[extropy-chat] Cryonics and uploading

Heartland velvethum at hotmail.com
Mon Jan 30 00:00:48 UTC 2006

> Slawomir wrote:
> "If I like chocolate (and I do :)) and and my brain has been scanned
> destructively in order to make a copy then it's the copy that will
> experience the pleasure of eating chocolate, not me. Instead, I will
> subjectively experience nothing (death). That's not my idea of 
> imortality."
> So who's this 'i' you are talking about?
> Once more: The copy *will be* you, if the procedure works properly.

First of all, let's assume the original and the copy coexist. The copy will 
be me in the sense that it will carry the same identity. Still, I will not 
be experiencing the life of the copy. The original will experience his own 

> (This has nothing to do with the original having been destroyed, either. 
> If it wasn't destroyed, then there would be two of you. Not an original 
> and a copy, not a 'genuine' and a 'fake' one, but simply you * 2).

Then let's think about this. Let's track the "is you"/"isn't you" status of 
just the copy in the following cases:

(Please fill the copy status for each case with either "is you" or "isn't 

Case 1:
Copy is created, original still exist. Copy status is...

Case 2:
Copy is created, original brain was destroyed during scanning. Copy status 

Case 3:
Copy is created, original stays around for a while and is then killed. Copy 
status is...



More information about the extropy-chat mailing list