[ExI] free-will, determinism, crime and punishment

[gts]

On Fri, 17 Aug 2007 21:41:26 -0400, Stathis Papaioannou
<stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> I completely agree with you, and I extend the notion not just to
> retributive justice, but to blame in general. If someone does
> something bad to me, it is either because of determined events, in
> which case they couldn't help it, or because of random events, in
> which case they couldn't help it.

Yes, or at least nobody can prove otherwise.

My hypothetical client was found guilty of premeditated murder. The
prosecutor is seeking the death penalty because he believes in
retribution; that is, he believes my client deeply and profoundly deserves
to die on the grounds that he was a free moral agent who could have chosen
to do right but chose instead to do wrong.

However the prosecution cannot prove that conjecture. I insist my client
did wrong simply because it was in his nature to do wrong. He is a
dangerous man with a defective nature, but I'm not going to let him die on
the electric chair for some philosophical hand-waving about what might
have happened in some contra-universe.

> However, what if it can be shown that anger and the threat of revenge  
> are an effective practical solution?

I think that probably can be shown to be true in the short-term in
personal relationships, but in the long run it's probably just asking for
trouble. Angry threats breed fear or more anger, resentment and contempt,
etc..

At an institutional level, in my view the threat of incarceration is an
effective and valid means to deter crime, and crime deterrence is a valid
goal of the criminal justice system. Prisons should not be fun places to
live even if their primary function should be rehabilitation.

-gts