[ExI] Fwd: Mental Phenomena

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, 31 Jan 2020 at 08:29, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> Oh, wait.  I forgot an addition point about your view.
> In addition to saying: "That can't be, because of what the neural
> substitution argument demonstrates"
> You amy also say:
> "That isn't important, because of what the neural substitution argument
> demonstrates."
>

Yes, I admit I have probably said that, which I would be expected to do if
indeed I thought you were making a point that was not relevant to the
argument, but I should explain why exactly I believe it is not relevant.

On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 1:45 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> Hi Stathis,
>> How about we try this.
>> I'm going to state your position, and all the points you keep making, as
>> completely and concisely as I can.
>> Then you can tell me if I'm missing anything important.
>> Then, let's see if you can do the same back to me, with anything close to
>> the same fidelity.  Describe, even briefly, my model of consciousness, and
>> using that model, point out as many of the problems as you can, which I
>> believe this view brings to light in your position.
>>
>> OK, let me know if I'm missing anything in the following:
>>
>> I don't recall any other arguments from you, other than the neural
>> substitution argument.
>> The Neural Substitution argument is as follows.
>> You replace neurons in the brain, one at a time, with simulated versions.
>> For all possible inputs to the real neuron, the simulated version of the
>> neuron results in identical outputs to what the real neuron would do.
>> In other words, from an input and output perspective, they are
>> indistinguishable.
>> For each individual neuron substitution you do, you switch back and forth
>> between the real and simulated to verify there is no subjective change by
>> switching to the simulated version.
>> You don't progress to the next neuron till this is achieved, perfectly.
>> Eventually you will get to the last real neuron.  When you switch back
>> and forth, between the last real neuron, and simulated version of the same,
>> still, the subject verifies that there is no subjective difference,
>> The only conclusion that can be made from this, is that the subjective
>> experience in the resulting final completely simulated version must be the
>> same as in the real version.
>> From that we can conclude subjective experience must be "functional" and
>> can't be "material", otherwise you would have irrational "fading",
>> "dancing" or "absent" qualia, on the way to the simulated version.
>> As long as the "behavior" remains the same the subjectivity must also
>> remain the same.
>>
>> Now it's your turn.  Can you describe my model of consciousness with an
>> equivalent amount of fidelity?
>> I believe my model of consciousness brings to light umpteen different
>> problems in this substitution argument, all of which I'm sure I've
>> described at least 2 or 3 times, in multiple different ways, over the years.
>> How many of those different issues can you enumerate, using my model, and
>> how well can you describe them?
>>
>> Feel free to point out the problems with each of these, as you describe
>> them, but my prediction is that you won't have much more to say for any of
>> them than: "That can't be, because of what the neural substitution argument
>> demonstrates."
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 11:46 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, 29 Jan 2020 at 08:24, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> “I appreciate the time you take in these communications and I am sorry
>>>> that we both seem to be repeating ourselves without getting through to the
>>>> other.”
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> After I sent that last long one to you, I was thinking I should have
>>>> included a statement like this, with it.  So, thanks and right back at
>>>> you.  James Carroll finally gave up on me LONG ago.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I’m thinking this pretty much captures your view in a way I can
>>>> understand:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> “IF glutamate is responsible for associated with redness qualia, and we
>>>> replicate the objective behaviour of the glutamate (the qualia-blind
>>>> behaviour, in your terminology) by some non-glutamate means, then the
>>>> redness qualia will also be replicated. It's quite remarkable that we can
>>>> say this, but it is true.”
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But I still struggle with the way you talk about many things.  You
>>>> haven’t mentioned the substitution argument, but I’m assuming this is the
>>>> only justification you have for making that last “but it is true.”
>>>> Claim.?  No thoughts on nothing being able to be redness, for the same
>>>> reasons?  Would you not agree that if experimentalist were never able to
>>>> reproduce redness, without glutamate, it would falsify this claim?
>>>>
>>>
>>> If the experimentalist could reproduce all the behaviour associated with
>>> redness but not the redness, then that would mean qualia are meaningless.
>>> The subject would have altered or absent qualia, but they would not notice
>>> any difference, and communicate that everything was exactly the same. The
>>> most important thing about qualia is that we know we have them and we know
>>> if they change; if this is eliminated, what is there left?
>>>
>>> “If the op amp configuration is changed but other circuitry is also
>>>> changed to compensate, the behaviour of the system will be preserved and so
>>>> will the redness qualia.”
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You never seem to acknowledge any other behavior than external behavior
>>>> (picking the strawberry).  You seem to be ignoring the fact that a qualia
>>>> invert robot could have identical “behavior”, and the qualia is NOT the
>>>> same.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If this is possible, then for the reason above it makes qualia
>>> meaningless. Behaviour does not mean just picking the strawberry, it means
>>> every type of behaviour that the subject can display, such as talking in
>>> detail about its experience of seeing strawberries. It will therefore have
>>> different qualia but declare that the strawberries are exactly the same
>>> shade of red as they were before the change. That would mean that your
>>> qualia might have become inverted in the last five minutes but you haven’t
>>> noticed. As far as you are concerned redness is still redness and greenness
>>> is still greenness. Or you might have gone completely blind in the last
>>> five minutes, but not noticed that you have no visual qualia at all any
>>> more. If you do notice, you are trapped in a nightmare, unable to
>>> communicate this information in any way. Does this make any sense?
>>>
>>> “I wouldn't say it's hopeless for scientific study if qualia are
>>>> epiphenomenal. We effectively study qualia by talking to people, and
>>>> deducing from that what they are experiencing. We cannot be sure that other
>>>> beings have qualia, but we can also be sure, as I have explained many
>>>> times, that IF they have qualia, replicating just the objective behaviour
>>>> will also replicate the qualia. Replicating the objective behaviour could
>>>> be done in an indefinite number of ways, so there is no particular physics
>>>> that is necessary for particular qualia.”
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You always ignore the binding functionality.  For example, you
>>>> mentioned multiple ways to study epiphenomenal qualia in that closing
>>>> statement, but not once did you mention anything about using neural
>>>> ponytails to do the strongest form of effing the ineffable to directly
>>>> observe the physical qualia of others physical knowledge.  Do you not agree
>>>> that your left hemisphere, knows absolutely, if your right hemisphere’s
>>>> knowledge is inverted?  (for example, you use some special glasses and a
>>>> camera system to make everything in the right field of vision red/green
>>>> inverted from the information in your right hemisphere (from the left field
>>>> of vision)?.  It seems to me that facts like this (and being necessarily
>>>> possible to do the same thing for 4 brain hemispheres [Is this not a fact
>>>> or not necessary if if qualia are epiphenomenal?]) should have some effect
>>>> on these closing remarks of yours?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Connecting brains together is not going to allow knowledge of qualia
>>> differences if even the original brain cannot notice qualia differences.
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 28, 2020 at 1:37 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, 28 Jan 2020 at 16:13, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Brent. I appreciate the time you take in these communications and I
>>>>> am sorry that we both seem to be repeating ourselves without getting
>>>>> through to the other.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 27, 2020 at 4:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>>> stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't think glutamate is sufficient for redness because it's too
>>>>>>> simple. You might agree with this, because you have said that glutamate is
>>>>>>> just an example to facilitate discussion. But I agree that glutamate might
>>>>>>> be sufficient as part of a component in a system. It cannot be necessary,
>>>>>>> because once we work out what physical interactions the component is
>>>>>>> involved in, we can substitute another component.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I always think you understand, especially when you say thing like: "
>>>>>> You might agree with this, because you have said that glutamate is just an
>>>>>> example to facilitate discussion."
>>>>>> But then you prove that you still don't understand, with the rest.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let's back up a bit, and see if we can get this right.  Start by
>>>>>> watching this video <https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/> up
>>>>>> to the "inverting pixel" section where it goes into a loop (1 pixel
>>>>>> switching between red and green) till you press continue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm talking about what is the necessary and sufficient set of physics
>>>>>> (or magic or spirit world stuff, or whatever) for that one pixel to have a
>>>>>> redness quality.  And what are the changers, when only that one pixel
>>>>>> changes.
>>>>>> Implications being you can do this for every pixel you are
>>>>>> consciously aware of, and that being proof that there must be something
>>>>>> physical for everything you know, including every pixel of visual knowledge.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If the pixel changes subjectively, then it must change objectively
>>>>> also. That is, there must be some test that can be done on the system which
>>>>> will reveal that there has been a change: the subject cannot distinguish
>>>>> between objects that are a different colour, or the subject says that the
>>>>> strawberry looks different, or something. If there is no such objective
>>>>> change, then there cannot be a subjective change. It is possible to change
>>>>> many parts of the system and produce no objective change. It is like a
>>>>> computer running a program: there are multiple different computers that
>>>>> will run the program exactly the same and give the same user experience.
>>>>> Thus it might be sufficient for a certain set of hardware to run Microsoft
>>>>> Word, but we can't state what is necessary to run Microsoft Word: in a
>>>>> thousand years time people may be running old computer programs on hardware
>>>>> based on dark matter, or other technologies that we can't even imagine now.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> When we abstractly describe glutamate, we have no idea the colorness
>>>>>> property of what we are objectively describing.  Everything we get,
>>>>>> objectively, is necessary abstracted away from physical qualities and
>>>>>> necessary substrate independent.  In other words, without a dictionary, you
>>>>>> can't know the colorness property you are describing or objectively
>>>>>> observing.  Subjective experience is very different.  Subjectively, we
>>>>>> directly experience the physical quality of what our abstract descriptions
>>>>>> are describing.  In order to connect the two, you need a mapping like both
>>>>>> the objective word "glutamate" and the subjective word "redness" are labels
>>>>>> for the same physical thing.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> By examining glutamate objectively, we cannot know what redness is
>>>>> like. However, we do know that IF glutamate is responsible for associated
>>>>> with redness qualia, and we replicate the objective behaviour of the
>>>>> glutamate (the qualia-blind behaviour, in your terminology) by some
>>>>> non-glutamate means, then the redness qualia will also be replicated. It's
>>>>> quite remarkable that we can say this, but it is true.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> So, despite attempting to define glutamate that way, as you are doing
>>>>>> here, you think of glutamate in a completely different way than I was
>>>>>> attempting to describe.  You reveal this misinterpretation of what I'm
>>>>>> trying to say with things like: "the component is involved in, we can
>>>>>> substitute another component."  In other words you are assuming glutamate
>>>>>> is just some "component" of whatever it is that has redness.  (Completely
>>>>>> changing what it actually says).  Thankfully, in the past, after a
>>>>>> gazillion requests, you finally provided the "op amp" example.  You pointed
>>>>>> out that you can replace all the neurons performing the op amp
>>>>>> functionality with neurons that can perform the same functionality, and it
>>>>>> would still result in redness.  You think I disagree with this, but I
>>>>>> don't.  You are just changing the conversion away from what I"m trying to
>>>>>> talk about.  If glutamate is just a component of rendes, then you must
>>>>>> substitute glutamate for whatever it is glutamate is a component of that
>>>>>> performs the necessary and sufficient functionality that is redness for
>>>>>> that one pixel, THAT is what I'm talking about, and you continue to change
>>>>>> the subject.  If that is true, I'm not talking about glutamate at all, as
>>>>>> you continue to think I am.  Glutamate is just a stand in word for whatever
>>>>>> is the necessary and sufficient set of physics (or functionality.  For your
>>>>>> sake, let's assume an addition op amp has the redness quality, and when
>>>>>> that pixel switches from redness to grenness, the op amp functionality
>>>>>> changes from addition to subtraction.  I can completely agree with you that
>>>>>> you could implement both an addition and a subtraction op amp in either
>>>>>> neurons, or silicone, or anything else, but I"m not talking about
>>>>>> components of redness, I'm talking about redness.  In this case it is the
>>>>>> the addition op amp functionality which can be implemented with either
>>>>>> silicon or neurons.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You seem to be agreeing with me that if the op amp is involved in
>>>>> redness qualia, and it is changed for a functionally identical op amp in a
>>>>> different substrate, then the redness qualia will be preserved. If the op
>>>>> amp configuration is changed, say from inverting to non-inverting, while
>>>>> leaving everything else the same, the behaviour of the system will change
>>>>> and the redness qualia may also change. On the other hand, if the op amp
>>>>> configuration is changed but other circuitry is also changed to compensate,
>>>>> the behaviour of the system will be preserved and so will the redness
>>>>> qualia. This demonstrates that there can be no particular physical property
>>>>> of the op amp that is necessary and sufficient for redness qualia.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> The binding system is part of the required functionality.  The
>>>>>> binding system makes you aware of the pixel that is changing from an
>>>>>> addition op amp, to a subtraction op amp (bound with all the other pixels
>>>>>> of color of yet different op amps that are not changing, while this one
>>>>>> pixel does change.)  Anything else you present to that binding system, for
>>>>>> that pixel, the system must immediately be aware of the change, just as
>>>>>> when you see that pixel change from addition op amp ness to subtraction op
>>>>>> amp ness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 26, 2020 at 3:55 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>>>>> stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Glutamate may be involved when red qualia are experienced, but
>>>>>>>>> this cannot be a unique property of glutamate, because if glutamate's
>>>>>>>>> physical effect in the brain,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It almost sounds like you think you have found a way arround my
>>>>>>>> "proof" that if it can't be glutamate, it can't be anything.  Since you now
>>>>>>>> seem to be on board (a change?) with glutamate at least being sufficient
>>>>>>>> for redness, but not necessary?  Is this new?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> changing the shape of glutamate receptors to which it binds, were
>>>>>>>>> replicated with a different mechanism, the red qualia would continue.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> How is this not just saying redness isn't physically real, it is
>>>>>>>> just magic.  There must be a very discoverable set of objectively
>>>>>>>> observable physics, that can result in a redness experience.  This is just
>>>>>>>> up to nature.  Either it is within that set or it isn't.  We don't get to
>>>>>>>> specify when we do and do not want redness to arise so it will fit our
>>>>>>>> possible faulty thinking.  Do you agree that even if there is some
>>>>>>>> "software functionality"  (trying to imagine what a "non physical
>>>>>>>> functionality" might be), it is up to physics (or God?) as to whether
>>>>>>>> redness will "arize' from that, right?  In other words, in all possible
>>>>>>>> cases, redness is a real physical quality?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I honestly can't see why you think that if the glutamate is replaced
>>>>>>> by another mechanism and everything works the same, that means qualia are
>>>>>>> magic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Again, you are thinking completely incorrectly about what I think, as
>>>>>> I indicated above.  If it is the entire mechanism that has the redness
>>>>>> quality, and glutamate is only a "component" of that mechanism.  In that
>>>>>> case, you need to replace glutamate, with the entire mechanism, or whatever
>>>>>> it is that is the necessary and sufficient set of functionality required
>>>>>> for you to directly experience it as a pixel of redness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Also, changing the shape of the glutamate receptor can't uniquely
>>>>>>>>> be the determinant of red qualia because if the physical effect in the
>>>>>>>>> brain of (one type of) glutamate receptor, opening sodium ion channels when
>>>>>>>>> glutamate binds, were replicated with a different mechanism, the red qualia
>>>>>>>>> would continue.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I've repeatedly tried to show the error I think I see in this logic
>>>>>>>> (you are clearly thinking as if glutamate isn't the redness, that redness
>>>>>>>> is something higher up in the system) but you just continue to even
>>>>>>>> acknowledge what I'm trying to say, let alone point out some mistake in my
>>>>>>>> logic.  You just keep saying this same old (clearly mistaken to me)
>>>>>>>> argument over and over again.  There must be something that is the
>>>>>>>> redness.  If this physically changes in any way, it will be physically
>>>>>>>> different than redness.  The system only works if it is physical redness.
>>>>>>>> If the system can't tell when the redness has physical changed, resulting
>>>>>>>> in the entire system being aware that it has changed, physics, it isn't
>>>>>>>> functioning correctly.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Glutamate changes the shape of receptors that it binds to due to the
>>>>>>> electrostatic force, and this is how it causes other physical effects in
>>>>>>> the body, such as muscle movement. Therefore, if the shape of the receptors
>>>>>>> can be changed by some other means than glutamate, the other effects in the
>>>>>>> body will be the same. Your error is to assume that glutamate has some
>>>>>>> other physical effect, "redness", that can cause muscle movement, such as
>>>>>>> the muscle movement associated with saying "I see red". But there is no
>>>>>>> extra such effect; changing the shape of receptors that it binds to due to
>>>>>>> the electrostatic force is 100% of the relevant physical effect of every
>>>>>>> glutamate molecule in every human that has ever lived.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> More proof that you are completely misunderstanding what I"m trying
>>>>>> to say.   Again, in the case you are talking about, glutamate is only a
>>>>>> "component".  In that case I'm not talking about a "component" of redness,
>>>>>> I'm talking about whatever is the necessary and sufficient set of physics
>>>>>> that has the redness quality we directly experience for that one pixel.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This analysis can be continued for the whole brain, replacing every
>>>>>>>>> part with a different part, but preserving all the qualia and
>>>>>>>>> consciousness. It cannot be any one component, or any one physical process,
>>>>>>>>> that is identified with qualia.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Again, as I've said, and demonstrated (remember the checkmate?) IF
>>>>>>>> this is true, then the result is that nothing can have redness, for the
>>>>>>>> same reason.  It seems like you are completely ignoring that, and just
>>>>>>>> going back and replaying the old steps that lead to the checkmate, without
>>>>>>>> changing anything, yet expecting different results?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I misunderstood the "checkmate". Was it that qualia are
>>>>>>> epiphenomenal? I don't consider that "checkmate".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OH, yea.  That was my bad.  James Carroll, who is also a
>>>>>> functionalist (the guy that joined the conversation on Quora the other day,
>>>>>> he liking your "functionalists" responses, and hem adding additional
>>>>>> functionalist responses.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My recollection is that he would repeatedly say the neural
>>>>>> substitution argument proves that if it is glutamate that has the redness
>>>>>> quality, then redness must be "epiphenomenal", which we both agreed meant
>>>>>> redness would not be approachable via science, and we both agreed that
>>>>>> would be game over or something neither one of us could accept.  Kind of
>>>>>> ironic, in a way.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, it was a big surprize to me to hear you say you believe qualia
>>>>>> are epiphenomenal.  But anyway, that doesn't matter.  What I was talking
>>>>>> about, was the second argument I was making that would also be a "check
>>>>>> mate", especially in your case.  (in James' case, I think I have a double
>>>>>> check mate, but let's ignore that for now.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, back to the op amp being the necessary and sufficient set of
>>>>>> functionality to experience a redness quality (including when you can
>>>>>> achieve the same addition op amp with various diverse sets of
>>>>>> "components")  So, now, we need to replace glutamate, with this op amp (or
>>>>>> whatever it is, including magic) that is the necessary and sufficient set
>>>>>> of physics that have the redness quality you can experience for that one
>>>>>> pixel.  For the same reason you are claiming it can't be glutamate, you
>>>>>> must also make the same claim for addition op amps.  They can't have
>>>>>> redness, absolutely nothing, even magic, can have redness, and you can
>>>>>> prove that for anything that you try to substitute glutamate with.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With that I'm thinking:  And we all know, more than anything, that we
>>>>>> can experience redness.  So if your so called "proof" "proves" we can't,
>>>>>> there is something wrong with your proof.
>>>>>> That seems to me to be Checkmate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Does that help at all?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I wouldn't say it's hopeless for scientific study if qualia are
>>>>> epiphenomenal. We effectively study qualia by talking to people, and
>>>>> deducing from that what they are experiencing. We cannot be sure that other
>>>>> beings have qualia, but we can also be sure, as I have explained many
>>>>> times, that IF they have qualia, replicating just the objective behaviour
>>>>> will also replicate the qualia. Replicating the objective behaviour could
>>>>> be done in an indefinite number of ways, so there is no particular physics
>>>>> that is necessary for particular qualia.
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
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-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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