[ExI] Humans losing freewill

Stuart LaForge avant at sollegro.com
Wed Nov 23 04:20:22 UTC 2016


Stathis wrote:
<I assume that I make choices because my brain is in a particular
configuration, and that my brain is in that configuration because of the
way the universe has evolved up to that point. When I say I could have
chosen differently, I mean that if my brain had been in a different
configuration I would have chosen differently; and my brain could only
have been in a different configuration if the universe had evolved
differently to the way it actually has. This is a counterfactual; all that
is required is logical possibility.>

So you are saying that you are assuming determinism, i.e. every choice you
make is caused by events in your past light-cone and that your decisions
are shaped by the actual history of the universe and not by any of the
other possible histories. Here you also seem to rule out that any of your
decisions are made because of events in the future or undetectable fairies
on the other side of the universe. So far so good.

Stathis continues:
<There is the possibility that I might make different choices given the
same brain configuration, because there is some truly random element in my
brain. This is in fact slightly disturbing, because it means I may make a
choice at some point not because [of] my experiences and disposition, but
for no reason at all.>

Ok here you are back-pedaling from determinism and saying that your
decisions are sometimes random. So could you describe what you mean by
random as randomness can be very subjective and relative. Are you talking
ontological or epistemic randomness? Objectively random or subjectively
random?

A schizophrenic's behavior may seem random to an outside observer but from
his subjective point of view he is simply doing what the voices in his
head tell him to do. So its random from the external observer's POV but
deterministic from his own. Furthermore you can have a process like
flipping a coin that is textbook random and end up finding some mechanism
that makes it deterministic such this coin-flipping machine:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1697475

So ontological randomness are those things that truly have no cause at all
while epistemic randomness is simply randomness *perceived* by observers
due to ignorance of hidden, possibly complex, deterministic causes.

Stathis wrote:
<We can punish criminal behaviour if it is due to deterministic factors,
but to the extent that it is due to this postulated random element, there
would by definition be no deterrent effect, so punishment would be
futile.>


It is interesting that you bring up "deterrent effects" because
deterrence, if efficacious, is a great example of a retrocausation. Think
about it: a counterfactual but possible punishment in your future causes
you to refrain from criminal behavior in the present which causes that
future punishment to never happen. A possible future causing the very past
which reduces the probability of that future occuring seems to violate our
understanding of how causality works in classical physics but agrees with
our intuitions of psychology.

This is interesting because photons can do similar things in QM as
demonstrated by Wheeler's delayed choice quantum eraser experiments and 
the Elitzur–Vaidman bomb-test experiments. Photons can seemingly make
decisions in your past based upon whether you are going to try to measure
their particle or wave properties in your future. They change their own
histories, by going through one slit instead of both for example, to
accomadate whichever measurement you are going to make. This is even if
the photons came from a distant galaxy.

This retrocausal aspect that both QM and human psychology share seems to
suggest that consciousness might be a quantum mechanical pehenomenon. Of
course the converse hypothesis might be true instead, that quantum
particles might have sufficient consciousness to make decisions based upon
the consequences of them going through one slit or both based upon whether
you are going to choose to measure an intereference pattern or which-way
information at a later point in time.

Stathis continues:
<If you used the term "free will" for this random component, then we might
say that a person is not to be held responsible for their behaviour if it
is freely willed, but only if it is determined. This, of course, is not
how "free will" is normally conceived; which supports the point that it is
an incoherent concept, and we are best to have the discussion using other,
universally agreed to terms.>

But I am not suggesting that randomness is the same as free will. They are
not necessarily mutually exclusive but they certainly are not the same
thing. Indeed our best applications of free will are those that are causal
to our well-being and gratification or the well-being of the people and
causes we care about.

Instead I am saying that free will is a choice precipitated by factors
intrinsic to the agent rather than extrinsic to him or her. That is to say
that there are no invisible puppet strings on you causing your behavior.

Stuart LaForge








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