[ExI] teachers
Jason Resch
jasonresch at gmail.com
Sun Aug 27 22:34:20 UTC 2023
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 4:50 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> Hello Jason,
>
> On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > Thank you Jason. Would you disagree with me if I call that absense
> of strict empirical proof?
> >
> > Is your objection based on not believing that life-compatible universes
> are rare (given current empirical observations), or is your
> > objection that it's not valid to infer from the rarity of
> life-compatible universes that it is likely there are many universes?
>
> I'd say the reason is that I have not seen any empirical proof of other
> life-comptaible universes, and therefore, they don't seem pretty real to
> me at the moment.
>
> I'm not ruling them out, but as far as my reality goes, at the moment,
> they, like god, are not part of it until further evidence presents itself.
>
What would you say about the measurements from the Planck satellite which
confirm the theory of inflation, and inflation (generally speaking), is
predicted to be eternal, leading to an infinite succession of big bangs
throughout all time? Now these big bangs will be so far away that we cannot
observe them, but it's an implication of a theory that we have
observationally confirmed.
Or again, consider galaxies beyond the cosmic horizon which are moving away
from us so fast we'll never see them, yet our cosmological theories predict
there are galaxies beyond the horizon, perhaps infinite space we cannot and
will never see, would you accept the existence of these theoretical,
unobserved galaxies?
(Just some examples I like to bring up to show scientist often use theories
for things we can't see, so MW is not a unique or special case in this
regard. For whatever reason people seem more willing to accept the infinite
universes of external inflation than MW)
> > I guess it comes down to whether the absence of observation, plus an
> inference, counts as an empirical observation. For instance, if
> > I play a shell game and put a coin under one of the shells and mix them
> around and flip one over, and you do not see a coin under it,
> > does that count as an empirical observation (which together with your
> inference) tells you the coin must be under the other shell? Or
> > must I lift the second shell for the light reflecting off the coin to
> enter your eyes, for this to count as empirical evidence of the
> > coin's location?
>
> Yes, I think that is the crux of the issue here. For physical objects,
> inferring is strong, but verfying it, is stronger. I'd prefer the
> possibility to verify it over infering.
>
> But this is physical objects only.
>
> When taking the step from physical objects, or by extension, our
> universe, to god or multiple universes, I'd very much not trust
> inference, but would very much like to verify.
>
Trust but verify. ��
>
> > With the anthropic reasoning, it is like the shell game where we don't
> see the coin. We see something that is hard to explain without
> > there being many lifeless universes out there, even though light from
> these other lifeless universes never reaches us. Is this
> > empirical? Arguably it's not, but do you have an alternative explanation
> for the dozen or so coincidences that made life possibile
> > here?
>
> Got it. No, my opinion is that it is not empirical. It is an attempt at
> explanation, but not proof. Does the explanation have some kind of power
> of prediction?
Perhaps this is the role filled by abductive reasoning:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abductive_reasoning
Does it help me become a better person? I could accept it
> from a pragmatic point of view, but it would be tool and probably not a
> part of my reality.
>
> I feel as I am clumsily grasping or trying to say something here, but
> perhaps you can tease it out of me, or a good nights sleep might help me
> find the right words.
>
We use induction to develop theories, then deduction to determine
consequences of theories. If we have a high confidence in our theories then
we should have a high (but not perfect) confidence in the predictions of
those theories in cases we can't directly confirm.
Surely, when we test something directly and confirm it our confidence
approaches 100%, but consider our confidence for something we've never
tested, such as our confidence that the theory of gravity would predict
that a 1-ton diamond, if dropped would fall if placed in Earth's
gravitational field. We're confident in this prediction solely due to our
confidence in the theory of gravity. I think our confidence in the
multiverse rests on similar grounds.
> > I think those kind of discussions sometimes let our imaginations
> run away with ourselves, and even if they indicate
> > something, I will never know, and it will never affect me, so as
> far as I am concerned, I can disregard it.
> >
> > But they can affect you. The existence of other universes provide
> continuation paths for your consciousness. You might awaken there,
> > or find yourself surviving an otherwise not survivable situation in this
> universe, through the continued existence of a parallel self
>
> Well, the problem is that this is a "could". So far it has not happened,
>
That you or I can remember.
and I have not heard from anyone who had it happen to them.
The theory explains why we would not have evidence within this universe of
others in other universes simulating us and copying us there. The trip is
one-way. So we can't consider this lack of evidence as evidence of absence.
So yes,
> anything can happen, but so far I have not seen any proof of this
> happening to me or anyone else. If there never can be a proof, then I
> prefer to leave it at the very stimulating thought experiment level.
>
The proof can only come if/when you find yourself in another universe. It
is much like with quantum suicide: you can only experience the proof for
yourself, and can't share it.
> > in one of those universes. It may even provide a means for life here to
> survive the heat death of this universe (by having some other
> > entity in another less resource constrained universe) copy-and-paste us
> into their universe, just as we can copy and paste objects
> > from the John Conway's Game-of-Life universe into our own.
>
> True, it may do so, but my reasoning I think, remains the same.
>
Well perhaps this is the evidence you're looking for. If we, say, discover
a glider in the GoL universe and then copy it and paste it into its own GoL
space where it can enjoy gliding forever, then here is an example of
"someone" whom underwent the procedure, so you know it alcan and does
happen for some entities. Now consider: what is the simulated universe is
more complex and the entity we copy into a simulation of our choosing is
conscious?
Jason
> >
> >
> > On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> > Hello Stuart,
> >
> > Just a quick question from someone not very
> knowledgeable of cutting
> > edge physics.
> >
> > You say that
> >
> > that a copy of you can truly be you, then you
> can relax because you are already immortal. You
> > don't need to
> > copy yourself because there are already plenty
> of, if not infinite numbers of, you strewn about
> > the
> > multiverse.
> >
> >
> > What I wonder is, are infinite numbers of you and
> multiverses supported by proof or is itone of many
> > interpretations of
> > current theories?
> >
> >
> > Anthropic considerations provide strong evidence, in the
> sense that the probability there's only one universe
> > (with one kind of
> > physics) is on the order of 1 in 10^122.
> >
> > https://alwaysasking.com/is-the-universe-fine-tuned/
> >
> > This is as close to proof as anything science can provide.
> >
> > Jason
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Best regards, Daniel
> >
> >
> > Stuart LaForge
> >
> >
> > This is a crucial point, for those of us
> interested in uploading, so I think we should
> > really
> > understand it, yet it makes no sense to
> me. Would you please explain further?
> >
> > Could you also please explain the comment
> about continuity and not-discontinuity not being
> > the
> > same thing?
> >
> > Ben
> >
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