[ExI] Digital Consciousness
brent.allsop at canonizer.com
Sun Apr 28 23:25:34 UTC 2013
Thanks for pointing that out Ben, so we can be completely clear that I
100% agree with what you are saying.
In every possible way, you can configure something (if you have enough
of it) in such a way, that it can be interpreted (if you know how to
properly interpret it), at least abstractly, as the other.
All I'm trying to point out is that there is a very real theoretical
possibility, that this is critically important to what the qualitative
natures of consciousness are like.
Ben, can I ask you a question, within your current working hyupothoses,
does a redness quaqle have any causal properties in realty? Or in other
words, what might the necessary and sufficient neural correlates be,
such that if you abstractly observe such, you can reliably know that
someone is experiencing your elemental redness quale? And how and why
would the same be different for an elemental greenness quality?
On 4/28/2013 3:49 PM, Ben Zaiboc wrote:
> Brent Allsop wrote:
>> James has admitted that an abstracted
>> representation of the causal properties of glutamate is just something
>> very different than the causal properties of glutamate, configured in a
>> way so that these very different causal properties, can be interpreted
>> as real glutamate. In other words, he has admitted that the map is not
>> like the territory, other than it can be interpreted as such.
> I thought it worth commenting that many people use this 'the map is not the territory' analogy as though it was accurately representing what uploading would accomplish. But it's an incomplete analogy. It would be more accurate to say that the map, while not being the territory, can be used (provided it's detailed enough) to create another territory identical to the first, maybe with different building-blocks.
> Ben Zaiboc
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
More information about the extropy-chat