[ExI] digital simulations, descriptions and copies

[Gordon Swobe]

--- On Tue, 1/19/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> More on topic: At some level of description almost
>> anything can be seen as digital. The high priests of
>> computationalism noticed this mundane fact and made a
>> religion out of it. They conflate the digital descriptions
>> of things with the non-digital things they describe.
> 
> The theory is that it is matter acting in a particular way
> that produces intelligence and that consciousness is a
> necessary accompaniment of intelligence. Your theory is that matter
> acting in a particular way produces intelligence and, independently of
> this, it produces consciousness... 

Your words here don't seem to address the more general comment of mine that you quoted. 

Consider the ordinary apple that I introduced a few messages ago. I consider natural apples non-digital objects even if we can simulate them on digital computers.

I contend that digital simulations of non-digital objects equal nothing more than *descriptions* of things and that we commit an egregious philosophical blunder when we conflate the digital descriptions of non-digital objects with the real objects they describe.

Some people seem to think that a digital simulation of an apple somehow equals a real apple; that supposing we find ways to create digital simulations of ourselves along with digital simulations of apples then those simulations of ourselves will actually eat and enjoy the taste of those scrumptious digitally-simulated delicious red apples. 

-gts