[ExI] Digital identity

Alan Grimes ALONZOTG at verizon.net
Sat Apr 27 03:43:02 UTC 2013

Anders Sandberg wrote:
>>> For example, if you regard selfhood as linked to having memories of 
>>> your past and overlapping core characteristics (say some cherished 
>>> personality traits) then there might not be a problem with enhanced 
>>> uploads. Or multiple copies of them.
>> So what reward/benefit do I receive for adopting this definition? Why 
>> would I consider uploading when there are a hundred and one ways to 
>> modify my being, using technology even, which don't raise this issue?

> Reward/benefit to *whom*? This is one of those tricky indexical 
> situations, where depending on your definition very different systems 
> matter and even the kind of benefit they gain differs.

It's only tricky because you are trying to wring the wrong answer out of 
the logic.

> Uploading can do things other technologies cannot do, like enabling 
> accurate backups, 

Backups make exactly as much sense as the original procedure (none 

> multiple realisation

"realisation" as you put it is tautologically singular. Now you are free 
to construct an assembly line of beings based on the same mind file, but 
then you cannot have the privilege of being more than one of them*.

* this statement holds true only with regards to the mold-and-stamp 
copying implied by the point.

> and all the benefits of having easily upgradeable software body/minds.

This statement is presented as if it were obvious. The reality is that 
software is famously brittle and difficult to modify. Even if the 
software weren't a problem, you would still be faced with the problem of 
re-configuring tens of millions of neurons each time you want to 
implement a mod. Nobody has written a convincing case that this will 
ever become feasible to the point where it can be done routinely.

> Very beneficial if you think it is identity preserving...


> or think that creating a being in such a state is a good thing, even 
> if it is not you.

That might have some practical applications; maybe; for a week or two at 

> Note that Anders-the-book is an inert instance of the above 
> equivalence class: not a member since it is not doing anything, but if 
> it could be turned into an information processing process it would 
> become an instance (by a reader acting it out, say: "If Anders sees 
> red, go to page 46, if he sees green, go to page 82.")

Extropia DeSilva expressed similar sentiments. =\


Powers are not rights.

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