[ExI] Bell's Inequality
jasonresch at gmail.com
Thu Dec 1 15:23:12 UTC 2016
On Thu, Dec 1, 2016 at 2:37 AM, Adrian Tymes <atymes at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 9:53 PM, Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 10:48 PM, Adrian Tymes <atymes at gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 7:36 PM, Rafal Smigrodzki
> >> <rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 5:56 PM, Adrian Tymes <atymes at gmail.com>
> >> >> But experiments do have only one outcome, as experienced and observed
> >> >> by
> >> >> the experimenters. Any alternate worlds are immeasurable and may as
> >> >> well
> >> >> not exist.
> >> >
> >> > ### If you were to say that only the observed experimental outcomes
> >> > exist,
> >> > then you imply there is something qualitatively different between the
> >> > part
> >> > of the wavefunction we do experience and the parts that we don't.
> >> Science is all about observability, measurement, and what actually
> >> exists. If you wish to speculate that something that is never
> >> measurable, observable, or otherwise detectable must still exist, you
> >> need evidence.
> > The other universes are detectable and they do effect our universe, e.g.
> > interference patterns.
> I do not see how interference patterns are necessarily an effect of
> other universes. They are explained well enough by single-world
> quantum mechanics.
Even the single-world quantum mechanics accept that individual particles
can be in multiple places at once given the two-slit single photon or
single electron experiments. They overcome this by saying the wave function
collapses once things get "big enough", but never say how big is too big
for the superposition to remain, nor when, why or how the collapse happens.
Collapse is an ad hoc kludge to maintain a single universe when the math of
the theory (e.g the Schrödinger Equation) makes it absolutely clear that
there are many universes.
“Schrödinger also had the basic idea of parallel universes shortly before
Everett, but he didn't publish it. He mentioned it in a lecture in Dublin,
in which he predicted that the audience would think he was crazy. Isn't
that a strange assertion coming from a Nobel Prize winner—that he feared
being considered crazy for claiming that his equation, the one that he won
the Nobel Prize for, might be true.”
-- David Deutsch
> > Furthermore, you must accept the reality of the wave function (and all
> > branches) in order to explain how quantum computers work.
> The wave function works just fine in a single world too.
The wave function is a system of many universes, as Feynman said that that
a universal wave function: “must contain amplitudes for all possible worlds
depending on all quantummechanical possibilities in the past and thus one
is forced to believe in the equal reality of an infinity of possible
and Stephen Hawking regarded the MWI as “self-evidently correct”. When the
British actor Ken Campbell, asked him “all these trillions of universes of
the multiverse, are they as real as this one seems to be to me?” Hawking
answered, “Yes.... According to Feynman's idea, every possible history [of
Ken] is equally real.”
The way single-worlders get around this is by saying the wave function
doesn't refer to anything real, that it is just a useful calculating
device. But how does this non-real "useful calculating device" enable a
table-top device to factor semi-prime numbers of millions of digits, when
such a calculation would take more time than then the heat death of the
universe to run on a conventional computer, even if all matter in the
observable universe were turned into computers?
> > The evidence for these other branches includes all the evidence we have
> > quantum mechanics. Indefensible mental gymnastics are required to
> believe in
> > both QM but deny the reality of the wave function and its many histories.
> They are only indefensible if you take MWI as a postulate. If you do
> not presuppose MWI, then you might see that things look the same
> whether there are multiple worlds or just the one.
MW is not a postulate, it is barebones QM.
Copenhagen = QM postulates + collapse postulate
Many Worlds = QM postulates
It is a theory with fewer assumptions, and it explains more. It explains
why you get the appearance of collapse, something Copenhagen had to assume.
By Occam, it should be preferred, the only reason it isn't is people are
uncomfortable with the idea that the universe is bigger than it seems.
It's okay, humanity has gone through this before, with the discovery of
other planets besides Earth, with the discovery of other stars besides the
sun, with the discovery of other galaxies besides the Milky Way. We are
just in the middle of a more recent awakening to the idea that reality is
bigger than we previously thought. It took 100 years for Copernicus's
heliocentric idea to become accepted, it's only been 60 years since Everett.
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