[extropy-chat] Blackford on enhancement

Damien Broderick thespike at satx.rr.com
Sat Jul 8 16:37:21 UTC 2006


My friend Russell Blackford, a polymath currently finishing his 
second PhD, eloquently makes some points about the philosophical 
underpinnings of the ethics of genetic enhancement, at his blog 
http://metamagician3000.blogspot.com/ (June 15 entry; be encouraged 
to comment there.)


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LeRoy Walters and Julie Gage Palmer's The Ethics of Human Gene 
Therapy (1997) includes one of the best discussions of the prospect 
of genetic enhancement that I've encountered to date. I've been 
rereading this over the past few days, and found this passage which 
really says it all, and highlights the difference between people who 
broadly favour changing human nature, and human capacities, and those 
who "don't get it". Here is what they say (it deserves quoting at some length):

"... a particular perspective on human nature clearly underlies our 
moral judgments about genetic enhancement. We are dissatisfied with 
and critical of certain aspects of the human condition as we see it 
reflected in the world around us and as we experience it. In the 
physical sphere, we regard disease and disability as evils that 
should be overcome as quickly and efficiently as possible. In the 
intellectual and moral sphere we have also identified serious 
problems that should be addressed in multiple ways, one of which is 
the judicious use of genetic technologies. We think that a certain 
dissatisfaction with human nature as it has developed and as we have 
inherited it is a prerequisite for intervention to improve human 
nature. Also implicit in the notion of genetic enhancement is a 
dynamic rather than a static view of human nature. While there are 
historical and evolutionary reasons for human nature's being as it 
is, we do not view the human race as being fated to accept the 
current state of affairs. Rather, we accept the possibility of change 
in human nature and have tried to argue for the ethical acceptability 
of certain kinds of planned changes in the characteristics of future 
human beings. In our view, such genetic enhancements are an important 
part of the overall task of attempting to provide a better life and a 
better world to our descendants." (page 133)

Unusually for me, I find I totally agree with this passage. Note that 
nothing here denies that we might, in practice, need to be very 
cautious about attempting genetic enhancement, or that there might be 
practical and ethical problems that are crucial barriers to 
particular experiments. The focus of the passage is on the big 
picture: that we do not have to take human nature as we find it.

I often make the point that we can never entirely step out of our own 
nature. This applies at both the individual level and the species 
level. If, for example, I am dissatisfied with some aspect of my own 
personality, and find it a barrier to achieving my goals, that is 
because it conflicts with desires that are themselves a product of my 
personality. As it happens, I am rather shy in social situations, a 
trait which I find annoying and frustrating - other aspects of my 
personality would better suited if I were less self-conscious and 
wary of others, a bit more extroverted, more relaxed about how others 
see me, and even able to be a bit more "pushy", etc., without 
embarrassment and the awkwardness that can go with it. However, all 
this is a problem only because it conflicts with the desires I 
actually have (although I find it difficult, I actually want to be 
gregarious and find social occasions energising, rather than 
emotionally draining, and to have the advantages of finding it easy 
to "network", and so on). I don't wish to jettison my entire 
personality and start again, just tweak aspects that don't fit well 
with my conscious desires - desires to be a certain way and to do, 
and enjoy, certain things.

There is no standard entirely external to us by which we are 
compelled to make changes to ourselves, but nor have our natures (as 
individuals or as a species) been designed for perfect harmony. At 
the individual level, we are the products of the genetic lottery and 
more-or-less chance occurrences in the process of socialisation as 
we've individually encountered it. There is no reason why our 
abilities and personalities should be expected to line up neatly with 
our desires or purposes. At the level of the species, we are a 
product of biological evolution that had no conscious goal. We have 
simply inherited genes that happened to confer more reproductive 
fitness than did their rivals in the environment of human 
evolutionary adaptedness. There is no reason to believe that they 
were the best genes for our ancestors' conscious happiness, let alone 
that they are best for our conscious pursuit of happiness, or 
whatever other conscious desires we have, in modern environments.

What we must concede is that it will be difficult to improve on what 
evolution has given us - not because we are perfectly designed by its 
processes but because we still have so much to learn about ourselves. 
For example, the underlying biological bases of our social nature 
need to be understood in much more depth before we take action that 
might hinder their operation. Accordingly, I am all for proceeding 
with caution and accepting that we may not see much change to human 
nature in our own lifetimes.

That acknowledged, it remains to be emphasised that we are conscious 
beings whose desires, purposes, and values go far beyond, and may 
even conflict with, reproductive fitness and with some aspects of our 
natures that once served it. If there is a genuine choice between 
maintaining our evolved physical and psychological nature as it is 
and tweaking it to something more conducive to getting what we 
consciously want for ourselves, then I'm all for doing the tweaking. 
On that point of principle, I am in good company with Walters and Palmer.




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