[extropy-chat] Self replicating computer programs ?

Eugen Leitl eugen at leitl.org
Fri Nov 14 11:09:49 UTC 2003


On Fri, Nov 14, 2003 at 12:12:33PM +1030, Emlyn O'regan wrote:
> > It seems imprudent to propagate how-to instructions for the

Don't fret, there have been public discussions about gray goo design which
were pretty detailed (down to a spec sheet).

They're still arbitrarily remote from a blueprint. Disseminating viable
blueprints in absence of a blueprint for a bootstrap fab is still very safe.

> > making of weapons or poisons until one has a *very* good 
> > antidote. Maybe.

The problem with countermeasure is that you need a very thorough experience
with the pathogen behaving (or a very good model thereof) to make sure it's
working.

> > I think I'd rather test myself against someone else's "aggressive"
> > weapon design then put my mind to the engineering problem of 
> > making and discussing a  better weapon myself. - Until I can find
> > a way of doing a logical end-run around the whole grey-goo 

You're making a logical mistake. Grey goo is not about logic, it's about
security and technology/engineering. This is not something you talk about,
this is something you need to address in simulators, tiger groups, and in field
tests. In very practical hands-on setting, in other words. A whitehat
ignorant of blackhats isn't.

Only then do you understand the problem domain sufficiently to make informed
statements about it.

> > scenario. 
> > 
> > Sorry if that's clear as mud.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Brett
> 
> It's clear, but I don't think it's valid. The only way to anticipate the
> threats is to know what they are, so public dissemination of that info is
> very useful. You are not actually broadcasting weapon making instructions,
> only potential future weapon making instructions, and vague at that... it's
> quite a ways off yet. So for now it is safe enough to talk about.

Right.
 
> Later, it gets scary, but if we've been thinking hard, discussing the
> problems, examples, etc, we should have the design for antidotes and
> safeguards well before it's actually possible to build the weapons. So by
> the time the tech turns up, we are prepared.

I disagree. You have to actually build the weapon prototypes and test them
(with very, very good containment procedures) to be able to control them (if
that is at all possible).
 
> OTOH, if we keep it quiet, the tech will turn up eventually, and someone
> *will* figure out how to make the weapons. The antidotes, however, which are
> probably harder, may not turn up in time.
> 
> So I say, blab on!

-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
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