[ExI] free-will, determinism, crime and punishment
sjatkins at mac.com
Sun Aug 19 04:19:09 UTC 2007
On Aug 18, 2007, at 7:08 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 19/08/07, Samantha Atkins <sjatkins at mac.com> wrote:
>>> Compatibilism involves redefining "free" so that it doesn't mean the
>>> logically impossible thing we intuitively feel it means: neither
>>> determined nor random. Whether you accept the redefinition and call
>>> yourself a compatibilist is a matter of taste rather than a
>>> substantive philosophical issue.
>> A matter of taste? Really?
> Compatibilists say that you had no choice in your actions given the
> circumstances, but that's OK, you still have free will because if
> circumstances had been different your actions could have been
But doesn't "a matter of taste" itself imply free choice? :-)
Dropping philosophically ridiculous absolutes seems required to even
begin to explore the area. I don't see where doing that is simply a
matter of taste.
> Incompatibilists say that you had no choice in your actions
> given the circumstances and this means that there is no free will,
> even though if circumstances had been different your actions could
> have been different.
In which case it isn't a matter of taste.
> There is no difference in factual claims, just a
> difference in whether the words "free will" should be used to describe
> the facts.
> Stathis Papaioannou
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
More information about the extropy-chat