[ExI] Digital Consciousness .

Eugen Leitl eugen at leitl.org
Mon Apr 29 06:25:15 UTC 2013


On Mon, Apr 29, 2013 at 04:11:44PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> It's difficult if you try to define or explain qualia. If you stick to

Then there is something quite severely wrong with the term.

> a minimal operational definition - you know you have an experience
> when you have it - qualia are stupidly simple. The question is, if a
> part of your brain is replaced with an electronic component that
> reproduces the I/O behaviour of the biological tissue (something that
> engineers can measure and understand), will you continue to have the
> same experiences or not? If not, that would lead to what Brent has
> admitted is an absurd situation. Therefore the qualia, whatever the
> hell they are, must be reproduced if the observable behaviour of the
> neural tissue is reproduced. No equations, but no complex theories of
> consciousness or attempts to define the ineffable either.

Qualia are an internal view of a measurement process.

I don't understand why people raise such a ruckus about
so trivial a thing, which is an emergent property of
a particular type of physical systems.



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