[ExI] Midazolam, Memory Erasure, and Identity
stathisp at gmail.com
Mon Jul 16 04:06:33 UTC 2007
On 16/07/07, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:
> > The problem goes away if you acknowledge that there is no *logical*
> > reason to consider that you are the same person from moment to moment,
> > but rather that it is just a matter of evolutionary expedience.
> I think that you are resorting to deconstructing entirely what is meant
> by "person". So can you tell me just what it is that you hope survives
> from month to month?
I hope that some entity entity exists next month which considers
itself to be the continuation of me in much the same way as I consider
myself to be the continuation of last month's version of me. If that
happens, then I would say that I have survived as a person. If the
entity next month is physically or even psychologically similar to me
without fulfilling that criterion, then even though by some definition
it might qualify as being the "same person", I will not consider that
I have survived.
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