[extropy-chat] Consciousness is a process in multi-dimensional time! [Was: Qualia Bet]

Marc Geddes marc.geddes at gmail.com
Thu Dec 15 05:28:26 UTC 2005


On 12/15/05, gts <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 13 Dec 2005 23:38:32 -0500, Marc Geddes <marc.geddes at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>
> >> Types of "Shape" and "Number" are classic platonic ideas, and Locke
> >> writes that these properties are in objects, whether or not we perceive
> >> them.
> >> if  qualia truly have objective reality as you and I want to say then I
> >> think  we have to admit they too are qualities of the object whether or
> >> not we  perceive
> >> them. What else could we mean by objective? We might say the  qualities
> >> have their origin in the platonic realm of ideas, and can be  seen only
> >> when we perceive the object, but they are nevertheless objective
> >> properties of the object.
> >
> >
> >  'Green' can't possibly be  a primary property of green objects! To see
> > why, just imagine an alien with a brain wired differently from ours, so
> > that what we see as 'Green', the alien sees as 'Red'.  He would see our
> > so-called
> > 'Green' objects as Red.
> >
> > Remember, we agreed that Qualia are objectively real and that they're
> > 'real'  in the same sense that 'numbers' are real.
>
> For your argument about aliens to work here, I think you would be forced
> to say that these aliens with brains wired differently from ours might not
> only see 'green' as 'red' but also see '5' as '3'. In that case I would
> say you are not referring to platonic ideas. If 5 exists objectively in a
> platonic sense then it is perceivable by all intelligent beings in the
> universe. In fact the SETI project works more or less on this assumption.



Not what I said.  Green is green.  All I said is that the property 'Green'
is not a primary property of physical objects.


If green exists platonically like a number then, like the number '5',
> green should also be perceivable by all intelligent beings, or at least by
> all intelligent beings with suitable sense organs. The existence of a
> being incapable of seeing green would not disprove the objective greenness
> of green objects, any more than would the existence of a color-blind
> person disprove the objective redness of tomatoes.



Of course.  See above.


>
> > To see how this works, imagine that Plato's world of forms is
> > 2-dimensional.  To locate the 'Green Quale' in Plato's world you would
> > need two
> > co-ordinates.  Then the properties possessed by physical things (like
> > green objects) are
> > *psuedo-Quale* (or proto-Quale) which give *one* co-ordinate for a
> > location in Plato's world.
>
> It seems then that you want to say 'proto-qualia' exist objectively in
> objects, but not qualia.



Right.  Proto-Qualia exist in objects.  Qualia does exist objectively, but
*not* as a primary property of physical objects.


> The Green Quale itself is not a property of the Green object, nor is it
> > equivalent to the material processes in the brain of the observer, but
> > exists instead in Plato's world of forms.
>
> But, again, Plato's forms are thought to exist objectively. If objects
> exist objectively along with their Lockean primary qualities and objective
> platonic qualities, and if qualia are objective, then I see no need for a
> subjective component in the definition of 'qualia'.



I can eliminate a subjective component from my definition.  Let me define
Qualia as composed of a combination of a Meme and an object.  A 'Meme' is an
abstract belief.  Then my definition is still objective.  But Qualia are not
primary properties of the object alone.  As I pointed out an alien with a
brain wired differently from ours could see red OBJECTS where we see green
OBJECTS.  Note that I didn't say the alien sees green as red.  I only said
the property 'Green' is not in the object.  The property 'Green' is extended
across space, like the idea of a 'wave function' in physics.

I wonder if you really mean that qualia are something like Aristotle's
> universals. This might be consistent with what you wrote earlier about
> your subscribing to a 'weaker form of platonism' in which forms do not
> exist separate from their instances. I think you mentioned set theory --
> that qualia are like sets --  also consistent with Aristotle. Sets are
> formed in a mind, whereas platonic forms exist before they are
> comprehended.
>
> -gts
>
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