[ExI] Midazolam, Memory Erasure, and Identity

Lee Corbin lcorbin at rawbw.com
Tue Jul 17 01:40:45 UTC 2007

Stathis writes

>> Surely it's simpler to go with the common view, and suppose
>> that all the A's and all the B's are "you" in the sense that you
>> survive if any of them do, no matter what strange ideas they
>> may begin to entertain (provided they don't go crazy, etc.,
>> i.e., that they don't cease in an objective fashion to resemble
>> you).
> They have to resemble me in a certain special way. My past self from a
> month ago resembles me about as much as my future self in a month's
> time will resemble, and yet I consider that I will survive in my
> future self, not in my past self, because the latter does not contain
> my present experiences as a memory subset.

Sorry to sound so arrogant and that "i've been there and done that"
all the time, but for a while many years ago I did entertain the
definition that I was "anything that was a superset of my memories".

But how is it again that when you're under midazolam you don't
consider yourself dead meat?   After all, tomorrow there will exist
a Stathis that is *not* a memory superset of who you are now.
Also, we forget things all the time.  (Especially as you get older,
alas!)  But it doesn't bother most of us too much.  

Would you part with all of this and last week's memories you
have for $10M?  I would.

Thanks for your patience,

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