[ExI] Let's play What If.

Ben Zaiboc bbenzai at yahoo.com
Wed Oct 27 13:16:37 UTC 2010

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>you would expect to end up as either
>the copy or the original with equal probability.


>there is a 1/million probability that you would be
>copy that differentiates.

Again, what is this 'you' of which you speak?  This is
the heart of the problem.  To say that 'you' would end
up as one or other of the instances is nonsense, as
'you' have been duplicated.  There are now two 'you's.
The Amoeba example is a good one.  After reproducing,
which one of the daughter cells is the 'true' amoeba? 
It's a nonsense question, isn't it?  The only possible
answer is "not one, both!".

'I' am what my brain /does/.  Wherever that 'doing'
happens, there am 'I'.  

All these objections seem to hinge on a totally
unsuported assumption:  There can only be one 'I'. 
There isn't any scientific principle which indicates
that this is true, and logic indicates that it's

Here's a thought experiment:  Imagine a machine which
could create two atoms where there was one, and move
each atom exactly 1 metre away from the original
position, in opposite directions, very quickly. This
process is applied to your entire body, creating two
exact copies, 2 metres apart.

So which one is 'you'?

Ben Zaiboc


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