[ExI] Uploading and selfhood

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 30/03/2008, John K Clark <jonkc at att.net> wrote:

> Position cannot possibly be the key to identity because of The Identity
>  Of Indiscernibles; Leibniz discover the idea about 1690. He said that
>  things that you can measure are what's important, and if there is no
>  way to find a difference between two things then they are identical
>  and switching the position of the objects does not change the physical
>  state of the system.

Why should position be disregarded as a property? The following
excerpt is from the SEP article on the Identity of Indiscernibles:

"Thus formulated, the actual truth of the Principle seems
unproblematic for medium-sized objects, such as rocks and trees, for
they are complex enough to have distinguishing or individuating
features, and hence may always be distinguished by some slight
physical difference. But fundamental principles are widely held to be
non-contingent. We might require, therefore, that the Principle should
hold even for hypothetical cases of qualitatively identical medium
sized objects (e.g., clones which, contrary to fact, really are
molecule for molecule replicas). In that case, we shall need to
distinguish such objects by their spatial relations to other objects
(e.g., where they are on the surface of the planet). In that case the
Principle is consistent with a universe in which there are three
qualitatively identical spheres A, B, and C where B and C are 3 units
apart, C and A are 4 units apart and A and B are 5 units apart. In
such a universe, A's being 5 units from B distinguishes it from C, and
A's being 4 units from C distinguishes it from B.

[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/]

The finding of quantum mechanics that two subatomic particles are
indistinguishable from each other does not mean they are one and the
same particle. Two protons may have different momenta, and together
they have double the mass of one proton.

However, these considerations aren't really relevant to the question
at hand. The fact is, I feel I remain the same person when I walk
across a room despite the fact that I am clearly *not* identical
throughout the process: not only are my atoms in a different position,
they are also in a different position relative to each other, some
have been absorbed from the atmosphere while others have been
excreted, some have undergone radioactive decay, and so on. So if some
process changes the matter in my body no more than walking across the
room does, then I would have to remain feeling the same person despite
that process.





-- 
Stathis Papaioannou