Fw: [extropy-chat] Essay on Physical Immortality

[Robert J. Bradbury]

On Sun, 4 Jan 2004, Samantha Atkins wrote:

> I agree with some of Hubert's points.  I would also remove the notion
> that abortion is morally impermissable as that begs a few questions and
> throws a controversy in that is not necessary to your point.

Well this isn't really Mark's point -- he is simply pointing out that if
the objection to preventing access to life extending technologies
is based on the right to a future -- then abortion is going to
come up in the minds of critics.

I'm going to raise this topic in my comments to him -- it twists
extensively in which rights trump other rights.  For example being
forced to have and care for an unwanted child may significantly
damage the futures of both the child and mother.  Or giving
the child up for adoption may produce similar results.  But
all of this has probably been extensively examined in the abortion
debates.

IMO, the key question may revolve around -- when precisely does one
have a "future"?  A human fetus or an infant have no capability for
self-enabled survival without depending upon their society or
parent(s).  This is in contrast to many newborn animals
have a reasonable chance at survival (having a future)
from the time they are born/hatched/etc.

There is also the fundamental problem that given cloning technology,
many of the cells in your body have the potential for producing
another human being.  So the cells of your stomach, intestine,
skin, etc. (e.g. cells with any turnover) are effectively
performing abortions on a daily basis.

> Not addressing the moral permissibility of using life extension
> technology is a major hole in your argument in my view.  It cannot be
> morally not permitted to stop others from doing that which is not
> morally permitted if that act in question has serious repurcussions on
> others.

This gets into how philosophers and ethicists debate these
topics.  Its been more than a decade since I've studied these
so my memory may be a bit fuzzy -- but it comes down to
cases where one is morally obligated not to interfere and
cases where one is morally obligated to take action.  Mark
is dealing just with the first and not with the second.
To deal with the second effectively one has to argue strongly
for something like a socialistic or communistic environment
or programming all humans to be completely altruistic, etc.
That is a much harder argument to make (and would certainly
cause a number of people on this list to get really PO :-)).

> I am sorry I commented before reading.  The general question could be
> much better addressed than by using some specious abortion argument.
> Please try again.

I think Mark only uses the abortion argument in passing -- simply pointing
out there is a value to "future life" -- be it for a fetus, an infant,
a normal human, or a human with an extended life.

What is missing (from my perspective as an extropian) is any
comment (from what I have read thus far) on the fact that there
may be an inherent value (and right to preserve) to accumulated
information/knowledge.  I.e. the past of a 1000 year old
individual is greater than the past of a 100 y.o. individual
is greater than the past of a 3 month old fetus.  At an
extremely gross level Extropians (vs. say transhumanists)
might argue that there is a very concrete scale in terms
of the value of information or experience content and so
one adjusts the "right to life" based on that.  Of course
after one grants that one immediately gets into a discussion
of the actual extropic value of the information.  I think
this gets into areas related to what one thinks when one
cleans ones closet or ones garage.  What is *really* worth
something?

Robert