[ExI] Open Individualism

Sun Jan 7 21:55:41 UTC 2024

If a person is someone who can have more than one experience, then what
determines the set of experiences that person will ultimately have?

I have to say that I do not understand the question.  The  only real answer
is:  who they see, what they read, where they go, what they believe, and
dozens more.  bill w

On Sun, Jan 7, 2024 at 11:25 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, Jan 7, 2024, 11:28 AM William Flynn Wallace via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> I think you can see where the trouble emerges.
>>
>> Jason   No,I really don't.
>>
>
> The trouble, to be clear, is in answering what connects two different
> experiences, represented by two different brain states, to the "same
> person".
>
> If a person is someone who can have more than one experience, then what
> determines the set of experiences that person will ultimately have?
>
> And why would you use the word 'trivial' to apply to anyone's personality?
>>
>
> I used the word trivial to refer to the truth of the statement that the
> content of your brain is unique and changes from moment to moment (as is
> true for everyone). That the statement is trivially true, means it is
> obviously true (that the content of the brain constantly changes is
> certainly true).
>
> You have to explain some of your terms, which I have not encountered
>> before.  bill w
>>
>
> I am happy to. Just let me know if I use any terms thet require
> clarification. ☺️
>
> Thanks Bill w.
>
> Jason
>
>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2024 at 2:21 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2024, 3:10 PM William Flynn Wallace via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> What principle in science says the experience this one life you are in is somehow different or special compared to all the trillions of other creatures who have lived
>>>> on this planet?   jason
>>>> Easy- the content of my brain is unique - my memories,
>>>> mmy personality, even my face is distinguishable from any
>>>> a others on earth (identical twins are not identical).  bill w
>>>>
>>>>
>>> It is, of course, trivially true that the content of your brain is
>>> unique and changes from moment to moment (thus constituting different
>>> "observer moments").
>>>
>>> The trouble comes when we try to attach two different observer moments
>>> to the *same* experiencer.
>>>
>>> What mechanism do we choose to define such a linkage, and how do we
>>> justify it?
>>>
>>> Is it the continuity of some body? If so then what about mind uploading
>>> or transporters?
>>>
>>> Is it the continuity of some memories? If so then what about amnesia?
>>>
>>> Is it the continuity of some processes? If so then what about
>>> concussions?
>>>
>>> I think you can see where the trouble emerges.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2024 at 2:03 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2024, 2:31 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 06/01/2024 17:32, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think you have yet understood the idea. It's not about grouping things.
>>>>>> It
>>>>>>  all comes down to one question: what did it take for you to be born?
>>>>>> For you you to be alive now in this moment? What principle in science
>>>>>> says the experience this one life you are in is somehow different or
>>>>>> special compared to all the trillions of other creatures who have lived
>>>>>> on this planet?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't understand the idea at all. It seems like complete nonsense.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Perhaps this question will sharpen the issue at hand:
>>>>>
>>>>> If you step into a star trek style transporter, but some error causes
>>>>> 5 identical copies of yourself to bean down, which one do you become?
>>>>>
>>>>> A) none of them
>>>>> B) one of them
>>>>> C) all of them
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> To answer the (two, not one) questions above:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1) Innumerable things, that nobody can possibly completely answer
>>>>>> (the question is a bit broad, really)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2) I am unique among the trillions of other creatures because
>>>>>> genetics and the many variables involved in my development ensure this, but
>>>>>> I'm not in any objective way 'special'. Subjectively, on the other hand...
>>>>>> Well, I'm the only 'Me' (so far), and that counts as special, at least to
>>>>>> me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But I don't see what this has to do with 'Open Individualism'. In
>>>>>> fact, these questions seem to be completely at odds with the idea that 'I
>>>>>> am everybody'. Everybody's different, so they can't be the same.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "2024-you" is also different in many ways (different place,
>>>>> different atoms, different experience), from the "2023-you".
>>>>>
>>>>> But we also, as a matter of general practice, believe/assume that
>>>>> despite these difference, they are experienced by the same person.
>>>>>
>>>>> Personal identity theories attempt to answer the question of what, and
>>>>> how much, can change while retaining the identity of a person.
>>>>>
>>>>> Empty individualism says any change at all, no matter how small,
>>>>> constitutes a new person. Closed individualism, says you can only change so
>>>>> much while being the same person. Open  individualism says there's no limit
>>>>> to how much can change and yet still remain the same person -- that all
>>>>> variations of material composition of the body or psychological content of
>>>>> the experience, are mere contingencies.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not everybody, I'm just me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you the same person as when you step out of a teleporter or is
>>>>> that someone else? Are you all your clones in the many worlds or are those
>>>>> other people? Are you the same you when you reappear in a similar form in
>>>>> another future big bang of eternal inflation, or is that someone else? Are
>>>>> you the same person in other mirror images of earth that appear in infinite
>>>>> locations across the infinite space of our universe, what about the ones
>>>>> that have one less hair on their head, or a different color of eyes? How
>>>>> much can change across all the infinite instances in reality while still
>>>>> being you?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> And the same is true for everyone else. We are all alone, no matter
>>>>>> how much we communicate with each other, or how well we know someone else,
>>>>>> we can never be in their heads.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Perhaps this concept of Open Individualism is a result of reluctance
>>>>>> to accept that? Similar to some religious ideas (particularly the
>>>>>> oxymoronic 'afterlife') being a result of reluctance to accept that when
>>>>>> you're dead, you're dead?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It comes from attempting to answer questions that arise in uncommon
>>>>> situations: split brains, fused brains, duplication machines, teleporters,
>>>>> cloning devices, healing devices. These normally don't come up, so it is
>>>>> easy to go all ones life without considering anything beyond the
>>>>> conventional view of personal identity, but the moment you venture into
>>>>> these uncommon situations, you will find conventional theories are no
>>>>> longer adequate.
>>>>>
>>>>> Jason
>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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