[ExI] Optical illusion tricks you into seeing different colors
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Thu May 20 23:06:27 UTC 2021
On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 11:34 AM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 20 May 2021 at 03:09, spike jones via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> *…*> *On Behalf Of *Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat
>> *Subject:* Re: [ExI] Optical illusion tricks you into seeing different
>> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 9:48 AM spike jones via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> Wouldn’t it be cool to somehow create a device that could measure this?
>> A color can’t really be doing the exact same thing in every brain, ja?
>> >… unproductive discussions on the meaning of "qualia" (which is one of
>> the reasons why I suggested ceasing use of that word)…
>> The concept of qualia is tricky and always has been. The terminology is
>> going to be as tricky as the concept.
>> Being an engineer and math guy, I like things that are stone cold
>> objective. I like it when steel and engineering meet to create a car that
>> wins a race, which is why I like self-driving race cars even more: it takes
>> the subjectiveness of the human brain out of the picture. Cool!
>> In order to give me some idea (after all this time) what is qualia (or
>> what ARE qualia? (is one qualia a qualium?)) we need some kind of objective
>> instrument or device which somehow measures what a brain is doing.
> The singular of qualia is quale. Qualia are synonymous with experiences.
> We can measure what a brain is doing when a human subject says “I see a red
> strawberry” and we can measure what a self-driving car is doing when it
> says “I see a red light” but we can’t know what they are experiencing. We
> can guess that if the human subject’s brain processes are similar to our
> own, their experiences are similar to our own,* but we can’t know. Even
> if we could somehow connect our own brain to the human subject or the car,
> altering our experiences, all we would know is what the melded being
> Stathis Papaioannou
Spike, now that you understand, maybe you can help me with all this? I can
clearly see that other's of you understand. I could use some help with
After all my attempts, I'm still clearly failing to get you to understand
how wrong and misleading this kind of faithless popular consensus bleating
Even if I try again, will you continue to completely ignore all this, and
instead of trying to understand it in a non qualia blind way, and just
continue to make these kinds of bleating claims?
As I've pointed out, so many times, there is the 1. Strong, 2. Stronger,
and 3. Strongest methods of effing the ineffable, if achieved this will
falsify your bleating claims that we can't eff the ineffable.
The strong method is simply having a dictionary, based on non qualia blind
observed facts, connecting the subjective to the objective in a way that
can't be falsified.
to understand this, see my simplified description of qualia to Spike, all
using only mathematical lookup tables using the "=" sign.
Sure, the fact that something like glutamate = redness (or something else)
could be the only thing that has a redness quality isn't absolute truth,
but if it can't be falsified, and if no functionalists can ever produce a
redness, ever, it will be VERY trustworthy.
Beyond that, let me go into more detail about the strongest method of
effing the ineffable, which, if achieved, will results in absolute
As Steven Lehar describes, we know that there is a "diorama" world in our
head, rendered by our perception systems into consciousness, composed of a
substrate of phenomenal intrinsic colors like redness and greenness.
This Diorama is our knowledge of the world. Half of this diorama is in our
left hemisphere, and the other half, in the right hemisphere of our brain.
The corpus callosum computationally binds all this stuff together into one
composite qualitative experience, defined to be consciousness.
The fact that this kind of effing communication happens between
hemispheres, outright proves, all by itself, that your "even if we could
somehow connect our own brain" to another is blatantly false.
But then, you just continue to ignore such facts you don't like, and you
continue to mistakenly assume I'm talking about "composite qualia" with: "*all
we would know is what the melded being experiences*" while I've attempted,
many times, that I'm only talking about elemental qualia, out of which
composite qualia or consciousness is composed.
In other words, both our left, and our right hemisphere know, absolutely,
what redness and greenness are like in our other hemisphere, since the
corpus callosum binds all these intrinsic qualities together in both
hemispheres so both hemispheres can be directly aware of all of them at the
same time, in one unified conscious experience.
The prediction is, that when we come up with neural ponytails
<https://youtu.be/X0mAKz7eLRc?t=146>, which do the same things the corpus
callosum is doing, both of our worlds will be computationally bound
together into one similarly singular conscious experiences, all of it being
directly apprehended by all 4 hemispheres. Our left hemisphere represents
visual knowledge of our right field of vision, and the right hemisphere
representing the left field of vision. When computationally bound
with a neural
ponytails <https://youtu.be/X0mAKz7eLRc?t=146>, (even if only bound at the
elemental level) we will have visual knowledge of what is behind us, bound
to the knowledge of what is in front of us, resulting in a sphere of
knowledge of everything around us, from the data being collected by our
partner's eyes, seeing behind our head.
And IF our partner is engineered to be red green inverted, strawberries in
front of us will be represented with our redness, and the ones behind us
will be represented with our greenness.
We will then know, necessarily since we will be directly apprehending both
of these facts at the same time, that our parners redness is like our
greenness, both of which we call red.
If this is achieved, this will simply be necessarily true, as it is already
necessarily true, between both of our hemispheres.
My prediction for the future about how science historians will judge these
kinds of claims of "functionalists" :
* "we can’t know. Even if we could somehow connect our own brain to the
human subject or the car, altering our experiences, all we would know is
what the melded being experiences "*
These will be judged as clueless bleating of the popular masses. These
functionalists who, instead of trying to understand the above, they just
continue to ignore it, believing that being qualia blind is OK, and that
their so called "proof" justifies them continuing to make faithless claims
like this that lead everyone astray into so called "hard problem" confusion.
Stathis, I fully admit that this claim can be falsified in the future. Do
you have any similarly valuable falsifiable claims for the future you see,
or at least something better than Chalmers' faithless claim that there will
forever be "hard" (interpretation: impossible) problems with consciousness,
or that your faithless claims of eternal ineffability, will always be true,
prefunding to believe your qualia blind 'proof' is justified, despite the
myriads of absurd conclusions that result, a few of which are described
above, which I continue to attempt to point out?
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