[ExI] Open Individualism

[Ben Zaiboc]

On 07/01/2024 00:21, Jason Resch wrote:
> Perhaps this question will sharpen the issue at hand:
>
> If you step into a star trek style transporter, but some error causes 
> 5 identical copies of yourself to beam down, which one do you become?
>
> A) none of them
> B) one of them
> C) all of them

"Which one do you become?" is not a sensible or meaningful question. I 
think it's better to consider the situation from the viewpoint of the 
five resultant people, and ask if they are different or not, from each 
other and from the person who stepped into the transporter. These are 
two different questions, and they have two different answers.

If I travel to Burma, am I the same person as when I left? It depends on 
what you're focusing on. The Ben that gets off the plane in Burma is the 
same person that got on it in England, if you're focusing on my 
continuity of identity, but at the same time, I've accumulated different 
experiences, perhaps have a different viewpoint on some things, and will 
continue to have different experiences than if I stayed at home, so from 
the viewpoint of my internal experience, I have become a different 
person, at least in part.

The same thing applies to someone who is duplicated multiple times. Each 
resultant person is the same in the sense that they can correctly claim 
to have been the original in the past, and they are all different from 
each other because they are now separate minds that have different 
experiences since the duplication. They will probably retain the same 
basic personality traits, and will probably express them in different 
ways, depending on their individual circumstances. They will each be an 
independent person, with the same past as all the others, up to the 
point of divergence.

If you insist on the wording "which one do you become?", I'd have to 
answer A and C. Which kind of illustrates that it's a silly question.


 > The "2024-you" is also different in many ways (different place, 
different atoms, different experience), from the "2023-you".

 > But we also, as a matter of general practice, believe/assume that 
despite these difference, they are experienced by the same person.

I'd agree with both these things: Different, and also the same, 
depending on which factors you're considering.

 > Personal identity theories attempt to answer the question of what, 
and how much, can change while retaining the identity of a person.

The answer to that depends on what your definition of 'identity' is, so 
it's a circular question. You could create a philosophical field called, 
say, Fish Identity Theory, that attempts to answer whether Sardines are 
animals or fish. There is no definitive answer to a question like this, 
without any other context (the most realistic answer, of course, is 
"both"). Insisting on one or the other is really more of an invitation 
to have a pointless argument than a genuine question.

 > Empty individualism says any change at all, no matter how small, 
constitutes a new person. Closed individualism, says you can only change 
so much while being the same person. Open  individualism says there's no 
limit to how much can change and yet still remain the same person -- 
that all variations of material composition of the body or psychological 
content of the experience, are mere contingencies.

Ok, so there you have three different views on the matter. That's all 
you can say. You certainly can't say if one is 'righter' than the 
others, without further qualifying context. They are simply opinions. 
Open Fish Identity Theory says that Sardines are Animals. Closed Fish 
Identity Theory says they are Fish. Both are correct.


 >>    I'm not everybody, I'm just me.

 > Are you the same person as when you step out of a teleporter or is 
that someone else?

Both. It's not "or" it's "and".

 > Are you all your clones in the many worlds or are those other people?

I'd say they (if such things exist) are other people, but that's just my 
opinion. You may validly disagree.

 > Are you the same you when you reappear in a similar form in another 
future big bang of eternal inflation, or is that someone else?

Depends on if there are any differences. If everything is identical, so 
there's no possibility of telling which is which (something that nobody 
could ever tell, of course), then the question answers itself. If not, 
then See Above.


 > Are you the same person in other mirror images of earth that appear 
in infinite locations across the infinite space of our universe, what 
about the ones that have one less hair on their head, or a different 
color of eyes? How much can change across all the infinite instances in 
reality while still being you?

Same answer.

And I'm still no closer to understanding what 'Open Individualism' 
actually means. "One numerically identical subject, who is everyone at 
all times, in the past, present and future" is a sentence that makes no 
sense. What does 'One numerically identical...' mean? 'Identical' is a 
comparison, so you have to have at least two things, for them to be 
identical to one another in any respect. 'One identical thing' is 
meaningless. Can we replace that with "one person", for clarity, or 
doesn't that work?. The rest just reads as gobbledigook. Can it be 
boiled down to "one person, who is all people"? At least that sentence 
is coherent. As for what it means...

Your definition above is different, though. You refer to how much 
someone can change and still be thought of as the same. The Wiki 
definition talks about everyone already being the same.

Ben