[ExI] Many Worlds (was: A Simulation Argument)

[Damien Broderick]

At 03:54 PM 1/16/2008 -0800, Lee wrote:

>Stathis writes
><stuff>
>
>By the way, I agreed with your explanations to Damien.

Oh? He wrote:

"It's important to point out (on my understanding of what Lee is
saying) that the worlds don't actually halve, double or undergo any
other special process at all when the "split" occurs. Say there are
two identical versions of you, A and B, contemplating a quantum coin
toss. Because A and B are identical, there is no way for you to say
that you are one or the other. After the coin toss, A sees heads and B
sees tails."

So even before the quatum toss, there are already two separate 
instantiations of you, eh? This will not bother Stathis, who  (I 
gather) doesn't see any problem with starting out with infinite 
variations that just get infiniter. But it disagrees with most of 
what I've read about MW, such as Michael Price's FAQ:

<Can we regard the separate worlds that result from a 
measurement-like interaction (See 
<http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm#measurement>"What is a 
measurement?") as having previous existed distinctly and merely 
differentiated, rather than the interaction as having split one world 
into many? This is definitely not permissible in many-worlds or any 
theory of quantum theory consistent with experiment. >

Damien Broderick