[ExI] The Reality of Categories
stathisp at gmail.com
Tue Jul 17 12:10:57 UTC 2007
On 17/07/07, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:
> > In the context of personal identity, it is not just the degree of
> > similarity that matters. I am roughly as similar to the person I was
> > yesterday as I will be to the person who identifies as being me
> > tomorrow, and yet I don't anticipate surviving in my yesterday
> > incarnation, not even if he exists in a timeless block universe.
> So technically speaking, you don't expect to survive this coming
> evening? I'm confused; I thought that if any memory superset
> of you survived, then you survive. Oh, hmm, I guess you mean
> "present incarnation": you don't expect the present incarnation
> to survive the coming night.
In a block universe, there are my previous selves and my future
selves, all doing their thing simultaneously (as it were). My past
selves are about as similar to me as my future selves at an equivalent
temporal displacement, but my future selves constitute a memory
superset of my present self while my past selves do not. Therefore, I
don't care if my past selves are wiped out by a giant
trans-block-universe-thingy whereas I do care if my future selves
suffer such a fate.
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