[ExI] Wernicke's aphasia and the CRA.

Gordon Swobe gts_2000 at yahoo.com
Sat Dec 12 14:16:57 UTC 2009


--- On Fri, 12/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> Suppose we replace some of the neurons in your visual
> cortex. The artificial neurons will behave just the same as the
> original neurons, sending the appropriate signals to their neighbours,
> which in turn send signals to their neighbours so that all of the
> biological parts of your brain behave the same as if the replacement 
> had not been made.

So goes the functionalist theory, just one of many in the philosophy of mind, but one which you seem here to take for granted.

On that theory it matters only that the artificial brain and its parts "act" like a real brain -- that the artificial neurons, as you say, "behave" like the originals. 

But you'll notice first that functionalism amounts to behaviorism at the level of the neuron -- it ignores the subjective first person ontology of mental states; and second, it relies on the shaky assumption that substance does not matter -- only function matters.

If only function matters then we could, as others have pointed out, construct a giant artificial brain out of beer cans and toilet paper. Do you think such a monstrosity would have semantics? 

-gts



      



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