A view on cryonics (was Re: [extropy-chat] Bad Forecasts!)

Slawomir Paliwoda velvethum at hotmail.com
Fri Sep 17 05:15:09 UTC 2004


> >I'm not sure how you arrive at this conclusion, but even if one can
conclude
> >from this that people have souls, this is definitely not the *only*
> >conclusion that we can draw here. Much more effective alternative is to
> >focus on subjective experience because that's the only thing that stays
the
> >same throughout memory fluctuations or changes in personality. I want
people
> >to think about identity from the perspective of subjective experience
rather
> >than from the perspective of memories and personalities.


> Subjective experience certainly does not "stay the same" in
> any measurable sense.


That's why I talk about the concept of tangible mind process that serves as
a container for intangible subjective experience. Defining the nature of
subjective experience is not necessary to define personal identity. If we
recognize that subjective experience, whatever it is, happens inside a
computational substrate of the mind, i.e., inside a physical object whose
location in space and time can always be measured, we can conclude that
personal identity is rooted in the uniqueness of the mind process in
space-time.

Slawomir



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