[extropy-chat] Analyzing the simulation argument

[Dan Clemmensen]

Eliezer Yudkowsky wrote:

> Dan Clemmensen wrote:
>
>>
>> However, we now go back to your premises A and B. Unfortunately, they 
>> are falsifiable only in the containing "real" universe, not in the 
>> sim, so we are still in trouble. You have committed a level shift 
>> from the rule set of the sim to the rule set of "reality." This in 
>> turn requires yet another unfalsifiable assumption: that statements 
>> of probability derived from observations in the sim somehow apply to 
>> the containing world.
>
>
> The Simulation Argument says that, under certain premises, the 
> conclusion that this world is probably real is *inconsistent* because 
> this world taken at face value would contain more simulations of 
> ancestors than ancestors. Whether the Red Pill Universe matches our 
> own is not specified by the SA; what SA just says is that if you 
> accept the premises as probably-true-at-face-value given the face 
> value of our universe, you are forced to the conclusion that something 
> other than face value applies - that we are a computer simulation 
> within an enclosing world that may or may not resemble our own; or 
> that our world is base-level and some other, unknown and unpostulated 
> force forbids all simulations or sharply reduces their frequency.

In essence, you argue that my existing "null hypothesis" is invalid. 
This is a strong argument. If you recall my initial post, I asserted 
that I reject a new hypothesis if the resulting logical system (existing 
plus new hypothesis) is inconsistent, as a first decision criterion, 
prior to applying several others, the last of which were falsifiability 
and Occam's razor.

Your point is valid: if my initial logical system is inconsistent, then 
I have nothing. I have an implicit premise embedded in my initial 
system: we are not in a sim. You assert that this premise may be false. 
and that "we are in a sim" is actually a simplification of my initial 
system.

I have a serious objection to this: by this logic, any logical system 
has an infinite number of implicit negative assumptions. Furthermore, I 
see no particular reason to choose the Simulation Argument over the God 
argument: each of them "fixes" the same problem with the underlying 
logical model.

New topic:
   It appears to me that if we accept the simulation argument, we have 
no way of assess the breadth of the sim. I have no reason to believe 
that I am an autonomous intelligent entity. If I assert (cogito, ergo 
sum) that I am an autonomous intelligent entity within a sim, I have no 
reason to believe that I am not the only such entity within the sim.

With all of the above, I will continue to struggle toward the 
Singularity, just as if my universe were real. When I reach the 
Singularity, I will either transcend in my universe, or I will reach the 
last level of the sim and finally see the "game over" screen, and then I 
will know.