[extropy-chat] Creativity and closed labs - was Self replicating computer programs ?

Brett Paatsch bpaatsch at bigpond.net.au
Fri Nov 14 02:28:57 UTC 2003


Emlyn wrote:

[Brett]
> > It seems imprudent to propagate how-to instructions for the
> > making of weapons or poisons until one has a *very* good 
> > antidote. Maybe.
> > 
> > I think I'd rather test myself against someone else's "aggressive"
> > weapon design then put my mind to the engineering problem of 
> > making and discussing a  better weapon myself. - Until I can
> > find a way of doing a logical end-run around the whole grey-goo 
> > scenario. 
> > 
> > Sorry if that's clear as mud.

> It's clear, but I don't think it's valid. The only way to anticipate
> the threats is to know what they are, so public dissemination of 
> that info is  very useful. You are not actually broadcasting weapon
> making instructions, only potential future weapon making
> instructions, and vague at that... it's quite a ways off yet. So for
> now it is safe enough to talk about.
> 
> Later, it gets scary, but if we've been thinking hard, discussing
> the problems, examples, etc, we should have the design for 
> antidotes and safeguards well before it's actually possible to
> build the weapons. So by the time the tech turns up, we are
> prepared.
> 
> OTOH, if we keep it quiet, the tech will turn up eventually, 
> and someone *will* figure out how to make the weapons. 
> The antidotes, however, which are probably harder, may not
> turn up in time.
> 
> So I say, blab on!

I'd be interested in others views on this. It would be real nice
not to have to engineer in secret for fear of empowering the
wrong folk but I am not sure that it is in fact as 'safe'? as you
think.

If one read's Peter Singhs Code book (perhaps you have)
one can get a pretty clear impression on how folks working
within government agencies have access (at least theoretically)
to all the stuff that is the public domain but the public doesn't
have access to the stuff in the closed labs. There are secret 
patents.

Government closed labs can be very well funded. 

I think that RSA encryption among a number of other 
technologies was actually produced first by boffins in closed 
labs that could not talk about it.  The principle rather than the
actual instance though is what concerns me. Perhaps not only
me - try communicating with Eugen ;-)

Against the idea that technology (particularly weapons and 
security related technology) is likely to be more advanced in 
some government closed labs is the counterpoint that people
are extraordinarily bad at keeping secrets. 

Yet, folk can set up networks of terrorist cells - the IRA model
(or my crude understanding of it comes to mind) that work.
Hussein is not obviously dead, neither is Bin Laden.

With technology though I am not sure that the bureaucrats
(spook bosses etc) are necessarily across the technologies
that their in-house techos are developing to be able to control
them. 

The Cambridge spies, I think, were one example of trusted
inner circle folk with deep convictions (they preferred 
communism) attaining power and providing the specs for 
nuclear weaponry to the Russians. So secrets even or perhaps
especially technological ones do get spilled sometimes. 

Yet - That the enigma machine was cracked and was not 
leaked.

Cryptonomicon by Neil Stevenson is a good book.

My point? I am not sure exactly where the optimal boundaries
are in disclosing ones creativity. I have seen plenty of instances
where stupid bosses were able to milk the inventiveness of
brighter staff members that did not have their bosses political 
savvy.

I don't know what the chances of the Exi list being watched with
real interest AND understanding is, but I doubt that it is 
infinitesimal. Heck I'm watching it and I've got considerably 
less resources than a government ;-)

Regards,
Brett
[feeling this conversation has a deja vu quality even at the outset]





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