[extropy-chat] Re: (Ethics/Epistemology) Arrow of Morality [Was:The statement that there is no truth...]

[Jef Allbright]

john-c-wright at sff.net wrote:

>My apologies for the length of this post, but as a humble disciple of
>philosophy, I find such specualtions sweeter than wine, despite that the eternal
>questions have been debated, well, eternally.
>  
>
That some questions are debated eternally is a strong hint to widen back 
and view such  issues from a broader perspective. 

I too enjoy philosophical speculation but available time is quite 
limited and after three iterations I seem to have made almost no 
progress conveying even the first of my points - the significance of 
nested scopes of context.

>Below, A is for Allbright and W is for Wright. 
>
>A: "I'm afraid my main point was lost -- again due in no small part to my
>tersity -- the point being that *all* subjective input should be considered, but 
>then weighted according to its [ultimately subjective] grounding in 
>empirically verifiable "reality"."
>
>W: Your point was not lost on me, I hope. What I was trying to do was argue the
>opposite side of this very question. My argument was twofold
>
>(1) The statement is self-contradictory. Those who argue that truth (what you
>call "input") is ultimately subjective, argue as if truth is objective. Those
>who put the word "reality" in scare quotes argue as if they are talking about
>reality, that is, real reality without any scare quotes. 
>  
>
As I've stated three times now in this discussion, I do believe in 
ultimate reality, highlighted by my statements that from a god's eye 
point of view, all is objective.

Certainly I do argue from assumptions of truth and consistency, as has 
been agreed and doesn't require pointing out yet again.  I suspect that 
a relatively superficial interpretation of my statements on subjectivity 
and incompleteness may lead one to conclude that I am arguing from an 
existentialist, nihilist, or (forbid) postmodernist point of view, but I 
have tried to point out that (1) I assume there is an ultimate reality 
(but I don't say it's static), (2) I point out that our knowledge of 
reality is necessarily incomplete and subjective, and (3) I argue that 
there is progress toward increasingly accurate approximations of 
reality, measured in terms of what works.

It would be foolish to argue the validity of your three self-evident 
truth statements, except (as I tried to do) to point out that the system 
doing the truth evaluation is itself limited to a subset of reality 
(truth) and is therefore inherently limited in its ability to certify 
absolutely the truth of any proposition.  No matter how obvious a 
proposition may appear, it may be superseded by a more encompassing 
interpretation.  This is a pragmatic approach to truth, but does not 
deny the correctness of your examples within the domains in which they 
were intended.

>(2) The statement rests on the assumption that moral maxims can be supported or
>denied by means of reference to statements of observation, what you call the
>naturallistic fallacy. 
>
>For example, comparisons of the statistics of the crime rates and the use of
>torture might tell you whether or not torture has a deterent effect on crime,
>but this reveals only whether it is efficient, not whether it is morally upright
>to use torture as an instrument of law-enforcement. 
>
>The statement that torture is efficient is a contingent statement: the statement
>is true if the statistics support it, false if not, and in any case is dependent
>on the accuracy of the demographic data. The statement that torture is barbaric
>is an absolute statement. The statement may be true of false, but, no matter
>what, statistics will not show whether the statement is true or false because
>"barbarism" is a moral condemnation, not an thing that can be measured by a census. 
>
>  
>
Yes, I hope we can agree that the Naturalistic Fallacy of attempting to 
derive "ought from is" is in error because value judgments are 
necessarily subjective.

>A: "My theory doesn't provide absolute moral answers, but it claims that 
>there is a rational basis for finding increasingly moral answers."
>
>W: Do you agree that the idea of increasingly accurate measurements only makes
>sense if there is some real thing being measured? 
>  
>

I've said that I assume (point of faith) an ultimate reality against 
which our measurements are necessarily approximate and incomplete.  Can 
we get beyond this starting point?

>We cannot get ever-more-precise measurements of the speed of light in a vacuum
>unless the speed of light actually exists. Likewise, we cannot get increasingly
>ever more objective and increasingly ever more correct maxims of morality unless
>there actually is a moral order to the universe. 
>  
>

John, I'm breaking protocol here, but I would like to draw your personal 
attention to this statement, which is causing me some frustration.  I've 
repeatedly made this point.  In fact, during our last exchange I showed 
that you had inverted this point and now you are challenging me to make 
it again!  So here it is, copied verbatim from the previous exchange:

    On the contrary, I argue that from the God's eye view, morality is
    in fact objective. However this ultimate view is only approachable,
    but not obtainable.

Please remember, I started by saying my intention is to make three 
points relating to the following:  (1) nested scopes of context, (2) 
subjectivity and nature of Self, (3) what we call "good" and thus moral 
is measured by what works, and what works over a larger context is 
(necessarily subjectively) considered better.

>A: (Works better with what end in mind?) Anything that subjectively promotes Self. 
>
>W: This is a subtle thought, and I am sorry you have no time to write it out
>more clearly. 
>
>If you do get a chance at some later date to expound on this principle, I, at
>least, would be interested in the disquisition. 
>
I have no hope of currently being able to convey this, which I consider 
a more subtle point, considering the difficulty we're still having with 
the previous.  You may wish to refer to Derek Parfit, _Reasons and 
Persons_, for a rigorous philosophical analysis of a large portion.  
Buddhist thinking and discoveries in cognitive science fill out the concept.

>My main question would be how to
>reconcile that three examples I gave of the heroic Achilles, the saintly John
>the Baptist and the wise Socrates with this principle of self-growth. It seems
>to me that  the hero, the saint, and the philosopher all value something greater
>than himself (glory, God, or truth) for which he is willing to lay down his life. 
>  
>
Yes, the key is that while all moral choice is necessarily subjective 
(from the viewpoint of self), the Self with which one identifies can be 
(and generally is) greater than the conventional concept of self limited 
to one's physical body.  We identify with our goals which extend outward 
and into the future; we identify with the society within which we are 
enmeshed, and we identify (at a less than conscious level) with kin and 
other members of our in-group.

As I stated in an earlier exchange, and quoted a few paragraphs above, I 
do not propose to provide absolute moral answers, but I claim that we 
can develop a rational basis for finding increasingly moral answers.

In the cases of Achilles, John the Baptist, and Socrates, their actions 
can be considered moral to the extent that they were performed with the 
"greater good" (with which they must necessarily identify) as their 
objective.

>I would be interested to see how self-sacrifice can be reconciled a philosophy
>which takes self-growth as its foundation. 
>  
>

I hope this was sufficiently elucidated above.

>A: (Works better for whom?) Works better for Self.  "Better" is inherently
>subjective [meaning dependent on the observer].  Self means that with which one
>identifies.  
>
>Q: This sounds like a formal description rather than a moral maxim. I suppose
>one could define "self" broadly enough to include the divinity or the community
>so as to explain the self-sacrifice of saints and heroes. (In other words,
>Socrates considers his "Self" to be the laws of Athens, and loyalty to their
>precepts, even when the laws are in the wrong, justifies his drinking hemlock.)
>  
>

Yes, as described above.

>But, by the same token, one could define the "self" and the "growth" of
>Raskolnikov to include that he must kill an innocent old crone and her
>halfwitted half-sister. 
>  
>
Raskolnikov, in his dysfunctional state of mind, believed he had moral 
justification for his actions.  He believed, necessarily subjectively, 
and within his limited context of awareness, that his actions were for 
the greater good.  Along the same lines, political assassinations have 
been performed, atrocities have been committed in the name of religion, 
and preemptive war has been carried out, all for ostensibly moral reasons.

In all these examples, we can see that moral goodness is subjective and 
limited in terms of context of awareness.  No absolute moral maxim helps 
here, because such moral absolutes can and have been used 
interchangeably by either side.  My point is that we can not know 
absolute moral certainty, but we can recognize that as the context is 
broadened, in terms of the number of actors, the variety of 
interactions, and the time over which interactions occur, we can 
evaluate, with increasing agreement, the relative morality of an action 
in terms of how well it (subjectively) works.

 From this realization, we can proceed to develop a science of 
principles of effective interaction.  Our understanding in this area is 
growing with studies in complex systems theory (and other areas) which 
can be applied at all scales from the cosmic, through inorganic 
chemistry, through biological evolution and on to human culture.

- Jef
http://www.jefallbright.net