[ExI] essentialism and/or continuity

[Stefano Vaj]

On 25 May 2010 03:25, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 24 May 2010 20:58, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
>> To play the devil's advocate, everybody would feel he or she is the
>> "same person" absolutely in any circumstance.
>
> Not under any circumstances. I don't feel I am the same person as you,
> but I feel that I am the same person as my self of a year ago. I also
> would not feel I was the same person as an exact copy in the room with
> me, and I would not feel I was the same person as my self of a year
> ago if I could go back in time and meet him.

Let me rephrase. Everybody cannot but feel that they are themselves.

> It's difficult to come up
> with a consistent philosophical account of selves.

Yes, that is exactly my point, and I suspect that the reason is that
no underlying hard reality correspond to the concept of identity,
which behaves as if it were simply a social construct (and for all
practical purposes actual is).

-- 
Stefano Vaj