[extropy-chat] "Dead Time" of the Brain

[J. Andrew Rogers]

On Apr 25, 2006, at 2:27 PM, Heartland wrote:
> 1. Minds are not information aka. pattern of brain structure, but a  
> 4-dimensional
> object (space + time). That's why "mind stops during a multiple of  
> Planck Interval"
> argument is false because it simply reduces to a "mind stops if we  
> inspect a single
> snapshot of brain state" argument which works exclusively within 3  
> dimensional
> space. Minds can only exist in time (enough time for minds to  
> arise), not just
> space.


Your argument is premised on an invalid assumption, or at minimum a  
misunderstanding of the concepts you are trying to use.  Every aspect  
of a dynamic process can be trivially represented in a static  
snapshot.  If that instantaneous (and therefore static) information  
is preserved, the very next state will be exactly what it was if it  
had never stopped, even if time-shifted.

When you suspend your computer operating system to disk, how do you  
think all the running software manages to be re-awakened in the exact  
state you left it in?


> 2. Preservation of subjective experience is more important than  
> preservation of
> personal memory that includes memory of "self" which is a luxury  
> not a requirement  for experiencing life. Superiority of SE over PM  
> can be illustrated by two cases. First, person's SE exists, but no  
> PM. Second, PM exists, no SE (cryonics). In the first case person  
> lives, in the second he doesn't.


I cannot figure out a way to read this that does not reduce to "non  
sequitur".  Perhaps a more careful argument is in order?


> 3. A person can run only one instance of SE.


True enough for unaugmented meat people, though even then you can  
stretch it.


> Conclusion: If each SE belongs to a different person then an  
> original instance of
> SE must also belong to a different person as well. Since SE depends  
> on an active
> mind process, SE ceases to exist forever at the point when brain  
> activity stops.
> Death is irreversible.
>
> I hope this is sufficient.


It is not sufficient.  The assumptions and reasoning appear to be  
invalid on many points, or at least suspect (some of it did not parse  
clearly enough to make a determination of validity).  Even if death  
is irreversible, I do not see how that assertion is remotely  
justified by the arguments provided.

Cheers,

J. Andrew Rogers