[ExI] Emily M. Bender — Language Models and Linguistics (video interview)
Gordon Swobe
gordon.swobe at gmail.com
Sun Mar 26 08:56:23 UTC 2023
I have a smart home. Some of the iPhone apps associated with it have and
can display what could be described as internal models representing my
home. Does this mean these apps have a conscious understanding of the
layout of my home? No, I think not, not as I and most people use the word
understand. Only minds can understand things, and despite my home being
"smart," I reject the idea that it has a mind of its own. That is nothing
more than foolish science-fiction..
-gts
On Sun, Mar 26, 2023 at 12:01 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon.swobe at gmail.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 25, 2023 at 4:49 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Gordon,
>>
>> Thanks for sharing this video. I watched and and found the following
>> points of interest:
>>
>> *1. She said they can't possibly be understanding as they are only seeing
>> a sequence of characters and predicting distributions and what these models
>> do is not the same thing as understanding language.*
>> My Reply: These models demonstrate many emergent capabilities that were
>> not things that were programmed in or planned. They can answer questions,
>> summarize texts, translate languages, write programs, etc. All these
>> abilities emerged purely from being trained on the single task of
>> predicting text. Given this, can we be certain that "understanding" is not
>> another one of the emergent capabilities manifested by the LLM?
>>
>
> This gets into philosophical debate about what, exactly, are emergent
> properties. As I understand the term, whatever it is that emerges is
> somehow hidden but intrinsic prior to the emergence. For example, from the
> rules of chess there emerge many abstract properties and strategies of
> chess. To someone naive about chess, it is difficult to imagine from the
> simple rules of chess how chess looks to a grandmaster, but those emergent
> properties are inherent in and follow logically from the simple rules of
> chess.
>
> So how does meaning emerge from mere symbols(words)? Sequences of abstract
> characters in no possible way contain the seeds of their meanings, as we
> can see by the fact that many different words exist in different languages
> and in entirely different alphabets for the same meaning.
>
>
>> *2. She uses the analogy that the LLM looking at characters would be the
>> same as a human who doesn't understand Cherokee looking at Cherokee
>> characters.*
>> My Reply: This is reminiscent of Searle's Chinese Room. The error is
>> looking at the behavior of the computer only at the lowest level, while
>> ignoring the goings-on at the higher levels. She sweeps all possible
>> behavior of a computer under the umbrella of "symbol manipulation", but
>> anything computable can be framed under "symbol manipulation" if described
>> on that level (including what atoms, or neurons in the human brain do).
>> This therefore fails as an argument that no understanding exists in the
>> higher-level description of the processing performed by the computer
>> program.
>>
>
> Yes her argument is similar to Searle's. See above. Sequences of
> characters (words) in no possible way contain the hidden seeds of their
> meanings, as we can see from the fact that many different words exist
> in different languages and alphabets for the same meaning.
>
> *3. She was asked what a machine would have to do to convince her they
>> have understanding. Her example was that if Siri or Alexa were asked to do
>> something in the real world, like turn on the lights, and if it does that,
>> then it has understanding (by virtue of having done something in the real
>> world).*
>> My Reply: Perhaps she does not see the analogy between turning on or off
>> a light, and the ability of an LLM to output characters to a monitor as
>> interacting in the real world (turning on and off many thousands of pixels
>> on the user's monitor as they read the reply).
>>
>
> I thought that was the most interesting part of her interview. She was
> using the word "understanding" in a more generous way than I would prefer
> to use it, even attributing "understanding" to a stupid app like Alexa, but
> she does not think GPT has understanding. I think she means it in exactly
> the way I do, which is why I put it in scare-quotes. As she put, it is a
> "kind of" understanding. As I wrote to you I think yesterday, I will grant
> that my pocket calculator "understands" how to do math, but it is
> not holding the meaning of those calculations in mind consciously, which is
> what I (and most everyone on earth) mean by understanding.
>
> Understanding involves the capacity to consciously hold something in mind.
> Otherwise, pretty much everything understands something and the word loses
> meaning. Does the automated windshield wiper mechanism in my car understand
> how to clear the rain off my windows when it starts raining? No, but I will
> grant that it "understands" it in scare-quotes.
>
> The other point I would make here is that even if we grant that turning
> the pixels off and on your screen makes GPT sentient or conscious, the real
> question is "how can it know the meanings of those pixel arrangements?"
> From its point of view (so to speak) it is merely generating meaningless
> strings of text for which it has never been taught the meanings except via
> other meaningless strings of text.
>
> Bender made the point that language models have no grounding, which is
> something I almost mentioned yesterday in another thread. The symbol
> grounding problem in philosophy is about exactly this question. They are
> not grounded in the world of conscious experience like you and me. Or, if
> we think so, then that is to me something like a religious belief.
>
>
>
>> *4. She admits her octopus test is exactly like the Turing test. She
>> claims the hyper-intelligent octopus would be able to send some
>> pleasantries and temporarily fool the other person, but that it has no real
>> understanding and this would be revealed if there were any attempt to
>> communicate about any real ideas.*
>> My Reply: I think she must be totally unaware of the capabilities of
>> recent models like GPT-4 to come to a conclusion like this.
>>
>
> Again, no grounding.
>
>
>> *5. The interviewer pushes back and says he has learned a lot about math,
>> despite not seeing or experiencing mathematical objects. And has graded a
>> blind student's paper which appeared to show he was able to visualize
>> objects in math, despite not being sighted. She says the octopus never
>> learned language, we acquired a linguistic system, but the hyper
>> intelligent octopus has not, and that all the octopus has learned is
>> language distribution patterns.*
>> My Reply: I think the crucial piece missing from her understanding of
>> LLMs is that the only way for them to achieve the levels of accuracy in the
>> text that they predict is by constructing internal mental models of
>> reality. That is the only way they can answer hypotheticals concerning
>> novel situations described to them, or for example, to play chess. The only
>> way to play chess with a LLM is if it is internally constructing a model of
>> the board and pieces. It cannot be explained in terms of mere patterns or
>> distributions of language. Otherwise, the LLM would be as likely to guess
>> any potential move rather than an optimal move, and one can readily
>> guarantee a chess board position that has never before appeared in the
>> history of the universe, we can know the LLM is not relying on memory.
>>
>
> I don't dispute that LLMs construct internal models of reality, but I
> cough when you include the word "mental," as if they have minds
> with conscious awareness of their internal models.
>
> I agree that it is absolutely amazing what these LLMs can do and will do.
> The question is, how could they possibly know it any more than my pocket
> calculator knows the rules of mathematics or my watch knows the time?
>
>
>
>>
>> *6. The Interviewer asks what prevents the octopus from learning language
>> over time as a human would? She says it requires joint-attention: seeing
>> some object paired with some word at the same time.*
>> My Reply: Why can't joint attention manifest as the co-occurrence of
>> words as they appear within a sentence, paragraph, or topic of discussion?
>>
>
> Because those other words also have no meanings or refrents. There is no
> grounding and there is no Rosetta Stone.
>
> Bender co-authored another paper about "stochastic parrots," which is how
> she characterizes LLMs and which I like. These models are like parrots that
> mimic human language and understanding. It is amazing how talented they
> appear, but they are only parrots who have no idea what they are saying.
>
>
>>
>> *7. The interviewer asks do you think there is some algorithm that could
>> possibly exist that could take a stream of words and understand them in
>> that sense? She answers yes, but that would require programming in from the
>> start the structure and meanings of the words and mapping them to a model
>> of the world, or providing the model other sensors or imagery. The
>> interviewer confirms: "You are arguing that just consuming language without
>> all this extra stuff, that no algorithm could just from that, really
>> understand language? She says that's right.*
>> My Reply: We already know that these models build maps of things
>> corresponding to reality in their head. See, for example, the paper I
>> shared where the AI was given a description of how rooms were connected to
>> each other, then the AI was able to visually draw the layout of the room
>> from this textual description. If that is not an example of understanding,
>> I don't know what possibly could be. Note also: this was an early model of
>> GPT-4 before it had been trained on images, it was purely trained on text.
>>
>
> This goes back to the question about Alexa.Yes, if that is what you mean
> by "understanding" then I am forced to agree that even Alexa and Siri
> "understand" language. But, again, I must put it in scare quotes. There is
> nobody out there named Alexa who is actually aware of understanding
> anything. She exists only in a manner of speaking.
>
>
>>
>> *8. She says, imagine that you are dropped into the middle of the Thai
>> library of congress and you have any book you could possibly want but only
>> in Thai. Could you learn Thai? The Interviewer says: I think so. She asks:
>> What would you first do, where would you start? She adds if you just have
>> form, that's not going to give you information. She then says she would
>> have to find an encyclopedia or a translation of a book we know.*
>> My Reply: We know there is information (objectively) in the Thai library,
>> even if there were no illustrations or copies of books we had the
>> translations to. We know the Thai library contains scruitable information
>> because the text is compressible. If text is compressible it means there
>> are discoverable patterns in the text which can be exploited to reduce the
>> amount of bits needed to represent it. All our understanding can be viewed
>> as forms of compression. For example, the physical laws that we have
>> discovered "compress" the amount of information we need to store about the
>> universe. Moreover, when compression works by constructing an internal toy
>> model of reality, we can play with and permute the inputs to the model to
>> see how it behaves under different situations. This provides a genuine
>> understanding of the outer world from which our sensory inputs are based. I
>> believe the LLM has successfully done this to predict text, it has various
>> internal, situational models it can deploy to help it in predicting text.
>> Having these models and knowing when and how to use them, I argue, is
>> tantamount to understanding.
>>
>
> How could you possibly know what those "discoverable patterns of text"
> mean, given that they are in Thai and there is no Thai to English
> dictionary in the Thai library?
>
> As she points out and I mentioned above, there is no Rosetta Stone.
>
> Thanks for the thoughtful email.
>
> -gts
>
>
>
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