[ExI] Uploading and selfhood

[Damien Broderick]

At 10:34 AM 3/28/2008 -0700, Michael Miller wrote in reply to JKC:

>the self and thoughts are not reducible to the machinery which 
>generates them, whatever that machinery may be. They are not 
>'reducible' at all, especially the self, as it is not an isolatable 
>thing. Therefore, to think that it can be 'transferred' from one set 
>of hardware to another is to posit some kind of supernatural or 
>metaphysical entity as the self. ...unless we're positing some kind 
>of non-physical essential self, how can uploading be any kind of 
>'transferrence' or 'sequel' other than a simulation?

Well, an emulation. John Clark's view is indeed a magical 
one--sympathetic magic, to be precise. This discussion has been going 
on here for well over a decade, so it's not going to get anywhere. 
But to me, the key issue remains this:

If a 1-to-1 mapping is made of you,

(a) will the mapping be convinced it's you?

(Answer: of course, by definition), and

(b) will you be convinced that the mapping over there is you, so that 
you'd now be very relaxed about being obliterated, whichever one you are?

(Answer: you have to make up your own mind/s about that. My personal 
reaction: are you fucking *nuts*?)

But John might well be correct that in a world where this tech is 
routine, people who share my current reaction will swiftly die off, 
overwhelmed by the growing numbers of those who *remember* being the 
people they emulate and hence feel fine about it. (Just shoot that 
terrified look-alike idiot and kick the corpse into the gutter? Maybe 
not, there's no call to be harsh to your progenitor--but no reason to 
be anxious over his death, either. Hey, the template's still in the uploader.)

Damien Broderick