[ExI] Repeated Experience (was Affecting Past Experience)
robotact at mail.ru
Thu Jul 26 17:58:00 UTC 2007
Wednesday, July 25, 2007, Lee Corbin wrote:
LC> Now actually, the pointer (*this) in my opinion must refer equally
LC> to this point in both runs. But to me, I am faced with the prospect
LC> of my runtime suddenly getting cut in half. This is exactly how the
LC> MWI devotee feels regarding a sudden fifty-fifty chance of
LC> imminent death: in half the universes he's okay, and in the other
LC> half he dies immediately. For me, I have a sort of fancy
LC> "Many Worlds Normalization Principle" which asserts that with
LC> very few exceptions, one ought to regard our feelings the same
LC> whether or not Many Worlds is true. In particular, having a 50/50
LC> chance of death---which ordinarily of course makes people worry
LC> greatly---should be regarded as a 50% reduction in measure over
LC> a sheath of worlds.
Problem is probably anthropomorphisation of indifferent
principle. Question is "should I worry or not?", where "worry" and
"should" are not well-defined.
Objective many worlds perspective is equivalent
to subjective reformulation of mind operation in the following terms.
Mind is an algorithm that selects an
action of an agent, or equivalently mind anticipates an action of an
agent, and anticipated action is performed. Mind also anticipates
performance of universe (grounded to senses, whatever). It doesn't
know with certainty what will happen, but it must select a single
action for an agent, so it holds a measure over possible states of the
universe, selecting an action of agent with greatest measure. So as
always selection between subjective and objective viewpoints don't
Now, having 50% chance of death in either case shouldn't cause any
'worry' to rational agent, if its actions can't affect that chance.
MWI trick is that performing a quantum suicide experiment is expected
under some circumstances to be selected by a rational mind
over not performing an experiment. In subjective interpretation of MWI
it corresponds to agent having a theory of its mind's operation, so
that agent can manipulate decision making procedure of its mind,
allowing otherwise irrational decisions.
Vladimir Nesov mailto:robotact at mail.ru
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