[ExI] Is Transhumanism Coercive?

Anders Sandberg anders at aleph.se
Mon Oct 24 08:56:28 UTC 2011


On 2011-10-24 00:47, Kelly Anderson wrote:
> So, in the competitive sense, we're already coerced into being fyborgs
> today... how is being transhuman going to be any different than what's
> already happening?

Please, let's be careful with the loaded word 'coerce'. It is important, 
because typically (but not always) we think coercion is wrong or a 
violation of rights - in any case, the coerced person is regarded as 
having diminished responsibility for their actions.

Looking at the philosophy of coercion, like e.g. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/
one can note that typically coercion is defined in such a way that there 
has to be somebody intending to get somebody else to do or not do 
something. In this regard technology change (or even transhumanism as an 
idea) cannot be coercive, since there is nobody intending anything. In 
the case of coercion as social pressure, the moral importance is much 
more in question - we might like or dislike the process or results, but 
it is much harder to claim it is morally wrong.

> Will those who don't chose enhancement be Amish?

There is a cost to chose to stay outside the social mainstream. Some 
groups willingly pay the cost. Amish are a fine example, especially 
since they partially reduce the cost by forming their own mini-society 
and by reduced expectations. The problem is when people both want to 
stay outside the mainstream but do not want to pay the cost: they must 
then convince enough of the rest that they have a moral claim to get 
repaid by the mainstream to cover the cost of what they perceive as 
exclusion.

If I refuse enhancements that make me competitive on grounds of profound 
philosophical or religious unease, I might have a plausible sounding 
claim - at least at first. Note that this claim does not work if 
enhancement is a fringe activity (then the enhancer users might in fact 
make the claim on the mainstream that *they* ought to be supported - 
they are exploring potentially useful territory!) Once enhancement is 
the mainstream the non-enhanced will start to be at a disadvantage they 
could try to claim a moral compensation for. This might still just be 
that they benefit from the effects of a more effective society - 
enhanced people invent useful things, do better jobs, pay more taxes - 
not necessarily that they get a pension. But one could imagine laws 
protecting the rights of non-enhanced to remain non-enhanced, running 
all the way from sensible negative rights to absurd privileges.

However, in the long run refusal tends to be worn down (socially and 
morally). Nobody accepts the "right to remain illiterate" today - 
children are forced to learn how to read and write, at least partially 
because otherwise they will be unable to interact with society well as 
autonomous individuals. Sufficiently good enhancements might be similar: 
not taking cognition enhancers might make your ability to be autonomous 
so much lower than everybody elses' that they see it as morally 
imperative to make sure you get the autonomy. Not giving children the 
biological resources they might need in order to participate in wider 
society if they so chose unduly impairs their freedom, so it would be 
parental neglect not to give them the vaccinations or enhancements they 
need.

So maybe there is coercion here, but it might very well be the 
legitimate kind of coercion that is used to protect rights.



-- 
Anders Sandberg
Future of Humanity Institute
Oxford University



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