet
    the criteria for personhood is likely to pose technological
    difficulties for enhancers. But the claim that if feasible it should
    be mandatory seems even more absurd than the idea of compulsory
    [enhanced mood] therapy."
    If you are confused by the above, so was I. The most eugenicists want
    to do is equip people with higher average intelligence, normal
    stature, pleasant looks, athleticism, and to be free of disease. I
    have never heard any eugenicists discuss much in the way of improving
    a person's behavioral traits or level of natural contentment.
    Nevertheless, no genetic enhancement say in overall happiness, would
    in any way lead to some sort of disharmony. I really have no idea how
    an enhanced person could in any way be truncated, in disharmony, have
    limited passions, etc. Humans have enough trouble understanding what
    it means to be conscious, much less fine-tuning the meaning of life in
    its various forms.
    These discussions beg an even broader question: What is the purpose of
    an egalitarian ethics that calls for redistributive justice? Are
    humans really happier because of how much wealth they have
    accumulated? If yes, then it is advantageous to accumulate as much
    wealth as possible and not give to those in need. If wealth is
    relative, then it is even more advantageous to obtain greater wealth,
    as much as possible, because it means little to have absolute wealth
    if all those around you are wealthier still. That is, humans compete
    for resources because having greater resources means out competing
    one's competitors.
    Looked at in this way, being destitute in sub-Saharan Africa means
    little in terms of relative happiness, if everyone around you is in
    the same situation. The same is true at Ivy League universities, it
    means little to the average student that they can afford a cell phone,
    an iPod, fly home for vacation, etc., because of family wealth when
    those all around you have the same level of wealth. Evolution has
    equipped humans with a homeostatic level of relative contentmentsex,
    food, shelter, dominance, killing off a competingneighboring tribe
    along with the excitement of the killthese proximate emotions were
    evolutionary successful at promoting life and reproduction. Just
    accumulating more wealth for its own sake means little in terms of
    happinesshumans merely readjust their ambitions upward and start the
    struggle all over again. This is the idiocy of egalitarianismit has no
    basis in human nature.
    Agar concludes that, "it is hard to see how someone could be harmed by
    being brought into existence as a human clone. Had he not been created
    by somatic cell nuclear transfer, he simply would not have existed at
    all. Utilitarian lawmakers who accepted a person-affecting condition
    on moral discourse could avoid making [mood enhancing] therapy
    compulsory by pointing out that their moral principle simply does not
    apply to the countless different kinds of people we could bring into
    existence. The problem is that person-affecting utilitarianism avoids
    the aforementioned absurd conclusions only by offering no guidance on
    how we should use enhancement technologies. Kantians also seem forced
    to choose between absurdity and silence when they confront enhancement
    technologies. According to the version of Kant's Categorical
    Imperative most often used to resolve bioethical dilemmas, one should
    never treat another person exclusively as a means to an end."
    He then goes on to discuss those who would clone for a means to their
    own ends (or not end in death): "The Raelians would create special
    kinds of human beings merely to satisfy the vanity of those who
    misguidedly see somatic cell nuclear transfer as a means of
    perpetuating their own existences. But first appearances are
    deceptive. People have always had selfish motives for reproducing.
    They want kids to save marriages, to ensure pampered retirements, or
    to find some new purpose in life. This selfishness in respect of
    individuals who do not yet exist seems perfectly compatible with
    proper parental concern once children's lives are under way. The fact
    is that it is hard to have non-instrumental motives in respect of a
    person who does not yet exist. Compare the aforementioned instrumental
    motives with the absence of motive that anticipates the existence of
    children whose parents were just too drunk or drugged to remember to
    use contraception. These children don't seem better off simply in
    virtue of the fact that there were no instrumental reasons for their
    I think he makes a very good point here. When people say, "I want the
    best for my children," they mean they want their children to be happy,
    but also they want their children to be successful and to pass on the
    genes that we all use temporarily while we are alive. In fact, in a
    modern technological world, it is hard to justify having children for
    any reason other than because a) we just want children and/or b) we
    want children to pass on our genes. In a modern society, one would be
    better off setting up a savings account and putting money aside for
    retirement, rather than rely on one's children to take care of you in
    old age.
    Children are used by society however. We spend large amounts of money
    on educating our children to be productive workers, we teach them to
    be patriotic so that they will fight and die for their country if the
    need arises, we imbue them with virtues that are beneficial for the
    society but not necessarily good for the individual, etc. Children, as
    far as society sees them, are instrumental for the future prosperity
    of the country; they are a means to an end.
    Agar continues, "Philosophers have thought hard about whether
    potentially rational human embryos have a moral entitlement to be
    born. The advent of enhancement technologies raises the issue of
    whether human embryos have any moral claim on a rational existence.
    Those who argue against any right to rational existence would point
    out that the discovery of human intelligence genes and the invention
    of techniques for transferring them into non-human embryos may herald
    an era in which every mammalian embryo is potentially a rational
    being. Kant seems to have little to contribute to this particular
    exchange on enhancement technologies beyond the idea that if we do
    deliberately create non-rational beings in place of rational ones, our
    treatment of them will not be constrained by the Categorical
    There was a great debate apparently eons agoI have lost the reference
    and if anyone knows of it I would like to hear from you. Anyway, the
    debate was about whether life is worth living, and how can we prove
    that it is. It seems that when bioethicists debate a "right to be
    born," they suffer a multitude of objections: is the life going to be
    a good life, is the planet already overpopulated, but more
    importantly, is it wise to add humans and what kinds of humans to the
    existing billions of people already here? The history of humanity has
    always been one of overpopulation followed by warfare, genocide,
    starvation or disease (Keeley 1996; LaBlanc 2003). I find little
    support to any claim that life in itself has value outside of various
    evolutionary drives to reproduce.
    Agar continues, "Utilitarianism and Kantianism orient our intuitions
    about right and wrong towards certain kinds of moral problemthose
    involving people whose existence is not at issue. We can use these
    theories to help us to decide whether or not we are permitted to end
    someone's existence, but not to decide whether or not someone should
    ever exist."
    Agar then discusses Leon R. Kass who is on the President's Counsel on
    Bioethics, "Kass is very impressed by the queasiness that typically
    accompanies contemplation of the possibility of cloning humans. He
    proposes that this unease is 'the emotional expression of deep wisdom,
    beyond reason's power to fully articulate it.' Kass continues: 'We are
    repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings . . . because we
    intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of
    things that we rightfully hold dear.' In chapter 2 I argued that we
    must make the new genetic technologies morally transparent. According
    to Kass, significant parts of morality itself are not transparent. We
    often know that we are disgusted by a certain practice without
    understanding precisely why we are disgusted. Kass asks of other
    abhorrent activities such as 'fatherdaughter incest (even with
    consent), or having sex with animals, or mutilating a corpse, or
    eating human flesh, or even just (just!) raping and murdering another
    human being whether anybody's failure to give full rational
    justification for his or her revulsion at these practices make that
    revulsion ethically suspect.' The contention that there is no decisive
    argument against human cloning should be understood not as support for
    cloning, but instead as an expression of rationality's impotence when
    faced with an issue that bears on human existence in such a
    fundamental way. Instinctual disgust is the only reliable guide."
    I find these types of arguments so shallow and absurd because they
    smack of intolerant religious dogma. Its as if we should have
    suppressed the revelation that the earth was a ball, floating in
    space, rather than flat, because people would be terrified of falling
    off otherwise. Just like other scientific trends, many people hate new
    technologies and change, while others embrace it. Kass may be
    "repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings," but I am equally
    repelled by miscegenation, especially between Blacks and Whites, as
    well as having that sinking feeling when I see Blacks in my
    neighborhood. I would argue that my lizard brain's emotional disgust
    is a much deeper part of human nature than feeling disgust from
    various changes in values and technologies that are new to our only
    recently evolved executive brains.
    He continues, "Kass makes the same kinds of points against human
    genetic engineering. The embryo that a couple offers to a genetic
    engineer for modification may contain nuclear DNA from both of them.
    But the attempt to improve upon sex's power to provide the kinds of
    children we want threatens the meanings of love and of making families
    that we humans have layered on to the biological functions of sex and
    reproduction. Transhumanists deny that enhancement technologies
    destroy meaning. They speak of 'aesthetic and contemplative pleasures
    whose blissfulness vastly exceeds what any human has yet experienced'
    and 'love that is stronger, purer, and more secure than any human has
    yet harbored.' Deciding who to believe requires moral images
    constructed from other cases in which a technology has separated the
    satisfaction of a desire from its customary foundation. We can use our
    judgment about whether this separation has destroyed meaning as a
    guide to what to say about the similar propensity of enhancement
    Well, circumcision comes to mind, a painful ritual to make a people
    different and deter others from joining the tribe, as well as natural
    childbirth versus being sedated. I see no reason why a couple that
    would take the time, expend the money, go through the somewhat painful
    process of harvesting eggs, etc. to make their children healthier,
    happier and wise would not be making a much greater commitment to
    reproduction than those who procreate because they happen to be horny
    and failed to discuss the consequences. The future of our children
    will be far more secure, safe, and productive when sex is finally
    separated from reproduction. Nature no longer needs horniness to make
    humans reproduce. After all, reproduction between lizards is
    essentially an act of rape, not love. If humans maintained that form
    of reproduction, would Kass be arguing that giving up rape as part of
    reproduction some how diminishes the "meaning of rape and of making
    Agar continues, "Kass presents the use of genetic technologies to
    treat disease 'by eliminating the patient' as a 'peculiar innovation
    in medicine.' But he is wrong. Consider the following example. Women
    who drink during pregnancy sometimes give birth to children suffering
    from fetal alcohol syndrome, a condition characterized by abnormal
    facial features, stunted growth and central nervous system problems.
    Suppose a woman who is currently drinking heavily asks her doctor for
    advice about whether or not she should get pregnant. He responds that
    she should not get pregnant until she has cut down on her drinkingin
    effect advising that she substitute the child she would have while not
    drinking for the one she would have while on alcohol. Does the fact
    that the healthy child would not exist at all had his mother become
    pregnant earlier make him a beneficiary of therapy? If we count his
    existence as a benefit conferred by the doctor, then we should be
    similarly generous to a skeptical father who postpones his daughter's
    marriage, thereby delaying the birth of her first child. This does not
    seem right. The important point is that, however we understand the
    case of the doctor advising his patient to cut down on her drinking
    before getting pregnant, it is not medical malpractice. We would not
    accuse the doctor of recklessly straying outside of the therapeutic
    domain. Perhaps no one is benefited, but disease is still prevented,
    and if so, the moral image of therapy can encompass PGD and gene
    therapy on gametes or early embryos. Both conventional doctors and
    gene therapists act morally in allowing a healthy baby to be born in
    place of an unhealthy one [by genetically selecting the healthiest
    eggs for implantation]."
    Kass seems to be oblivious to alternative moral or ethical norms. In
    Mother Nature, Hrdy portrays humans as routinely killing or abandoning
    their children as a practical matter under varying ecological
    circumstances (Hrdy ??). Sometimes, the elite didn't want to be
    bothered by raising children and sent them off, poor people often
    abandoned their children to die, and numerous cultures killed their
    newly born children whenever prospects looked poor or the children
    were deemed unfit or cursed. That has been the norm for thousands of
    years, it is still practiced in many parts of the world, and it seems
    to be quite moral for humans to make decisions about the viability of
    their childrenlet this one die, and invest in another later on with
    better potential for survival. That is human morality as it was
    practiced before the modern age, and it has merit. Why should a family
    or society invest resources in less than ideal children when we have
    the ability to select the quality of the children that we wish to
    raise to adulthood? Far too many families are torn apart because a
    child is disabled. It would be better for all to terminate the
    defective at birth, and have a healthy babya decision that benefits
    the whole family and society in general. Disabled children demand an
    inordinate amount of resources that should be diverted to the children
    with more potential for the future.
    Turning back to genetic determinism Agar states, "Genetic determinists
    make the formation of a person's embryo an extremely significant event
    for her identity. According to them, the formation of a person's
    genome causally necessitates her every significant characteristic. In
    chapter 2 I suggested that genetic determinism fails to take account
    of the important role of the environment. The question of the relative
    significance to human beings of environmental and genetic influences
    has occasioned many an academic spat. Genetic determinism finds its
    ideological counterpart in environmental determinism."
    Agar is wrong in his assumption that eugenicists think only in terms
    of genes and not development, especially in raising children. I and
    many others in the particularistracialist eugenics' movement are very
    concerned about how to raise our children so that they will feel bound
    to their tribe, prosper emotionally and intellectually, and be
    provided with an environment that allows them to find their own
    nicheas long as it is not becoming a self-hating White. Eugenicists I
    believe would be much less demanding of their children in their early
    years, because being aware of their intellectual potential, pushing
    children too hard and too early, is not beneficial. Children need to
    develop at a slow enough pace to learn how to think, not just what to
    think. So contrary to Agar's conjectures, eugenicists believe in
    balancing nature and nurture. It is the egalitarian Left that rejects
    the interactionist concept of development.
    Even more bizarre than Kass's philosophy, Agar goes on to Fukuyama's.
    "Fukuyama's account of human nature is a fusion of two different
    scientific ideas. He says that human nature comprises 'the species
    typical characteristics shared by all human beings qua human beings.'
    'Species typical' is to be understood in the way that biologists do
    when they say 'pair bonding is typical of robins and catbirds but not
    of gorillas and orangutans.' Fukuyama also invokes genes, saying
    'human nature is the sum of the behavior and characteristics that are
    typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than
    environmental factors.' He allows that genes do not fix traits like
    intelligence or height. Instead, they set 'limits to the degree of
    variance possible.' Fukuyama elaborates on this idea, saying that 'the
    finding that IQ is 40 to 50 percent heritable already contains within
    it an estimate of the impact of culture on IQ and implies that even
    taking culture into account, there is a significant component of IQ
    that is genetically determined.' His point is best explained by
    reference to something that E. O. Wilson has called the genetic leash.
    This softer version of genetic determinism specifies that although
    genes do not precisely fix traits, they fix limits within which traits
    can vary. Fukuyama says 'there are limits to the degree of variance
    possible, limits that are set genetically: if you deprive a population
    of enough calories on average, they starve to death rather than
    growing smaller, while past a certain point, increasing calorie intake
    makes them fatter, not taller.' This, according to Fukuyama, is what
    morally separates changes to a person's genes from changes to her
    environment. While the consequences of environmental changes could
    never be of sufficient magnitude to take our humanity from us, the
    consequences of genetic changes may be. No leash limits the efforts of
    genetic engineers. They can insert as many NR2B genes [that makes mice
    smart] as their scruples allow. In doing so, they corrupt human nature
    by going beyond the maximum extension of the leash. Genetic engineers
    who want only to treat Alzheimer's and diabetes do not corrupt human
    nature because they respect the leash."
    The last few sentences are a bit confusing, but what Agar is trying to
    say is that when we mess with germline genetic changes, we change
    humans genetically into the future. However, how does this change
    human nature? For example, if a group used PGD along with IVF to
    select the brightest future child out of a dozen genetically tested
    embryos, they are only selecting for the best, just like entrance
    exams to a university. Human nature is not changed, just the average
    human intelligence. It only changes the frequency of some genes
    (actually alleles or gene variants) over others, which is how humans
    evolved and races differ. If this changes human nature, then there
    must be more than one human nature out there, contrary to what
    Fukuyama and many evolutionary psychologists claim.
    Agar continues, "The best way to introduce concerns about the
    biotechnology's impact on liberal social arrangements is by way of
    Fukuyama's reflections on both of these topics. His 1992 book, The End
    of History and the Last Man, established him as a leading defender of
    liberal democracy. In it, Fukuyama declared that history, considered
    as a progression of political arrangements, was over. Soon, and
    evermore, all human societies would be liberal democratic ones.
    Fukuyama spent much of the 1990s rebutting arguments for the staying
    power of various illiberal social arrangements. With the 2002
    publication of Our Posthuman Future, he turns his attention towards
    biotechnology, a threat that he finds more potent than communism or
    religious fundamentalism. According to Fukuyama, biotechnology has the
    power to restart history by replacing humans with posthumans.
    Posthumans may have imposed upon them, or perhaps even choose,
    political arrangements very different from liberal democratic ones."
    I find this assertion by Fukuyama to be so bizarre that he is
    definitely on the fringe. First, there is no reason why our current
    liberal democracies have any forgone staying power just because
    Fukuyama says so. If humans fall into a dysgenic trend, say with an
    average IQ of 85 around the world, liberal democracy cannot be
    sustained. It takes knowledgeable people to keep democracy safe from
    its inherent corroding influences (Somit & Peterson 1997; Hoppe 2001).
    Democracy is not a stable political system by any means.
    In addition, if we can increase the average intelligence of a
    population group, we can replace representative democracy with direct
    democracy with constitutional guarantees to protect segments of the
    population from the possible oppressiveness of direct democracy. A
    highly intelligent population group is far better equipped to think
    for themselves, rather than being manipulated by politicians, the
    media, interest group propaganda, etc. Fukuyama wants to stop the
    natural progression that the enlightenment, freedom, and innate
    intelligence has made possible. Could anyone really claim that today's
    democratic liberalism is the solution to all of the world's present
    and future problems? Absurd, we will always be trying to improve our
    political systems.
    Agar then tries to address the truly strange human trait of effort:
    "The human marathon runner feels totally exhausted at Mile 23, but at
    least he can claim the credit for having got that far. The posthuman
    athlete, still feeling good, deserves no congratulations. She is
    simply performing up to her design specifications. Eric Juengst
    suggests the label 'biomedical Calvinism' for the view that those who
    win races because they have taken performance-enhancing drugs or had
    their genomes modified are denied the possibility of putting in the
    effort that would make their apparent achievements worthwhile. If
    there is any credit due for the victory won by the genetically
    engineered athlete, it should go to the person who did the work
    modifying his genome. However, if an athlete's winning advantage
    derives from the chance recombination of his parents' DNA, then there
    is no other agent for the credit to default to; his parents did not
    choose which of their genes to pass on to him. He truly deserves his
    Do humans really think this way? Do we look at someone who is
    beautiful versus ugly and dismiss their good fortune because no effort
    was put into being beautiful, just the luck of the genes? How about a
    lawyer that passes the bar exam on her first try, not because she
    studied hard, but because she is just plain brilliant. Does another
    lawyer get congratulated more enthusiastically after passing the bar
    exam after the sixth time? Probably not, I doubt that they would brag
    about how much effort they put in. More than likely, they would be
    just a tad embarrassed. Humans do not normally weigh deservedness when
    it comes to accomplishments; we give credit for the outcome even when
    they have natural abilities, like the Kenyan marathon runners. Whether
    parents pay special athletic coaches or educational tutors for their
    children's environmental enhancement, or whether they use genetic
    engineering to enhance their children's ability, in the end it is the
    same. "Effort" is not something that most people want to face when
    seeking goals, they would far prefer to have the ability to make the
    task easier, then go on to more difficult tasks.
    Agar then discusses the outcome of one of the children from Graham's
    Repository for Germinal Choice [2](see my review of The Genius
    Factory). He notes that one particular gifted child with an IQ of 180,
    ended up studying comparative religion rather than scienceas if this
    was some kind of failure. With the flawed logic spewed out by the
    current crop of bioethicists, we could certainly use some enhanced
    intelligence in the non-scientific fields. But even more important,
    unlike pushing this gifted child into scienceonly to have them turn
    their back on it by pushing environmental enhancementsthe genetic
    enhancements are available for future generations. The genius baby
    turned religious scholar will pass on to his children more
    intelligence genes, then they in turn can decide how to use their
    enhanced intelligence. Genetic intelligence is forever; environmental
    enhancements have to be repeated every generation. Which approach is
    more economical? Genetic selection of the best fertilized-eggs for
    implantation currently costs about $10,000. To educate a child for one
    year currently costs about the same. You do the math of where we
    should be spending our money if we want smart, educable children in
    the future.
    Agar returns to Kass: "The beneficiaries of genetic engineering to
    boost intelligence, like the beneficiaries of the best educations,
    ought to be capable of more than others, but this does not mean that
    they live lives without character building struggle; it does not make
    their achievements meaningless. Consider the following objection to
    human genetic engineering made by Leon Kass: '[T]he price to be paid
    for producing optimum or even genetically sound babies will be the
    transfer of procreation from the home to the laboratory. Increasing
    control over the product can only be purchased by the increasing
    depersonalization of the entire process and its coincident
    transformation into manufacture. Such an arrangement will be
    profoundly dehumanizing ...'"
    Well maybe to Kass, but it seems that many people don't feel any
    dehumanizing when they use alternative means to reach an intended
    goal. Is a man dehumanized because he needs to take Viagra to have
    sex? Does masturbation to video porn now dehumanize masturbation
    because instead of our imaginations, the new machines don't require
    any imagination? Many single moms who are financially sound are
    getting pregnant at "the factory" and they do not report the child
    that results or themselves as "dehumanized." To many, feeling
    dehumanized is being turned down by a mate for sex, being denied that
    anticipated promotion, or being unable to perform an assigned task at
    work. Another example is someone feeling dehumanized by getting a face
    lift at the cosmetic surgery factory, rather than applying tons of
    makeup to cover up wrinkles at home (or worse still while driving to
    Agar rebuts Kass, "Once we accept that environments also make
    personalities, we should be prepared to pass the same judgment on
    'manufacture by education' as we do on 'manufacture by genetic
    engineering.' If some forms of education are innocent of the charge of
    manufacture, then likewise so are some forms of genetic engineering."
    On the other side, Blacks are always being held up and praised for
    doing better on performance tests as a result of "teaching to the
    test," Head Start programs, additional schooling during the summer
    months, special tutoring, etc. Shouldn't we also be able to make the
    claim that these exceptional environmental enhancement programs'
    outcomes are equally undeserved using Kass's argument for
    undeservedness via environmental enhancement?
    Agar then turns to Jurgen Habermas objections to genetic enhancement:
    "Habermas identifies what he thinks is a difference between
    environmental and genetic improvements. Unlike the latter,
    environmental enhancements can be questioned or challenged by the
    person who receives them. One has the option of rebelling, perhaps
    unsuccessfully, against after-school math lessons. No similar option
    exists in respect of genetic engineering. One is simply born with
    one's genome engineered to include a parental 'fifth column.' Habermas
    describes the likely experiences of a genetically enhanced adolescent:
    'To the extent that his body is revealed to the adolescent who was
    eugenically manipulated as something which is also made, the
    participant perspective of the actual experience of living one's own
    life collides with the reifying perspective of a producer.... The
    parents' choice of a genetic program for their child is associated
    with intentions which later take on the form of expectations addressed
    to the child, without, however providing the addressee with an
    opportunity to take a revisionist stand. The programming intentions
    ...have the peculiar status of a one-sided and unchallengeable
    Agar has his own means of dismissing Habermas, but I will provide my
    own: however parents open up a child's options in life, whether they
    are environmental or genetic enhancements, they are merely expanding
    opportunity, not directing the child's ultimate goal. I have no doubt
    that when genetically enhanced children reach puberty, the hormones
    will be raging, and they will follow their own paths as they desire,
    just like any other adolescent. They will not feel any different from
    any other child, except learning will be easier, they will have fewer
    genetic diseases, they will not be short, they will be reasonably
    athletic, they will be attractive, and they will be smart. It seems to
    me that this is the perfect formula for providing eugenically enhanced
    children with the most open of futures. Whatever they desire, they
    will be better equipped to seek itunless of course they have some
    strange desire to be in a circus freak-show.
    Agar goes on to explain how extreme environmental enhancements can
    leave children damaged: it is called "hothousing." Parents take
    extreme measures to teach their children early and well, only to have
    them become zombies of rote learning, without the ability to organize
    facts and search out solutions to problems on their own. These
    children are suffocated, not developing in a natural way, that leads
    to destroying any option of a "right to an open future." Their
    overbearing and demanding parents drive them beyond what they are
    naturally capable of for their age. Genetic enhancement does
    thisprovide children with the talent to pursue many different
    opportunitiesthen lets them do what suites them the best. As Agar
    notes, "Infertile couples are now offering financial inducements of up
    to US $100,000 for the eggs of women with demonstrated Ivy League
    educations, attractiveness, elite scholastic aptitude scores, specific
    ethnicities, and backgrounds free of major family medical issues."
    Agar states, "The moral image of nurture helps us to understand a
    popular objection against genetic enhancement. According to this
    objection, we should not allow enhancement because attributes like
    increased intelligence, stronger muscles and more charming
    personalities are positional goods. Positional goods are sought
    because they give a competitive advantage over others. Suppose the
    great cost of enhancement means that only the rich will have any real
    freedom to enhance their children. Inequalities resulting from genetic
    enhancement layered on existing educational and dietary inequalities
    will turn the gap between the rich and the poor into a gulf between
    their children." Greatlet this speciation event commence so that we
    can move those capable of understanding and appreciating genetic
    enhancement beyond the reach of the bottom feeders that we have
    tolerated for too long already. But what about justice for all?
    Agar notes, "I stressed that enhancement technologies present us with
    problems that seem quite unlike those we have confronted before.
    However, the challenge I have just described seems quite familiar.
    Isn't it just the issue, long pondered by philosophers, of what counts
    as a just distribution of the goods required for a good life?
    Political philosophers have proposed a number of accounts of how
    houses, doctors' visits and retirement moneys should be distributed
    and of how best to achieve what they deem a just distribution. Why
    shouldn't we see enhancements as just more goods to feed into a
    society's distributive apparatus? John Rawls's distributive scheme
    currently enjoys the most widespread philosophical support. Rawls
    proposes a 'difference principle', which allows deviation from equal
    distribution of goods such as liberty and opportunity only when an
    unequal distribution helps everybody, most especially the worst off.
    Were we to entrust enhancements to Rawls we would grant the rich
    better access only if the worse off were to be benefited by this
    pattern of access. We would be confident about the fairness of this
    way of allocating enhancements to the extent that we were confident
    about Rawls's theory of justice." Fortunately, Rawls's theory of
    justice is dead on arrival. It has no scientific basis other than feel
    good socialism. It is a failed philosophy.
    Agar then turns to manipulating behavioral traits: "The moral image of
    NURTURE can help us to respond to such a use of enhancement
    technologies. R. Paul Churchill argues that parents have an obligation
    to educate their children to be moral altruists. He claims that the
    aim of raising healthy, happy and autonomous human beings does not
    conflict with, indeed is often promoted by, the goal of raising
    altruists. It does seem unlikely that parents would benefit their
    children by making them psychopaths. Those completely devoid of
    empathy may flourish in the short term, but they are usually exposed
    in the end. Perhaps geneticists will find genes that can be modified
    so as to reduce but not entirely eliminate the capacity to empathize.
    It seems to me that even slight moral impairment is likely to handicap
    many life plans. A person who is incapable of acknowledging the full
    moral worth of others is likely to find forming meaningful
    relationships with them more difficult. However, even if enhancement
    by way of moral impairment did not harm its recipients, it should be
    banned. This should be apparent once we take into account the plights
    of those whose spouses, neighbors and colleagues are morally
    This is where the debate gets down and dirtyAgar along with other
    bioethicists are out of touch with evolutionary realities. It is true
    that when humans were confined to small bands of huntergatherers,
    psychopaths could be held in check. If they became too much of a
    liability, they were banished or hacked to death. The same is true in
    small villages, where psychopaths, through gossip, could be countered
    by alerting others to the danger they posed. In a modern, cosmopolitan
    society however that is no longer truean intelligent psychopath can do
    very well in terms of reproductive success and economic success. They
    can go after whatever they want without the shame, guilt, or shyness
    that many of us feel if we don't conform to accepted behaviors. Today,
    it is the empathetic suckerthe altruistthat will do less well. Trivers
    and Hamilton in addition have shown that altruism is merely a means to
    advance reproductive success for cooperation in the environment of
    evolutionary adaptiveness. That world no longer exists.
    As Agar notes, "Moral and political philosophers have defended a
    variety of views about reciprocity's significance. According to some,
    it is at the heart of morality. Moral rules emerge from the needs of
    rational beings to cooperate with one another to generate goods and
    protect against threats."
    Then Agar returns to the bizarre, "Conceiving of diversity as only
    instrumentally valuable makes it vulnerable to enhancement
    technologies. It is the manifest diversity in conceptions of the good
    life that supplies much of the motivation for the liberal doctrine. As
    enhancement technologies eliminate or reduce differences between
    people, they eliminate or reduce the need for laws protecting
    citizens' rights to make unpopular choices about the good life."
    This seems not to be incorrect, just highly indeterminable. First, we
    don't know yet whether enhancement technologies will increase the
    differences between people or reduce them. That all depends if it is
    the elite who will take advantage of genetic engineering, or it will
    be the state(s) policy to raise everyone up to at least a minimal
    level of enhancementor both at the same time in different parts of the
    world. Second, with enhancement will come a whole new set of values.
    Highly enhanced people could be egalitarians, inegalitarians,
    indifferent to lesser human beingswe will not know until it happens.
    One thing is fairly certain because it exists todaythe elite will
    dictate the policy and the value system of the state using the media,
    and control of resources.
    Agar goes on to warn, "The morally noxious homogenizing influence that
    I will focus on is prejudice. A program of liberal enhancement would
    prevent a state from using the reproductive acts of its citizens to
    implement its bigoted ideology. But no society is entirely free of
    prejudice. Despite efforts to protect them, people suffer because of
    their genders, racial backgrounds, religious commitments and sexual
    orientations. Often this prejudice is subconscious but, conscious or
    not, it can still influence enhancement choices. Enhancement
    technologies will turn reproduction into another means of expressing
    prejudice. They will grant racism and homophobia an unprecedented
    efficacy. While today these attitudes make many people miserable, in
    the future genetic technologies may enable them to shape successive
    generations. The progressive elimination of psychological and physical
    characteristics that, for whatever reason, attract prejudice will
    dramatically reduce diversity. Many racists wrongly believe that the
    color of one's skin indicates the possession of particular
    intellectual, moral and physical virtues. Racism has the great
    advantage, from the perspective of the genetic engineer, of focusing
    on superficial characteristics of human beings."
    Of course, all people have their prejudices, including those who hate
    prejudiced people. That is the conundrum of value systems, they change
    but there are always those behaviors and kinds that are in and those
    that are anathema to most people. Humans are easily indoctrinated into
    changing many of their attitudes, but I believe that the more
    intelligent human being will be better equipped to bias their
    prejudices towards those values, actions, and human kinds that are
    truly inimical to society. For example, will an enhanced intellect be
    more or less prejudiced towards pedophiles? Well, if they understand
    the organic nature of the condition (if that is what it really is)
    they would be less condemning but would also perhaps be more
    protective in keeping pedophiles away from children. Again, Agar
    speculates too much about human nature when we still do not understand
    if humans are even truly rationalStanovich et al. would say we are not
    (Stanovich 1999, 2004; Gigerenzer & Todd 1999; Giovannoli 1999).
    Bioethicists seem to be all about speculation, as if X always leads to
    Y. With regards to racistsor what eugenicists call race realiststhose
    who are educated know that the color of one's skin has no meaning
    whatsoever with regards to intelligence, behavioral traits or anything
    other than just the amount of melanin produced. Race is not about
    color, it is about real differences in the frequency of genetic
    alleles that have taken place within breeding populations. Blacks have
    low intelligence, they act out, they are more violent, and with their
    own form of racism, they blame all of their problems on Whites and
    Racism is coalitional psychology: it is found in the chimpanzee, our
    closest ancestor, as well as in humans. In addition, assortative
    mating is the norm among animals. Sexual selection is strongly
    influenced by the likeness between mating pairs, and is a powerful
    component of speciation (Jernvall in Hall 2003). It is highly likely
    that as the world becomes more multicultural, and some races or
    population groups interbreed, others will be in the process of sorting
    themselves based on intelligence, looks, personality, etc. Some humans
    will breed for intellect, while others for athletic ability, because
    both can pay off big time (sports is a long shot of course, while
    intellect is a sure bet for at least a highly prestigious job if not
    enormous wealth). Now, along with a diaspora form of racial separation
    based on selected traits, speciation can be driven by technology.
    Agar states that, "Leon Kass worries that the advent of reproductive
    cloning will create an immoral market in Michael Jordan's genome. The
    combination of genetic engineering and cloning may enable people to
    become the parents of a white Mike."
    It is interesting that the same people who deny that athletic talent
    or intelligence is highly genetic, now worry that evil Whites will
    steal athletic Black genes, then make the child look White. These are
    some bizarre science fiction scenarios, not on the technical side but
    the value laden moral side. Likewise, Blacks could clone a White
    genius but change their genes so that they are Black in color. But is
    color a factor? The last time I looked at the young and old women
    alike at the health club, getting a tan was still very much in, even
    with the risks of skin cancer. I saw one young women at the club who
    was very dark with a very attractive caramel color, and I couldn't
    determine if it was the new spray-on tan or the real thing. More than
    likely, when we can alter skin color through genetic engineering, the
    color selected could be dark just as easily as white, and the
    preference would probably change over time. Dark skin has more sexual
    appeal when it is combined with White features, and it would also
    protect sun lovers with ultraviolet light protection.
    Agar continues these absurd speculations, "Racism may become relevant
    to decisions about the welfare of future persons in another, more
    insidious, way. It does not have to be a motive of parents-to-be for
    it to influence their enhancement choices. Although prospective
    parents may recognize that the claims of homophobes or racists are
    false, they should nevertheless acknowledge that these claims make up
    part of the social environment in which their children will live.
    Consider this fact in the light of my appeals in chapter 5 and chapter
    6 that we ought neither to reduce our children's real freedom, nor to
    infringe their autonomy. Racism and homophobia are threats to real
    freedom and autonomy. A person may think about the transmission of his
    dark variants of the melanin-producing genes in the same way as he
    does about passing on his asthma-risk genes. This prospective parent
    is unlikely to be fooled into thinking that being black or having
    asthma reduces one's moral worth. He may feel that his conception of
    himself has been formed by these characteristics, and hence be
    reluctant, or even find it impossible, to imagine his life as a white
    non-asthmatic. However, he may at the same time understand that the
    path of the person he is about to bring into existence will be easier
    if he is white and non-asthmatic."
    Agar above conflates science, religion and preferences of humans. What
    does he mean by "claims of homophobes or racists are false?" From a
    religious perspective, homosexuality is often taboo, while culturally
    it is celebrated in many cosmopolitan niches. As for science,
    homosexuality is studied just like introversion or neuroticism. And it
    is the same with racismanyone not of the chosen people are lesser
    people, some people regard other races preferentially or
    disparagingly, and science looks to behavior genetics to determine how
    races differ from environmental influences versus genetic influences.
    As to what he means by "racism and homophobia are threats to real
    freedom and autonomy" I cannot determine. The fact that I am not
    "hung" like Michael Jordan certainly has reduced my freedom to pursue
    women like those that I would have liked. The same can be said for
    homely people, short people, shy people, and a host of other traits
    that are limiting in a very judgmental world. As for autonomy, in the
    world we live in today, to be Black gives one a great deal of autonomy
    on making claims or excuses for why they should be given preferences
    for jobs, education and benefits over those that cannot use their
    minority status for special freedoms and opportunities. Only
    minorities are allowed to form special interests groups based on
    raceWhites are condemned if they try it.
    Agar elaborates, "Helping a person to escape prejudice by changing his
    genome misdiagnoses the problem. Being black or gay is not a
    disability. It is a mistake to seek biotechnological solutions to
    problems that have nothing at all to do with genes. The fault is in
    the attitudes of racist people, not in the genomes of the people they
    hate. We should change the attitudes, not the genomes. We would block
    the homogenizing combination of enhancement technologies and prejudice
    by banning choices that collude with unjust environments."
    Agar misses the primary objective, conscious or not, as to why parents
    use genetic enhancements: it is to give their children the ability to
    prosper and procreate, if they so choose, thus passing their genes to
    future generations. If your child is a homosexual they perceptually at
    least may not procreate or will not do so with as high a numbers on
    average as heterosexuals. In addition, parents have the right to apply
    enhancements that they feel are more desirable like attractiveness,
    height, and athleticism as an aesthetic concern. If parent(s) find
    homosexuals disgusting, then they have a right to try to avoid that
    behavioral type. If lesbians find heterosexuals disgusting, they can
    opt for birthing homosexuals. To be human is to have prejudices, but
    with greater intelligence, we equip ourselves to check on our
    prejudices to see if they make sense. Not all prejudice is wrong or
    Agar argues that, "By analogous reasoning, the fact that dark-skinned
    people suffer only because they live in a social environment shaped to
    some extent by morally wrong racist attitudes does not make any less
    real their suffering. If light-to-dark skin gene therapy is justified
    to avoid the ill effects of UVB then why should not dark-to-light skin
    therapy be justified to avoid the ill effects of racism? Both ozone
    depletion and racism are ugly realities, but they are realities
    nonetheless. Of course, it would certainly be preferable to eliminate
    racism, but prejudice, racial or otherwise, is an entrenched feature
    of most societiesit cannot be changed overnight. Optimists may think
    that education can reduce prejudice, but they would not deny there is
    still much to do. Parents have little control over whether their child
    will be born into a society in which there are many racistsbut they
    can use enhancement technologies to prevent the child from being
    harmed by this morally defective environment.
    "The logic of the above reasoning can be summarized as follows. The
    mere recognition that a certain harm has its origins in a morally
    defective environment does not alter its reality. If parents are
    allowed to use enhancement technologies to spare their children the
    harms imposed by mild asthma then they should also be allowed to spare
    them the same amount of harm inflicted by racists and homophobes.
    "However, there is a difference between using genetic engineering to
    escape the harmful effects of ozone depletion, on the one hand, and
    using it to escape the harmful effects of prejudice, on the other. In
    the former case, collusion with injustice may remove part of the
    motivation for addressing the real problem, but it does not prevent us
    from doing something about it. The technologies that would make a
    future person's skin darker are not themselves ozone-depleting. We can
    darken people's skins while still fighting to reduce emissions harmful
    to the ozone layer. This two-pronged approach to the problem should be
    motivated by the recognition that the thinning of the ozone layer not
    only harms humans, it also harms the environment. Some philosophers
    think that the environment is valuable in itself. Even those who deny
    that nature has intrinsic value think that humans derive a wide range
    of goods from it. Ozone depletion threatens these goods.
    "Now consider parents who replace dark with light skin alleles in the
    genomes of their future child. The value of a procedure that
    transforms a black fetus into a white one depends to some extent on
    the continuing existence of people to serve as targets for the
    prejudice that is avoided. Prospective parents may succeed in sparing
    their child the burden of prejudice, but, in doing so, they increase
    the burden on children who continue to be born with the dark variants.
    Whether they intend it to or not, their complicity with prejudice will
    be seen as endorsing the idea that moral value really is determined by
    one's skin color. The complicity is likely to make racism more
    efficacious, encouraging the very idea of prejudice. The same points
    apply to genetic engineering to change sexual orientation. The perhaps
    accidental endorsement of homophobia will make it worse for the gay
    people who remain in our society. It is hard to imagine a successful
    fight against prejudice in the very society in which there is a widely
    exercised freedom on the part of parents to remove from their children
    the characteristics that would make them objects of prejudice.
    "Suppose, improbably, that therapy to alter sexual-orientation genes
    and skin color genes were not only to be made universally available,
    but also that every prospective parent used them to make their
    children invisible to bigotry, and furthermore that they are
    universally successful. There would be no more black or gay people
    left to hatebut the arbitrariness of bigotry allows the same motives
    that underlie the prejudice whose targets we have eliminated to fix on
    other targets. They would default to other morally irrelevant
    attributes of people. Those who would have been homophobes could find
    some part of the broad spectrum of heterosexual behavior to focus on
    with equivalent vehemence. The hatred of racists would be replaced
    with loathings fixed on other easily recognizable distinguishing
    characteristics of people, such as their religious beliefs or sporting
    affiliations. Thus, in order to put an end to prejudice, the processes
    of homogenization would need to proceed to the point of making us all
    indistinguishable from one another.
    "It is because of this close connection between the moral badness of
    racism and the action of removing dark skin alleles that we should not
    allow parents to choose this modification for their children. We
    imagine a widely exercised prerogative to use genetic engineering to
    spare one's future child the harmful effects of UVB being combined
    with a successful struggle against the agents damaging the ozone
    layer. Neither the gene therapy nor sun-blocks prevent us from
    recognizing and acting against the wrongness of the circumstances that
    necessitate them. This is not the case when we deflect bigotry by
    genetically modifying skin color or sexual orientation."
    Agar seems to be singularly obsessed with racism and homophobia, but
    he fails to realize that if Blacks used genetic enhancement to
    increase their intelligence and conscientiousness, reduce their
    violence, becoming productive members of society, their dark skin
    would be irrelevant. It is not skin color that causes Whites, Jews,
    East Asians, and very dark Indian Asians from fleeing Black
    neighborhoods, it is in recognition that Blacks' high levels of
    violence and low intelligence leads to neighborhood decline.
    Agar and the rest of his liberal eugenic' advocates have also
    forgotten that very near and dear segment of the world's population,
    the ubiquitous indigenous people. Their advocates want to preserve
    their tribal way of life, free of modernism's corrupting influence,
    and preserve the lands they occupy as they have for thousands of
    years. If the rest of us cosmopolitan genetic progressives use
    enhancement technologies to change our racial characteristics, will
    these indigenous natives become just another attraction like an
    African safariwhere we can use them to look back at our primitive
    past? They will eventually be left so far behind that we will see them
    being closer to apes than to enhanced humans.
    Throughout the literature of bioethicists is a common theme: there is
    a denial that intelligence is primarily genetic while at the same time
    there is a fear that genetic enhancement for intelligence will not be
    distributed equally to everyone. The elite will have ever more
    children that are more intelligent, leading to a gradual speciation
    between enhanced humans and the unenhanced underclass. They want it
    both ways, to deny any innate differences in average intelligence
    between races, while arguing for a redistribution of intelligence
    genes to bring Blacks, Amerindians, and others up to the innate
    intelligence of Whites, Jews and East Asians.
    It was not too many years ago that everyone was declaring that
    eugenics was dead; it was a pseudoscience. Now, they are scrambling to
    try to make the implementation of eugenics an egalitarian mandate of
    the socialist society. I am confident however that we are getting very
    close to a point where eugenicistsfuturists will start to split away
    from others, forming our own societies for accumulating wealth, to
    produce children that are as perfect as possible to win the
    evolutionary arms race to the top.
    The separation of course does not have to be complete physical
    separation. We can continue to live in the resource rich cosmopolitan
    environment, working with others not like ourselves, but retreat in
    our leisure hours to our own communities to raise our children within
    a eugenic value system. No altruism or empathy towards outsiders, no
    socializing with outsiders, and no sharing of any sort with outsiders.
    The good life will be one where we share in the awe and passion of
    intellectualism, futurism, wealth accumulation, and producing children
    to carry on after we depart.
    published 10/21/2005 by Matt Nuenke


    2. http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/Plotz.htm

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