[extropy-chat] POL: Gerrymandering and Geometry: A Tiling Problem?

[Robin Hanson]

On 12/10/2003, Max More wrote:
>>The answer is yes, it is quite possible.  Two criticisms are usually 
>>offered of this approach.
>>1) There are lots of different "objective" algorithms possible, and you'd 
>>move the political battle up a level to pick which one.
>>2) "Judgement" is always needed, so we can't just trust a machine.
>>I find these arguments unpersuasive.
>
>Robin, why do you find the first criticism unpersuasive?  Is it because 
>you see one algorithm as clearly the best? Or because all good contenders 
>are *equally* good and so it doesn't matter which one you pick? Or some 
>other reason?

Yes, pretty much any of them is better than the current system.  Once we 
pick a rule, we don't need to change it again for a long time, and we avoid 
the incumbency advantage that now exists.

>I'm especially curious about this because, if this *is* an issue with a 
>clear technical solution, we should publicize it.

Another related technical solution is approval voting.  This is where you 
can vote for as many or as few candidates as you want, and the person with 
the most votes wins.  This nicely lets you vote for people who have a low 
chance of winning, without having to worry about "throwing away your 
vote."  Since it would give third parties a better chance, it is opposed by 
the main two parties.



Robin Hanson  rhanson at gmu.edu  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323