[ExI] Do digital computers feel?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 , Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:

​> ​
> I feel like we’re repeatedly saying many things back and forth, but filing
> to communicate.
>

​Me too.​

​> ​
> I’m talking about two types of speaking.  There is qualia blind speaking,
> and there is speaking that is not qualia blind.
>

​But when communicating with other human beings (or with anything else) you
have absolutely positively no way of knowing if the speech is qualia blind
or not unless you make certain assumptions, such as if the speech is
intelligent then it is not qualia blind. Fortunately it's easy to determine
if the speaker is intelligent blind or not, but without the assumption of a
link between intelligence and qualia you'd have no reason not to conclude
you're the only conscious thing in the universe.         ​



> ​> ​
> You seem to be thinking that all the speaking I’m talking about is qualia
> blind speaking, and not understanding what I mean by speaking that is not
> qualia blind.
>
>
​But how do you know which it is? All you know for certain is that noises
are issuing from that other person's mouth, to conclude more you need to
make assumptions that you can NOT prove and will never be able to prove,
but we all make these assumptions because none of us could function if we
really believed we were the only conscious being in existence.


> ​> ​
> You are not understanding what might enable someone to be able to make a
> statement like: “My knowledge of red is like your knowledge of green” in a
> way that is demonstrably provable to everyone both objectively and
> subjectively,
>

​You are entirely correct and have hit the core of the matter. I do not
understand how even in theory I could prove
both objectively and subjectively
​ ​
that
​my ​qualia
knowledge of red is like your
​qualia ​
knowledge of green
​.​


> ​> ​
> you don’t seem to understand the implication of being able to connect two
> brains with binding systems, enabling two brains to eff the ineffable in
> the strongest undeniable way.
>

​Correct again. I do not understand how a new being called Brent Clark
would know what it's like to be either
Brent Allsop
​ or John Clark.​


> ​> ​
> I talk about a simplistic binding system that is binding two elemental
> qualitative representations together.  When you replace half the
> representations of knowledge with something that is qualitatively
> different, in order for the binding system to behave the same,
>
>
​Behave the same? ​
 Brent Clark
​ would be something new, he's not going to behave like ​
Brent Allsop
​ nor John Clark.  And the same would be true subjectively, when
Brent Clark
​ looks at a red strawberry he'd have no way of knowing if the qualia he's
experiencing came from
Brent Allsop
​ or John Clark or from neither and was something brand new experienced by
nobody else before in the entire history of the world.


> ​> ​
> you must replace all of the knowledge representations being fed to the
> binding system at the same time you replace the entire binding system. Again,
> so that the system will behave exactly as you and I agree will happen, as
> the neural substitution progresses.
>
>
​If you swap all my qualia knowledge of red with green then ​yes my
objective behavior will be exactly the same, but my subjective experience
will be exactly the same too, I couldn't even tell you'd actually done
anything.


> ​> ​
> I see no evidence that you fully understand the implications of what I’m
> trying to describe with all this.
>
>
​You see no evidence of understanding because there is none.

 John K Clark​
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