[ExI] Probability is in the Mind

[Jef Allbright]

On Wed, Mar 12, 2008 at 8:21 AM, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:

>    One ultimate purpose of philosophy, and I argue the most important
>    one, is be prescriptive. Philosophy most vitally---for me and for many
>    others---should instruct us about what actions to take and what
>    decisions to make.
>
>  and
>
>    Ultimately, again, I want to know what actions I should take and
>    what I can expect the different outcomes to be like.

Abraham Lincoln said something to the effect that if he knew he had to
cut down a tree the next day, he'd spend most of his time until then
sharpening his ax.

My interest in philosophy is pragmatic, but our key difference is that
I emphasize the importance of awareness of an always broader (and
ultimately uncertain) context, while you characteristically use terms
like "the simple truth" and strive to convey models in "objective"
terms.

I emphasize the importance of increasing coherence over increasing context.

You demonstrate that coherence tends naturally to increase inversely
with context.

Note that coherence applies only to the map, not the territory.

Within a fully defined context (Peano arithmetic, predicate logic,
basic game theory...), your approach is beyond reproach.  However,
within an increasingly uncertain context -- as we find ourselves to be
as necessarily subjective agents within a world of accelerating change
-- our emphasis should shift away from hopes of an increasingly
accurate model of expected consequences, toward increasing effective
modeling in principle (to be applied at each moment of decision.)

The game itself is evolving (it always was, but we hadn't really
noticed) and it's becoming increasingly important not only to act
effectively, but to adapt increasingly effectively in order to act
increasingly effectively.  Wash, rinse, repeat.


>  And so I prefer to pose situations that call for decisions, for
>  actions.

The first several years of my professional life I was a successful,
even gifted, troubleshooter of scientific instruments, applying my
skills to correcting problems and achieving customer satisfaction. Of
course, I was so good at that role that I was promoted out of it, and
asked to manage, teach and train others.  Which I did for the next 20+
years.

And I found that some of my most talented engineers were blind to the
importance of context.  Some would brilliantly address
electro-mechanical problems within the equipment but fail to perceive
the importance of the environment of the lab (temperature, humidity,
vibration, fluctuating power or ground loops...)  Most did recognize
the importance of the *physical* environment but then failed to
recognize that the customer doesn't really care about the equipment,
but rather the technical solutions they provide. Very few realized
that in the larger context both equipment and solutions were
subordinate to the customer's (mere) perception.

The point here is that the hard-core engineer was typically set firmly
in his belief that he was acting most decisively in optimizing
objective performance of the instrument.  Anything else was
wishy-washy, vague and abstract.  But I would much rather have (and
pay) engineers whose primary value was to achieve customer
satisfaction, and would then act (including optimizing technical
solutions and equipment performance) as appropriate.


>  Otherwise, the terminological confusions and irreconcilable
>  philosophies may be simply moot.

<snipped examples of specific thought experiments>

>  But unless you delineate very exact, sharp *decisions* and
>  *actions* in scenarios that serve to distinguish your beliefs
>  from everyone else---and put less emphasis on the abstract
>  hard-to-follow verbiage---then you won't be facing up to
>  the true challenge, namely, prescribing courses of action.

Lee, you discovered many years ago that, contrary to popular
individual and cultural biases, it is incoherent to conceive of
personal identity as dependent on any particular physical embodiment,
nor any "discrete trajectory" of its constituent particles or
processes, nor any requirement of a discrete self, tangible or not.
In short, you arrived at a functionalist account of personal identity
defined in terms of a particular (dynamic) pattern of information.

Your model is an improvement, coherent and extensible over a context
broader than common-sense, and all the more satisfying and seductive
since it appears to offer newfound potential for extended survival of
the self.

Your view posits exact identity of duplicates at T=0, with identity
then diminishing as some function of diverging pattern/functional
similarity due to accumulating change brought about by separate paths
of interaction with the world.  This is delightful, because it means
(with logical certainty) that sufficiently (?) similar copies,
regardless of displacement in place or time, must be considered
(existing/surviving) identical persons.

But just as the popular common-sense view fails when extended while
yours succeeds, your view fails when extended only to be superseded by
a model coherent within an even broader context.

Because personal identity is not a property of any object.  Personal
identity is entirely a function of the observer.  Even when the
subject *is* the observer.

And personal identity based on pattern/function similarity is merely a
narrow special case of personal identity based on perceived agency.

Personal identity based on perceived agency encompasses and
accommodates the preservation of identity over the lifetime of a
person, regardless of any degree of physical/functional change due to
aging, disfigurement, body-morphing or enhancement,
memory-alteration,...to the extent that the agent is perceived as
acting on behalf of a particular entity.

Personal identity based on perceived agency allows for special-purpose
replicants, each a valid instance of "self" to the extent that they
act as an agent of a particular entity, regardless of physical (or
virtual) form or function.

Personal  identity based on perceived agency resolves the obvious and
immediate paradox of self in direct conflict with self, for instance
as a consequence of duplicates stepping out of the duplication machine
with both intent on control/enjoyment of the same property, spouse,
etc.

Personal identity based on perceived agency accommodates the full
range of moral/legal/social responsibility and is extensible, without
the obvious contradictions of a pattern/functional similarity where,
for instance Lee1 is held responsible for the violent actions of his
near duplicate Lee2 who went a little crazy while working out in the
asteroid mines.

Of course this has all been discussed before and in more detail,
available in the archives.

So Lee, a theory of personal identity more coherent over greater
context is available to you.  But as the believer in the popular
common-sense view must give up an attachment to belief in a discrete
self, you must give up an attachment to belief in an ontological self.

And everything will be just the same, but with a more coherent model,
supporting more effective action.

- Jef