[Paleopsych] Public Interest: Charles Murray: Measuring abortion
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Charles Murray: Measuring abortion
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Measuring abortion
Charles Murray
SEX and Consequences: Abortion, Public Policy and the Economics of Fertility
is a model of contemporary social science discourse, revealing in one
book both how the enterprise should be conducted and its vulnerability to
tunnel
vision on the big issues.
Phillip B. Levine, a professor of economics at Wellesley College, sets out
in
Sex and Consequences to explore the thesis that the role of abortion is akin
to
the role of insurance. Legal abortion provides protection from a risk
(having an
unwanted child), just as auto insurance provides financial protection
against
the risk of an accident. Legalizing abortion has a main effect of reducing
unwanted births, just as auto insurance has a main effect of reducing
individuals' losses from auto accidents.
But abortion faces the same problems of moral hazard as other kinds of
insurance. Just as a driver with complete insurance may be more likely to
have
an accident, a woman who has completely free access to abortion may be more
likely to have an accidental pregnancy. Levine hypothesizes that legislated
restrictions on abortion might serve the same purpose as deductibles do on
auto
insurance--they alter behavior without having much effect on net outcomes.
Thus
a state with some restrictions on abortion may have no more unwanted births
than
a state without restrictions, even though the number of abortions is smaller
in
the restrictive state. The restrictions raise the costs of abortion, and
women
moderate their behavior to reduce the odds of an unwanted pregnancy.
Levine develops his model carefully and with nuance, and eventually wends
his
way back to conclusions about its empirical validity (it is broadly
consistent
with the evidence). But the chapters between the presentation of the model
and
the conclusions about it are not limited to the insurance thesis. They
constitute a comprehensive survey of the quantitative work that has been
done on
the behavioral effects of abortion, incorporating analysis of the abortion
experience worldwide as well as in the United States.
THE book's virtues are formidable. Levine writes clearly, avoids jargon
(or explains what the jargon means when he can't avoid it), and is
unfailingly
civil in characterizing the positions in the abortion debate. He is
judicious,
giving the reader confidence that he is not playing favorites when the data
are
inconclusive or contradictory. The breadth and detail of the literature
review
are exemplary. The book is filled with convenient summaries of material that
could take a researcher weeks to assemble--a table showing the differences
in
abortion policy across European countries plus Canada and Japan, for
example.
Levine also gets high marks for one of the most challenging problems for any
social scientist who is modeling complex human behavior: making the model
simple
enough to be testable while not losing sight of the ways in which it
oversimplifies the underlying messiness of human behavior.
The book's inadequacies reflect not so much Levine's failings as the nature
of
contemporary social science. Abortion policy is one of the great moral
conundrums of our time. Anyone who is not the purest of the pure on one side
or
the other has had to wrestle with the moral difference (or whether there
even is
one) between destroying an embryo when it is a small collection of cells and
when it is unmistakably a human fetus. None of the tools in Levine's toolkit
can
speak to this problem. Levine is aware of this, and makes the sensible point
that more argumentation on the philosophical issues is not going to get us
anywhere. He has picked a corner of the topic where his tools are useful, he
says, and that's a step in the right direction. Still, as I read his
dispassionate review of the effects of abortion policy on the pregnancy
rate, I
could not help muttering to myself occasionally, "Aside from that, Mrs.
Lincoln,
how was the play?" *
EVEN granting the legitimacy of looking where the light is good, Sex and
Consequences may be faulted for sheering away from acknowledging how much
scholars could do to inform the larger issues if they were so inclined. Here
is
Levine discussing the non-monetary costs of abortion:
The procedure may be physically unpleasant for the patient. She may
need to take time off from work and spend time traveling to an
abortion provider that may not be local. When she gets to the
provider's location, there may be protesters outside the clinic,
making her feel intimidated or even scared. If her family and/or
friends find out about it, she may feel some stigma. Finally, it
should not be overlooked that the procedure may be very difficult
psychologically for a woman in a multitude of ways that cannot be
easily expressed.
"Cannot be easily expressed"? The woman is destroying what would, if left
alone,
have become her baby. That's easy enough to express. That Levine could not
bring
himself to spit out this simple reason why "the procedure may be very
difficult
psychologically" is emblematic of the tunnel vision that besets contemporary
social science.
A policy is established that has implications for the most profound
questions of
what it means to be human, to be a woman, to be a member of a community.
What is
the most obvious topic for research after such a policy is instituted? To
me, a
leading candidate is the psychological effects on the adult human beings who
are
caught up in this problematic behavior. There are ways to study these
effects.
Quantifiable measures of psychological distress are available--rates of
therapy
or specific psychological symptoms, for example--not to mention
well-established
techniques for collecting systematic qualitative data. And yet it appears
from
Levine's review that the only thing that social scientists can think of to
study
are outcomes such as pregnancy rates, abortion rates, birth rates, age of
first
intercourse, and welfare recipiency. I don't know if there are good studies
on
psychological effects that Levine thought were outside his topic, or whether
the
available studies aren't numerous enough or good enough to warrant
treatment. I
suspect that good studies just aren't available--Levine gives the impression
of
covering all the outcomes that the literature has addressed.
IS the tunnel vision a result of political correctness or of the inherent
limitations of quantitative social science? One should not underestimate the
role of technical problems. Counting pregnancy rates is relatively easy;
assessing long-term psychological outcomes for women who have abortions is
much
tougher and more expensive. Studying topics such as the coarsening effect
that
abortion might have on a society would be tougher yet. But it remains a fact
that the overwhelming majority of academics who collect data on the effects
of
abortion policy are ardently pro-choice. The overwhelming majority of their
colleagues and friends are ardently pro-choice. To set out on a research
project
that might in the end show serious psychological harm to women who have
abortions or serious social harm to communities where abortions rates are
high
would take more courage and devotion to truth than I have commonly
encountered
among today's academics. Actually, Levine represents a significant profile
in
courage. By concluding that restrictions on abortion do not necessarily have
"bad" effects (from a pro-choice perspective), Levine is stating a
conclusion
that most of his fellow academics do not want to hear.
What makes the tunnel vision most frustrating is the extent to which it
produces
uninteresting results. Out of all the tables that Levine presents and all
the
generalizations he draws from the extant literature, hardly any of the
findings
fall in the category of "I would never have expected that." Economics does
indeed explain many things under the rubric of "make it more expensive and
you
get less of it, subsidize it and you get more of it." But we knew that
already.
And when it comes to the less obvious findings, one is seldom looking at
large,
transforming effects, but at effects that are statistically significant but
small in magnitude. Levine is caught in the same bind as all of us who
commit
quantitative social science: The more precisely we can measure something,
the
less likely we are to learn anything important. But as we try to measure
something important less precisely, the more vulnerable we become to
technical
attack. And so it has come to pass that on the great issues that
quantitative
social scientists might study, we are so often irrelevant.
Princeton University Press. 215 pp. $35.00.
* There should be a rule requiring anyone reviewing a book on a
controversial
policy to disclose his own biases. With regard to the morality of abortion,
I
set the bar high--abortion for any but compelling reasons is in my view
morally
wrong, and my definition of "compelling" is strict. But I think that
governments
do a bad job of characterizing where the bar should be, and that, except in
extreme cases such as partial-birth abortion, the onus for discouraging
abortion
should rest with family and community, not laws. My legal position is thus
pro-choice.
References
1. http://www.findarticles.com/
2. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0377
3. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0377/is_158
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